Swords and Shields: Ballistic Missiles and Defenses in the Middle East and South Asia

Swords and Shields: Ballistic Missiles and Defenses in the Middle East and South Asia by Richard L. Russell

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he American war effort in Afghanistan has naturally eclipsed what had been a rigorous debate over the strategic wisdom of ballistic missile defenses, an initial national security emphasis of the Bush administration. And Americans confronting anthrax in the U.S. postal system could not help but see ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a less immediate threat. In the long range, however, the tragedies of September 11 are likely to reinforce for policymakers and citizens the need to prepare for the unexpected and heighten awareness and support for ballistic missile defenses. The debate over ballistic missile defenses (BMD) has been reduced from boiling to simmering, and the current dialogue has partisan tones. Republicans continue to argue that the threat to American territory by nationstates armed with ballistic missilesÐperhaps armed with chemical, biological, and nuclear warheadsÐis a contemporary reality. They assert that the United States is defenseless against these weapons and must embark on an ambitious research, development, and procurement program to ®eld BMD to guard American citizens, home territory, and armed forces abroad. On the other side of the aisle, Democrats contend that the threat posed by ballistic missiles and WMD payloads is merely a futuristic possibility. They argue that substantial investments in BMD will siphon money from defense programs of more immediate and higher priority and that aggressive BMD programs would erode nuclear stability of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty era. From the Democratic perspective, Richard L. Russell is Professor, Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, the National Defense University. He is the author of George F. Kennan's Strategic Thought: The Making of an American Political Realist (Praeger, 1999). The author thanks the National Defense University's Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies Director Alina Romanowski and Academic Chair Roger Harrison for their support and Judith Yaphe for her comments on an earlier draft. The views expressed are those of the author and do not re¯ect the of®cial policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. ß 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.

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RUSSELL the decision to set aside the ABM Treaty for the sake of BMD programs could set off a chain reaction of ballistic missile arms races. The speci®c concern is that Russia and China may feel compelled to build up their ballistic missile forces to compensate for American BMD in order to ensure the viability of their intercontinental strategic nuclear force deterrents. The more general concern is an arms race involving all nuclear and could-be nuclear powers. As is the case with many controversies over national security and defense priorities, many Washington players are consumed by inside-theBeltway views. The foreign viewpoints that have registered have been largely those of our NATO allies and Russia. The Bush administration early on faced signi®cant European resistance to its BMD plans, and the leadership of NATO countries remains dominated by liberal notions of using multinational institutions to promote international stability and the legacy of the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of stability with Russia. Recently, the Bush administration has made headway with its NATO partners, who now appear to have concluded that the Americans are committed to BMD and that it could be wiser to accommodate the Americans, lest the issue become another source of a transatlantic rift. Simultaneously, the Bush team is managing a dialogue with Russia, and President Bush has announced dramatic cuts in the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal that cast doubt on the relevance of the ABM Treaty system in the post-Cold War world. The American dialogue with China on BMD has been stalled since spring 2001 by the Chinese downing of the American reconnaissance aircraft. The Chinese reliance on ballistic missiles as a tool of intimidation and war against Taiwan as well as the potential provision of American BMD to Taipei, however, will make American diplomacy with Beijing on this issue an uphill battle.1 Little headway appeared to have been made on this score during President's Bush's February trip to Beijing. Although there are varying assessments of the threat posed to the continental United States by ballistic missiles, both Republicans and Democrats agree that they are formidable threats to American military forces posted abroad, particularly in the Middle East. The Middle East is the only region of the world that has witnessed the combat use of ballistic missiles since Nazi Germany ®red Blitz bombs against England in World War II.2 With telling effect, the Nazis ®red V-1 cruise missiles, which are essentially air breathing, pilotless aircraft, and V-2 ballistic missiles, which are rocketpowered only during launch and follow a curved, or ballistic, trajectory as the warheads carried by missiles fall to earth. The Germans ®red more than 1 For a review of the evolution of U.S. thinking on BMD and the American relationship with Russia, China, and allies in Asia and Europe on this issue, see Peter W. Rodman, Shield Embattled: Missile Defense as a Foreign Policy Problem (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, 2001) (www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/ shieldembattled.pdf). 2 The Chinese ®red several ballistic missiles north and south of Taiwan in a 1996 crisis, but those ®rings were acts of political coercion, not warfare. See Richard L. Russell, ``The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The U.S. and China at the Precipice of War?'' Pew Case in International Affairs, no. 231 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2000).

