Sea of Japan

Sea of Japan Transnational marine resource issues and possible cooperative responses

Mark J. Valencia

The Sea of Japan borders on the less developed areas of all its coastal countries and Its resources could be used to stimulate growth In these areas. When the four countries surrounding the Sea of Japan (Japan, the USSR, North and South Korea) extend their jurisdictions to 200 nautical miles the overlaying of a mosaic of national jurisdi~ions on inherently transnational resources will produce international problems requiring international solutions. Many fish stocks are shared and most conventional species are fully exploited. Petroleum potential may exist In the Tsushima Basin and the Yamato Rise, the Korean borderland and along the sea’s western margin. Hydrothermal polymetallic deposits may also be present. With Improving international relations, maritime traffic Is Increasing and the sea Is already showing signs of pollution and has many endangered species. Cooperation is required in scientific research (particularly in geology/geophysics, fisheries and environmental management) and in safety of navigation. An ad hoc working group on the Sea of Japan should be established to elaborate and Implement such cooperative efforts. Mark J. Valencia is Research Associate, Resource Systems Institute, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822, USA.

‘J.R.V. Prescott, ‘Maritime jurisdiction in East Asian Seas’, Occasional Paper No 4, Environment and Policy Institute, EastWest Center, Honolulu, HI, 1987.

0308-597~~/060507-20

For millenia, the Sea of Japan has served as a conduit for the flow of culture between the Asian mainland and Japan and for the exchange of people and goods between the two. However, during recent history, the economies of the coastal portions of all the countries bordering the sea have lagged behind development of their opposite coasts. The use of the sea’s resources could stimulate economic growth along its coasts and thus help to reduce the internal economic gap in each country. As the sea’s coastal countries strive to develop and improve the welfare of their people, an optimal use of sea resources could be the beginning of a new era of cooperation. Opening a new chapter in cooperative use of the sea’s resources may help fulfil for the USSR, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) the promise of the Pacific Age and turn this sea from a zone of conflict and isolation into a zone of peace and prosperity. When all the coastal States extend their jurisdictions, no area in the sea will be left unclaimed and some claims may overlap (Figure 1). Tok-do, or Takeshima, consists of two tiny islets 18 nautical miles (33.3 kilometres) east of South Korea’s Uilung-do and 31 nautical miles (57.4 kilometres) northwest of the Japanese Dogo. Tok-do is uninhabitable, and under the Law of the Sea Convention (LOS Convention) should not have an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.’ Since 19.52Japan and South Korea have disputed the ownership of this island, which could permit claims to about 16 600 square nautical miles (56 938 square kiIometres) of sea and seabed if it is used as the basis of a median line. Tok-do is occupied by South Korea. Whichever country eventually owns the islands will have to negotiate a boundary with the USSR. There is also a potential problem in the sea between North Korea and South Korea and between North Korea and the USSR. The boundary of North Korea’s claimed military warning zone and apparentfy that of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extend beyond hypothetjcal equidistant lines with both neighbouring countries. North Korea’s potential EEZ would even extend beyond a hypothetical equidistant line with Japan based on Japanese ownership of Takeshima (Figure 1).

@ 1990 Su~e~o~h-Heinemann

Ltd

507

Figure 1. Jurisdictional equidistance

claims

and

lines.

Sources: J.R.V. Prescott, ‘Maritime jurisdiction in East Asian Seas’, Occasional Paper No 4, Environment and Policy Institute, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii 1987; Office of the Geographer, Department of State, United States of America, Potential Maritime Zones of Northeast Asia, Washington DC; Choon-ho Park, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, Seoul National University Press, Seoul, 1983.

‘ibid.

508

There are about 26 islands in the volcanic chain which links Hokkaido with the Kamchatka Peninsula. The ownership of four islands, the so-called Northern Territories, has been disputed by Japan and the USSR since 1945, when the USSR gained the Kurile Islands at the end of the second world war. 2 Both countries have claimed maritime jurisdiction around the disputed islands, but the USSR controls the waters there, and Japanese fishermen plying their trade must secure licences to fish legally. These unresolved boundaries increase the danger of endless international disputes, especially as the coastal countries turn their attention more fully to exploiting the sea’s resources. In fact, the relative absence of disputes over the use of the sea so far may be less a result of deliberate policy than of good fortune, in that individual nations have so far been cautious in their policies to manage the sea. The management of the sea is especially complicated in that it is surrounded by nations that share the same historical and cultural background, but differ in internal political systems, external political and economic alignment, and levels of economic development. Therefore, the sea has also been a

MARINE

POLICY

November 1990

Sea

of Japan: trans~ationai marine resource issues and possibie cooperative respanses

centre of miiitary interest and rivalry. For the past four decades the political environment in the region has not permitted cooperative ocean resource management programmes to be formulated by all the neighbouring nations. For a peaceful future it is thus imperative for the coastal nations to realize the importance of full regional cooperation. If Chinese and North Korean labour resources could be combined with South Korean and Japanese capital and technology to develop Soviet natural resources, the Sea of Japan could indeed become a thriving region of peace, cooperation and prosperity. At present there are insufficient consultations among the coastal nations on this or any other matter. In addition, many of the existing national management policies or bilateral management programmes for the sea have been designed and carried out with insufficient attention to the transnational nature of the resources and industries that the sea harbours and supports. Recent East-West Center Conferences in Niigata (1988) and Nakhodka (1989), assembled marine policy makers and scholars from the region to explore, from national perspectives, the resources and their uses, and to make some tentative possibilities for regional cooperation in their management. The conferences fostered a spirit of cooperation and created an awareness by scholars and policy makers, individually and collectively, of the policies and perspectives of neighbouring countries, and of the advantages and disadvantages of regional harmonization of some policies. This paper summarizes presentations and discussions at those meetings.”

Fisheries4

3For greater detail on the 1988 Niigata Conference, see Mark. J. Valencia. ‘International conference on the Sea of Japan: transnational ocean resource management issues and options for cooperation’, Occasional Paper No IO, Environment and Policy institute, East-West Center, Honolulu. HI, 1989. %hiro Chikuni, ‘The fish resources of the northwest Pacific’. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No 266, Rome, 1985; Shiro Chikuni, ‘Fishery resources and fisheries’, paper prepared for the Sea of Japan Conference, Niigata, Japan, 1 l-14 October 1988. 5Tsuneo Akaha, ‘The post-war JapaneseSoviet and Japanese-Korean fisheries regimes and possible international cooperation’, paper prepared for the Sea of Japan Conference, Niigata, Japan, 1 l-14 October 1988.

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1990

There is little information on fish catches and the status of stocks in the western part of the sea. The North Korean catch may be very high almost as high as that of Japan, which is about 2.5 million tons (Table 1). Total production increased from about 9 million tons in 1982 to 12 million tons in 1985. Most conventional species are fully exploited but the total catch might be increased to about 13 million tons. The species composition of the catch has changed. This may be due in part to use of different fishing gear but it probably also implies changes in the ecosystem for both demersal and pelagic fish. Coastal fisheries stocks are in reasonable shape but there is concern about the stocks of flying fish, Pacific herring, sandfish, halibut, Alaska pollack, and Japanese sardine. Exchange of information and cooperation in fisheries research and management is necessary and urgent. Tra~natio~al issues and possible cooperative response?

