- Email: [email protected]
Social class and policy preferences: implications for economic inequality and interclass relations
Accepted Manuscript Title: Social Class and Policy Preferences: Implications for Economic Inequality and Interclass Relations Author: Heather E Bullock PII: DOI: Reference:
S2352-250X(17)30125-2 http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.08.021 COPSYC 547
To appear in: Received date: Revised date: Accepted date:
4-7-2017 4-8-2017 7-8-2017
Please cite this article as: H.E. Bullock, Social Class and Policy Preferences: Implications for Economic Inequality and Interclass Relations, COPSYC (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.08.021 This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
Social Class and Policy Preferences:
cr
ip t
1
an
Heather E. Bullock
us
Implications for Economic Inequality and Interclass Relations
pt
ed
M
University of California, Santa Cruz
Ac ce
Word Count (not including abstract and references): 3,091
Author Note
Heather E. Bullock, Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz Contact Information: Heather Bullock, Department of Psychology, Social Sciences 2, University of California, Santa Cruz, 95064. Email: [email protected]
Page 1 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
2
Abstract Record-setting levels of income and wealth inequality are deepening social class divisions. The
ip t
adoption of strong progressive redistributive policies is crucial to reducing class inequities, yet many barriers to doing so exist. This review examines class-based policy preferences, focusing
cr
on the effects of economic self-interest, system justification, and classist, racist, and sexist
us
stereotypes on policy support. The impact of broader economic conditions is also considered. Collectively, this body of research makes clear that building stronger cross-class support for
an
redistributive policies and programs will prove difficult without addressing both class-based power differences and beliefs that justify inequality. Reducing stereotypes and developing a
M
shared sense of societal responsibility that cuts across class lines can help advance these goals.
ed
Social psychological research is vital to informing these efforts.
Ac ce
pt
Keywords: social class, redistribution, policy attitudes
Page 2 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
3
Social Class and Policy Preferences: Implications for Economic Inequality and Interclass Relations Social class affects every aspect of human experience from health and well-being to
ip t
expectations and aspirations to intergenerational mobility. Not surprisingly, social class is also
cr
correlated with policy attitudes and preferences. Social scientists have long tracked voting and
policy support patterns across diverse socioeconomic groups, treating interclass similarities and
us
differences as a window into understanding preferences and at times, class polarization. The importance of studying class-based policy attitudes and the complexities of doing so are
an
illustrated by Bartel’s [1] analysis of International Social Survey Programme data from 33
M
countries prior to the Great Recession. When asked about reducing government spending to boost the economy, similar levels of support were found across affluent democracies and income
ed
groups, but class polarization distinguished the United States from comparison countries. Rich Americans overwhelmingly favored reducing government spending, whereas poor respondents
pt
were only slightly more likely to support than oppose spending cuts [1]. No other wealthy democracy approached the level of class polarization found in the U.S., raising important
Ac ce
questions about cross-national variability in interclass attitudes and relations, and underlying sources of differences.
Class status is highly correlated with political and economic power, making understanding interclass differences and similarities in policy attitudes such as these crucial. With economic inequality reaching record setting levels, interclass policy attitudes are essential to reducing the widening economic divide yet class differences in attitudes toward redistributive policies diminish the prospects for doing so. Class-based policy attitudes are informed by historical and contemporary institutions (e.g., welfare state practices), political dynamics,
Page 3 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
4
interclass relations, and economic conditions (e.g., income inequality) as well as a broad network of intersecting beliefs about social class and mobility (e.g., meritocratic beliefs, individualism), gender, race, and social responsibility. Social psychological research, with its emphasis on the
ip t
intersections of individuals and groups with their environment, is well positioned to address these complexities.
cr
This review examines how class differences foster policy preferences that further harden
us
class divisions and undermine the adoption of strong redistributive policies. I begin with an overview of how social class is related to policy preferences and political power. I then examine
an
the role of self-interest, system justifying beliefs, and classist, racist, and sexist stereotypes in shaping class-based policy preferences. I also consider how broader social and economic
M
conditions effect policy attitudes. Drawing on social science research findings, I close with
viewing poverty and inequality.
ed
suggestions for challenging redistributive inequities and strategies for developing new ways of
Social Class, Power, and the Politics of Policy Preferences
pt
Social scientists have debated for decades – at times heatedly - whether social class is
Ac ce
relevant in contemporary political and social life or if it has been subsumed by other social identities and categories such as race, ethnicity, religion, or political affiliation [2, 3]. That social class (e.g., income, occupation, education, or some combination of these variables) can be operationalized in different ways has added to the complexity of its study [4]. However, with income and wealth inequality reaching record peaks, the significance of class is increasingly undeniable. A new wave of social science research sides squarely with the centrality of social class to understanding political participation and policy attitudes, and in psychology, analyses focused on class and economic policy are gaining prominence [e.g., 5-10]. Class may not operate
Page 4 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
5
in isolation and intersectional investigations of policy preferences can be particularly powerful. Their value is illustrated by Gilliam and Whitby’s [11] finding that high SES African Americans were more conservative than their lower SES counterparts regarding welfare spending but
ip t
significantly more liberal than their European American class peers. Higher Social Class = Greater Economic Conservatism, Political Participation, and Power
cr
Higher socioeconomic groups tend to be less supportive of redistributive policies and
us
programs than lower socioeconomic groups [12, 13]. Wealthy Americans have been found to hold more conservative attitudes toward taxation, economic regulation, and social welfare
an
programs than the general public [14]. Among these elites, the top one-tenth of 1 percent of wealth-holders (i.e., people with $40 million or more in net worth) are even more conservative
M
[14]. Greater support for redistribution and government intervention tends be found among lower income and other less powerful groups (e.g., women, people of color) [12, 13].
ed
Class-based differences in political engagement and power amplify the likelihood that policy outcomes align with elite preferences. Although low-income groups potentially have
pt
much to gain from political participation, they are less likely than their higher income
Ac ce
counterparts to vote or be involved with politics. Limited participation is widely attributed to restricted access and resources, however, psychological aspects of class may also hinder engagement. After accounting for political ideology and objective class status, Kraus and his colleagues [15] found that lower perceived class standing was consistently associated with reduced political efficacy and participation. When subjective class status was experimentally enhanced, political efficacy and intent to participate increased [15]. Political participation by class elites bear out these relations. The top 1 percent of Americans, in particular, tend to be highly active politically. Class elites also hold the lions’
Page 5 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
6
share of influence over political agenda setting and outcomes. In a multivariate analysis of 1,179 policy cases, economic elites and organized groups representing business interests were found to have significant independent effects on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and
ip t
mass-based interest groups had little or no independent influence [16]. As Gilens and Page [14, p. 576] surmise, “When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized
cr
interests, they generally lose.” These troubling findings raise questions about the viability of
us
democracy, the value society assigns to low SES groups, and whether greater political participation by low SES groups would have much impact [see 17]. Stark class divides also
an
separate policymakers from the public they represent. With a median net worth of more than one million dollars, U.S. congressional representatives have 18 times the net worth of the median
M
U.S. household [18, 19].
Understanding Class-Based Policy Preferences
ed
Research documenting class-based policy preferences is essential to mapping the sociopolitical landscape; equally crucial is identifying causes and correlates of these differences.
pt
I review findings related to three commonly employed explanations: self-interest; system
Ac ce
justifying beliefs, and classist, racist, and sexist stereotyping. Additionally, to highlight the significance of broader economic trends, I examine the impact of income inequality on beliefs and policy attitudes.
Complicating Economic Self-Interest Economic self-interest is frequently invoked to explain the greater support found for redistributive policies (e.g., welfare policies, progressive taxation) among lower SES groups than higher SES groups [20, 21]. For example, in Andersen and Curtis’ [12] study of 24 democracies, working class individuals were more likely than professional and managerial respondents to
Page 6 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
7
believe that government should take more responsibility for providing for its people. Similarly, support for land reform, affirmative action, and apartheid compensation is greater among poor than non-poor South Africans [22]. However, the predictive power of self-interest is called into
ip t
question by numerous U.S. based studies and public opinion polls. The explanatory limits of economic self-interest are powerfully illustrated by Frank’s [23] indepth study of Kansans’
cr
policy attitudes and Williams’ [24] analysis of anti-government attitudes among working class
us
Whites.
