On monosemy: A study in linguistic semantics

Language Sciences, Volume 14. Number l/2, Printed in Great Britain

pp. 169-172,

1992 0

0388-0001192 $S.OO+.OO 1992 Pergamon Press Ltd

REVIEW ARTICLE

ON MONOSEMY: A STUDY IN LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS. By Charles Ruhl. Albany: State University of New York, 1989. 299+xvi pp. Reviewed International

Scientists

who are as yet unfamiliar

with the advantages

by Joseph DeChicchis Christian

of a text-based

University

approach

to linguistic analysis should study this book. Computer-assisted corpora linguistics is revolutionizing our ability to evaluate data at all levels of analysis, from pragmatic phonetic. The availability of fast pattern-matching programs has extended the utility of the computer beyond the enclaves of number-crunching phoneticians and quantitative sociolinguists, and even the modest capabilities of inexpensive personal computers are sufficient to permit an efficient review of syntactic, lexical, and morphological items. As with any empirical

science,

data review

is critical

during

the proposal

and

evaluation of hypotheses. During the 197Os, the insufficiency of both introspection and metalinguistic questioning as means of discovery and testing prompted a reaction against armchair linguistics, which proved to be an inadequate methodological paradigm. Linguistics turned to older historical and descriptive methods, as well as to newer statistical analytic methods, and the analysis of linguistic corpora regained its former respectability. A fair amount of vitriol accompanied these methodological readjustments, onistic factions. data.

which unfortunately Factions

divided linguists

into competing

differed as to what they considered

Without a doubt, many of the great advances

in conceptions

and often antag-

to constitute

linguistic

of syntactic

structure

have been made by linguists seeking to explain intuitional data. Yet the idealization of language demanded by structuralists such as Harris and transformationalists such as Chomsky inevitably abstracted grammatical theory to the point where it was no longer immediately concerned with the facts of actual, naturally occurring speech and writing. Focusing on competence had the effect of mathematicizing linguistics. No longer firmly moored to the empirical treatment of real data (i.e. actual speech and writing), linguistics was in danger of becoming, at best, the cutting edge of cognitive psychology, or, at worst, a minor area of algebra. Polemics aside, the importance of real data is generally recognized. Intuitional data is most often appealed to in syntactic and semantic studies, where it is difficult to glean

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Language Sciences, Volume 14, Number l/2 (1992)

naturally

occurring

linguists

from recognizing

shows a refreshing

examples.

Bridging some of the gulfs which have prevented the value of work done in different

commitment

to the semantic

analysis

frameworks,

some Ruhl

of real data. Long lists of

citations from published works of various genres are the grist for the arguments of this book which “is intended as a contribution to theoretical semantics” (p. 2). Such citations are used not merely to describe the semantic coverage of particular lexical items, but also to support particular theses of semantic theory. That Ruhl finds it necessary to articulate his belief that this is a legitimate use of real data underscores the rift between

certain

linguistics. It is easy to recommend

groups

with respect

to the nature

this book for its conciliatory

of data in theoretical

and constructive

tone and for

its advocacy of a certain methodological conservatism. His criticism is even-handed (both Chomsky and Bolinger are said to rely too much on intuition), and he shows an ability to evaluate theses independently of their proponents (Putnam’s ideas, for example, are alternately lauded and laughed at). Moreover, despite being pieced together from papers presented at LACUS (Linguistic Association of Canada and the United States) conferences, the prose is clear and the argumentation perspicuous. Ruhl is careful to acknowledge his debt to the insights of other linguists who have provided contexts for his particular conceptual departures. Together, these factors make it a comfortable chore to consider and evaluate the primary thesis being advanced, namely, that “a word has a single general meaning” (p. 234). Monosemy Ruhl’s method for demonstrating the monosemic nature of words involves what he calls a monosemic bias. This bias is an operational bias consisting of two parts. First, the analyst is to assume that any meaning that is not present in all contexts of a word is not part of the word’s inherent meaning. If we think that words bear their meanings on their sleeves, then this is an assumption that words do not wear undershirts. Granting a willingness to make this assumption ab initio, it may nevertheless prove difficult to characterize an inherent meaning which is common to each of the observed instances of usage. In such an event, the monosemic bias instructs the analyst to assume that any distinct meanings are figuratively related. Ruhl’s position amounts to the claim that the meaning of a word in context either is equivalent to the word’s inherent lexical meaning or is provided by pragmatic specialization to the usage context. English words examined in detail include bear, hit, take, ice, kick, and slap. The cited examples of usage are a treat to read, although the reader who becomes too engrossed in the long lists of citations risks losing the thread of the argument. Occasionally, Ruhl’s interpretation of usage is questionable (p. 45: his paraphrases of items 179 through 183); yet as often his use of example is genial (p. 62: item 370).

