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Psychological dimensions of political terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany
International Printed
in the
Journal U.S.A.
of Law All
rights
and Psychiatry,
Vol.
2, PP. 79-85.
1979
reserved.
0160.2527/79/010079J37$02.00/0 Copyright
0
1979
Pergamon
Press
Ltd
Psychological Dimensions of Political Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany Wilfried Rasch *
At first sight, modern German terrorism looks incomprehensible if not absurd. The Federal Republic of Germany is the most liberal state in German history. The accusations frequently voiced by terrorists that the state is fascist and aims at oppression and control of the people is not supported by social reality; in particular this belief is not shared by the people themselves who demonstrate their affirmation of the state in regularly-held democratic elections. The contention that the population of the Federal Republic of Germany is oppressed by a fascist regime, therefore, sounds paranoid and arouses the suspicion that its adovcates are sick. Thus, not surprisingly, many attempts have been made to explain the terrorist activities in Germany with the psychological or psychopathological conditions of the offenders as a basis. The efforts at interpretation by psychological, psychiatric or psychoanalytical theories outnumber those afforded by sociology and political science. The multitude of interpretations put forward by psychology have yielded no surprising or novel insights. The theories used by clinical criminology during recent decades to explain deviant behavior have been rehashed. Indeed, the speediness and superficiality with which the old models have been transferred to the new issues sometimes gives the interpretations the appearance of travesties. Another reason for their insufficiency is that none of the authors have ever been able to examine so-called terrorists. As a consequence, the explanations offered are idle speculation. The authors have attempted to force their pet theory upon the character of the terrorists. In some cases, well-known personalities of the terrorist scene have been utilized as show-pieces for propagating the authors’ own ideas. The endeavors to explain the phenomenon of terrorism with the help of psychological or psychopathological models or, as has been done during trials, to denounce the offenders simply as paranoids, neurotics, or psychopaths, are intentionally part of the psychological warfare by which the offenders, their goals and their ideas, are disqualified. If this can be achieved, a discussion of the terrorists’ political arguments and related issues may be avoided. Of course, psychological mechanisms are always involved in human behavior. However, psychology has to delineate to what extent it can legitimately contribute to the explanation of social phenomena. Science has to be aware of the danger of being abused in the struggle between differing political or religious beliefs. The assumption that the majority of politically motivated offenders in the *Professor, Institute of Forensic D-1000 Berlin 45. West Berlin.
Psychiatry
of the
79
Free
University
of Berlin,
Limonenstrasse
27,
80
WILFRIED
RASCH
Federal Republic of Germany are disturbed personalities, acting from warped motives, is clearly refuted by the way in which the state reacts to them. Were the terrorists merely disturbed personalities whose mental normality is to be doubted, the harsh reaction of the state, perhaps one should say overreaction, is inexplicable. Every year several hundred mentally sick persons commit offenses in the Federal Republic and in these cases the reaction follows within the existing legal framework without creating a stir. In connection with the question of whether terrorists are mentally or emotionally disturbed persons, it should be remembered that the identification of psychic abnormality which manifests itself in deviant behavior does not mean very much in these general terms. It is a generally accepted premise in criminology that deviant behavior and the underlying attitude may well be indicative of innovation and societal change. Abnormality in the sense of deviance from the norm should only then be negatively evaluated when the biography of the individual in question shows recurrent patterns of behavior marked by egocentricity, asociality, and lack of constructiveness. It would go against all statistical probability if personalities of this type were not found amongst the terrorists. In these cases, however, the political ideas do not appear genuine, the actions as clumsy imitations. If one attempts to classify the politically-motivated offenders under current criminological categories, the most appropriate types would be the Perpetrator by Conviction and Subcultural Identifier. In the individual case, of course, these dimensions overlap. Regarding the individuals belonging to the terrorist scene in the Federal Republic of Germany, no conclusive evidence has been found for the assumption that a significant number of them are disturbed or abnormal. In my own examinations made by request of the authorities and with the consent of those concerned, out of 11 subjects suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, only one man was found to have committed these actions predominantly out of a marked desire to draw attention to himself. His actions were, incidentally, insignificant and performed amateurishly. In all other persons examined nothing was found which could justify their classification as psychotics, neurotics, fanatics or psychopaths. They were convinced that their position was right while still being able, principally, to look at themselves from a distance and to recognize and reflect upon reality. None of the men and women I encountered could have been diagnosed as “paranoid.” This applies particularly to the four main defendants who died in the Stuttgart prison: Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin, and Raspe. A study for the Federal Police covering 40 persons wanted as terrorists did not find any indications of psychological disturbances in those persons examined. The data gathered did not show any typical patterns regarding educational level, job preferences, family structure, or child education. The conclusion finally made was that inner psychic conflicts existed prior to their having taken up terrorist activities. This statement is without doubt too general to be considered a serious contribution in the discussion of the roots of terrorism. Worth mentioning in this connection perhaps is the high proportion of women actively engaged. To understand modern German political terrorism and the careers of the par-