Importantly, more nuanced, complex understandings of and approaches to self-interest
an
are emerging. Self-interest, for instance, may work along with other beliefs and characteristics. Kaltenthaler and Ceccoli [21] found that personal as opposed to government responsibility for
M
welfare provision were predicted by both self-interest and greater individual acceptance of risk. Integrative models are expanding how we think about self-interest [and new conceptualizations
ed
of self-interest are drawing attention to the importance of subjective comparisons with other people [5]. Brown-Iannuzzi and her colleagues [5] found that feeling higher in status caused
pt
reduced support for redistribution, and when participants believed that they had outperformed
Ac ce
other players in an economic game, they recommended rule changes to reduce redistribution even though they could not profit from their recommendations Importantly, these changes were legitimized by shifts in perceptions of what is fair. These findings underscore the need for broader understandings of self-interest, particularly in Western contexts, that look beyond the material to the psychological, and how feeling “different from” or superior to other groups fuels support for exclusionary initiatives such as anti-immigration policies. System Justification: Making Sense of When Socioeconomic Groups Endorse Policies that Do Not Advance their Economic Interests
Page 7 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
8
Although groups across the socioeconomic spectrum have been found to support policies that do not advance their economic interests (e.g., some of the wealthiest Americans support paying higher taxes), greater research attention has focused on understanding why poor and
ip t
working class groups defend class hierarchies and policies that they do not benefit than why elites might do so. Research on system justification is pivotal to understanding these beliefs.
cr
According to this theory, people are motivated “to defend, justify, and bolster aspects of the
us
status quo, including existing social, economic, and political systems, institutions, and arrangements” [26, p. 321). The finding that poorer individuals tend to believe that there is more
an
mobility in the U.S. than richer individuals is but one recent illustration of system justification [27].
M
Ironically, system justification is fostered by many aspects of poverty and low SES that could be radicalizing such as limited opportunities for upward mobility. System justification is
ed
enhanced when the status quo is perceived as inevitable or inescapable, systemic inequality is salient, and when the system is challenged or threatened [26]. Recent research drawing on both
pt
system justification and social identity theory, furthers our understanding of the conditions in
Ac ce
which low status groups uphold the status quo [28]. Even subtle reminders of money have been found to lead to stronger endorsement of free-market capitalism, stronger belief that victims deserve their fate, and that advantaged groups should dominate disadvantaged groups [29]. For example, Caruso and his colleagues [29] found that participants who were exposed to faint images of $100 bills or asked to unscramble words related to money expressed stronger support for system justifying beliefs than control groups who engaged in non-monetary activities. A vast network of legitimizing or hierarchy-enhancing beliefs (e.g., individualism, meritocracy, perceived deservingness, social dominance orientation, free market ideology, belief
Page 8 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
9
in a just world) is associated with system justification [6, 26, 30-32]. In individualistic societies, beliefs such as meritocracy and individualism are deeply held and influential, shaping attitudes, values, and policy. Support for restrictive welfare policies and reduced welfare spending, for
ip t
instance, is associated with individualistic attributions for poverty, belief that the world is a just place where people get what they deserve, and meritocratic beliefs [30, 33]. A large body of
cr
scholarship documents that low-status groups are not immune to endorsing these beliefs [see 26].
us
System justification not only provides an ideological framework for understanding antiredistribution attitudes among disadvantaged groups, the palliative functions of system
an
justification are highly reinforcing. Legitimizing beliefs are associated with increased positive affect and well-being and decreased negative feelings [34]. These protective benefits are
M
illustrated by Christandl’s [35] finding that strong just world believers perceived the subprime mortgage crisis and tax increases as having fewer damaging consequences. Unfortunately, the
ed
same legitimizing beliefs that promote well-being and perceived control also reduce support for redistributive policies and political mobilization [6, 30].
pt
Classist, Racist, and Sexist Stereotypes
Ac ce
Class stereotypes, not just class, itself, are central to attitudes toward redistribution. Higher SES groups are stereotyped as hardworking and competent, whereas the poor are perceived as undisciplined, animalistic, and unmotivated [30, 36, 37]. “The poor” are a heterogeneous group and perceived responsibility for poverty and judgements of deservingness, factors which influence whether welfare programs are supported, vary considerably across poor subgroups [31]. The intergenerational poor may elicit greater empathy and support than the downwardly mobile [38]. “Welfare mothers,” in particular, are the targets of highly negative stereotypes (e.g., lazy, promiscuous, unintelligent), with the word “welfare” serving as a
Page 9 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
10
symbolic code word for activating racism, sexism, and classism [39, 40]. Internalizing the stigma associated with poverty and welfare receipt contributes to low-income individuals distancing themselves from people experiencing poverty and redistributive programs [6, 41].
ip t
Class, race, and gender stereotypes inform the structure of redistributive programs and support for them. Common features of welfare programs such as fingerprinting, work
cr
requirements, caseworker discretion, and time limits are grounded in stereotypical beliefs that
us
low-income groups require discipline, motivation, and close oversight [42-44]. Conversely, tax expenditures (e.g., mortgage interest deductions), which largely benefit “deserving” upper and
an
middle classes are not thought of as “welfare” and remain relatively “hidden” from the public [45, 46]. This relative invisibility benefits class elites; greater awareness of upward redistribution
M
decreases support for these programs [46].
The media’s role in reinforcing racist stereotypes about program beneficiaries and
ed
shaping attitudes toward redistribution is well-documented. African Americans are overrepresented in unsympathetic news stories about poverty both pre and post U.S. welfare
pt
reform [47]. Experimental research illustrates the deleterious consequences on policy support.
Ac ce
After priming the "promiscuous Black female" stereotype via sexualized rap lyrics, Johnson, Olivo, Gibson, Reed, and Ashburn-Nardo [48] found that participants were less supportive of policies to assist a poor Black pregnant woman than a similarly-situated white woman. A clever set of studies by Brown-Iannuzzi and her colleagues [49] offers further documentation of racism in anti-welfare attitudes. First, a perceptual task was used to visually estimate participants’ mental representations of welfare recipients. Compared to the image of the “average” nonrecipient, the “protypical” welfare recipient was perceived as having stronger African American facial features and as aligning more closely with common stereotypes of welfare recipients and
Page 10 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
11
African Americans (e.g., lazy, incompetent, unattractive, unlikeable). When allocating welfare benefits to the hypothetical targets, less support was given to the more African American appearing target depicted in the image of the prototypical welfare recipient than to the target in
The Impact of Economic Conditions on Class-Based Policy Preferences
ip t
the non-recipient image.
cr
Policy attitudes are not formed in a vacuum and researchers are increasingly examining
us
the impact of broader economic conditions on redistributive beliefs. Rising income inequality, itself, may influence support for democracy and redistribution [50]. Income inequality has been
an
found to moderate the relationship between social class and policy preferences, with support for government intervention growing more similar across social classes with rising inequality [12].
M
Increasing economic precariousness may bring heightened sensitivity to the need for and support of a strong safety net. As negative effects extend up the socioeconomic ladder, higher SES
ed
groups may become just as likely as lower SES groups to support reduced inequality [51]. Yet, other research indicates that heightened inequality has limited effects on redistributive attitudes
Ac ce
area.
pt
and may even dampen support for them [52], underscoring the need for further research in this
Heightened economic inequality may also increase class polarization. Greater class conflict is reported in countries with high economic inequality and limited welfare programs than those with less inequality and more supportive welfare programs [2]. Dodson [53] found that high-level professionals and managers responded to rising unemployment by withdrawing support for greater tax progressivity, whereas manual workers and low-level professionals/managers became more supportive of tax progressivity. Nevertheless, other research documents limited class effects. Schöneck and Mau [54] found less support for welfare
Page 11 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
12
spending in globalized countries but that class divisions were neither intensified or reduced by globalization. Other research focuses on how correlates of inequality such as economic segregation
ip t
shape policy preferences. Thal [55] found that affluent, class-isolated Americans extrapolated from their own social conditions to others, resulting in inaccurate, overly positive beliefs about
cr
the availability of jobs and accessibility of healthcare. Indeed, the extent of economic inequality
us
is widely underestimated [60], and greater exposure to economic inequality does not necessarily foster greater support for redistribution. In Sands’ [57] field experiment, randomized
an
confederates who appeared to be poor were positioned in public spaces in an affluent neighborhood. After this exposure, people passing by were asked to sign a petition calling for
M
greater redistribution via a “millionaire’s tax” or alternatively, in the control condition, to sign a petition to reduce plastic bag use. Exposure to inequality was found to beget inequality, with
ed
support for redistribution declining after this exposure [57]. A growing body of research examining the relationship of class privilege to narcissism, entitlement, and reduced empathy
pt
lends further insight into the psychological underpinnings of elite policy attitudes [58].