The boundary issues complicate the implementation of national fisheries regulations in this area under the LOS Convention. Only North Korea has deciared an EEZ, but Japan and the USSR have declared fisheries zones (although Japan applies the zone incompletely). Preexisting treaties between Japan and South Korea are incorporated in the Japanese extended fisheries zone legislation. Implementation of national regulations in the Southern Kurile Islands is hazardous at best. The lack of a South Korean declaration of a fisheries zone avoids broader issues with Japan and North Korea. For the most part, provisions of the LOS Convention relating to highly migratory species, marine mammals, anadromous and catadro509

Table 1. Estimated annual region’ (‘000 tons). Species type

Japanb

fish Salmon Demersal fish Pelagic fish Other fish Subtotal

66 670 1 106 181 2 031

Other animals and seaweeds II Shrimpsiprawns Crabs 75 Cephalopods 188 Shellfish 132 Other animals 13 Seaweeds 37 Subtotal 455 TO&l

2

486

p~~uction

by country

10 1 890 240 90 2 230

6 5 30 60 10 209 131

and species

type taken

South Koread

USSR”

114 26 14 156

99 31 1 146’ 243 5 141

175 112 2517 531 9 558

1 31 40 12 2 5 91

19 112 286 210 30 67 723

5 228

IO 277

1

28 6 5 5

46

2 361

Source: Table from S. Chikuni, ‘The Fish Resources of the Northwest Pacific’, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No 266, Rome, 1985. aThe FAO statistical area for reportmg of fish catch covers the entire Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk plus a part of the Northwest Pacific Ocean along the Kurile islands. “Source: Japanese Year&ok of Fisheries Sfalistics, The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Government of Japan, 1983, 1984, and 1985. Average of three years, 1983-85. The statistics cover the no~heastern part of Hokkatdo and the southern part of the Sea of Japan. “Estimates based on information collected by the four FAOlUNDP missions sent to North Korea, 1976-86. Average of three years, 1982-84. Estimates include production from the Yellow Sea along the west coast. dSource: Korean Yearbook of Fisheries Sfatistics, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Republic of Korea, 1983, 1984. Statistics cover the two provinces bordering the Sea of Japan (Gang weon-di and Kyeong sang buk-do). Refers only

from the defined

Total

to the ‘adjacent water fisheries’. excluding the ‘distant fisheries’. Average of two years, 198384. ‘Source: FAO Yearbook of Fishery Statisfics, Catches and Landings, FAO, Rome, 1986. Statistics cover the entire Northwest Pacific (FAO Fishing Area 61) as the nominal catch statistrcs are not separable by subregions (seas). Average of four years, 1983-86. ‘Pacific herring, 160 248 tons; Pacific saury, 21 595 tons; Japanese sardine, 736 909 tons; and Japanese chub mackerel, 227 380 tons. The catch of the last two species (totailing about 967 000 tons) has been taken mostly from Japanese waters mainly along the Sea of Japan coast, outside the region, and partly along the Sea of Japan coast. Qln addition to the collection of natural seaweeds, a large amount of seaweed would have been produced by aquaculture (North Korea, 1984). The seaweed culture has been Intense in Japan and South Korea. Aquaculture production has been excluded from this review Note: Subtotals are probably incomplete.

mous stocks, and sedentary species pertain to cooperation among coastal States and non-coastal nations fishing certain species. Still, the management of these stocks within national jurisdiction is expected to conform to international standards. The USSR claims sovereign rights over ‘migratory’ species in its 200 nautical mile fishing zone and outside this zone, except when inside the territorial waters, fishing zones, or EEZs of coastal States recognized by the USSR. This provision would appear to apply more to anadromous species than to highly migratory species, but a clear distinction is not made. Japan adopts exactly the opposite position, allowing fishing for highly migratory species to occur with its waters. Japan’s listing of highly migratory species differs substantially from that of the LOS Convention, excluding pomfrets, sauries, dolphins, sharks, and cetaceans. South Korea does not have special regulations for highly migratory species in its territorial sea. North Korea is silent on highly migratory species. North Korea is suspected of catching substantial quantities of salmon in the sea to its east, but catch statistics and information on production of salmon from its rivers are not available. The harvest of salmon by North Korea in the absence of domestic production would be an indication of lack of adherence on the LOS Convention anadromous species provision. South Korea reports no harvest of salmon. Catadromous species are not mentioned in any of the countries’ legislation.

510

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Sea of Japan: trans~at~o~ul marine resource issues and possible

cooperative

responses

Cooperation

Five bilateral fisheries agreements currently exist in the region: (1) the Japan-USSR agreement on fishing other than salmon in the counterpart’s jurisdictional waters, (2) the Japan-USSR agreement on Japanese high sea salmon fishing, (3) the Japan-South Korea agreement on fishing by both countries in the joint regulatory zone, (4) the North Korea-Japan agreement on Japanese fishing in the jurisdictional waters of North Korea, and (5) the North Korea-USSR agreement on fishing in each of the jurisdictional waters.’ Clearly Japan is the common ingredient in these arrangements. The absence of dipIomatic recognition and direct contact between the USSR and South Korea throughout the post-war period has meant there are no fisheries relations between Moscow and Seoul from which to deduce future patterns of cooperation. Nor are there trilateral fisheries relations involving Japan, the USSR, and South Korea. The feasibility of future cooperation between the three over the management of fishery resources in the Sea of Japan will thus depend on the stability of the bilateral fisheries regimes that have been constructed between them and the willingness of the three countries to adjust and adapt those regimes to meet the requirements of poiicy coordination in this arena. Marine living resources often traverse maritime boundaries of neighbouring States, rendering unilateral, national resource assessments less than complete and sometimes quite inadequate. Fishery resources in the Sea of Japan are no exception. This observation applies particularly to those anadromous species that spend part of their migratory life in the Sea of Japan, especially pink salmon (Uncorhynchus gorhuscha) and cherry salmon (Oncorhyrzchus masou). Since the establishment of 200 nautical mile zones by the USSR and Japan in 1977, Japan has been forced to harvest pink salmon only in its southernmost area of distribution in the Sea of Japan, causing a great deal of difficulty for Japanese driftnet and long-line fisheries in the area. If careful assessments of the stock indicate significant improvement, Japan would certainly like to harvest a share. Japan has recently succeeded in the artificial propagation of cherry salmon larvae and is now exploring ways of developing them to sustainable levels on a stable and efficient basis. Certainly, the technology developed by Japan would be of interest to the USSR and both Koreas. Fishery resource management requires reliable information on the status of the resources in demand. The parties to the bilateral fisheries agreements often come up with different and competing resource assessments. Multinational cooperation would enhance the coastal States’ ability to assess the status of other valued stocks in the Sea of Japan. Careful monitoring of these stocks is needed in view of their erratic ~uctuations and, in some cases, deterioration. Several species winter, spawn in, or migrate across Chinese waters and thus PR China should atso be involved in cooperative management schemes. The fisheries interests of Japan, the USSR, and South Korea are not always mutually exclusive. A good example is the Soviet reliance on herring, which is not so highly valued in Japan, and the Japanese appreciation of Alaska pollack, which the USSR tends to undervalue. Although the Northern Islands issue continues to be a problem between Japan and the USSR, fisheries joint ventures there may be possible. As an example, Japan and the USSR agreed in 1988 to establish a joini venture company to construct salmon hatcheries in Sakhalin and to

“Ibid.