PSYCHOLOGICAL
DIMENSIONS
OF POLITICALTERRORISM
81
ticipants, consideration of the political development of the Federal Republic of Germany is unavoidable. The history of German terrorism is, strictly speaking, inextricably linked with the history of the Federal Republic itself. There are many indications that it is not possible to discard all criticisms made by the politically motivated offenders as pure fantasies or just paranoid ideas. Since its foundation, the Federal Republic has had problems realizing constitutionally guaranteed rights. As early as twenty-five years ago, incidents occurred which suggested that the authorities entrusted with the protection of the constitution were more likely to endanger it. The police, too, had difficulties in developing a democratic self-concept close to the public. When public meetings and demonstrations took place, the unjustified, brutal intervention of the police was seen repeatedly. Characteristic of the general attitude in the Federal Republic of Germany is the fact that an appropriate assessment of the National Socialist past as a disgraceful period in the German history has seemingly not yet taken place. The end of the war was and still is not regarded as relief or liberation, but is still called The Collapse. Former Nazis remained or had access to high positions in politics and the economy. The post-war years were marked by extreme materialism, ruthless striving for profit, and affluence-fetishism. Other values were neglected. Already in the Adenauer era, political discussions degenerated into a catch-as-catch-can; defamation of political adversaries was not considered disreputable. Finally, and this characterized the general thinking in the Federal Republic of Germany best, in spite of wealth, a number of marginal social groups were ignored and received no assistance. This is the soil out of which certain political trends of the late sixties and early seventies grew. Generally speaking, people lived in a “new start” atmosphere. In the middle of the sixties the traditional political rivals, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party, united in a sort of emergency association and established a coalition government. As a consequence, the so-called extra-parliamentary opposition (APO) developed, supported chiefly by the student’s movement which in turn was part of a world-wide phenomenon. The discussions held in this movement had as focal points issues of home affairs, the Vietnam war, and the political situation in Iran. In 1969 another important political event took place: the Social Democratic Party succeeded in forming a coalition government with the Liberal Party. The way seemed clear for overdue reforms. Very soon, however, it became apparent that this could not be achieved to the expected extent. This was on the one hand due to the adverse world-wide economic development swallowing up resources. On the other, it became obvious that the new government did not feel powerful enough to give the German post-war policy already embarked on an entirely different course. It has been said that terrorism is the continuation of public protest by other means. The progress of terrorist careers in the Federal Republic of Germany can be explained at least partly in terms of the frustration-aggression theory. At the outset of these careers stood serious social engagement which did not confine itself to verbal propagation of revolutionary goals but was realized in practical social work. In view of the standstill of reform, the idea was formed to come up with actions which would force the government to go ahead because
82
WILFRIED
RASCH
these could no longer be integrated into the established system. This was the moment when the plan was born to commit arson in a large department store in Frankfurt. The deed itself, performed on April 2nd, 1968, by Baader, Ensslin and others was of a rather unserious, almost jesting nature. Nevertheless, it represented an important step in the development of these personalities. They intended to give a signal but then suddenly found themselves confronted with the very hard reaction of the state. This, inevitably, influenced the self-concept of the persons involved. The next significant action was the liberation of Andreas Baader from prison on May 14th, 1970, which marked the point of no return - in the course of the violent action a man was severely wounded. Only then did the group close up to consciously form a gang which named itself RAF (Red Army Group). Because of the search for Baader, all legally sanctioned work to politically enlighten became impossible. Moreover, the rainbow press began to stylize the Baader-Meinhof group as Public Enemy No. 1. Finding themselves in an outsider position, the group decided to work on the lines of urban guerillas and started to develop the appropriate logistics: apartments were rented, cars, weapons, radio equipment, and false identity cards procured. All this required money which was obtained through bank robberies. The group itself is also important for the continuation of a terrorist career, not only in a technical