Ac ce
Old Obstacles to New Class Alliances: Challenges and Opportunities The adoption of strong progressive redistributive policies is crucial to reducing the widening class divide, yet many barriers exist. Class-based power differences make for a highly uneven political playing field, narrow understandings of self-interest undermine strong crossclass alliances and the realization of shared concerns, system justification legitimizes unjust class relations among those who bear the brunt of inequality, and classist, racist, and sexist stereotypes erode support for fundamental safety net programs. Yet, finding by Norton and Ariely [56] offer hope that finding “common ground” may not be impossible. When asked about to identify their
Page 12 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
13
ideal distribution of wealth, survey respondents constructed distributions that were far more equitable than the status quo. Moreover, a level of consensus that is both encouraging and surprising was observed, with all demographic groups, including those who do not typically
ip t
support redistribution (e.g., people who are wealthy, Republicans), desiring a more equal distribution of wealth than is currently the case [56].
cr
The social science research reviewed here may help us move closer to challenging the
us
longstanding politics of social class and redistribution, developing new ways of viewing poverty and inequality, and fostering much needed, new class alliances. Educational programs (e.g.,
an
service learning, classroom curricula, documentaries) and other interventions that challenge stereotypes of welfare receipt and foster structural understandings of poverty, wealth, and
M
economic inequality can help reduce negative perceptions of low-income groups. Awareness of social class and classist stereotyping begins at an early age and interventions geared toward
ed
attitude underscore importance of teaching children about social class [59, 60]. Following their completion of a poverty curriculum, Mistry and her colleagues’ [60] found that young children
pt
expressed less deterministic views of poverty and recommended slightly more expansive
Ac ce
suggestions for assisting poor families than children in the control condition. Equally crucial is heightening awareness of the societal impact of inequality, and shifting individualistic discourse that depicts poverty as an individual-level issue or concern [6]. Income inequality does not just harm low income groups, it negatively affects population health and societal well-being [61]. Framing economic inequality as a threat to broader societal well-being and reviving conceptualizations of a shared or “public good” may help increase support for universal health care, progressive taxes, and other policies that reduce the income and wealth gaps. With the economic gap continuing to widen, putting social psychological knowledge to use
Page 13 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
14
may prove pivotal to strengthening interclass relations and bolstering support for redistributive
Ac ce
pt
ed
M
an
us
cr
ip t
policies.
Page 14 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
15
References [1] Bartels L: U.S. is a world leader in class conflict over government spending. Washington Post 2014, April 21; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
spending/?utm_term=.331d97f58709
cr
ip t
cage/wp/2014/04/21/u-s-is-a-world-leader-in-class-conflict-over-government-
[2] Edlund J, Lindh A: The democratic class struggle revisited: The welfare state, social
us
cohesion and political conflict. Acta Sociol. 2015, 58: 311-328.
[3] Hout, M: How class works: Objective and subjective aspects of class since the 1970s. In
an
Social Class: How Does It Work? Edited by Lareau, A, Conley, D. Russell Sage; 2008: 25-64.
M
[4] Diemer MA, Mistry RS, Wadsworth ME, Lopez I, Reimers F: Best practices in conceptualizing and measuring social class in psychological research. Anal. of Soc. Issues
ed
and Public Policy 2013, 13: 77-113.
[5] **Brown-Iannuzzi JL, Lundberg KB, Kay AC, Payne BK: Subjective status shapes
pt
political preferences. Psychol. Sci. 2015, 26: 15-26. In a series of related studied the researchers document that subjective status, not just material status, can elicit self-interest. Feeling lower or
Ac ce
higher in subjective status elicited patterns of policy support that were consistent with selfinterest. These shifts in policy attitudes were legitimized by shifting beliefs about fairness. [6] Bullock, HE: Women and Poverty: Psychology, Public Policy, and Social Justice. John Wiley & Sons; 2013.
[7] Fiske ST, Markus HR (Eds.): Facing Social Class: How Societal Rank Influences Interaction. Russell Sage; 2012. [8] Markus HR: In this together: Doing and undoing inequality and social class divides. J. of Soc. Issues 2017, 73: 211-221.
Page 15 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
16
[9] Smith L: Raising the minimum wage: Toward a psychological perspective. Am. Psychol. 2015, 6: 557-565. [10] United Nations Development Programme: The role of the private sector in inclusive
ip t
development: Barriers at the base of the pyramid. Istanbul International Center for Private Sector Development 2014; http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-
cr
reduction/private_sector/barriers-and-the-opportunities-at-the-base-of-the-pyramid---the-.html
ethclass interpretation. Soc. Sci. Q. 1989, 70: 88-100.
us
[11] Gilliam FD, Whitby, KJ: Race, class, and attitudes toward social welfare spending: An
an
[12] Andersen R, Curtis, J: Social class, economic inequality, and the convergence of policy preferences: Evidence from 24 modern democracies. Can. Rev. of Sociol. 2015, 52:
M
266-288.
[13] Kluegel, JR, Smith, ER: Beliefs about Inequality: Americans’ Views of What is and What
ed
Ought to Be. Aldine De Gruyter; 1986.
[14] Page BI, Bartels LM, Seawright J: Democracy and the policy preferences of wealthy
pt
Americans. Perspect. on Polit. 2013, 11: 51-73.
Ac ce
[15] Kraus, MW, Anderson C, Callaghan B: The inequality of politics: Social class rank and political participation (Working Paper No. 120-15). Institute for Research on Labor and Employment (IRLE) 2015; http://irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/120-15.pdf [16] Gilens M, Page BI: Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average citizens. Per. on Pol. 2014, 12: 564-581. [17] Mayer J: Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right. Doubleday; 2016. [18] Carnes N: White-Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making.
Page 16 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
17
University of Chicago Press; 2013. [19] Choma R: One member of Congress = 18 American households: Lawmakers’ personal finances far from average. Center for Responsive Politics 2015, January 12:
ip t
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2015/01/one-member-of-congress-18-american-householdslawmakers-personal-finances-far-from-average/
us
Self interest or political ideology. Acta Sociol. 2006, 49: 321-338.
cr
[20] Jaeger MM: What makes people support public responsibility for welfare provision:
[21] Kaltenthaler KC, Ceccoli SJ: Explaining patterns of support for the provision of citizen
an
welfare. J. of Eur. Public Policy 2008, 15: 1041-1068.
[22] Roberts, BJ: Your place or mine? Beliefs about inequality and redress Preferences in
M
South Africa. Soc. Indic. Res. 2014, 118: 1167-1190.
Henry Holt and Company; 2004.
ed
[23] Frank, T: What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America.
[24] Williams JC: White Working Class: Overcoming Class Cluelessness in America. Harvard
pt
Business School Publishing; 2017.
Ac ce
[25] Nagayoshi K, Sato Y: Who supports redistributive policies in contemporary Japan? An integrative approach to self-interest and trust models. Int. Sociol. 2014, 29: 302-323. [26] **Jost, JT, Gaucher D, Stern C: “The world isn’t fair:” A system justification perspective on social stratification and inequality. In APA Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology: Vol. 2. Group Processes. Edited by Mikulincer M, Shaver, PR. American Psychological Association; 2015: 317-340. Comprehensive review of the central postulates of system justification theory.
