Public perceptions of underground coal gasification in the United Kingdom

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Energy Policy 34 (2006) 3423–3433 www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

Public perceptions of underground coal gasification in the United Kingdom Simon Shackleya,b,, Sarah Mandera, Alexander Reichea,b a

The Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, The University of Manchester, P.O. Box 88, Manchester M60 1QD, UK b Manchester Business School, The University of Manchester, P.O. Box 88, Manchester M60 1QD, UK Available online 29 August 2005

Abstract There is growing interest internationally in the technology of Underground Coal Gasification (UCG) as a means of accessing the energy contained within inaccessible coal reserves. One of the potential obstacles to UCG deployment is adverse public perceptions and reactions, either stopping or delaying proposed applications. This paper explores the public perceptions of UCG in the UK through a detailed case-study and focus group discussion. A failed proposal for a UCG drill site at Silverdale (Staffordshire) provides an opportunity to understand the influence of local social, cultural and institutional factors on the manner in which the risks and benefits associated with UCG are perceived. The participants of the focus group recognised the potential of UCG as a secure source of energy for the UK in the future, provided that it is safe to humans and the environment and cost-effective. The group discussed potential benefits to the local community, potential risks, the role of carbon dioxide capture and storage, and links to the hydrogen economy. The group recommended that an open, transparent and consultative process of decision-making and operation should be adopted by the developer, operator and regulator; and that UCG should be developed at a remote site, preferably on land, before applying it in coal seams close to populated areas. r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Underground coal gasification

1. Introduction Given the recent volatility of oil and gas prices, electricity generators and governments are once again focusing upon the role of coal for electricity generation. Underground Coal Gasification (UCG) is currently receiving an increased level of attention within business, academic and policy communities. UCG is a technique which permits access to coal which either lies too deep underground, or is otherwise too costly, to exploit using conventional mining methods (Lamb, 1977; DTI, 2004). As such, UCG, which has been developed experimentally since the 1920s, has the potential to open-up for Corresponding author. Tyndall Centre, The University of Manchester, Pariser Building, P.O. Box 88, Manchester M60 1QD, UK. Tel.:+44 161 306 8781; fax:+44 161 306 3255. E-mail address: [email protected] (S. Shackley).

0301-4215/$ - see front matter r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2005.07.010

exploitation of large coal reserves around the world which are currently too difficult or too expensive to mine. UCG involves the injection of steam and air or oxygen into an underground seam of coal which is ignited, and reacts in the presence of the injected gases to form a combustible gas that can be used either as a fuel or as a chemical feedstock. The input gases are introduced through an injection well and the product gas removed at the production well. The product gas requires cleaning once it has reached the surface, either to meet the specification for input into a gas turbine (for electricity generation), or to be of sufficient purity for use as a chemical feedstock for conversion to synthetic fuels. Additionally, the gas can be processed to remove its CO2 content before it is passed on to end users, the captured CO2 can then be stored, thereby contributing to climate change mitigation.

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The largest UCG trials took place in the USA in the 1970s and 1980s at sites in the Rocky Mountains and Hoe Creek, where 10,000 tonnes of coal were gasified to provide chemical feedstock. These trials were terminated for economic and geological reasons, and have since been shown to have led to groundwater contamination (USEPA, 1999). A trial took place in Spain from 1992 to 1998 (Underground Gasification Europe (UGE) project involving Spain, Belgium and the UK), though it was terminated following an underground explosion. The most advanced UCG operation is at Chinchilla in Queensland, Australia, where the operator claims to be generating electricity from UCG product gas at a highly competitive cost (1.5 US cents per kWh) (DTI, 2003). UCG remains a relatively unknown technology with some characteristics which might influence how it is more widely perceived by stakeholders, members of local communities and the wider public. There may be concerns about possible risks and how readily the processes involved can be effectively controlled. Public, local community and non-governmental organisation (NGO) perceptions have, for many years, been important in planning decisions on energy projects in numerous countries, most famously in relation to nuclear power (Bedford, 1992, Owens and Cowell, 2002, Pickett, 2002, Surrey and Huggett, 1976, Wynne, 1982). Increasingly, however, well-organised opposition to renewable energy projects has been delaying the implementation of wind energy, waste from energy and biomass schemes, in several European countries (Toke, 2004, Upreti, 2004, DevineWright, 2004, 2005, Upham and Shackley, 2005). Many governments now accept that some better understanding of potential public perceptions in advance of the implementation of a new energy technology is desirable to inform technology implementation. The UK government has accepted that the public might play a constructive role in the actual development of a new energy technology, having made a commitment in its 10-year strategy for science and innovation: y to enable [public] debate to take place ‘‘upstream’’ in the scientific and technological development process, and not ‘‘downstream’’, where technologies are waiting to be exploited, but may be held back by public scepticism brought about through poor engagement and dialogue on issues of concern. (HM Treasury, 2004, p. 105). It is within this context that we were commissioned by the UK government’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to undertake a study of the potential public reactions to the development and implementation of UCG in the UK. The two key objectives of the

study were:

 

to explore what are the main (a) dangers and objections, and (b) benefits and advantages, of UCG as perceived by members of the public, and to explore what factors, if any, might change public perceptions such that UCG is perceived (a) more favourably; (b) less favourably.

In this paper we convey the main results from that study, exploring the key issues arising for developers of the technology and for policy makers who will be tasked with assessing its risks and devising an appropriate regulatory and planning framework.

2. Methodology A real-life example of public reactions to UCG emerged in the late 1990s at Silverdale (Staffordshire, UK) when an application for a test site was made in the year 2000 by the Coal Authority, but later withdrawn due to the public outcry and a legal challenge as to whether research and development of this type was allowable under the remit of the organisation. We decided to study this case because such controversies frequently concentrate and focus local resident perceptions in a way that an abstract discussion of a technology divorced from a proposed project does not. The second author visited the relevant planning authority, went through the publicly available documentation, interviewed a key official and accessed the local newspaper accounts of the opposition to the development. A summary of the key issues and implications is included in Section 3. We also held a one-day-long discussion group in order to obtain opinion on UCG from a group of ten members of the public. A group discussion allows individuals to interact and respond to one another; a useful feature when a new issue is being discussed because it stimulates mutual and creative information sharing, exploration and analysis (Burgess et al., 1988, Greenbaun, 1998, Harrison et al., 1996, Krueger, 1998).1 The discussion group was not intended to be ‘representative’ of the public, but rather to reflect the opinions and views of the participants at a particular time (June 2003) and place (York). 1 The discussion group is similar to, but differs in two ways from, a conventional focus group: (a) the group met for a whole day, whereas focus groups are usually of 2–3 h duration; (b) the group heard from, and interacted with, two speakers during the course of the day. Such one-day groups have been employed in previous research and have been found to be effective (e.g. Darier et al., 1999). The use of a oneday discussion group benefited from the fact that six out of the ten participants had already interacted extensively in the CCS panel (Shackley et al., 2005).

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All the participants were male2 and mostly in their late-20 s to mid-40 s. The participants included six individuals who had been members during January– March 2003 of a five session Citizen Panel on the topic of carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) (Shackley et al., 2005). Unfortunately, not all the members of that group could attend the one-day session on UCG, so we recruited (through personal contacts) four further individuals, who fitted broadly into the gender, age and occupational profile of the original group. Each additional member of the group was briefed before hand on the main topics covered by the prior panel, namely global climate change, the challenge of reducing CO2 emissions and basic details surrounding CCS. Each participant was sent an information package on UCG prior to the meeting. The day began with an initial round table discussion of views and perceptions of UCG. A leading expert on UCG technology then gave a comprehensive presentation on the potential and limitations of UCG, with reference to several case-studies, during which questions were posed by the participants and addressed by the expert. This was followed-up with a second brief presentation by one of the authors (AR) on the wider policy and political issues surrounding UCG, to balance the expert’s largely favourable opinion. The group then moved on to debate whether or not UCG would be an acceptable technology in social and environmental terms, alongside exploring the political and moral issues that might arise and what objections might occur. Six questions were used to structure the discussion and the debate was spontaneous and lively, requiring little prompting from the facilitator beyond ensuring that the comments remained relevant to the topic. The proceedings of the focus group were taped, fully transcribed and analysed by two of the authors to identify key issues arising from the discussion of the six questions. We have used quotes from the focus group in this article to show how the ideas and perceptions were expressed within the group. The names next to the quotes have been changed to protect the respondent’s identity. Certain features should be borne in mind when considering the results presented here. The group met only once and, given the fact that no participants had any prior knowledge of UCG, it is likely that new issues were thought of after the meeting had concluded, or that positions and viewpoints expressed within the group 2 The discussion group was all male in order to ensure consistency with the previous citizen panel on the topic of carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS). Two citizen panels were held for the work on CCS, one all-female and the all-male panel, upon which we drew for recruitment here. To gain the most from re-convening the group in terms of personal interactions and dynamics, we chose to keep the composition as close as possible to the original group. Clearly, gender may influence perceptions of UCG and we discuss this topic in Section 5.