sense, but also with respect to the psychological development of its members. The group provides back-up when other support is eradicated. Within the group several psychological variables become essential; solidarity, complicity, and reality perception. Group membership means obligatory acceptance of a certain system of values and norms; deviation from these is not sanctioned. The group dynamics of complicity catalyze actions which any one member would hardly ever have been able to accomplish alone and which he has difficulties understanding later on. He acts within a set of mutual expectations and role assignments. Being forced into underground, the group lives in isolation and, working in close cooperation, evolves new models for the interpretation of reality, which acquire a binding character for the group members. The term reality loss, often used in this context, describes this process insufficiently, for any group constitutes and creates to a certain extent its own reality. Furthermore, of importance for the ongoing terrorist activity is the nature of the internal group dynamic processes such as power struggles, leadership claims, rivalries and coalitions, sympathies and antipathies. The influences and dynamics resulting from living together in the group, which tend to gradually foster alienation from society, are always the same. Apart from this, the starting point and personal needs existing at the time of entry into the terrorist scene are very different for the individual terrorists. In the Federal Republic we are now confronted with second and third generation terrorists. The first, calling themselves RAF, grew out of the student movement of the sixties and was motivated by genuine political and social commitment. For the terrorists operating now, this base is destroyed. The hope of realizing the original political aims has faded since the key figures of the movement are either imprisoned or dead and the political climate has changed considerably. Thus terrorist activities of the past few years appear, at least to a certain extent, as terrorism for terrorism’s sake. The larger-scale actions were, however,
PSYCHOLOGICAL
DIMENSIONS
OF POLITICALTERRORISM
83
motivated by attempts to free comrades from jail. The first of these operations even had some measure of success. On February 27th, 1975, in a highly-charged situation during a general election campaign, the top candidate of the CDU for West Berlin, Peter Lorenz, was abducted and later released in exchange for five political prisoners. Other actions were carried out along the same lines but failed in their objective: the shooting of the president of the Berlin Supreme Court of Justice, Von Drenkmann, in November 1974, and of the banker, Ponto, in July 1977, during attempts to abduct them; the occupation of the German embassy in Stockholm in April 1975; the kidnapping of the Employers’ Federation President, Schleyer, and the hijacking of a Lufthansa plane in the autumn of 1977. The motivation and justification given for these actions was the allegation that, on the pretext of extreme security measures, the conditions of detention for political prisoners were designed to bring about their annihilation. The particular circumstances under which political prisoners are held in the Federal Republic and which are a factor in the incitement of further terrorist acts, require some attention. In an ordinary prison the system of security measures already surpasses actual necessity because the majority of the inmates cannot be considered dangerous in the proper sense of the word. Even if a prisoner escapes, no great harm is to be expected. Furthermore, he will probably be re-arrested within a few days. The psychological conditions connected with the imprisonment of politically-motivated offenders and the founding of the special form of their detention are distinguished by the following: 1. The prisoners are not prepared to come to terms with the prison authorities. They do not play their part in the usual arrangement that exists between prison officers and prisoners. 2. The politically-motivated prisoners sense no feeling of guilt. They are convinced of being in possession of norms of higher value. 3. They are more intelligent than most prison inmates; they have a good chance of outwitting their guards. 4. The prison guards, on the other hand, run the risk of being suspected of subversive activities or of sympathies for this specific type of prisoner. More than usual they endeavor to keep their distance. 5. The judges and the prison authorities are no longer independent in their discretions regarding the conditions of imprisonment. The Police Department of State Protection exerts a strong influence. Consequently, the demands of so-called security have been elevated to an extraordinarily high level. The system which aimed at perfectionism cannot escape being labelled “torture by isolation.” The prisoners have shown various physical and psychic disturbances and have been found to be only partially able to stand trial. Some of the politically motivated offenders were kept under very strict conditions for longer periods. In some cases the detention regime came close to the test conditions set up for experiments of sensory and perceptual deprivation. Although the total isolation was frequently interrupted by the surveillance rou-
84
WILFRIED
RASCH