Page 17 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
18
[27] **Davidai S, Gilovich T: Building a more mobile America – One income quintile at a time. Perspect. on Psychol. Sci. 2015, 10: 60-71. An analysis of survey findings reveals the disconnect between U.S. beliefs about economic mobility and reality. Respondents
ip t
overestimated the amount of upward mobility and underestimated the likelihood of downward mobility. Economic status and political affiliation influenced these perceptions.
cr
[28] Owuamalam, CK, Rubin M, Spears R, Weerabangsa MM: Why do people from low-status
us
groups support class systems that disadvantage them? A test of two mainstream explanations in Malaysia and Australia. J. of Soc. Issues 2017, 73: 80-98.
an
[29] *Caruso EM, Vohs, KD, Baxter B, Wayz A: Mere exposure to money increases endorsement of free-market systems. J. of Exp. Psychol. 2013, 142: 301-306. Exposure to money was found to
M
lead to stronger endorsement of capitalism, social dominance, and victims deserve their fate. [30] Bullock HE, Reppond, HA: Of “takers” and “makers:” A social psychological analysis
ed
of class and classism. In Oxford Handbook of Social Psychology and Social Justice. Edited by Hammack, PL. Oxford University Press; 2016.
pt
[31] Watkins-Hayes C, Kovalsky E: The discourse of deservingness: Morality and the
Ac ce
dilemmas of poverty relief in debate and practice. In The Oxford Handbook of the Social Science of Poverty. Edited by Brady D, Burton LM. Oxford University Press; 2016: 193-220. [32] Rodriguez-Bailon R, Bratanova B, Willis, GB, Lopez-Rodriguez L, Sturrock A, Loughnan S: Social class and ideologies of inequality: How they uphold unequal societies. J. of Soc. Issues 2017, 73: 99-116.
[33] Hunt MO, Bullock HE: Ideologies and beliefs about poverty. In Oxford Handbook of the Social Science of Poverty. Edited by Brady D, Burton LM. Oxford University Press; 2016: 93116.
Page 18 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
19
[34] McCoy SK, Wellman JD, Cosley B., Saslow L, Epel E: Is the benefit in meritocracy palliative for low status groups? Evidence for a benefit for self-esteem and physical health via perceived control. Eur. J. of Soc. Psychol. 2013, 43: 307-318.
ip t
[35] Christandl F: The belief in a just world as a personal resource in the context of inflation and financial crises. Appl. Psychol. 2013, 62: 486-518.
cr
[36] Durante F, Bearns Tablante C, Fiske, ST: Poor but warm, rich but cold (and
us
competent): Social classes in the stereotype content model. J. of Soc. Issues 2017, 73: 138-157.
an
[37] Loughnan S, Haslam N, Sutton RM, Spencer B: Dehumanization and social class: Animality in the stereotypes of “white trash,” “chavs,” and “bogans.” Soc. Psychol. 2014,
M
45: 54-61.
[38] Hofman P, Valentino L, Weed E: Being and becoming poor: How cultural schemas
ed
shape beliefs about poverty. Soc. Forces 2017, 95: 1023-1048. [39] Henry PJ., Reyna C, Weiner B: Hate welfare but help the poor: How the attributional
pt
content of stereotypes explains the paradox of reactions to the destitute in America. J. of
Ac ce
Appl. Soc. Psychol. 2004, 34: 34-58.
[40] Katz MB. The Undeserving Poor: America’s Enduring Confrontation with Poverty (2nd edition). Oxford University Press; 2013. [41] Bullock HE, Truong SV, Chunn L: Combatting social exclusion: “Safe space” and the dynamics of inclusion at a homeless farming site. J. of Poverty 2017, 21: 166-192. [42] Deeming C: Foundations of the workfare state: Reflections on the political transformation of the welfare state in Britain. Soc. Policy and Adm. 2015, 49: 826-886.
Page 19 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
20
[43] Houser L, Schram SF, Soss J, Fording, RC: From work support to work motivator: Child care subsidies and caseworker discretion in the post-welfare reform era. J. of Women, Polit., and Policy 2014, 35: 174-193.
ip t
[44] Soss J: Making clients and citizens: Welfare policy as a source of status, belief, and
AL, Ingram, HM. University of New York Press; 2005: 291-328.
cr
action. In Deserving and Entitled: Social Constructions and Public Policy. Edited by Schneider
us
[45] Faricy C: The distributive politics of tax expenditures: How parties use policy tools to distribute federal money to the rich and the poor. Polit., Groups, and Identities 2015, 4:
an
110-125.
[46] Faricy C, Ellis C: Public attitudes toward social spending in the United States: The
M
differences between direct spending and tax expenditures. Pol. Beh. 2014, 36: 53-76. [47] van Doorn BW: Pre- and post-welfare reform media portrayals of poverty in the United
162.
ed
States: The continuing importance of race and ethnicity. Politics and Policy 2015, 43:142-
pt
[48] Johnson, JD, Olivo N, Gibson N, Reed W, & Ashburn-Nardo, L: Priming media
Ac ce
stereotypes reduces support for social welfare policies: The mediating role of empathy. Pers. and Soc. Psychol. Bull. 2009, 35: 463-476. [49] **Brown-Iannuzzi JL, Dotsch R, Cooley E, Payne, BK: The relationship between mental representations of welfare recipients and attitudes toward welfare. Psychol. Sci. 2017, 92: 113. In a set of four studies, the researchers found that when respondents thought of a prototypical “welfare recipient,” they envisioned someone who is African American and associated negative stereotypes with this hypothetical person. The protypical welfare recipient was granted lower benefits than a hypothetical target who did not conform to this prototypical image.
Page 20 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
21
[50] Krieckhaus J, Byunghwan S, Bellinger NM, Wells JM: Economic inequality and democratic support. J. of Polit. 2014, 76: 139-151. [51] **Curtis J, Andersen, R: How social class attitudes on economic inequality: The
ip t
competing forces of self-interest and legitimation. Int. Rev. of Soc. Res. 2015, 5: 4-19. Multifaceted analysis of survey and national statistics from 24 countries. The results show that
cr
self-interest is affected by levels of economic inequality. High levels of income inequality were
us
associated with greater alignment of middle and low-income policy interests.
[52] Haggard S, Kaufman RR, Long, JD: Income, occupation, and preferences for
an
redistribution in the developing world. Stud. in Comp. Int. Dev. 2013, 48: 113-140. [53] Dodson K: Economic change and class conflict over tax attitudes: Evidence from nine
M
advanced capitalist democracies. Soc. Forces 2017, 95: 1509-1537. [54] Schöneck NM, Mau S. Coming together or growing apart? Globalization, class and
ed
redistributive preferences. J. of Eur. Soc. Policy 2015, 25: 454-472. [55] Thal A. Class isolation and affluent Americans’ perception of social conditions.
pt
Political Behavior 2017, 39: 401-424.
Ac ce
[56] Norton MI, Ariely, D: Building a better America – One wealth quintile at a time. Perspect. on Psychol Sci. 2011, 6: 9-12. [57] *Sands ML: Exposure to inequality affects support for redistribution. Proc. of the Natl. Acad. of Sci. 2017, 114: 663-668. In a placebo-controlled field study conducted in an affluent neighborhood, passersby were randomly exposed to confederates who appeared to be experiencing poverty and asked to sign a petition to reduce inequality. Exposure to inequality (i.e., poor confederates) resulted in reduced support for economic redistribution.
Page 21 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
22
[58] Piff, PK: Wealth and the inflated self: Class, entitlement, and narcissism. Pers. and Soc. Psychol. Bull. 2014, 40: 34-43. [59] Mistry RS, Brown CS, White ES, Chow KA, Gillen-O’Neel C: Elementary school
ip t
children’s reasoning about social class: A mixed-methods study. Child Develop. 2015: 16531671.
cr
[60] Mistry RS, Nenadal L, Griffin KM, Zimmerman FJ, Cochran HA, Thomas CA, Wilson C:
us
Children’s reasoning about poverty, economic mobility, and helping behavior: Results of a curriculum intervention in early school years. J of Soc. Issues 2017: 760-788.
an
[61] Pickett, KE, Wilkinson, RG: 2015. Income inequality and health: A causal review. Social
Ac ce
pt
ed
M
Science & Medicine 128: 316-326.