GAMINE

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1990

511

Sea of Japan: Iran5

‘Ibid. ‘Ibid.

512

marine resource

1.wues and possible cooperarive responses harvest the fruit of their joint efforts.’ To generate funding for the joint venture, Japan was allowed to catch up to 2 000 tons of salmon in the Soviet EEZ east of the Kuriles during the second half of July 1988. In return, Japan was required to pay 1 750 000 rubles (about 380 million yen) in fishing fees. Bilateral consultation among scientists and fisheries experts has also become a permanent feature of the Japan-USSR fisheries regime. The plan for scientific-technological cooperation in 1988, for example, included seven topics relating to the study of salmon fisheries and six topics under the rubric of the study of marine fish and invertebrates, as well as exchange of information on all these projects. Among these arc two projects that study the ecology and the changes in the quantitative condition of squids in the areas of the Sea of Japan under Japanese and Soviet jurisdiction. The present Japan-USSR bilateral fisheries regime also includes private-level arrangements (1) for Japanese crab fishing off Sakhalin in the Sea of Okhotsk, and in the Sea of Japan in exchange for fisheries cooperation fees; (2) for Japanese sea kelp and sea urchin fisheries around the USSR-controlled Kaigara Island, east of Hokkaido; (3) for Japanese purchase at sea of Alaska pollack and herring; and (4) for Japanese madara (Gadus macrocephalus) dragnet fishing in the Soviet EEZ. These recent developments in the Japan-USSR fisheries regime indicate increasing Soviet interest in cooperative ventures in fishery resource management. What would the countries lose if no further cooperation developed? Japan would suffer enormous losses if the entire Sea of Japan was enclosed by the four surrounding countries. One estimate of Japanese loss that would result from the division of the sea by the four countries in accordance with the median line principle was 35% of its squid angling fisheries (or 80 000 tons), about 60% of its offshore dragnet fisheries (200 000 tons), and about 40% of its crab pot fisheries (9 000 tons).x Put another way, Japan would lose four major fishing grounds entirely, 90% of one fishing area, 40% of two fishing grounds, 25% of another area, 10% of two more areas, and 1% of one other fishing area. Japan would like to undertake joint scientific studies of fishery resources, joint determination of the total fish quota for each of the four countries, and to establish joint resource conservation zones, joint fishing zones, and joint fishery propagation projects. One possibility would be for Japan to allow access to part of its trawl fishery in the Sea of Japan in return for Japanese access to its neighbours’ coastal waters. Japan occupies the pivotal position regarding possible cooperation in the management of fishery resources in the Sea of Japan. It has the longest coastline facing this semi-enclosed sea. It has also been the most extensive user and beneficiary of the marine living resources in the sea. It therefore depends more heavily than either the USSR or South Korea on these resources. Furthermore, Japan has the most advanced scientific and technological expertise in the use of marine living resources. Finally, it has diplomatic or other ties to the other two parties, while South Korea and the USSR - despite recent signs of reciprocal warming have been hostile throughout the post-war period and are still some distance from establishing diplomatic ties. Japan clearly understands the need to cooperate with the USSR and South Korea. Technical expertise for fishery resource management is growing in Japan, although so far the most promising has been in fisheries production rather than conservation and rational use of fishery

MARINE

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1990

Sea

of Japan: ~ra~na~~on~l marine resource issues and possible cooperative responses

Table 2. Offshore petroleum production and potential. Countrylbasin

Oil (thousand barrels per day) North Korea South Korea Japan Offshore Aga-Oki Field Higashi (East) Niigata Kubiki Field Sarukawa Field USSRC~d Far East

Gas (million tt3 per day)

142.258

13.0

11900 50

Resources (estimated ultimate recoverable)

Cumulative production

Production

61 920 -e

Proved reserves

Oil (million barrels)

Gas (trillion tt3)

Oil (million barrels)

Gas (trillion W

Oil (mlllion barrels)

Gas (trlllion ft3)

133.16’

0.995h

5417” 4 585’ 9.49c 8.76C 10.95c 8.76’ 59 000 240 730 21900-365100~

23 31.5’ 19 658” 305.46’ 147.34= 132.97c 7.19= 1 550 000 4.2r.e

578

1 osO*

“Oil and Gas Journal, Vol 85, No 52, 1967, p 36. ?‘etroleum News, January 1987. ‘Edward Miles et al, Atlas of Marine Use in the iVorff~ Pacific Region, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1982. ‘G. Ulmishek and W. Harrison. ‘Oil and gas developments in USSR in 1983-1985’, American Association of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin, Vol 70, No 10. pp 1566-1574. ‘Minimal due to lack of market. ‘Chayvo field. gOkha field. “Total potential in Sakhalin.

resources. Institutional arrangements should not be too difficult as Japan has a long history of dealing with its neighbours. The absence of diplomatic relations between the USSR and South Korea will prove an obstacle to the development of trilateral cooperative arrangements among the three, but once normalization of relations between the USSR and the Republic of Korea gathers steam, the need to coordinate their fishery policies may facilitate improvement of overall relations, just as Japan-USSR and Japan-South Korea fisheries agreements positively influenced the two bilateral relationships in general in the 1950s and 1960s. Although cooperative management of fishery resources has been proposed in the past by many fisheries experts, it has remained a largely unrealistic goal. However, circumstances today are far more favourabfe. If Japan, the USSR, South Korea, North Korea and PR China are to maintain their status as fishing nations, they must learn to cooperate in the effective management and efficient use of the bountiful yet bounded living resources of the Sea of Japan. This includes limits on catch and effort, no-fishing zones, regulations on gears, mesh size, and fish length and the international coordination of these measures and management through agreement. The alternative - of conflicting claims and unbridled competition - will surely bring about the deterioration of those resources, and in the end harm those whose livelihood depends critically on the stable supply of marine living resources over many decades to come.

Hydrocarbons and minerals’ Thomas WC. Hilde, ‘Geological framework and petroleum prospects in the Japan Sea’, paper prepared for the Sea of Japan Conference, Niigata, Japan, 11-14 October 1988; T.W.C. Hilde, and J.M. Wageman, ‘Structure and origin of the Japan Sea’, in P.J. Coleman, ed, Western Pacific: Island Arcs, Marginal Seas, Geochemistry, American Geophysical Union Memoirs, Taylor and Francis, New York, NY, 1973, pp 415-434.