tine of the guards or by visits from relatives and lawyers, it was maintained as the general framework of existence far longer than in any of the known research experiments. When the trial against the remaining four alleged leaders of the Baader-Meinhof-group began, the lawyers claimed that the defendants were unable to stand trial due to the effects of prolonged isolation. It took the court more than three months to order an examination of the defendants by independent medical experts. According to their findings, the ability of the defendants to stand trial was reduced on the grounds of several psychic and physical disturbances, for which they blamed the prison conditions. After the authorities had been made conscious of the isolation problems, they attempted to compensate by granting the prisoners certain privileges such as television, table tennis, record players, etc. They were even allowed to visit each other for some hours. But these alleviations did not essentially change the situation. Unlike other inmates, they could not participate in the prison sub-culture. Even if they were in a group, they remained isolated. There was no chance of making spontaneous or incidental contacts. Every feature of their lives was strictly planned and organized. Surrounded by an aura of suspicion and people afraid of being suspected as sympathizers, they lived, shut off from reality, as if under a glass cover. In order to perfect this tightening-up, high-security departments exist or are under construction in several prisons: one cannot but receive the impression that the authorities condone the impairment of health likely to result from this type of detainment. These measures arouse the suspicion that mausoleums are being erected for the negative heroes of the nation. It is obvious that in this isolation in groups of similar prisoners, the individual prisoner has less chance of revising and renouncing his belief system and actions committed. Moreover, these conditions violate the German Prison Law which came into force in 1977 which makes it a duty of the prison authorities to eradicate all harmful effects of prison detention. This kind of treatment in prison is to be evaluated as part of the overreaction which has manifested itself in the Federal Republic and which, as officially sanctioned counter-terrorism, appears just as menacing as terrorism itself. The real danger emanating from German terrorism does not seem to be high. Official estimates suggest the number of terrorists originating from the Federal Republic of Germany is less than two hundred, half of whom have already been arrested. The number of persons possibly prepared to afford active assistance is estimated at about ten times that figure. The brutal killings in 1977 doubtlessly alienated many former sympathizers from the terrorists. In order to see the threat of terrorism in the Federal Republic in the right proportions, one has to remember that since the emergence of this phenomenon ten years ago, a total of less than thirty people have lost their lives through acts of German terrorists, that is, fewer than the daily deathtoll on the roads. However, the danger which is claimed to result from terrorists has decisively changed life in Germany. Many of the countermeasures brought into effect raise the question of whether they will not induce new opposition and terrorism. - A number of laws were passed by the West German parliament in which new types of offences were defined and laid down, cementing the terrorist threat
PSYCHOLOGICAL
DIMENSIONS
OF POLlTlCALTERRORISM
85
in public consciousness. New regulations were brought into force for the proceedings against the terrorists with the effect that certain rights of the defending lawyers have been infringed. - More than half a million people have been screened, not just for highly treasonable or terrorist activities, but for any activities that might cast doubts on their political “reliability.” - In the quest for proof of high-treason or terrorist activities, the police themselves have engaged in illegal practices under the approving auspices of ministers and high-ranking officials. The entire police force has been considerably expanded and re-equipped during the past few years. This can clearly be seen from the Federal Police Office’s budget which has risen from DM 22.4 million in 1969 to DM 199.1 million in 1978. A vast apparatus for the “fight against terrorism” has been created. The question must be raised of whether the apparatus is bound to produce terrorists in order to prove the necessity of its existence? Whether a person is to be considered a terrorist or not is, of course, a question of how terrorism is defined. The situation is similar in the area of jusisdiction. The defendants do not have the impression that they are getting a fair trial. The trials of politicallymotivated offenders have been concentrated in a few courts so that de facto special Courts of Law have been created. In the court rooms an atmosphere of moderate civil war prevails. At the trial of the four main accused in Stuttgart in May 1975, more than eighty objections brought forward by the defending lawyers were required before the presiding judge was replaced because of bias. Some judges revealed attitudes in their handling of the accused that were apparently marked by base cynicism. Orders regulating the living conditions of the offenders, which are in essence repressive and humiliating, have been hypocritically professed to be for the prisoner’s welfare. This form of administration of justice definitely does not demonstrate that the accusations made by the terrorists are totally without foundation; neither can it bring about a reconciliation of the terrorists with the state. Terrorism emerges when other lines of communication have broken down. The question must be raised of whether, during the years of the student movement, one did not stop listening too early to the arguments of young people and whether the social problems which triggered off the terrorist movement have been given sufficient attention. It will not serve to prevent future terrorist actions if the terrorists continue to be regarded as monsters or lunatics: they must be considered as people for whose actions we too are responsible. The same thing applies to the Federal Republic of Germany today as was said in France after the 1968 May Revolt: ce sont nos fils.
in the
Journal U.S.A.
of Law All
rights
and Psychiatry,
Vol.