Page 22 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
Ac ce
pt
ed
M
an
us
cr
ip t
23
Page 23 of 23
S2352-250X(17)30125-2 http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.08.021 COPSYC 547
To appear in: Received date: Revised date: Accepted date:
4-7-2017 4-8-2017 7-8-2017
Please cite this article as: H.E. Bullock, Social Class and Policy Preferences: Implications for Economic Inequality and Interclass Relations, COPSYC (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.08.021 This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
Social Class and Policy Preferences:
cr
ip t
1
an
Heather E. Bullock
us
Implications for Economic Inequality and Interclass Relations
pt
ed
M
University of California, Santa Cruz
Ac ce
Word Count (not including abstract and references): 3,091
Author Note
Heather E. Bullock, Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz Contact Information: Heather Bullock, Department of Psychology, Social Sciences 2, University of California, Santa Cruz, 95064. Email: [email protected]
Page 1 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
2
Abstract Record-setting levels of income and wealth inequality are deepening social class divisions. The
ip t
adoption of strong progressive redistributive policies is crucial to reducing class inequities, yet many barriers to doing so exist. This review examines class-based policy preferences, focusing
cr
on the effects of economic self-interest, system justification, and classist, racist, and sexist
us
stereotypes on policy support. The impact of broader economic conditions is also considered. Collectively, this body of research makes clear that building stronger cross-class support for
an
redistributive policies and programs will prove difficult without addressing both class-based power differences and beliefs that justify inequality. Reducing stereotypes and developing a
M
shared sense of societal responsibility that cuts across class lines can help advance these goals.
ed
Social psychological research is vital to informing these efforts.
Ac ce
pt
Keywords: social class, redistribution, policy attitudes
Page 2 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
3
Social Class and Policy Preferences: Implications for Economic Inequality and Interclass Relations Social class affects every aspect of human experience from health and well-being to
ip t
expectations and aspirations to intergenerational mobility. Not surprisingly, social class is also
cr
correlated with policy attitudes and preferences. Social scientists have long tracked voting and
policy support patterns across diverse socioeconomic groups, treating interclass similarities and
us
differences as a window into understanding preferences and at times, class polarization. The importance of studying class-based policy attitudes and the complexities of doing so are
an
illustrated by Bartel’s [1] analysis of International Social Survey Programme data from 33
M
countries prior to the Great Recession. When asked about reducing government spending to boost the economy, similar levels of support were found across affluent democracies and income
ed
groups, but class polarization distinguished the United States from comparison countries. Rich Americans overwhelmingly favored reducing government spending, whereas poor respondents
pt
were only slightly more likely to support than oppose spending cuts [1]. No other wealthy democracy approached the level of class polarization found in the U.S., raising important
Ac ce
questions about cross-national variability in interclass attitudes and relations, and underlying sources of differences.
Class status is highly correlated with political and economic power, making understanding interclass differences and similarities in policy attitudes such as these crucial. With economic inequality reaching record setting levels, interclass policy attitudes are essential to reducing the widening economic divide yet class differences in attitudes toward redistributive policies diminish the prospects for doing so. Class-based policy attitudes are informed by historical and contemporary institutions (e.g., welfare state practices), political dynamics,
Page 3 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
4
interclass relations, and economic conditions (e.g., income inequality) as well as a broad network of intersecting beliefs about social class and mobility (e.g., meritocratic beliefs, individualism), gender, race, and social responsibility. Social psychological research, with its emphasis on the
ip t
intersections of individuals and groups with their environment, is well positioned to address these complexities.
cr
This review examines how class differences foster policy preferences that further harden
us
class divisions and undermine the adoption of strong redistributive policies. I begin with an overview of how social class is related to policy preferences and political power. I then examine
an
the role of self-interest, system justifying beliefs, and classist, racist, and sexist stereotypes in shaping class-based policy preferences. I also consider how broader social and economic
M
conditions effect policy attitudes. Drawing on social science research findings, I close with
viewing poverty and inequality.
ed
suggestions for challenging redistributive inequities and strategies for developing new ways of
Social Class, Power, and the Politics of Policy Preferences
pt
Social scientists have debated for decades – at times heatedly - whether social class is
Ac ce
relevant in contemporary political and social life or if it has been subsumed by other social identities and categories such as race, ethnicity, religion, or political affiliation [2, 3]. That social class (e.g., income, occupation, education, or some combination of these variables) can be operationalized in different ways has added to the complexity of its study [4]. However, with income and wealth inequality reaching record peaks, the significance of class is increasingly undeniable. A new wave of social science research sides squarely with the centrality of social class to understanding political participation and policy attitudes, and in psychology, analyses focused on class and economic policy are gaining prominence [e.g., 5-10]. Class may not operate
Page 4 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
5
in isolation and intersectional investigations of policy preferences can be particularly powerful. Their value is illustrated by Gilliam and Whitby’s [11] finding that high SES African Americans were more conservative than their lower SES counterparts regarding welfare spending but
ip t
significantly more liberal than their European American class peers. Higher Social Class = Greater Economic Conservatism, Political Participation, and Power
cr
Higher socioeconomic groups tend to be less supportive of redistributive policies and
us
programs than lower socioeconomic groups [12, 13]. Wealthy Americans have been found to hold more conservative attitudes toward taxation, economic regulation, and social welfare
an
programs than the general public [14]. Among these elites, the top one-tenth of 1 percent of wealth-holders (i.e., people with $40 million or more in net worth) are even more conservative
M
[14]. Greater support for redistribution and government intervention tends be found among lower income and other less powerful groups (e.g., women, people of color) [12, 13].
ed
Class-based differences in political engagement and power amplify the likelihood that policy outcomes align with elite preferences. Although low-income groups potentially have
pt
much to gain from political participation, they are less likely than their higher income
Ac ce
counterparts to vote or be involved with politics. Limited participation is widely attributed to restricted access and resources, however, psychological aspects of class may also hinder engagement. After accounting for political ideology and objective class status, Kraus and his colleagues [15] found that lower perceived class standing was consistently associated with reduced political efficacy and participation. When subjective class status was experimentally enhanced, political efficacy and intent to participate increased [15]. Political participation by class elites bear out these relations. The top 1 percent of Americans, in particular, tend to be highly active politically. Class elites also hold the lions’
Page 5 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
6
share of influence over political agenda setting and outcomes. In a multivariate analysis of 1,179 policy cases, economic elites and organized groups representing business interests were found to have significant independent effects on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and
ip t
mass-based interest groups had little or no independent influence [16]. As Gilens and Page [14, p. 576] surmise, “When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized
cr
interests, they generally lose.” These troubling findings raise questions about the viability of
us
democracy, the value society assigns to low SES groups, and whether greater political participation by low SES groups would have much impact [see 17]. Stark class divides also
an
separate policymakers from the public they represent. With a median net worth of more than one million dollars, U.S. congressional representatives have 18 times the net worth of the median
M
U.S. household [18, 19].
Understanding Class-Based Policy Preferences
ed
Research documenting class-based policy preferences is essential to mapping the sociopolitical landscape; equally crucial is identifying causes and correlates of these differences.
pt
I review findings related to three commonly employed explanations: self-interest; system
Ac ce
justifying beliefs, and classist, racist, and sexist stereotyping. Additionally, to highlight the significance of broader economic trends, I examine the impact of income inequality on beliefs and policy attitudes.
Complicating Economic Self-Interest Economic self-interest is frequently invoked to explain the greater support found for redistributive policies (e.g., welfare policies, progressive taxation) among lower SES groups than higher SES groups [20, 21]. For example, in Andersen and Curtis’ [12] study of 24 democracies, working class individuals were more likely than professional and managerial respondents to
Page 6 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
7
believe that government should take more responsibility for providing for its people. Similarly, support for land reform, affirmative action, and apartheid compensation is greater among poor than non-poor South Africans [22]. However, the predictive power of self-interest is called into
ip t
question by numerous U.S. based studies and public opinion polls. The explanatory limits of economic self-interest are powerfully illustrated by Frank’s [23] indepth study of Kansans’
cr
policy attitudes and Williams’ [24] analysis of anti-government attitudes among working class
us
Whites.