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Prospects for substantial discoveries of hydrocarbons and minerals in production occurs off the Japan Sea are uncertain. Hydrocarbon southern Sakhafin, on the coast of Hokkaido and in the Tsushima Basin along the southwest coast of Honshu; there is further potential in these areas (Table 2). Possible strategies include more extensive and deeper drilling along Honshu, deeper water exploration on the Yamato Rise and Korea Plateau and in Tsushima and Tartary Basins at the southern and northern extremes of the Japan Sea, respectively, and exploration 513

Sea of Japan: transnational marine resource issue& and possible cooperative responxc

Figure 2. Structures Japan that petroleum.

may

of the Sea of be prospective for

Source: Based on Thomas W.C. Hilde, ‘Geographical framework and petroleum prospects in the Japan Sea’, paper prepared for the Sea of Japan Conference, Niigata, Japan, 11-14 October 1988.

along its western margin where rifted margin structures may contain substantial sedimentary basins as suggested by SeaSat derived gravity anomalies (Figure 2). Conditions favourable for petroleum accumulations in thick elastic wedges on the Tsushima/Ullung Basin margin include: (1) source beds with appropriate thermal-maturation conditions for petroleum generation, (2) reservoir rocks of sufficient porosity and permeability to allow migration and accumulation of hydrocarbons, and (3) structural or stratigraphic traps. Gas was evident in the Yamato Basin and the Japan Basin sediments drilled by the Deep Sea Drilling Program. With predictions that oil prices will remain low into the 21st century, production from deep waters may not be justified unless there is a truly major discovery.

514

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Sea of Japan: transnational marine resource issues and possible cooperative responses “‘Mark J. Valencia, ‘The sea between Japan, Korea, and the Soviet Union: geology, petroleum potential, jurisdictional claims, and joint development’, paper prepared for the Sea of Japan Conference, Niigata, Japan, 1 l-l 4 October 1988. “Gerald Segal, ‘Moscow adopts a new realistic line on Japan’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 October 1988, pp 28-30. “‘Russia very pacific about the Pacific’, The Economist, 15 October 1988, p 42. 13Harun Ariffin, ‘The Malaysian philosophy of joint development’, in Mark J. Valencia, ed, Geology and Hydrocarbon Potential of the South China Sea and Possibilities of Joint Development, Pergamon Press, New York, 1985, pp 533-544; Prakong Polahan, ‘Thailand-Malaysia Memorandum of Understanding’, in Mark J. Valencia, ed The South China Sea: Hvdrocarbon Potential and Possibilities oi Joint Development, Pergamon Press, New York, 1981, pp 3355-3357; Mark J. Valencia, Southeast Asian Seas: Oil Under Troubled Waters, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1985; Mark J. Valencia, ‘Taming troubled waters: joint development of oil and mineral resources in overlapping jurisdictional zones’, San Diego Law Review, Vol23, No 3, 1986, pp 661-684. 14Masahiro Mivoshi. ‘The Jaoan-South Korea agreement of joint deveiopment of the continental shelf’, in Mark J. Valencia, ed, Geology and Hydrocarbon Potential of the South China Sea and Possibilities of Joint Development, Pergamon Press, New 1985, pp 545-553; Masahiro York, Miyoshi, ‘Licensing in Japan-South Korea joint development arrangement’, paper prepared for the Third East-West Center Workshop on the Hydrocarbon Potential of the South China Sea and Possibilities of Joint Development, Bangkok, Thailand, 1985; Choon-Ho Park, ‘Joint development of mineral resources in disputed waters: the case of Japan and South Korea in the East China Sea’, in Mark J. Valencia, ed, The South China Sea: Hydrocarbon Potential and Possibilities of Joint Development, Pergamon Press, New York, 1335-l 354; Masayuki 1981, PP Takeyama, ‘Japan’s foreign negotiations over offshore petroleum development: an analysis of decision making in the JapanKorea joint continental shelf development program’, in Robert L. Friedheim et al, eds, Japan and the New Ocean Regime, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1984, pp 27f5313. “Eric Blissenbach and A. Nawab, ‘Metalliferous sediments of the sea bed’, in E. Borgese and N. Ginsburg, eds, Ocean Yea>book 3, University of Chicago Press, Chicaao. 1982. DD 77-104: Ali A. ElHakim, The Middk’Eastern States and the Law of the Sea, Syracuse University Press, NY, 1979; K.O. Emery et al, ‘Summary of hot brines and heavy metal deposits in the Red Sea’, in E. Deaens and b. Ross, eds, Hot Brines and Recent Heavy Metal Deposits in the Red Sea, continued on p 576

MARINE

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Hydrothermal polymetallic deposits have been discovered in the Okinawa Trough and the Mariana Trough, both typical back-arc basins associated with plate subduction zones. Further, Kuroko ores which contain copper, lead, zinc, cadmium, gold and silver are distributed along the western coast of Honshu Island, in association with volcanic rocks. These ores are thought to be the remains of submarine polymetallic deposits formed during the spreading of the Sea of Japan as a back-arc basin. Gold-bearing deposits have been found on Loihi, an active submarine volcano at the extreme southwest end of the Hawaiian chain. These facts may indicate ore potential either in the former spreading zones in the Sea of Japan, or in association with formerly active submarine volcanos.

Transnational

issues and possible

cooperative

responses”

At stake in the southern Sea of Japan is a polyhedron encompassing the northeastern Tsushima Basin and the southwestern Yamato Rise and Trough. If Japan owns Takeshima (Tok-do), it will obtain a small northeastern portion of the Tsushima Basin, and almost the entire Yamato Rise and Trough, including an area of possible seafloor spreading and any concomitant metallic sulphide deposits. If South Korea owns Tok-do, then it would gain the northeastern portion of the Tsushima Basin as well as the southwestern end of the Yamato Rise and Trough. The Japanese concession system overlaps the equidistant line and includes most of the disputed area while carefully skirting South Korea’s ‘special maritime zone’. Japan’s concession blocks even overlap North Korea’s potential EEZ boundary. The Kurile dispute has not prevented mutually beneficial arrangements from being made between Japan and the USSR in other areas and they now seem to be willing to discuss the issue. Soviet leader Gorbachev indicated to Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone in Moscow that there is a chance of reviving the aborted 1956 agreement between the two countries, providing for the return of the southeastern two islands to Japan. It has also been hinted that joint ventures on the other two islands and cooperative exploitation of the fish in the surrounding waters might be possible.” Soviet economists have even suggested co-ownership of the four disputed islands or leasing all or part of the islands to Japan.” Joint development is one possible solution to overlapping claims in areas with petroleum potential, such as in the southern and northern sea. Joint development is a process in which the boundary dispute is set aside and the parties agree jointly to explore and develop any resources in an agreed area. Joint development agreements exist between Thailand and Malaysia,‘” the Republic of Korea and Japan,14 Sudan and Saudi Arabia, among others.‘” A similar arrangement has been recommended for Tunisia and Libya.16 Joint development is clearly not the optimal or permanent solution to the problem of unresolved boundaries. However, in some situations it may be the only alternative to no action, and thus no hydrocarbon development or, worse, to confrontation and conflict. In an energy-poor world, with many offshore areas with hydrocarbon potential claimed by more than one needy country, joint development is an idea whose time has come. Indeed, it will appear increasingly attractive as the need for oil intensifies and precedents mount. What is needed is a series of technical and policy conferences to explore the possibilities for joint

515

Sea of Japan: transnational

marine resource issues and possible cooperative respot~ses

js

\ I

SEA OF/APAN

;
Figure 3. Korea

Strait

traffic

B1 =,( ,_ (‘,‘_ f :;__. an, “.“‘, i

in 1987.