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might have changed after a period of reflection. Some questions that were raised during the discussion could only be answered after the group meeting due to the further investigation they required.

3. The Silverdale case The Coal Authority in the UK applied for a permit to initiate a drilling exercise at a coal mine that had closed down in 1998 (Silverdale Colliery, Staffordshire). The coal seam was highly suitable for UCG and this appears to have been the main reason for site selection, but the planning application submitted was only for the initial drilling phase. The site would only have been used for a trial, not for any commercial applications. The Environmental Statement concentrated on the likely impacts of the drilling, and did not consider the impacts of the possible extension to include UCG. The work was to take place 24 h a day, seven days a week and to last between 22 weeks and 38 weeks. The impacts that were judged significant in the scoping study by the Coal Authority were noise, visual impact and contamination of ground and surface water as a consequence of the drilling. The Coal Authority aimed to provide public information through a public display in the local library and display of the application and the environmental statement in a local shop. The planning authority (Staffordshire County Council) received some 80 letters of objection, a few letters of support and a petition against the scheme with 3000 signatures on it. Silverdale Parish Council opposed the scheme, and the overall campaign of opposition was co-ordinated by a local councillor. The information published by the Parish Council claimed that Silverdale has a relatively high incidence of cancer and infant mortality and is an area of poor health (Silverdale Parish Council, 2000). Although the leaflet does not equate these figures to a baseline, further research has shown that Silverdale has the highest rate of male deaths from lung cancer and stomach cancer in the Borough with figures well above the national average (Knutton Cross Health NMI, 2003). These health problems are likely to be, in part, attributable to the history of mining and industry in the area (Knutton Cross Health NMI, 2003). The issues for concern raised by the Parish Council were pollution of the water table by UCG, explosion hazards from UCG, commercial activity on the site of the former colliery and noise and air pollution. Many of these concerns related to the potential future development of UCG at the site, rather than to the actual application for drilling at the site. Analysis of the letters of objection received show a similar pattern, as highlighted in Table 1 below. The local newspaper, the Staffordshire Sentinel, was

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Table 1 Issues of concern raised by local people Drilling issues

UCG issues

General issues

Noise

Fear of uncontrollable coal burn underground

Visual impact of the drilling rigs

Waste from the UCG contaminating aquifers. In particular coal tars which are believed to cause cancer

Fear of coal catching fire and burning uncontrollably. The area has a history of spontaneous combustion—‘Sponcon’— and this issue was high in the awareness of local people. The area is considered to be cleaner and ‘better’ since the colliery has closed. Dust and air pollution were highlighted as two areas where great improvement had occurred.

Increased traffic (one resident estimated the number of vehicle movements at 700 Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGV) movements over the course of the project).

Danger from underground explosions

The experimental nature of the work was questioned, with people not wishing for a scheme to go ahead when some of their questions could not be answered. A residential area was not seen as suitable for research with many unknowns.

Gaseous emissions from UCG could rise to the surface Subsidence (the area has a history of subsidence)

Regeneration of the local area could be threatened and firms would be ‘put off’ from locating near the site. The scheme did not bring any benefit to Silverdale The value of local property would be reduced.

Source: Authors from examination of letters held by Staffordshire County Council.

critical of the proposal and championed the cause of the objectors. Faced with uncertain and potentially complex technical questions, the Planning Authority appointed the British Geological Survey (BGS) as independent consultants on the scheme to advise them and help formulate the response to the Coal Authority. On BGS’s advice further information was sought from the Coal Authority over the accuracy of the assessments of noise and ground water contamination. Further concerns expressed by Staffordshire County Council included the potential health impacts, and a lack of explanation as to why Silverdale had been selected. One local resident had provided the Council with information on health risks from coking ovens (essentially gasification above ground) and this led to new concerns being raised as to whether the toxic by-products of gasification would stay below ground with an UCG operation. The Coal Authority withdrew its application in September 2000. In a letter to the Chief Planning Officer, a representative explained that the Coal Authority felt that there was no point in continuing with the application given the extent of the public opposition. The Coal Authority maintained that many of the objections to the scheme arose from the potential future adoption of UCG, as opposed to the drilling application per se, but it could not see how it would be able to turn around public perceptions. Whilst the formal risk assessment process only allows for assessment of a given planning application—in this case for a test drilling site—the public and local stakeholder perceptions of the risks anticipated a full UCG application. There are parallels here with the case of the disposal of the Brent Spa oil platform, where one