Importantly, more nuanced, complex understandings of and approaches to self-interest
an
are emerging. Self-interest, for instance, may work along with other beliefs and characteristics. Kaltenthaler and Ceccoli [21] found that personal as opposed to government responsibility for
M
welfare provision were predicted by both self-interest and greater individual acceptance of risk. Integrative models are expanding how we think about self-interest [and new conceptualizations
ed
of self-interest are drawing attention to the importance of subjective comparisons with other people [5]. Brown-Iannuzzi and her colleagues [5] found that feeling higher in status caused
pt
reduced support for redistribution, and when participants believed that they had outperformed
Ac ce
other players in an economic game, they recommended rule changes to reduce redistribution even though they could not profit from their recommendations Importantly, these changes were legitimized by shifts in perceptions of what is fair. These findings underscore the need for broader understandings of self-interest, particularly in Western contexts, that look beyond the material to the psychological, and how feeling “different from” or superior to other groups fuels support for exclusionary initiatives such as anti-immigration policies. System Justification: Making Sense of When Socioeconomic Groups Endorse Policies that Do Not Advance their Economic Interests
Page 7 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
8
Although groups across the socioeconomic spectrum have been found to support policies that do not advance their economic interests (e.g., some of the wealthiest Americans support paying higher taxes), greater research attention has focused on understanding why poor and
ip t
working class groups defend class hierarchies and policies that they do not benefit than why elites might do so. Research on system justification is pivotal to understanding these beliefs.
cr
According to this theory, people are motivated “to defend, justify, and bolster aspects of the
us
status quo, including existing social, economic, and political systems, institutions, and arrangements” [26, p. 321). The finding that poorer individuals tend to believe that there is more
an
mobility in the U.S. than richer individuals is but one recent illustration of system justification [27].
M
Ironically, system justification is fostered by many aspects of poverty and low SES that could be radicalizing such as limited opportunities for upward mobility. System justification is
ed
enhanced when the status quo is perceived as inevitable or inescapable, systemic inequality is salient, and when the system is challenged or threatened [26]. Recent research drawing on both
pt
system justification and social identity theory, furthers our understanding of the conditions in
Ac ce
which low status groups uphold the status quo [28]. Even subtle reminders of money have been found to lead to stronger endorsement of free-market capitalism, stronger belief that victims deserve their fate, and that advantaged groups should dominate disadvantaged groups [29]. For example, Caruso and his colleagues [29] found that participants who were exposed to faint images of $100 bills or asked to unscramble words related to money expressed stronger support for system justifying beliefs than control groups who engaged in non-monetary activities. A vast network of legitimizing or hierarchy-enhancing beliefs (e.g., individualism, meritocracy, perceived deservingness, social dominance orientation, free market ideology, belief
Page 8 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
9
in a just world) is associated with system justification [6, 26, 30-32]. In individualistic societies, beliefs such as meritocracy and individualism are deeply held and influential, shaping attitudes, values, and policy. Support for restrictive welfare policies and reduced welfare spending, for
ip t
instance, is associated with individualistic attributions for poverty, belief that the world is a just place where people get what they deserve, and meritocratic beliefs [30, 33]. A large body of
cr
scholarship documents that low-status groups are not immune to endorsing these beliefs [see 26].
us
System justification not only provides an ideological framework for understanding antiredistribution attitudes among disadvantaged groups, the palliative functions of system
an
justification are highly reinforcing. Legitimizing beliefs are associated with increased positive affect and well-being and decreased negative feelings [34]. These protective benefits are
M
illustrated by Christandl’s [35] finding that strong just world believers perceived the subprime mortgage crisis and tax increases as having fewer damaging consequences. Unfortunately, the
ed
same legitimizing beliefs that promote well-being and perceived control also reduce support for redistributive policies and political mobilization [6, 30].
pt
Classist, Racist, and Sexist Stereotypes
Ac ce
Class stereotypes, not just class, itself, are central to attitudes toward redistribution. Higher SES groups are stereotyped as hardworking and competent, whereas the poor are perceived as undisciplined, animalistic, and unmotivated [30, 36, 37]. “The poor” are a heterogeneous group and perceived responsibility for poverty and judgements of deservingness, factors which influence whether welfare programs are supported, vary considerably across poor subgroups [31]. The intergenerational poor may elicit greater empathy and support than the downwardly mobile [38]. “Welfare mothers,” in particular, are the targets of highly negative stereotypes (e.g., lazy, promiscuous, unintelligent), with the word “welfare” serving as a
Page 9 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
10
symbolic code word for activating racism, sexism, and classism [39, 40]. Internalizing the stigma associated with poverty and welfare receipt contributes to low-income individuals distancing themselves from people experiencing poverty and redistributive programs [6, 41].
ip t
Class, race, and gender stereotypes inform the structure of redistributive programs and support for them. Common features of welfare programs such as fingerprinting, work
cr
requirements, caseworker discretion, and time limits are grounded in stereotypical beliefs that
us
low-income groups require discipline, motivation, and close oversight [42-44]. Conversely, tax expenditures (e.g., mortgage interest deductions), which largely benefit “deserving” upper and
an
middle classes are not thought of as “welfare” and remain relatively “hidden” from the public [45, 46]. This relative invisibility benefits class elites; greater awareness of upward redistribution
M
decreases support for these programs [46].
The media’s role in reinforcing racist stereotypes about program beneficiaries and
ed
shaping attitudes toward redistribution is well-documented. African Americans are overrepresented in unsympathetic news stories about poverty both pre and post U.S. welfare
pt
reform [47]. Experimental research illustrates the deleterious consequences on policy support.
Ac ce
After priming the "promiscuous Black female" stereotype via sexualized rap lyrics, Johnson, Olivo, Gibson, Reed, and Ashburn-Nardo [48] found that participants were less supportive of policies to assist a poor Black pregnant woman than a similarly-situated white woman. A clever set of studies by Brown-Iannuzzi and her colleagues [49] offers further documentation of racism in anti-welfare attitudes. First, a perceptual task was used to visually estimate participants’ mental representations of welfare recipients. Compared to the image of the “average” nonrecipient, the “protypical” welfare recipient was perceived as having stronger African American facial features and as aligning more closely with common stereotypes of welfare recipients and
Page 10 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
11
African Americans (e.g., lazy, incompetent, unattractive, unlikeable). When allocating welfare benefits to the hypothetical targets, less support was given to the more African American appearing target depicted in the image of the prototypical welfare recipient than to the target in
The Impact of Economic Conditions on Class-Based Policy Preferences
ip t
the non-recipient image.
cr
Policy attitudes are not formed in a vacuum and researchers are increasingly examining
us
the impact of broader economic conditions on redistributive beliefs. Rising income inequality, itself, may influence support for democracy and redistribution [50]. Income inequality has been
an
found to moderate the relationship between social class and policy preferences, with support for government intervention growing more similar across social classes with rising inequality [12].
M
Increasing economic precariousness may bring heightened sensitivity to the need for and support of a strong safety net. As negative effects extend up the socioeconomic ladder, higher SES
ed
groups may become just as likely as lower SES groups to support reduced inequality [51]. Yet, other research indicates that heightened inequality has limited effects on redistributive attitudes
Ac ce
area.
pt
and may even dampen support for them [52], underscoring the need for further research in this
Heightened economic inequality may also increase class polarization. Greater class conflict is reported in countries with high economic inequality and limited welfare programs than those with less inequality and more supportive welfare programs [2]. Dodson [53] found that high-level professionals and managers responded to rising unemployment by withdrawing support for greater tax progressivity, whereas manual workers and low-level professionals/managers became more supportive of tax progressivity. Nevertheless, other research documents limited class effects. Schöneck and Mau [54] found less support for welfare
Page 11 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
12
spending in globalized countries but that class divisions were neither intensified or reduced by globalization. Other research focuses on how correlates of inequality such as economic segregation
ip t
shape policy preferences. Thal [55] found that affluent, class-isolated Americans extrapolated from their own social conditions to others, resulting in inaccurate, overly positive beliefs about
cr
the availability of jobs and accessibility of healthcare. Indeed, the extent of economic inequality
us
is widely underestimated [60], and greater exposure to economic inequality does not necessarily foster greater support for redistribution. In Sands’ [57] field experiment, randomized
an
confederates who appeared to be poor were positioned in public spaces in an affluent neighborhood. After this exposure, people passing by were asked to sign a petition calling for
M
greater redistribution via a “millionaire’s tax” or alternatively, in the control condition, to sign a petition to reduce plastic bag use. Exposure to inequality was found to beget inequality, with
ed
support for redistribution declining after this exposure [57]. A growing body of research examining the relationship of class privilege to narcissism, entitlement, and reduced empathy
pt
lends further insight into the psychological underpinnings of elite policy attitudes [58].