Source: Based on Hal Olson and Joseph Morgan, ‘The structure of shipping in the Sea of Japan’, paper prepared for the Sea of Japan Conference, Niigata, Japan, 1 l14 October 1988, (data from Lloyd’s Maritime Information Services).

516

SEA OF JAPAN KOREA STRAIT TRAFFI To selected ports-l 987

C i

/

I”

development disputes.

continued from p 5 15 Springer-Verlag, New York, 1969. “%J Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunikt v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), pp 278, 321 (Judgment of 24 February, Eversen, J, dissenting), 1982. Reprinted in 21 ILM, 225, 295. 17Edgar Gold, ‘Shipping in the Sea of Japan: perspectives on present and future trends’, paper prepared for the Sea of Japan Conference, Niigata, Japan, 1 l-l 4 October 1988; Hal Olson and Joseph Morgan, ‘The structure of shipping in the Sea of Japan’, paper prepared for the Sea of Japan Conference, Niigata, Japan, 11-14 October 1988; Teruji Sakiyama, ‘Direction of international trade and potentials of development across the sea’, paper prepared for the Sea of Japan Conference, Niigata, Japan, 1 l-l 4 October 1988.

v

I’ 1”

as well as other

11,

approaches

/II/

for the resolution

,I

of these

For all the countries considered here, the Sea of Japan borders on their less developed portions and the sea’s resources could be used to stimulate growth in these less-developed areas of each country. If political relations warm, trade across the Sea of Japan may well return to pre-war levels (Figure 3). However, as the Soviet Far East develops, trade may flow to Japan’s Pacific ports unless internal policy decisions to develop its west coast ports are taken and implemented. The Korea Strait is already one of the busiest in the world (Figure 4). With growth, it will become even more congested. The likelihood of accidents involving tankers and other vessels carrying potential pollutants will increase and a stricter navigation regime may be necessary. Political tension involving, for example, the jurisdictional question of Tok-do/Takeshima and the military zones of both North Korea and South Korea, could interfere with shipping in the region.

MARINE

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1990

Sea of Japan: transnational marine resource issues and possible cooperative responses

Figure

4.

Sea of Japan

marine

traffic

in 1987. Source: Based on Hal Olson and Joseph Morgan, ‘The structure of shipping in the Sea of Japan’, paper prepared for the Sea of Japan Conference, Niigata, Japan, 1 l14 October 1988 (data from Lloyd’s Maritime Information Services).

Transnational issues and possible cooperative responses

“Tadao Kuribayashi, ‘The new ocean regime and Japan’, Ocean Development and International Law,Vol 11, 1982, p 103. ‘Transnational IgThomas A. Mensah, issues and possible co-operative responses: navigation’, paper delivered to the International Conference on the Yellow Sea held at the East-West Center, Honolulu, HI, 23-27 June 1987. For more detail, see Mark J. Valencia, ‘International Conference on the Yellow Sea’ Occasional Paper No 3, East-West Environment and Policy Institute, 1987.

MARINE

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November

1990

Shipping casualties in the channels of the Korea Strait and the area off the southern coast of South Korea can be heavy.‘s Political tensions have overshadowed concerns related to the shipping sector, such as freedom of navigation, safety of shipping, marine pollution control, vessel accident contingency planning, and coordination of vessel traffic. For the benefit of all vessels operating within the Sea of Japan region, a coordinated effort to regulate maritime traffic is needed. Such effort could take the form of cooperative, non-political initiatives among the respective government agencies, in addition to the possible formation of an effective international regional organization. It is only through a regional approach that maximum utilization of all aspects of the shipping sector may be realized. Possible activities might include weather monitoring and broadcasting, navigation and traffic separation schemes. International conventions” Japan,

the

USSR,

North

and

South

Korea

are all members

of the

517

Sea of Japan: fransnational marine resource hues

urzd possible cooperative

re~pmses

Table 3. Status of IMO conventions

as of 25 April 1988.

Country

Convention

PR China North Korea Japan South Korea USSR

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10. 13, 14, 16. 20, 23, 24, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 16, 17, 18, 19 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 16. 19, 20, 21, 23, 26. 32, 39, 40 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. 9, 13, 14, 16, 23, 40 ~,2,3,4,5,6,7,9,10,13,14,15,16.17,18.19,20.21.22,23,26,30,33,34,35. 37, 38, 40

No

Source. Mensah, op tit, Ref 19 Key: List of Conventions 1. International Maritime Organization. 2. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. International Convention for the Safety of 3. Life at Sea, 1978 Protocol International Convention on Load Lines. 4. 5. International Convention on Tonnaae of Ships. Regulations 6. Convention on International for Preventing Collision at Sea. International Convention for Safe Contain7. ers. Convention on Safety of 0. International Fishing Vessels. 9. International Convention on Standards of Training. Certification and Watchkeepmg for Seafarers. International Convention on Maritime 10. Search and Rescue. 11. Special Trade Passenger Ships Agreement. 12. Protocol on Space Requirements for Special Trade Passenger Ships. 13. Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization. International Maritime Satellite Organiza14. tion Operating Agreement. 15. Convention on the Facilitation of Maritime Traffic. 16. Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Annex 112. 17. Convention for the PreventIon of Pollution from Ships, Annex 3. 18. Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Annex 4. 19. Convention for the PreventIon of Pollution from Ships, Annex 5. Convention on the Prevention of Marine 20. Pollution by Dumping. International Convention Relating to In21. tervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties.

*“G Plant > ‘International traffic separation schemes in the new law of the sea’, Marine Policy, Vol 9, No 2, April 1985. “Maritime Safety Agency, Annual Reporf on Maritime Safety, International Affairs Division, Tokyo, December 1987.

518

22.

23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

26.

29.

30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37 38.

39. 40

International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1973 Protocol. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1976 Protocol. International Convention on Civbl Liability for Oil Pollution Damaae. 1984 Protocol. Convention on the Eitablishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1976 Protocol. Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for 011 Pollution Damage, 1984 Protocol Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material. Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea. Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea, 1976 Protocol. Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims. International Convention on Load Lines, 1971 Amendment. International Convention on Load Lines, 1975 Amendment. International Convention on Load Lines, 1979 Amendment. International Convention on Load Lines, 1983 Amendment. Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization, 1985 Amendment. International Maritime Satellite Organization Operating Agreement, 1985 Amendment. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1978 Protocol International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code.