171

Review Faithful including

adherence paraphrase,

to the monosemic systematicity,

bias has consequences

compositionality,

definition,

for other concepts, and form-meaning

duality. The view, for example, that “the more general a word’s meaning, the less likely it can be paraphrased by other words” (p. 234) may strike some as curious. Full compositionality is also abandoned: “The meaning of a sentence is always more than the structured semantics of its parts. ” (p. 235) The shortfall is made up by pragmatics via the figurative extension of intralinguistic (i.e. semantic) meaning to tit the extralinguistic context. Ruhl is aware that monosemicity

is no stranger

to the kinds of closed,

highly

systematic language we find in mathematics. Discussing Ogden and Richards, he offers the sublanguage of mathematics as a refutation of overly referential theories of meaning which posit a one-to-one relationship of word to concept to reference (p. 133). On the other hand, Ruhl is careful not to overgeneralize in the opposite direction, and his belittling of Putnam’s feigned ignorance of an elm-beech distinction (198) drives home the point that Saussurean systematicity fails as a complete semantic picture to the extent that meaning must hook up with reality at some points. “Definition” is the most speculative of the chapters, and it is here that Ruhl reveals the extent of his commitment to continuum and cline. “Syntax and semantics are (I am arguing) a linguistic continuum.” (p. 183). For Ruhl, the semantics (and thus syntax) of a given word consists in its systematic contrasts with other words; whereas its pragmatics consists in its complex relations to particular real-world circumstances. Even so, he maintains that the boundary between linguistic order (syntax and semantics) and natural order (pragmatics) is a matter of degree. “What I am calling pragmatic, uses of language, are not ‘out there’ conditions, but also linguistic: the pragmatic, to the extent that we can note it at all, is linguistically more specific, more diversified

than the semantic.”

(p. 181). Without wishing to deny the existence

of a

reality external to thought, Ruhl insists that the abstractness of a word (the degree to which a word is “remote from the flux of reality”) is a linguistic property: “There should be a cline of words from less remote to more remote.”

(p. 183).

Shortcomings Immediate distractions are the long lists of citations and the frequent restatements of theses. The latter is presumably due to the fifteen-year history of the book’s composition; however, this has also resulted in extensive and generally good references to the positions of contemporary linguists. Of course, it is unfortunate that the views of certain relevant linguists and philosophers (e.g. Pike, Hjelmslev, Greimas, Rorty, Dummett) are not mentioned; still, the book is not intended as a scholarly synthesis of prevailing thought, but as an exposition of the author’s own position. As for the long lists, they are a small price to pay for the inclusion of pertinent data. Beyond the

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foregoing, First,

several less trivial points of criticism a monosemic

bias would

also bear mention.

seem to come naturally

to multilinguals

and to

monolinguals who prefer the variation of grammatical formatives and syntactic constructions to the mastery of large vocabularies, while belief in polysemy (and to some extent homonymy) would seem to be better suited to monolinguals with extensive and refined vocabularies; however, Ruhl offers no speculation along these lines. Similarly, one’s view of linguistic relativity could conceivably dispose one agreeably or disfavorably toward monosemy, but Ruhl is silent on this point as well, except to say “The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis is obviously right and obviously wrong, and a considerable bit of in between.” (p. 184). Additionally, a case could be made for mustering extralinguistic considerations in favor of a monosemic bias, but Ruhl chooses to remain within the domain of linguistics proper, that is, the domain wherein context can be successfully specified in one or two sentences. In sum, Ruhl’s is not a knock-down argument against polysemic analysis; rather, his review of the data is bent on showing the viability and the attractiveness of monosemic analysis. Applied linguists should judge for themselves the extent to which a monosemic approach would be appropriate for their particular investigations of linguistic phenomena. NOTES 1.

Address correspondence to: Dr J. DeChicchis, Division of International Studies, International Christian University, Osawa 3-10-2, Mitaka, Tokyo 181 Japan.