2, PP. 79-85.
1979
reserved.
0160.2527/79/010079J37$02.00/0 Copyright
0
1979
Pergamon
Press
Ltd
Psychological Dimensions of Political Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany Wilfried Rasch *
At first sight, modern German terrorism looks incomprehensible if not absurd. The Federal Republic of Germany is the most liberal state in German history. The accusations frequently voiced by terrorists that the state is fascist and aims at oppression and control of the people is not supported by social reality; in particular this belief is not shared by the people themselves who demonstrate their affirmation of the state in regularly-held democratic elections. The contention that the population of the Federal Republic of Germany is oppressed by a fascist regime, therefore, sounds paranoid and arouses the suspicion that its adovcates are sick. Thus, not surprisingly, many attempts have been made to explain the terrorist activities in Germany with the psychological or psychopathological conditions of the offenders as a basis. The efforts at interpretation by psychological, psychiatric or psychoanalytical theories outnumber those afforded by sociology and political science. The multitude of interpretations put forward by psychology have yielded no surprising or novel insights. The theories used by clinical criminology during recent decades to explain deviant behavior have been rehashed. Indeed, the speediness and superficiality with which the old models have been transferred to the new issues sometimes gives the interpretations the appearance of travesties. Another reason for their insufficiency is that none of the authors have ever been able to examine so-called terrorists. As a consequence, the explanations offered are idle speculation. The authors have attempted to force their pet theory upon the character of the terrorists. In some cases, well-known personalities of the terrorist scene have been utilized as show-pieces for propagating the authors’ own ideas. The endeavors to explain the phenomenon of terrorism with the help of psychological or psychopathological models or, as has been done during trials, to denounce the offenders simply as paranoids, neurotics, or psychopaths, are intentionally part of the psychological warfare by which the offenders, their goals and their ideas, are disqualified. If this can be achieved, a discussion of the terrorists’ political arguments and related issues may be avoided. Of course, psychological mechanisms are always involved in human behavior. However, psychology has to delineate to what extent it can legitimately contribute to the explanation of social phenomena. Science has to be aware of the danger of being abused in the struggle between differing political or religious beliefs. The assumption that the majority of politically motivated offenders in the *Professor, Institute of Forensic D-1000 Berlin 45. West Berlin.
Psychiatry
of the
79
Free
University
of Berlin,
Limonenstrasse
27,
80
WILFRIED
RASCH
Federal Republic of Germany are disturbed personalities, acting from warped motives, is clearly refuted by the way in which the state reacts to them. Were the terrorists merely disturbed personalities whose mental normality is to be doubted, the harsh reaction of the state, perhaps one should say overreaction, is inexplicable. Every year several hundred mentally sick persons commit offenses in the Federal Republic and in these cases the reaction follows within the existing legal framework without creating a stir. In connection with the question of whether terrorists are mentally or emotionally disturbed persons, it should be remembered that the identification of psychic abnormality which manifests itself in deviant behavior does not mean very much in these general terms. It is a generally accepted premise in criminology that deviant behavior and the underlying attitude may well be indicative of innovation and societal change. Abnormality in the sense of deviance from the norm should only then be negatively evaluated when the biography of the individual in question shows recurrent patterns of behavior marked by egocentricity, asociality, and lack of constructiveness. It would go against all statistical probability if personalities of this type were not found amongst the terrorists. In these cases, however, the political ideas do not appear genuine, the actions as clumsy imitations. If one attempts to classify the politically-motivated offenders under current criminological categories, the most appropriate types would be the Perpetrator by Conviction and Subcultural Identifier. In the individual case, of course, these dimensions overlap. Regarding the individuals belonging to the terrorist scene in the Federal Republic of Germany, no conclusive evidence has been found for the assumption that a significant number of them are disturbed or abnormal. In my own examinations made by request of the authorities and with the consent of those concerned, out of 11 subjects suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, only one man was found to have committed these actions predominantly out of a marked desire to draw attention to himself. His actions were, incidentally, insignificant and performed amateurishly. In all other persons examined nothing was found which could justify their classification as psychotics, neurotics, fanatics or psychopaths. They were convinced that their position was right while still being able, principally, to look at themselves from a distance and to recognize and reflect upon reality. None of the men and women I encountered could have been diagnosed as “paranoid.” This applies particularly to the four main defendants who died in the Stuttgart prison: Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin, and Raspe. A study for the Federal Police covering 40 persons wanted as terrorists did not find any indications of psychological disturbances in those persons examined. The data gathered did not show any typical patterns regarding educational level, job preferences, family structure, or child education. The conclusion finally made was that inner psychic conflicts existed prior to their having taken up terrorist activities. This statement is without doubt too general to be considered a serious contribution in the discussion of the roots of terrorism. Worth mentioning in this connection perhaps is the high proportion of women actively engaged. To understand modern German political terrorism and the careers of the par-