of the major issues arising for environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace was the fear that a precedent would be established for oil platform disposals. It has been argued that part of the negative assessment of the Brent Spa disposal was a consequence of this fear that ocean sinking would become the norm for future oil rig disposal (Grove-White, 1996, Lofstedt and Renn, 1997, Shell, 2001). In the Silverdale case-study it seems probable that local residents were concerned that approval of a test site application would increase the likelihood of a full UCG application being approved. Since an application for a full UCG operation was not lodged, however, information on the potential risks of such an enterprise (such as underground explosions, emissions, traffic, subsidence, visual and noise impacts) was not provided by the Coal Authority. This then led to information being sought by activist residents from elsewhere and/or by analogy with past accidents and events (especially potent given the long history of coal mining) (Irwin et al, 1999, Phillimore and Moffatt, 2004). Information on the environmental and health risks associated with the conventional coal gasification process is readily accessible via the web, e.g. contamination of the local ground water with substances such as benzene and toluene from the US trials.3 An ‘experimental’ trial was also likely to imply to the lay public a 3 Coal tar by-products of gasification have been shown to cause cancers of the lungs, bladder and scrotum of workers exposed to these substances (IARC 1984, 1987). A number of former conventional coal gasification sites in the US are known to have caused contamination of local ground water with substances including benzene, toluene, xylene, lead, trans-1,2-dichloroethylene, and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbon compounds, among them naphthalene, fluoranthene, and pyrene. These sites are subject to clean up under the US ‘Superfund’ program (USEPA, 1999).

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greater level of uncertainty concerning risks and potential for ‘things to go wrong’ than would be the case for a ‘routine’ application. In a situation where affected people have judged that a facility or project is not inherently too risky, the level of tolerance will be influenced by a number of other factors (Kunreuther and Easterling, 1996, Miranda et al., 2000, Quah and Tan, 1998, Rogers, 1998, Simmons and Walker, 1999, Upreti, 2004, Lofstedt, 1997, Rogers, 1998). Typical factors are:

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(iii) What factors, if any, might change public perceptions such that UCG is perceived more favourably? (iv) What factors, if any, might change public perceptions such that UCG is perceived less favourably? (v) Is there a significant difference in perceptions between on- and off-shore UCG? (vi) How does UCG fit into a sustainable low-carbon energy system as envisaged in the Energy White Paper? 4.1. Objections and perceived dangers of UCG

    

Local economic benefits in terms of local jobs or locally let contracts Compensation Participation of affected people in site planning and liaison Extent of safety controls and monitoring Distrust in the organisations involved in the development.

In the Silverdale case, the small scale and experimental nature of the site was unlikely to result in local jobs or economic benefit given that all the expertise would come from outside the area. The remoteness of the UCG test sites in Spain, Australia and the USA, meant that the presence of the experimental teams was itself a significant contributor to the local economy. In Silverdale, residents considered that the site would act as a disincentive to other firms seeking to relocate in the area, and that local house prices would be depressed. Local residents considered that they had suffered the consequences of coal mining for many years (e.g. subsidence, risk of flooding from mine water, methane levels in cellars, etc.) and that the area had ‘improved’ since the mining had ceased.4

4. Discussion group findings The following questions were used to frame the focus group discussion. The sections below summarise the discussion arising from each question. The main questions used to frame the discussions in the group were: (i) What are the main dangers and objections to UCG as perceived by members of the public? (ii) What are the main benefits and advantages of UCG as perceived by members of the public? 4 Given the lead role of the Coal Authority it is possible that distrust in this organisation was an important factor in the public opposition to the proposed trial (cf. Boholm and Lofstedt, 2004). The empirical evidence collected did not provide support for this idea, though we relied upon written documentation, an interview and media reports. More detailed empirical analysis would have been necessary to elucidate the role of distrust in the Coal Authority.