International Maritime Organization (IMO). However, many IMO conventions have not been ratified by all of these nations. Of the 40 conventions, including the IMO Convention itself. the USSR has ratified 28; Japan, 22; South Korea, 13; and North Korea, 9 (Table 3). In addition to IMO, several other international organizations are active in the maritime sector. The International Labour Organization (ILO)‘” an agency established to help promote basic workers’ rights, has developed specific conventions relating to seafarers. Of the 36 Labour Conventions concerning seafarers, the USSR has ratified nine and Japan eleven. Neither North nor South Korea has ratified any of these conventions. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has also developed three conventions relating to maritime matters.” First, the Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences. the primary objective of which is the improvement of the

MARINE

POLICY

November

1990

Sea of Japan:

transnational

marine

resource issues and possible cooperative

responses

liner conference system, has been signed by South Korea and the USSR but not by Japan and North Korea. Second, UNCTAD’s UN Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, designed to facilitate the continued expansion of international multimodal transport, has been signed by Japan and the USSR but not by North Korea nor by South Korea. Third, UNCTAD’s UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships has been formulated to combat ‘open registries’ by ensuring that a real link exists between a State and ships flying its flag. Although none of the States in this region operates an ‘open registry’, South Korea and the USSR appear to support this convention while Japan, with the world’s third largest fleet, has expressed opposition. Another important maritime organization is the Comite Maritime International (CMI). ** The principal aims of this non-governmental international organization are the unification of maritime and commercial law and the promotion of national associations of maritime law. Japan, South Korea, and the USSR are members. Navigational

‘*Edgar Gold, ‘Vessel traffic regulation: the interface of maritime safety and operational freedom’, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol 14, January 1983, pp l-21. 23Mensah, op cir, Ref 19. Whoon-Ho Park, East Asia and the Law of the Sea, Seoul National University Press, Seoul, 1983. 25Tsuneo Akaha, Japan in Global Ocean Politics, Law of the Sea Institute and the University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, HI, 1985.

MARINE

POLICY

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1990

regime?3

The USSR, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea have all declared territorial seas of 12 nautical miles. However, both Japan and South Korea have modified their territorial sea to three nautical miles in the Korea Straitz4 This strait is an important regional navigational area connecting the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea and therefore has been designated as a strait used for international navigation. These declarations of three nautical mile territorial seas provide a high-seas ‘corridor’ through which ships may transit without entering either States’ territorial seas. Despite this corridor, tension still exists because South Korea does not approve of the number of Soviet naval vessels currently using this route. However, shipping through the strait continues unabated. Japan has also declared territorial seas of three nautical miles width in the Soya Strait, Tsugami Strait, and Osumi Strait.25 Hopefully the Tok-do/Takeshima dispute will not affect navigation in the region. There is also a disagreement as to whether Cheju Strait, a body of water that lies between South Korea’s mainland and its Cheju Island, is a strait used for international navigation. South Korea would prefer that foreign vessels used the seaward side of the island. Foreign vessels claim that this route is not as convenient and continue to use the strait between the island and the mainland. According to the LOS Convention, if the seaward route is in fact as convenient as the route via the strait, then the seaward route must be used. In addition to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, North Korea has declared a 200 nautical mile EEZ within which a 50 nautical mile area has been designated as a ‘military boundaries zone’. Controversy has arisen with respect to navigational restrictions imposed within the military zone, where North Korea has declared a prohibition on both navigation and overflight unless previous authorization has been granted. This restriction applies to foreign merchant ships and military vessels. It is questionable whether this restriction conforms with the LOS Convention. The maritime boundary between North and South Korea is probably the most sensitive area in the Sea of Japan because of the precarious relationship existing between these two States. At present, there is no cooperation and information-sharing between these States on maritime

519

Sea of Japan:

transnational marine resource issues and possible cooperative responses

Although the fixing of the various maritime boundaries and the delimitation of the continental shelf of the Sea of Japan may be considerably delayed by poor relations between the two Koreas, that should not necessarily hinder other cooperation or undermine the achievement of a minimum level of stability in the area. While well-travelled international straits are focal points of vessel traffic and often of congestion, there are no IMO-approved traffic separation schemes (TSS) in the Sea of Japan straits. The only IMOapproved TSS in the Sea of Japan are based on proposals of the USSR and are off Ostrovnoi Point and in the approaches to the Gulf of Nakhodka.26 Outside the Sea of Japan are two TSS, also IMOapproved, for Aniwa Cape and the Fourth Kuril Strait. Only one of these is concerned with a strait and that is not a major strait. In the initial stage of adoption of these TSS, Japan expressed reservations,” but did not pursue the matter, and they were adopted as they were said to have been ‘implemented on a voluntary basis since 1972’. The USSR interprets the LOS Convention to the effect that a State may require innocent passage of warships to be carried out only by determined routes and traffic separation schemes. 28 This interpretation would not receive universal approval. Some areas of straits remain outside the putative application of the transit passage regime: Okushiiri-kaikyo, Rishiri-kaikyo, and Sadokaikyo all fall within the exception of Article 31(l) of the LOS Convention, which provides that it will not apply when there exists seaward of an island and its mainland (with a strait between) a route through the high seas (or an EEZ) ‘of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics’. The Western Channel of the Korea Strait would still not become a transit passage strait if Japan extended its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles and if the East Channel provided a route of ‘similar convenience’. matters.

Possible avenues of cooperation

‘%ternational Maritime Organization, Ship’s Routing, IMO, London, 1984. “IMO, Documents NAV Xx.4; NAV XX.1 0. “E Franckx, ‘The USSR position on the innocent passage of warships through foreign territorial waters’, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol 18, No 1, January 1987, pp 35-65.

520

The Sea of Japan could eventually become a model area for whatever forms of ship management emerge in the field of safe navigation. It is an area where most of the elements that engender vessel management are found: narrow sea areas and island-fringed coastlines, intensive fishing activity combined with merchant shipping, and uncertain weather with poor visibility. In time there may be offshore installations to add another element and calls for a fairway system or safety zones. Already in its busy ports, Japan has resorted to sophisticated and effective measures involving both overall traffic guidance and specific directions to vessels. A variety of organizations is ready to assist the Sea of Japan countries in many ways and to move them toward collaboration. The IMO is available for multiple facets of shipping expertise and the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) for essential hydrographical assistance where charts are out of date, or obstructions, navigation aids and TSS need charting. For cooperation in scientific research and exchange of information and data, UNESCO and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) are available to ensure that knowledge about marine pollution and effective measures is available and in circulation. The first task which might be attempted is the compilation of an inventory of maritime issues in the region, singling out those which are not divisive in themselves, but which can provide some advantage for

MARINE

POLICY

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1990

Sea of Japan: transnational marine resource issues Table 4. Threatened species in the Sea of Japan. Whales