PSYCHOLOGICAL
DIMENSIONS
OF POLITICALTERRORISM
81
ticipants, consideration of the political development of the Federal Republic of Germany is unavoidable. The history of German terrorism is, strictly speaking, inextricably linked with the history of the Federal Republic itself. There are many indications that it is not possible to discard all criticisms made by the politically motivated offenders as pure fantasies or just paranoid ideas. Since its foundation, the Federal Republic has had problems realizing constitutionally guaranteed rights. As early as twenty-five years ago, incidents occurred which suggested that the authorities entrusted with the protection of the constitution were more likely to endanger it. The police, too, had difficulties in developing a democratic self-concept close to the public. When public meetings and demonstrations took place, the unjustified, brutal intervention of the police was seen repeatedly. Characteristic of the general attitude in the Federal Republic of Germany is the fact that an appropriate assessment of the National Socialist past as a disgraceful period in the German history has seemingly not yet taken place. The end of the war was and still is not regarded as relief or liberation, but is still called The Collapse. Former Nazis remained or had access to high positions in politics and the economy. The post-war years were marked by extreme materialism, ruthless striving for profit, and affluence-fetishism. Other values were neglected. Already in the Adenauer era, political discussions degenerated into a catch-as-catch-can; defamation of political adversaries was not considered disreputable. Finally, and this characterized the general thinking in the Federal Republic of Germany best, in spite of wealth, a number of marginal social groups were ignored and received no assistance. This is the soil out of which certain political trends of the late sixties and early seventies grew. Generally speaking, people lived in a “new start” atmosphere. In the middle of the sixties the traditional political rivals, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party, united in a sort of emergency association and established a coalition government. As a consequence, the so-called extra-parliamentary opposition (APO) developed, supported chiefly by the student’s movement which in turn was part of a world-wide phenomenon. The discussions held in this movement had as focal points issues of home affairs, the Vietnam war, and the political situation in Iran. In 1969 another important political event took place: the Social Democratic Party succeeded in forming a coalition government with the Liberal Party. The way seemed clear for overdue reforms. Very soon, however, it became apparent that this could not be achieved to the expected extent. This was on the one hand due to the adverse world-wide economic development swallowing up resources. On the other, it became obvious that the new government did not feel powerful enough to give the German post-war policy already embarked on an entirely different course. It has been said that terrorism is the continuation of public protest by other means. The progress of terrorist careers in the Federal Republic of Germany can be explained at least partly in terms of the frustration-aggression theory. At the outset of these careers stood serious social engagement which did not confine itself to verbal propagation of revolutionary goals but was realized in practical social work. In view of the standstill of reform, the idea was formed to come up with actions which would force the government to go ahead because
82
WILFRIED
RASCH
these could no longer be integrated into the established system. This was the moment when the plan was born to commit arson in a large department store in Frankfurt. The deed itself, performed on April 2nd, 1968, by Baader, Ensslin and others was of a rather unserious, almost jesting nature. Nevertheless, it represented an important step in the development of these personalities. They intended to give a signal but then suddenly found themselves confronted with the very hard reaction of the state. This, inevitably, influenced the self-concept of the persons involved. The next significant action was the liberation of Andreas Baader from prison on May 14th, 1970, which marked the point of no return - in the course of the violent action a man was severely wounded. Only then did the group close up to consciously form a gang which named itself RAF (Red Army Group). Because of the search for Baader, all legally sanctioned work to politically enlighten became impossible. Moreover, the rainbow press began to stylize the Baader-Meinhof group as Public Enemy No. 1. Finding themselves in an outsider position, the group decided to work on the lines of urban guerillas and started to develop the appropriate logistics: apartments were rented, cars, weapons, radio equipment, and false identity cards procured. All this required money which was obtained through bank robberies. The group itself is also important for the continuation of a terrorist career, not only in a technical sense, but also with respect to the psychological development of its members. The group provides back-up