The UCG case-studies (provided both in the pre-event information pack and within the two presentations) were an important resource for the participants in evaluating claims about the potential risks of UCG. It was felt that UCG raised many possibilities for ‘things to go wrong’ and to thereby generate environmental, health and safety risks. The explosion that terminated the Spanish trial, and the water contamination resulting from the trials in the USA, were used here by participants to demonstrate some of the risks and hazards associated with the technology. Although the underground explosion in Spain did not have any adverse effects on the surface, the expert speaker informed the group that underground destruction of the boreholes or the engineering equipment is highly undesirable and should be avoided at all costs. It could damage the integrity of the borehole liners and lead to the spread of gases and pollutants into the adjacent strata. Furthermore, if an explosion occurred near the surface or at the wellhead, there could be serious effects. The group felt that manipulation of high-pressure toxic and flammable gases at the surface presented further potential risks. It was also felt that there was an inherent element of risk and uncertainty associated with the lack of control operators may have over the underground combustion process. An uncontrollable and unstoppable underground fire was an alarming prospect: Charles

Alan

There would be a public concern that the thing [underground gasification] is uncontrolled. There is nobody down there watching what is going on.

Although UCG engineers claim overall control of the underground combustion process, one member of the group wished to know what was the probability of an uncontrolled fire spread due to an unnoticed geological feature such as a fault that would provide air supply to the underground combustion process (a question which could not be answered during the meeting). A further concern with UCG trials was that there were few, if any, benefits to local inhabitants, yet they would have to incur potential risks.

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Steve

Ian

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Any local community would feel a bit like a guinea pig if it was to accept being part of a trial and it would be very hard to convince them that it’s OK. Silverdale was chosen purely because of the seam itself without great consideration being paid to getting it right with the locals.

The group engaged in a reasonably technical discussion concerning the energy efficiency of UCG and associated CO2 emissions. The expert speaker noted that a sizeable amount of the energy produced through UCG is used to run the operation. The group’s concern about this parasitic energy consumption was somewhat alleviated by the fact that the pressure at which the product gas emerges is suitable for use in generating energy for the process. This closed loop operation was valued as a positive feature and all members agreed that it should be taken advantage of by utilising an air separation plant on-site, rather than importing oxygen from existing air separation plants. (Air separation is a highly energyintensive process, hence if a separate air separation unit were to be employed the overall efficiency of the process would be reduced). The participants were presented with data on the CO2 emissions per megawatt hour (MWh) associated with UCG in their pre-event information packs. This data shows that UCG with electricity generation using a combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) produces about 10% less CO2 per MWh than a modern coal powered steam plant. UCG with carbon dioxide capture reduces CO2 emissions per MWh by about 65% but this is significantly less than the reduction from a coal steam plant with carbon dioxide capture (90% reduction).5 On the other hand, the costs of capturing CO2 emissions from UCG appear to be lower that those associated with capture from coal steam plant. The relatively high carbon intensity of UCG as a form of electricity generation was of concern to the participants: Bill

Without carbon sequestration it doesn’t seem to offer any benefit.

During the course of the discussion, two options were sketched out regarding the issue of CO2 emissions arising from electricity generation from UCG as part of the national power supply:



The CO2 arising from UCG and power generation could be emitted into the atmosphere, but this could

5 Since the discussion group was held, more detailed information on the CO2 capture efficiency of UCG has become available which indicates that the capture efficiency can be improved to approximately 90% (equivalent to other coal technologies) through using stream reformation and the shift reaction, or pre-combustion decarbonisation. For more detailed information see DTI 2004.



impede the UK’s commitment to reduce CO2 levels by substantial amounts in the medium term and would undoubtedly raise strong criticism from environmentalists. The CO2 could be captured and stored underground, in certain cases also permitting enhanced oil recovery.

For some participants the latter option could be a winwin scenario, but others considered CCS itself to be undesirable and potentially dangerous. The earlier citizen panels had conditionally accepted CCS, but only as part of a wider portfolio of options and/or as a bridging policy until we find cleaner ways of producing electricity. Hence, according to this perspective, CCS should not detract resources and effort away from developing renewables and zero-emission technologies which should remain the priority (Gough et al., 2002; Shackley et al., 2005). Furthermore, linking up UCG and CCS was of concern to one participant who noted that: Bill

It seems like a nice idea to combine UCG with carbon sequestration but it’s linking one unknown technology to another unknown technology. This is making a lot of assumptions that these things are actually going to work, and could lead to a dangerous scenario.

A final concern with UCG is that the process generates other waste which must be stored underground for extensive periods of time and could have adverse effects if it were to leak out. This led to some participants drawing an analogy between the management of these waste products and the experience of waste management in the nuclear industry, including the expression of public opposition. Louis

[UCG] is very much like the nuclear industry y and there are problems around public perceptions and knowledge of it, and essentially fear y in terms of not understanding it but also in some areas it may hit people’s back pockets where it affects their property.