Ac ce
Old Obstacles to New Class Alliances: Challenges and Opportunities The adoption of strong progressive redistributive policies is crucial to reducing the widening class divide, yet many barriers exist. Class-based power differences make for a highly uneven political playing field, narrow understandings of self-interest undermine strong crossclass alliances and the realization of shared concerns, system justification legitimizes unjust class relations among those who bear the brunt of inequality, and classist, racist, and sexist stereotypes erode support for fundamental safety net programs. Yet, finding by Norton and Ariely [56] offer hope that finding “common ground” may not be impossible. When asked about to identify their
Page 12 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
13
ideal distribution of wealth, survey respondents constructed distributions that were far more equitable than the status quo. Moreover, a level of consensus that is both encouraging and surprising was observed, with all demographic groups, including those who do not typically
ip t
support redistribution (e.g., people who are wealthy, Republicans), desiring a more equal distribution of wealth than is currently the case [56].
cr
The social science research reviewed here may help us move closer to challenging the
us
longstanding politics of social class and redistribution, developing new ways of viewing poverty and inequality, and fostering much needed, new class alliances. Educational programs (e.g.,
an
service learning, classroom curricula, documentaries) and other interventions that challenge stereotypes of welfare receipt and foster structural understandings of poverty, wealth, and
M
economic inequality can help reduce negative perceptions of low-income groups. Awareness of social class and classist stereotyping begins at an early age and interventions geared toward
ed
attitude underscore importance of teaching children about social class [59, 60]. Following their completion of a poverty curriculum, Mistry and her colleagues’ [60] found that young children
pt
expressed less deterministic views of poverty and recommended slightly more expansive
Ac ce
suggestions for assisting poor families than children in the control condition. Equally crucial is heightening awareness of the societal impact of inequality, and shifting individualistic discourse that depicts poverty as an individual-level issue or concern [6]. Income inequality does not just harm low income groups, it negatively affects population health and societal well-being [61]. Framing economic inequality as a threat to broader societal well-being and reviving conceptualizations of a shared or “public good” may help increase support for universal health care, progressive taxes, and other policies that reduce the income and wealth gaps. With the economic gap continuing to widen, putting social psychological knowledge to use
Page 13 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
14
may prove pivotal to strengthening interclass relations and bolstering support for redistributive
Ac ce
pt
ed
M
an
us
cr
ip t
policies.
Page 14 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
15
References [1] Bartels L: U.S. is a world leader in class conflict over government spending. Washington Post 2014, April 21; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
spending/?utm_term=.331d97f58709
cr
ip t
cage/wp/2014/04/21/u-s-is-a-world-leader-in-class-conflict-over-government-
[2] Edlund J, Lindh A: The democratic class struggle revisited: The welfare state, social
us
cohesion and political conflict. Acta Sociol. 2015, 58: 311-328.
[3] Hout, M: How class works: Objective and subjective aspects of class since the 1970s. In
an
Social Class: How Does It Work? Edited by Lareau, A, Conley, D. Russell Sage; 2008: 25-64.
M
[4] Diemer MA, Mistry RS, Wadsworth ME, Lopez I, Reimers F: Best practices in conceptualizing and measuring social class in psychological research. Anal. of Soc. Issues
ed
and Public Policy 2013, 13: 77-113.
[5] **Brown-Iannuzzi JL, Lundberg KB, Kay AC, Payne BK: Subjective status shapes
pt
political preferences. Psychol. Sci. 2015, 26: 15-26. In a series of related studied the researchers document that subjective status, not just material status, can elicit self-interest. Feeling lower or
Ac ce
higher in subjective status elicited patterns of policy support that were consistent with selfinterest. These shifts in policy attitudes were legitimized by shifting beliefs about fairness. [6] Bullock, HE: Women and Poverty: Psychology, Public Policy, and Social Justice. John Wiley & Sons; 2013.
[7] Fiske ST, Markus HR (Eds.): Facing Social Class: How Societal Rank Influences Interaction. Russell Sage; 2012. [8] Markus HR: In this together: Doing and undoing inequality and social class divides. J. of Soc. Issues 2017, 73: 211-221.
Page 15 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
16
[9] Smith L: Raising the minimum wage: Toward a psychological perspective. Am. Psychol. 2015, 6: 557-565. [10] United Nations Development Programme: The role of the private sector in inclusive
ip t
development: Barriers at the base of the pyramid. Istanbul International Center for Private Sector Development 2014; http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-
cr
reduction/private_sector/barriers-and-the-opportunities-at-the-base-of-the-pyramid---the-.html
ethclass interpretation. Soc. Sci. Q. 1989, 70: 88-100.
us
[11] Gilliam FD, Whitby, KJ: Race, class, and attitudes toward social welfare spending: An
an
[12] Andersen R, Curtis, J: Social class, economic inequality, and the convergence of policy preferences: Evidence from 24 modern democracies. Can. Rev. of Sociol. 2015, 52:
M
266-288.
[13] Kluegel, JR, Smith, ER: Beliefs about Inequality: Americans’ Views of What is and What
ed
Ought to Be. Aldine De Gruyter; 1986.
[14] Page BI, Bartels LM, Seawright J: Democracy and the policy preferences of wealthy
pt
Americans. Perspect. on Polit. 2013, 11: 51-73.
Ac ce
[15] Kraus, MW, Anderson C, Callaghan B: The inequality of politics: Social class rank and political participation (Working Paper No. 120-15). Institute for Research on Labor and Employment (IRLE) 2015; http://irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/120-15.pdf [16] Gilens M, Page BI: Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average citizens. Per. on Pol. 2014, 12: 564-581. [17] Mayer J: Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right. Doubleday; 2016. [18] Carnes N: White-Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making.
Page 16 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
17
University of Chicago Press; 2013. [19] Choma R: One member of Congress = 18 American households: Lawmakers’ personal finances far from average. Center for Responsive Politics 2015, January 12:
ip t
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2015/01/one-member-of-congress-18-american-householdslawmakers-personal-finances-far-from-average/
us
Self interest or political ideology. Acta Sociol. 2006, 49: 321-338.
cr
[20] Jaeger MM: What makes people support public responsibility for welfare provision:
[21] Kaltenthaler KC, Ceccoli SJ: Explaining patterns of support for the provision of citizen
an
welfare. J. of Eur. Public Policy 2008, 15: 1041-1068.
[22] Roberts, BJ: Your place or mine? Beliefs about inequality and redress Preferences in
M
South Africa. Soc. Indic. Res. 2014, 118: 1167-1190.
Henry Holt and Company; 2004.
ed
[23] Frank, T: What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America.
[24] Williams JC: White Working Class: Overcoming Class Cluelessness in America. Harvard
pt
Business School Publishing; 2017.
Ac ce
[25] Nagayoshi K, Sato Y: Who supports redistributive policies in contemporary Japan? An integrative approach to self-interest and trust models. Int. Sociol. 2014, 29: 302-323. [26] **Jost, JT, Gaucher D, Stern C: “The world isn’t fair:” A system justification perspective on social stratification and inequality. In APA Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology: Vol. 2. Group Processes. Edited by Mikulincer M, Shaver, PR. American Psychological Association; 2015: 317-340. Comprehensive review of the central postulates of system justification theory.