when other support is eradicated. Within the group several psychological variables become essential; solidarity, complicity, and reality perception. Group membership means obligatory acceptance of a certain system of values and norms; deviation from these is not sanctioned. The group dynamics of complicity catalyze actions which any one member would hardly ever have been able to accomplish alone and which he has difficulties understanding later on. He acts within a set of mutual expectations and role assignments. Being forced into underground, the group lives in isolation and, working in close cooperation, evolves new models for the interpretation of reality, which acquire a binding character for the group members. The term reality loss, often used in this context, describes this process insufficiently, for any group constitutes and creates to a certain extent its own reality. Furthermore, of importance for the ongoing terrorist activity is the nature of the internal group dynamic processes such as power struggles, leadership claims, rivalries and coalitions, sympathies and antipathies. The influences and dynamics resulting from living together in the group, which tend to gradually foster alienation from society, are always the same. Apart from this, the starting point and personal needs existing at the time of entry into the terrorist scene are very different for the individual terrorists. In the Federal Republic we are now confronted with second and third generation terrorists. The first, calling themselves RAF, grew out of the student movement of the sixties and was motivated by genuine political and social commitment. For the terrorists operating now, this base is destroyed. The hope of realizing the original political aims has faded since the key figures of the movement are either imprisoned or dead and the political climate has changed considerably. Thus terrorist activities of the past few years appear, at least to a certain extent, as terrorism for terrorism’s sake. The larger-scale actions were, however,
PSYCHOLOGICAL
DIMENSIONS
OF POLITICALTERRORISM
83
motivated by attempts to free comrades from jail. The first of these operations even had some measure of success. On February 27th, 1975, in a highly-charged situation during a general election campaign, the top candidate of the CDU for West Berlin, Peter Lorenz, was abducted and later released in exchange for five political prisoners. Other actions were carried out along the same lines but failed in their objective: the shooting of the president of the Berlin Supreme Court of Justice, Von Drenkmann, in November 1974, and of the banker, Ponto, in July 1977, during attempts to abduct them; the occupation of the German embassy in Stockholm in April 1975; the kidnapping of the Employers’ Federation President, Schleyer, and the hijacking of a Lufthansa plane in the autumn of 1977. The motivation and justification given for these actions was the allegation that, on the pretext of extreme security measures, the conditions of detention for political prisoners were designed to bring about their annihilation. The particular circumstances under which political prisoners are held in the Federal Republic and which are a factor in the incitement of further terrorist acts, require some attention. In an ordinary prison the system of security measures already surpasses actual necessity because the majority of the inmates cannot be considered dangerous in the proper sense of the word. Even if a prisoner escapes, no great harm is to be expected. Furthermore, he will probably be re-arrested within a few days. The psychological conditions connected with the imprisonment of politically-motivated offenders and the founding of the special form of their detention are distinguished by the following: 1. The prisoners are not prepared to come to terms with the prison authorities. They do not play their part in the usual arrangement that exists between prison officers and prisoners. 2. The politically-motivated prisoners sense no feeling of guilt. They are convinced of being in possession of norms of higher value. 3. They are more intelligent than most prison inmates; they have a good chance of outwitting their guards. 4. The prison guards, on the other hand, run the risk of being suspected of subversive activities or of sympathies for this specific type of prisoner. More than usual they endeavor to keep their distance. 5. The judges and the prison authorities are no longer independent in their discretions regarding the conditions of imprisonment. The Police Department of State Protection exerts a strong influence. Consequently, the demands of so-called security have been elevated to an extraordinarily high level. The system which aimed at perfectionism cannot escape being labelled “torture by isolation.” The prisoners have shown various physical and psychic disturbances and have been found to be only partially able to stand trial. Some of the politically motivated offenders were kept under very strict conditions for longer periods. In some cases the detention regime came close to the test conditions set up for experiments of sensory and perceptual deprivation. Although the total isolation was frequently interrupted by the surveillance rou-
84
WILFRIED
RASCH