4.2. Perceived advantages and benefits of UCG All of the participants recognised the potential of UCG as a secure source of energy for the UK in the future, provided that it is safe to the environment and human health as well as being cost-effective. Indeed, the group widely accepted that UCG could potentially benefit the UK in terms of cutting the costs of importing energy from distant parts of the world and avoid UK power supply being subject to foreign political or economic risks and fluctuations.

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Some participants regarded UCG as a combination of existing technologies merely used in a different context. They found this reassuring because they thought that existing technologies would be easier to assess and control with less room for uncertainties and potential hazards. Similarly, some concerns seemed to be alleviated by the fact that UCG can fit (at least to some extent) into the existing energy supply infrastructure. This is because CCGT power stations can function on UCG gas, hence UCG does not require the construction of bespoke power generation plants. 4.3. Factors that might influence public perceptions such that UCG is perceived more negatively Some participants expressed a lack of trust in the organisations and companies involved in the development and operation of UCG (distrust being a recurring theme in siting and risk controversies, e.g. Groothuis and Miller, 1997; Kasperson et al., 1992; Kunreuther et al., 1993; Petts, 1998; Slovic, 1993, 2001; Boholm and Lofstedt, 2004). While debating the Silverdale case-study, one participant declared that he would be ‘on the side of the people of Silverdale’ and he would not have trusted any outside organisation. He felt that there are too many examples of catastrophes in the UK, and elsewhere, where the engineers and the responsible parties had claimed that developments were safe. Remember Aberfan! [site of a major accident in 1966 in Wales] y ‘this will work and not make any noise, we promise it’y and then when it does what are you going to do about it? The information presented to the participants during the expert speaker’s presentation revealed the existing legislative uncertainty surrounding UCG, raising concerns about what would constitute ‘best practice’ with respect to UCG operations. As UCG is felt to be a potentially hazardous technology with room for procedures to go wrong and have adverse effects as a consequence, the participants considered it essential to see high levels of involvement from UK and European control and regulatory bodies and for the submissions to the regulators to be publicly available. One participant considered that the liability of the regulator and developer in the event of accidents needed to be clearly established. Jacques

There should be a publicly announced and written proof that those responsible for the project will pick up the bill if something goes wrong. y.. None of the public will

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ever have any confidence in the planners, architects, engineers, anyone like that y unless there is a mechanism. Such comments reflect a lack of confidence in the past regulatory framework for major hazards and in its treatment of those affected by past accidents. 4.4. Factors that might influence public perceptions such that UCG is perceived more positively The participants supported a clear, transparent and accessible system of regulation and associated information provision which would help in building up trust between local communities, UCG developers and regulators. The main emphasis here was on making the data understandable to the public and providing easy, fast and reliable access to that information. Jacques

[UCG] is presented to us as a solution to some very serious problems, and if you are going to do that, you have got to have public transparency and you have got to involve the local community in it and bind them in.

Several participants supported the establishment of a physical centre where people could go to get information and ask questions, e.g. some sort of community resource and visitor centre. As well as providing a range of information on UCG and the installation, open days could involve visits to the UCG site and plant. Information which has to be reported as part of the operational licence of the facility could also be made available at the visitor centre. A further idea was that there should be some independent and on-going review of the information provided by the operator, preferably from within the local community to improve the trust in the assessment. Jacques

there needs to be a mechanism to make sure things are going well all the time, so you can be reassured and you’re not living in fear.

How individuals or groups within the community would be trained in order to be able to play this role was not discussed, though it was agreed that a daily fee should be paid to the assessors. The group’s ideas resonate strongly with some of those in the literature on public participation in decision-making on risky technologies (e.g. Fischhoff, 1995; Lynn and Busenberg, 1995; Petts and Leach, 2000; Renn et al., 1995; Walker, 1995; Walker et al., 1999). It was also suggested that resources could be made available for the local community to appoint their own independent reviewers to cross-examine the information

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provided in a proposal by the developer. It was felt that this would be a good way to get the local community involved and to provide people with a sense of control. It was also felt that the costs would not be excessive when compared to the commercial costs of a UCG plant. The discussion group felt that there should be some benefits for the local community that accepted the development of a UCG trial site or commercial plant. The local community should get ‘something in return’ for accepting a UCG plant in their ‘backyard’. This point led to a fruitful discussion on how the possibly negative local perception of a UCG project could be turned around so that it was regarded as part of a beneficial wider development programme. The group approved of the suggestion, made by the local authority at the time of the Silverdale proposal, that a UCG technology and R&D centre should be established at the same time as the test site, as part of the local regeneration programme. The group then went on to discuss what other elements could be added to a potential UCG/regeneration programme.