Page 17 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
18
[27] **Davidai S, Gilovich T: Building a more mobile America – One income quintile at a time. Perspect. on Psychol. Sci. 2015, 10: 60-71. An analysis of survey findings reveals the disconnect between U.S. beliefs about economic mobility and reality. Respondents
ip t
overestimated the amount of upward mobility and underestimated the likelihood of downward mobility. Economic status and political affiliation influenced these perceptions.
cr
[28] Owuamalam, CK, Rubin M, Spears R, Weerabangsa MM: Why do people from low-status
us
groups support class systems that disadvantage them? A test of two mainstream explanations in Malaysia and Australia. J. of Soc. Issues 2017, 73: 80-98.
an
[29] *Caruso EM, Vohs, KD, Baxter B, Wayz A: Mere exposure to money increases endorsement of free-market systems. J. of Exp. Psychol. 2013, 142: 301-306. Exposure to money was found to
M
lead to stronger endorsement of capitalism, social dominance, and victims deserve their fate. [30] Bullock HE, Reppond, HA: Of “takers” and “makers:” A social psychological analysis
ed
of class and classism. In Oxford Handbook of Social Psychology and Social Justice. Edited by Hammack, PL. Oxford University Press; 2016.
pt
[31] Watkins-Hayes C, Kovalsky E: The discourse of deservingness: Morality and the
Ac ce
dilemmas of poverty relief in debate and practice. In The Oxford Handbook of the Social Science of Poverty. Edited by Brady D, Burton LM. Oxford University Press; 2016: 193-220. [32] Rodriguez-Bailon R, Bratanova B, Willis, GB, Lopez-Rodriguez L, Sturrock A, Loughnan S: Social class and ideologies of inequality: How they uphold unequal societies. J. of Soc. Issues 2017, 73: 99-116.
[33] Hunt MO, Bullock HE: Ideologies and beliefs about poverty. In Oxford Handbook of the Social Science of Poverty. Edited by Brady D, Burton LM. Oxford University Press; 2016: 93116.
Page 18 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
19
[34] McCoy SK, Wellman JD, Cosley B., Saslow L, Epel E: Is the benefit in meritocracy palliative for low status groups? Evidence for a benefit for self-esteem and physical health via perceived control. Eur. J. of Soc. Psychol. 2013, 43: 307-318.
ip t
[35] Christandl F: The belief in a just world as a personal resource in the context of inflation and financial crises. Appl. Psychol. 2013, 62: 486-518.
cr
[36] Durante F, Bearns Tablante C, Fiske, ST: Poor but warm, rich but cold (and
us
competent): Social classes in the stereotype content model. J. of Soc. Issues 2017, 73: 138-157.
an
[37] Loughnan S, Haslam N, Sutton RM, Spencer B: Dehumanization and social class: Animality in the stereotypes of “white trash,” “chavs,” and “bogans.” Soc. Psychol. 2014,
M
45: 54-61.
[38] Hofman P, Valentino L, Weed E: Being and becoming poor: How cultural schemas
ed
shape beliefs about poverty. Soc. Forces 2017, 95: 1023-1048. [39] Henry PJ., Reyna C, Weiner B: Hate welfare but help the poor: How the attributional
pt
content of stereotypes explains the paradox of reactions to the destitute in America. J. of
Ac ce
Appl. Soc. Psychol. 2004, 34: 34-58.
[40] Katz MB. The Undeserving Poor: America’s Enduring Confrontation with Poverty (2nd edition). Oxford University Press; 2013. [41] Bullock HE, Truong SV, Chunn L: Combatting social exclusion: “Safe space” and the dynamics of inclusion at a homeless farming site. J. of Poverty 2017, 21: 166-192. [42] Deeming C: Foundations of the workfare state: Reflections on the political transformation of the welfare state in Britain. Soc. Policy and Adm. 2015, 49: 826-886.
Page 19 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
20
[43] Houser L, Schram SF, Soss J, Fording, RC: From work support to work motivator: Child care subsidies and caseworker discretion in the post-welfare reform era. J. of Women, Polit., and Policy 2014, 35: 174-193.
ip t
[44] Soss J: Making clients and citizens: Welfare policy as a source of status, belief, and
AL, Ingram, HM. University of New York Press; 2005: 291-328.
cr
action. In Deserving and Entitled: Social Constructions and Public Policy. Edited by Schneider
us
[45] Faricy C: The distributive politics of tax expenditures: How parties use policy tools to distribute federal money to the rich and the poor. Polit., Groups, and Identities 2015, 4:
an
110-125.
[46] Faricy C, Ellis C: Public attitudes toward social spending in the United States: The
M
differences between direct spending and tax expenditures. Pol. Beh. 2014, 36: 53-76. [47] van Doorn BW: Pre- and post-welfare reform media portrayals of poverty in the United
162.
ed
States: The continuing importance of race and ethnicity. Politics and Policy 2015, 43:142-
pt
[48] Johnson, JD, Olivo N, Gibson N, Reed W, & Ashburn-Nardo, L: Priming media
Ac ce
stereotypes reduces support for social welfare policies: The mediating role of empathy. Pers. and Soc. Psychol. Bull. 2009, 35: 463-476. [49] **Brown-Iannuzzi JL, Dotsch R, Cooley E, Payne, BK: The relationship between mental representations of welfare recipients and attitudes toward welfare. Psychol. Sci. 2017, 92: 113. In a set of four studies, the researchers found that when respondents thought of a prototypical “welfare recipient,” they envisioned someone who is African American and associated negative stereotypes with this hypothetical person. The protypical welfare recipient was granted lower benefits than a hypothetical target who did not conform to this prototypical image.
Page 20 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
21
[50] Krieckhaus J, Byunghwan S, Bellinger NM, Wells JM: Economic inequality and democratic support. J. of Polit. 2014, 76: 139-151. [51] **Curtis J, Andersen, R: How social class attitudes on economic inequality: The
ip t
competing forces of self-interest and legitimation. Int. Rev. of Soc. Res. 2015, 5: 4-19. Multifaceted analysis of survey and national statistics from 24 countries. The results show that
cr
self-interest is affected by levels of economic inequality. High levels of income inequality were
us
associated with greater alignment of middle and low-income policy interests.
[52] Haggard S, Kaufman RR, Long, JD: Income, occupation, and preferences for
an
redistribution in the developing world. Stud. in Comp. Int. Dev. 2013, 48: 113-140. [53] Dodson K: Economic change and class conflict over tax attitudes: Evidence from nine
M
advanced capitalist democracies. Soc. Forces 2017, 95: 1509-1537. [54] Schöneck NM, Mau S. Coming together or growing apart? Globalization, class and
ed
redistributive preferences. J. of Eur. Soc. Policy 2015, 25: 454-472. [55] Thal A. Class isolation and affluent Americans’ perception of social conditions.
pt
Political Behavior 2017, 39: 401-424.
Ac ce
[56] Norton MI, Ariely, D: Building a better America – One wealth quintile at a time. Perspect. on Psychol Sci. 2011, 6: 9-12. [57] *Sands ML: Exposure to inequality affects support for redistribution. Proc. of the Natl. Acad. of Sci. 2017, 114: 663-668. In a placebo-controlled field study conducted in an affluent neighborhood, passersby were randomly exposed to confederates who appeared to be experiencing poverty and asked to sign a petition to reduce inequality. Exposure to inequality (i.e., poor confederates) resulted in reduced support for economic redistribution.
Page 21 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
22
[58] Piff, PK: Wealth and the inflated self: Class, entitlement, and narcissism. Pers. and Soc. Psychol. Bull. 2014, 40: 34-43. [59] Mistry RS, Brown CS, White ES, Chow KA, Gillen-O’Neel C: Elementary school
ip t
children’s reasoning about social class: A mixed-methods study. Child Develop. 2015: 16531671.
cr
[60] Mistry RS, Nenadal L, Griffin KM, Zimmerman FJ, Cochran HA, Thomas CA, Wilson C:
us
Children’s reasoning about poverty, economic mobility, and helping behavior: Results of a curriculum intervention in early school years. J of Soc. Issues 2017: 760-788.
an
[61] Pickett, KE, Wilkinson, RG: 2015. Income inequality and health: A causal review. Social
Ac ce
pt
ed
M
Science & Medicine 128: 316-326.
Page 22 of 23
RUNNING HEAD: Social Class and Policy Preferences
Ac ce
pt
ed
M
an
us
cr
ip t
23
Page 23 of 23