Fin whale (Balaenopleraphysahs) Blue whale fBa/aenooteramuscu/us) Sei whale (halaenopieraborealis) ’ Northern right whale (Eubalaena gla-

cialus) White (Beluga) whale (Defphinapterus ieucas)

_

Seals

Harbor seal (Phoca largha) Ribbon seal fPhoca fasciafa) Turt/es

Loggerhead turtle (Caretta carerta) Olive Ridley turtle (Lepidochelys oli-

vacea) Marine birds

Oriental white stork (Ciconia

ciconia

boyciana)

Japanese crested ibis (Nipponia nippon) Chinese egret (Egretta eutophotas) White-naped crane (Grus vipio) White-tailed sea eagle (Haliaeetus albicitfa)

Hooded crane (Grus monacha) Possible or near/y extinct species North Pacific gray whale (Eschrichtius robustus) Japanese sea lion (Zalophus californianus japonicus) Crested shelduck (Tadoma cristata) Ryukyu kingfisher (Halcyon miyakoensia) Relict gull (Lasrus relectus)

MARINE

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November

1990

possible cooperative responses

the region and the participants. In semi-detente, the solution of some of these issues might not even require goodwill among some of the participants in the process to realize the advantages of cooperative action. The countries might set aside those issues which raise the question of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of precedent. A common interest in the rescue of persons in distress at sea and in preserving an unpolluted marine environment are strong inducements to act in concert, even if at ‘arm’s length’. Traditionally, States could agree also to suppress piracy and other lawless maritime acts, since most States prefer law and order. This uncontentious area seems as relevant to the present as to the past. As well as the eradication of piracy, there is the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, maritime fraud and unauthorized broadcasting from ships. The States bordering the Sea of Japan might easily establish a standing mechanism of some kind between their marine law enforcement agencies (if they have not already done so) or arrive at some practical method of collaboration to detect and suppress such acts.29 There may be substantial room for manoeuvre and practical assistance by turning to the secretariats of international organizations; particularly those of the United Nations system, but not limited to those bodies. For example, all the States bordering the Sea of Japan are members of IMO and send representatives to the technical and legal bodies where the work of the organization is done. Some of these states take very active roles in the process of formulating and adopting standards. Although North Korea is a relatively recent member, it has expressed its keen interest in participating in that process. Scholarly gatherings are of great value to the process of pragmatic cooperation in maritime matters, as well as in the implementation of the new Law of the Sea. Technical and other informal coordinating mechanisms, brought about by institutions of learning and professional bodies, are powerful agents of beneficial change. In the very process of ‘lobbying’, these non-governmental groups are often influential in focusing on new solutions to old problems and in raising public consciousness of issues.

Pollution and environmental

2gMensah, op cif, Ref 19. %aruch Boxer, ‘Marine environmental protection in the Seas of Japan and. Okhotsk: issues and challenges’, paper prepared for the international Conference bn ‘the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, Nakhodka. USSR. 17-22 Seotember 1989. 3’Sequoia Shannon, ‘Valuable and vulnerable resources’, paper prepared for the Sea of Japan Conference, Niigata, Japan, 11-14 October 1988.

and

protection3’

Although marine environmental protection is a minor peripheral issue in relations among the four coastal States bordering the sea, negotiations on environmental questions permit parties to avoid direct confrontation on more controversial matters such as boundary delimitation or fisheries. Provisional agreement on environmental issues can improve the atmosphere for further discussion of more difficult questions. The Sea of Japan is already showing signs of pollution, particularly of mercury, and there are many endangered species (Table 4). If tourism is to be an available option, the sea must be kept clean from both landand sea-based sources of pollution. Transnational

issues and possible

cooperative

response.?

Apart from responses to occasional tanker accidents that have destroyed coastal fisheries, and severe public health risks from untreated industrial effluents, there has been only minimal overt recognition by the four coastal States in recent years of the long-term effects of land-source, vessel, and other forms of pollution on people and the

Sea of Japan: tramnational murine resource issues und possihlr cooperative responae.r

marine environment. Limited regional law drafting and policy development respond chiefly to IMO and law of the sea related initiatives. Scientific questions on factors affecting the health of marine species and ecosystems are poorly articulated, and the relevance of national laws and policies to regional environmental protection has not been seriously considered by coastal States. Prospects for improved transnational cooperation in resource development and use, however, depend upon better understanding of the potential for improved marine environmental protection in both coastal and open-sea areas. Several perspectives are important. They include historical characteristics of sea use and protection; differences in national views on the place of environmental law and policy in marine resource development; distinctions between resource conservation and pollution control in national programmes; relations between national and international norms and standards; the role of bilateral and multilateral formats in the definition of national rights and responsibilities towards the marine environment; institutions and organizations; and cultural factors in national approaches to marine environmental protection. Review of national legislation shows little evidence of laws and regulations being developed with specific reference to natural features or processes that may affect pollutant transport, circulation, transformation, and dispersion. Laws and policies are couched in terms that separate legal justification and intent from the reality of people, ecosystem, and place. This is not unique to this sea but is more important here because the apparent failure to relate law more directly to nature through improved scientific understanding supports a general impression of regional lack of interest in marine environmental issues. Environmental consciousness in the region must be further raised, new institutional arrangements developed and new economic theory applied. incorporating environmental benefits and pollution costs. A UNEP Regional Seas Programme should be developed and implemented for the sea. Laws must be harmonized, and cooperative monitoring implemented, particularly regarding future industrial development. Particular focus should be concentrated on ocean dumping, red tides. and the environmental hazards of expansion of nuclear power. The first step may be to form a working group to synthesize information on the state of marine pollution and dumping in the sea.

Cooperation in scientific research Although there has been some cooperative marine scientific research on the sea via the Working Party for the Western Pacific (WESTPAC), much more is necessary. This section summarizes proposals for cooperative research, and in part answers the following questions. What do we not know? What do we need to know to resolve transnational regional issues? How might we go about obtaining the required information? Geologylgeophysics-”

32Hilde, op tit, Fief 9.

522

Measurements of surface gravity, magnetic anomalies, and heat flow in the sea are nearly complete for the southeast portion. Seismic reflection studies are also nearly complete for the geologically interesting rises and basins. Comparative coverage of the rest of the sea is needed. Age determination of the seafloor has been carried out on Yamato Bank and small seamounts. It is important to an understanding of the origin of the

MARINE

POLICY

November

1990

Sea of Japan: transnational marine resource issues and possible cooperative responses

basin to date seamounts in the western part of the sea. It is also important to determine the age of the basement covered with thick sedimentary layers. This can be determined by use of samples obtained from ‘deep sea drilling’. Studies on the microstructure of the surface of the seafloor have been carried out by the submersible Shinkai 2000. The possibility of thermal vents has been discovered. Such vents may be associated with metallic sulphide deposits. The entire floor could be scanned by side-scan sonar, and interesting features checked with submersibles.