 



A UCG programme could be combined with other, more labour-intensive industrial developments as part of an employment initiative. The UCG process could be designed to produce hydrogen which could then be used to set up a local hydrogen economy project, e.g. the running of the town buses on hydrogen. Such an initiative would bring welcome publicity to the town, as well as possibly stimulating investment in the ‘hydrogen economy’ and promoting associated skills. The group wanted to see more information on the extra costs of producing hydrogen from UCG with CCS before deciding on the viability of this proposal. Part of the budget that might be made available to the local community could be used to launch an energy demand reduction scheme. A scheme conducted by N-Power was cited as an example whereby selected houses benefited from energy improvement features such as efficient insulation, low-wattage light bulbs, etc. worth over £1000 per household.

In summary, the group felt that local communities would perceive UCG more positively and be more willing to have a production plant as a neighbour if the UCG programme could be tied in with various other improvement initiatives aimed at tackling unemployment and enhancing the local economy and environment. The various schemes should be coordinated and presented together as an integrated local improvement and regeneration scheme. Indeed, following the discussion of other ‘add-on’ benefits, the prospect of seeing UCG developed alone raised little enthusiasm, whereas the participants all agreed on the possible benefits to the

local community, and to the UK more generally, if UCG were to be part of a package of measures aimed at improving the local economy, quality of life and the environment (cf. Owens, 2004). There was a general view amongst participants that all measures and programmes which introduced additional benefits to the community needed to be formulated and implemented in such a way so as to avoid giving the impression that local residents were being ‘bought off’. 4.5. Is there a significant difference in perceptions between on- and off-shore UCG? This discussion topic was only brief because of the apparent technical problems of establishing and operating UCG at a distant off-shore location. The possibility of estuarine or close-to-shore operations was briefly discussed but it was merely to underline the possible damage to biodiversity that could result. No real conclusions were drawn about off-shore operations. However, it was felt out that UCG should preferably take place on-shore rather than off-shore because if something went wrong it would be easier to access and try to solve the problem before too much damage was done. 4.6. How does UCG fit into the low-carbon energy system envisaged in the energy white paper? As noted, UCG could be combined with CCS to fulfil the objectives of low-carbon energy supply and energy security. The most acceptable use of CCS, according to many stakeholders (and confirmed by focus group work) is as a bridging policy (Shackley et al., 2005). If UCG is to involve CCS, then it follows that it too must be regarded as a bridging policy to be faded out at the same time as CCS. This led the group to consider the length of time that such bridging policies are intended to be in place. On the basis of the prior citizens panel work, the group felt that CCS would be acceptable for a period of 20–30 years.6 On the other hand, it was felt that there would be commercial pressure for UCG operations (if profitable) to continue for a longer period to recoup capital investment. The focus group, fearing that the length of the bridge for each of these technologies will be different, suggested that UCG should be viewed as more of a ‘backstop technology’ that would be readily available to the UK in case of a sudden shortage of other power supplies. This approach would suggest that UCG be further 6 Note that the group was assuming that CO2 capture would use retrofit technology on existing power stations with a limited life time. The group did not consider new power stations; the timescale for return on investment for such plants would be longer and hence integrate better with the timescale for return on UCG investment.

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researched and developed until it is a readily available off-the-shelf technology. Whether or not the technology became a significant part of the energy infrastructure would then depend upon the extent to which there were problems such as energy security.

5. Discussion and conclusions The group’s anxieties regarding UCG can be grouped into generic and specific concerns. We turn first to generic factors, which we suspect would be raised in many industrialised countries where the potential risks of new technologies are important issues on the wider political and public agenda (Beck, 1992). The group tended to perceive UCG as a moderately high-risk system that has the potential for dangerous (and possibly disastrous) effects in terms of health and safety to the local community. There was a general feeling by the group that fire hazards and explosions could occur and that there was the potential for environmental degradation. The reasonably high level of concern appeared to arise from the perceived lack of control of a combustion/gasification process occurring underground, the perception of high uncertainty regarding detailed knowledge of the potential hazards and the examples of previous accidents, such as groundwater contamination in the US trials and an underground explosion in the Spanish trial. It was noticeable, for example, that the expert witness was not able to provide definitive answers to some of the detailed questions concerning environmental risks, reflecting a lack of knowledge and scientific uncertainty (not solely on the part of the expert but within the UCG technical community more widely). This response highlighted to the participants the experimental, test status of the technology. Despite the above anxieties, as a generic technology UCG was still viewed by most members of the group as a good potential energy, safety net, for the UK. The discussion group developed a far more positive view of UCG when the technology was combined with other new technologies and economic developments which were regarded more overtly in a positive light, including: hydrogen generation for public transport, use of the syngas in other local industries and energy efficiency measures. We suspect that such positive tie-ins will tend to make UCG more attractive in other national contexts, and not just in the UK (at least if the analogy with ‘planning gain’ can be made though the concept of planning gain is itself not without its critics (Crow, 1998)). Whilst an attractive prospect to the discussion group, in reality it is difficult for a developer(s) or a development agency to be in such a powerful position as to provide a package of very different measures and projects. There is largely no institutional-political or