tine of the guards or by visits from relatives and lawyers, it was maintained as the general framework of existence far longer than in any of the known research experiments. When the trial against the remaining four alleged leaders of the Baader-Meinhof-group began, the lawyers claimed that the defendants were unable to stand trial due to the effects of prolonged isolation. It took the court more than three months to order an examination of the defendants by independent medical experts. According to their findings, the ability of the defendants to stand trial was reduced on the grounds of several psychic and physical disturbances, for which they blamed the prison conditions. After the authorities had been made conscious of the isolation problems, they attempted to compensate by granting the prisoners certain privileges such as television, table tennis, record players, etc. They were even allowed to visit each other for some hours. But these alleviations did not essentially change the situation. Unlike other inmates, they could not participate in the prison sub-culture. Even if they were in a group, they remained isolated. There was no chance of making spontaneous or incidental contacts. Every feature of their lives was strictly planned and organized. Surrounded by an aura of suspicion and people afraid of being suspected as sympathizers, they lived, shut off from reality, as if under a glass cover. In order to perfect this tightening-up, high-security departments exist or are under construction in several prisons: one cannot but receive the impression that the authorities condone the impairment of health likely to result from this type of detainment. These measures arouse the suspicion that mausoleums are being erected for the negative heroes of the nation. It is obvious that in this isolation in groups of similar prisoners, the individual prisoner has less chance of revising and renouncing his belief system and actions committed. Moreover, these conditions violate the German Prison Law which came into force in 1977 which makes it a duty of the prison authorities to eradicate all harmful effects of prison detention. This kind of treatment in prison is to be evaluated as part of the overreaction which has manifested itself in the Federal Republic and which, as officially sanctioned counter-terrorism, appears just as menacing as terrorism itself. The real danger emanating from German terrorism does not seem to be high. Official estimates suggest the number of terrorists originating from the Federal Republic of Germany is less than two hundred, half of whom have already been arrested. The number of persons possibly prepared to afford active assistance is estimated at about ten times that figure. The brutal killings in 1977 doubtlessly alienated many former sympathizers from the terrorists. In order to see the threat of terrorism in the Federal Republic in the right proportions, one has to remember that since the emergence of this phenomenon ten years ago, a total of less than thirty people have lost their lives through acts of German terrorists, that is, fewer than the daily deathtoll on the roads. However, the danger which is claimed to result from terrorists has decisively changed life in Germany. Many of the countermeasures brought into effect raise the question of whether they will not induce new opposition and terrorism. - A number of laws were passed by the West German parliament in which new types of offences were defined and laid down, cementing the terrorist threat
PSYCHOLOGICAL
DIMENSIONS
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in public consciousness. New regulations were brought into force for the proceedings against the terrorists with the effect that certain rights of the defending lawyers have been infringed. - More than half a million people have been screened, not just for highly treasonable or terrorist activities, but for any activities that might cast doubts on their political “reliability.” - In the quest for proof of high-treason or terrorist activities, the police themselves have engaged in illegal practices under the approving auspices of ministers and high-ranking officials. The entire police force has been considerably expanded and re-equipped during the past few years. This can clearly be seen from the Federal Police Office’s budget which has risen from DM 22.4 million in 1969 to DM 199.1 million in 1978. A vast apparatus for the “fight against terrorism” has been created. The question must be raised of whether the apparatus is bound to produce terrorists in order to prove the necessity of its existence? Whether a person is to be considered a terrorist or not is, of course, a question of how terrorism is defined. The situation is similar in the area of jusisdiction. The defendants do not have the impression that they are getting a fair trial. The trials of politicallymotivated offenders have been concentrated in a few courts so that de facto special Courts of Law have been created. In the court rooms an atmosphere of moderate civil war prevails. At the trial of the four main accused in Stuttgart in May 1975, more than eighty objections brought forward by the defending lawyers were required before the presiding judge was replaced because of bias. Some judges revealed attitudes in their handling of the accused that were apparently marked by base cynicism. Orders regulating the living conditions of the offenders, which are in essence repressive and humiliating, have been hypocritically professed to be for the prisoner’s welfare. This form of administration of justice definitely does not demonstrate that the accusations made by the terrorists are totally without foundation; neither can it bring about a reconciliation of the terrorists with the state. Terrorism emerges when other lines of communication have broken down. The question must be raised of whether, during the years of the student movement, one did not stop listening too early to the arguments of young people and whether the social problems which triggered off the terrorist movement have been given sufficient attention. It will not serve to prevent future terrorist actions if the terrorists continue to be regarded as monsters or lunatics: they must be considered as people for whose actions we too are responsible. The same thing applies to the Federal Republic of Germany today as was said in France after the 1968 May Revolt: ce sont nos fils.