Because there is no systematic picture of the whole region, scientists cannot provide comprehensive advice to their governments. To improve the basis of rational utilization of fishery resources, each coastal State bordering the region should standardize its data on fishery resources and release them. Details of information covering all the major species currently utilized and its timely release are critically important to detecting any change occurring in the ecosystem of the living resources in the region. Frequent and reciprocal exchanges of scientists concerned with resources assessment between laboratories in different countries would intensify technical cooperation, primarily on a bilateral and ultimately on a regional basis. Each of the laboratories should encourage visits by scientists of other nations and make its own data and information available to them as they work together with national scientists. Working sessions in neutral locations by scientists from two or more nations dealing with specific species or species complexes should also be encouraged. The major research actions needed by the countries concerned are as follows: 0 0 0

0

Intensify research on fish resources. This will provide scientific data for maintaining the fish stocks and fisheries. Jointly investigate stocks which winter and spawn in the waters of the coastal countries. Cooperate in management. Each state must share the benefit and responsibility of conservation by limiting fishing effort and catch. More closed fishing zones must be established to conserve the young fish and fry, and the use of gears, the size of the mesh, and the size of fish caught must be restricted. Work with the FAO, IOC, and regional agencies. They can help coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of fish stocks in this region by organizing the exchange of oceanographic data, fishing statistics and research on marine resources and environment, and provide suggestions and information to the governments concerned.

Shippin$4

33David Fluharty, ‘National fisheries polities and regulations: in the sea between Japan, Korea and the Soviet Union’, Paper prepared for the Sea of Japan Conference, Niigata, Japan, 11-14 October 1988. 34Mensah, op cif, Ref 19.

MARINE

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November

1990

The following proposals are suggested responses to the need for the States bordering the Sea of Japan to promote positive cooperation to deal with increased vessel traffic and to coordinate the uses of the sea in an orderly manner. A major premise of this programme is that the Sea of Japan provides a good area for experimentation in pragmatic cooperation and could in time be a model area for rational management of shared uses concerned with shipping and offshore operations. A second premise is that this programme should proceed on a ‘lead

Sra of Japan:

transnational

marine

rcsourcc

issws

and pmsihle

cooprraliv~

rc’spmx.~

country’ basis, with Japan and South Korea taking initiatives and frankly acknowledging those issues for which bilateral solutions are unrealistic, as well as agreeing to avoid actions that impinge on national claims or controversies, or that establish unwanted precedents. 0

0

l l

Immediate steps might be taken within the Maritime Safety Agency of Japan and the Korea Maritime and Port Administration to study and realize coordinated responses to all matters of safety of navigation on the Japan Sea. That cooperation could include: (1) a coordinated look at flag State, port State. and coastal State rights and duties under the LOS Convention; (2) a cooperative response to needs of the fisheries community for safety of fishing vessels, as well as effective search and rescue, and measures to deal with emergencies and disasters which might occur in the Sea of Japan; (3) measures to harmonize regulatory regimes for shipping in the area, including traffic separation schemes and vessel traffic management systems and laws for offshore activities (in view of the LOS Convention); and (4) measures to coordinate publicity regarding safety zone routing of ships (separation schemes) and aids to navigation, as well as governmental requirements for entering ports and for pollution control. On the model of a Western European agreement (‘The Paris Memorandum’), a cooperative approach might be initiated for port State control of vessels entering the ports of those States of the Sea of Japan that wish to coordinate their policies for environmental protection from vessel-source pollution. Such an initiative would cover matters of inspection of vessels and prompt release thereof (with measures for bonding and other financial security) and might be widened to encompass the cooperative enforcement of fishing regulations. A cooperative approach to shipbuilding might be explored with the study of possible joint development among Japan, South Korea, and PR China. An ad hoc body might be set up on the initiative of one or more States of the region to study and assess the institutional implications of regional cooperation and to examine all the global, regional, and subregional fora in which the States of the Sea of Japan area might cooperate with the aid of third parties. Such a body would not shy away from examining issues that present a potential for conflict, but would explore the use of international organizations as focal points for data collection and cooperation in means of conflict avoidance. Publicity aspects would also be agreed as, for example, in providing for dissemination through the IMO, IHO, and others, of information on hydrography, the breadth of territorial seas, other navigational zones and special areas, and the laws governing navigation in the Sea of Japan and into its ports.

Environment’-’

35Boxer, 1989, op tit, Ref 30.

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and IMO might be approached in the context of a Regional Seas Action Plan and requested to assist all bordering States regarding the feasibility of coordinated management of the Sea of Japan, including all aspects of pollution control (vessel source, land-based and transnational) as well as contingency plans and measures necessary for safety of offshore installa-

MARINE

POLICY

November

1990

Sea of Japan: transnational marine resource issues and possible cooperative responses

tions. More information regions is needed.

on the ecology

of the western

and northern

General Article 123 of the LOS Convention calls for states bordering semienclosed seas to cooperate in the exercise of their rights and duties under the convention. An ad hoc body of experts, perhaps assisted by the UN secretariat, might explore the implications of this article in the form of a medium-term study, with results made available to all States concerned with the Sea of Japan. The ad hoc body might focus thus: 0

0

0

0

How can information and basic data on all issues regarding the sea best be exchanged? Could an integrated database on the sea be built? What kinds of data should most urgently be included in such a database? What are the conditions - eg technical, institutional, diplomatic - which should be satisfied to build such a database? How can an interdisciplinary network of institutions conducting research on the different issues regarding the sea be built? What kinds of research institutions exist in and out of the region? What kinds of scientific cooperation (bilateral and multilateral) exist among the countries bordering the sea? Is it better to organize networks, discipline by discipline, issue area by issue area, or in an interdisciplinary fashion? How can systematic joint research be developed among the nations bordering the sea on jointly agreed priority issues? Could a regional project be conceived? Would a joint survey cruise among all coastal States be feasible, say, using a Japanese or Soviet research vessel? Is it sufficient to develop projects on specific issues in the different issue areas? Or is it necessary to examine issue linkages within an integrated regional system? How can this effort be opened to extra-regional scholarship while encouraging intra-regional cooperation? How can the scientific activities among the countries bordering the Sea best be related with the activities developed in other parts of the world? Is it possible to conceive of a broader unit of analysis of related seas from the South China Sea to the North Pacific? Is it possible to develop a comparative scheme involving different seas (South China Sea, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, etc)? How can the sea provide an example of regional scientific collaboration which can be a model to other seas?

To further the prospect of cooperation a small ad hoc working group could be formed, to be comprised of members from the USSR, PR China, South Korea, North Korea and Japan. This working group on the Sea of Japan would meet consecutively in the main port cities on the sea and explore and delineate areas for cooperation. In particular, the group could focus initially on environmental protection and monitoring of pollution in the sea. The effort might eventually lead to the establishment of a Regional Marine Science and Technology Centre as called for the in the LOS Convention. Such a research centre might combine the efforts of NGOs, universities, the United Nations University, UNEP, IOC, IMO and industrial enterprises. This centre might initially be attached to a university and nurtured into independence. In this way, the Sea of Japan could turn from a zone of tension to one of peace and cooperation.

MARINE

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1990

525