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commercial framework in which consecutive developments with (potentially) mutually supportive elements are promoted in a centralised, planned fashion, at least not in a market-based economy such as the UK. One of the key environmental concerns of group participants related to the high CO2 emissions associated with UCG compared to other types of electricity generation, e.g. using natural gas. The group therefore concluded that UCG should only be considered in combination with CCS. This concern was not raised at all in the Silverdale case-study which might be a consequence of the climate change agenda having grown since 2000, though recruitment of group participants from the earlier citizen’s panel on CCS is almost certainly the most important factor. The CO2 issue is more likely, therefore, to be a concern specific to this group and we would not anticipate such a strong interest in a comparable randomly recruited public group. The Silverdale case-study revealed the powerful influence of local social, cultural and political-institutional factors on the way in which the risks and benefits associated with UCG are perceived in a specific instance. The familiarity of local people with the consequences and legacies of conventional coal mining appears to have amplified the perceptions of risk of local communities. All of the group members agreed that a UCG trial, or even a commercial application, seems to provide little or no advantages for the community local to the site, but exposes the inhabitants to potential industrial and environmental hazards. A community might come to feel like a ‘guinea pig’ if it were to accept being part of a trial and this would likely result in opposition. It was therefore concluded that future trial tests are best conducted in more remote areas. The group provided some valuable ideas on how to enhance the acceptability of a UCG development to a local community, including: building trust between the developer, regulator and the local community; greater transparency in regulatory and assessment processes, responsibilities and liabilities; more pro-active community participation in site selection and monitoring; independent review of the submitted case for development and regulatory data; and establishment of a site liaison committee with membership from the local community, regulators and site operators. Similar suggestions have arisen from research on public perceptions of industrial hazards in other industrialised countries, and hence, although the specific context and circumstances will differ from place to place and from country to country, it is likely that many of the above recommendations would also be appropriate in other settings. We stress that we are reporting on perceptions based on limited information and time for discussion. More time for deliberation and more precise information on, and understanding of, the risks and their assessment

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might have changed the tone of such perceptions. It is revealing, nonetheless, that many of the same concerns emerged during both the discussion group and the Silverdale planning application. This work represents very early stage research on public perceptions of UCG and should not be overgeneralised. An all-male discussion group will almost certainly have shaped the focus of discussion, as will the recruitment of the group from a previous citizen panel. Furthermore, a process involving more than one meeting of the discussion group would provide a valuable opportunity for more reflection and question and answer sessions. Such in-depth discussion groups or citizen panels are known to generate a richer and more internally differentiated set of perceptions than one-off focus groups (e.g. Burgess et al., 1988). More research will be necessary to examine the extent to which the results presented here are dependent in part upon socio-economic variables such as gender, age, socioeconomic grouping, as well as upon possession of certain knowledge or the entertainment of particular social beliefs and values (cf. Devine-Wright, 2005). Further focus group type research would be useful, though possibly complemented with survey research with statistically representative sampling. If a UCG proposal were to be developed in the UK, early-stage and independent work on local public perceptions would be an important component of the project design and process. Despite its nascent stage, this work has demonstrated that: UCG is a technology which would not be automatically rejected by the public; that UCG proposals in urbanised areas are likely to encounter local opposition (and probably not just in old-mining areas, but more generally) and therefore that more remote sites are probably the most suitable for UCG trials and applications; and that a focus on the assessment and regulatory process and institutional framework can potentially make a major difference to the public acceptability of UCG. Acknowledgements We would like to thank all the participants of the focus group, who contributed so actively, Susan Stubbs for her invaluable research support, and to Dr. Michael Green for participating as an expert witness. Finally we would like to thank the Cleaner Fossil Fuels Programme of the DTI for the opportunity to conduct this research through their financial support. The Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research has provided enabling background financial and administrative support.

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