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Missile Defenses 17,000 V-1s and 3,500 V-2s, penetrated British airspace with impunity, and killed nearly 12,000 British civilians.3 Since the 1991 Gulf War, regional powers in the Middle East as well as in South AsiaÐfriend and foe alikeÐhave been placing greater emphasis on short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in their military postures and modernization plans. Middle Eastern and South Asian militaries clearly anticipate that ballistic missilesÐincluding ones armed with WMDÐare essential pillars of deterrence against adversaries and, should deterrence fail, are likely ingredients for military supremacy on the battle®eld.4 What are the trends in ballistic missile capabilities in the Middle East and South Asia? How do regional states view BMD? What are the implications of these trends for American national security policy? To answer these questions, one needs to look at the history of ballistic missile proliferation in the region, particularly the use of ballistic missiles during the 1980±88 Iran± Iraq War and the Gulf War, and the modernization efforts that have taken place in the region since the Gulf War that shape the views of regional partners on the pros and cons of BMD and the anticipated impact of American BMD on their relationships with the United States. In a series of recent seminars sponsored by the National Defense University's Near EastSouth Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, senior military of®cers and diplomats from the Middle East and South Asia have been exchanging views on missile proliferation and other matters that de®ne options and broad policy contours in the current debate. A basic point seems clear: the United States will move toward a greater reliance on BMD to support regional partners and American forces operating in the Middle East and South Asia. Swords in Battle Ballistic missiles are attractive instruments of power for nation-states in the Middle East and South Asia for several reasons. They deliver their payloads faster than combat aircraft and are largely assured of penetrating enemy airspace due to the lack of highly effective defenses. To be exact, combat aircraft, which can ¯y at more than 1,000 kilometers per hour, reach targets 900 kilometers away in about an hour, while ballistic missiles can reach them in about six minutes.5 Ballistic missiles also are less hampered by 3 W. Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response (Westport, Conn.: Praeger for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990), p. 2. For German wartime missile programs, see Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (New York: Oxford University Press for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1996), pp. 37±44. 4 Ballistic missiles are characterized by range; short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) ¯y under 1,000 kilometers, medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) travel 1,000±3,000 kilometers; intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) reach 3,000±5,500 kilometers; and, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are capable of hitting targets located more than 5,500 kilometers away. These de®nitions are taken from the National Intelligence Council's unclassi®ed 1999 National Intelligence Estimate ``Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015'' (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html). 5 Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, p. 27.

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RUSSELL poor weather and darkness than pilots and aircraft and, in many respects, are less technologically demanding to maintain and support than modern combat aircraft. For these reasons, ballistic missiles have a long history in the Middle East and South Asia. Egypt received inventories of Scud missiles from the Soviet Union prior to the 1973 Middle East War. Egyptian President Anwar SadatÐaware that his air force would be unable to gain air superiority over the Israeli Air ForceÐviewed Scuds as military means to ensure that Cairo could strike at Israeli civilian targets to deter Israeli aircraft strikes against Egyptian population centers.6 Sadat also viewed ballistic missiles as tools to support tactical battle®eld objectives. In the 1973 war, he ordered the ®ring of three Scud missiles at Israeli bridges across the Suez Canal, although all of them failed to hit their targets.7 By the 1970s, faced with regional adversaries armed with Soviet-supplied ballistic missiles, the Israelis opted to rely on ballistic missiles as part of a nuclear deterrent force. Israel may have readied its nuclear deterrent missile force in the initial losing stages of the 1973 war.8 Soviet-supplied Scuds have been used in numerous con¯icts in Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran. In 1986, Libya sponsored a terrorist bombing against American soldiers in Germany that resulted in the Reagan administration's retaliatory bombing raids against Libya. In a weak response, Tripoli ®red two errant Scud missiles at a U.S. Coast Guard station on the Italian island of Lampedusa in the Mediterranean Sea. Although the Yemeni civil war in 1994 was of little note in the Western media, it featured the use of ballistic missiles. Southern Yemeni forces ®red an estimated twenty Scud missiles against North Yemen's capital of Sanaa in a vain effort to undermine public support for the North's war effort. South Asia has witnessed the combat use of ballistic missiles in Afghanistan. Between 1988 and 1992, the regime in Kabul ®red about 2,000 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles at Afghan rebel strongholds and bases.9 The most notable use of ballistic missiles occurred in the Iran±Iraq War. In the so-called ``War of the Cities,'' Iraq launched about 160 Al Husayn extended-range Scud missiles at Tehran and scores of missiles at Isfahan and Qom between February and April 1988.10 The Iranians returned ®re with about eighty-eight Scud missiles against Iraq during that time frame.11

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Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), p. 227. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., ``Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Egypt and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War,'' Jane's Intelligence Review, Dec. 1991, p. 537. 8 For treatments of Israel's nuclear deterrent, see Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994) and Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 9 Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, pp. 45±46. 10 Thomas L. McNaugher, ``Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran±Iraq War,'' International Security, Fall 1990, p. 5. 11 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq: The Threat from the Northern Gulf (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), p. 90. 7

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Missile Defenses Though the military damage in¯icted was limited, Iraqi ballistic missile attacks dealt a psychological blow to Iran and, coupled with the Iranian political capitulation at the war's end, bolstered arguments by missile and airpower enthusiasts that the strategic bombing of civilians can break the political will of adversaries. As Thomas McNaugher wisely points out, however, the role of ballistic missiles in the ``War of the Cities'' should be assessed in the broader strategic context. Loss of con®dence in the regime, economic deterioration, and battle®eld losses also reduced Iranians' will to resist the Iraqis. ``Iraq's missiles did not so much destroy Iranian morale as hasten a deterioration in morale that was the work of other factors and that was already well underway when the 1988 missile campaign began,'' he wrote. ``If there is a general case to be made, it is that missiles are an effective `coup de grace' weapon, decisive only when target states are already near collapse.''12 Iraqi ballistic missile capabilities were upgraded after the war with Iran. During the Gulf War, Baghdad ®red eighty-eight extended-range Scud missiles at Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.13 In the three-year interval, the Iraqis had managed to extend the ranges of Soviet-supplied missiles by reducing warhead weights and increasing fuel in missiles. They had also managed to manufacture mobile launchers for the missiles, complicating the U.S.-led effort to hunt Iraq's Scuds. After the war, there was no conclusive evidence that the coalition had actually succeeded in destroying any Scud mobile launchers.14 As in the case of the Iran±Iraq War, the political and military effectiveness of Iraqi ballistic missile attacks in the Gulf War were mixed. Iraq's conventional Scud warheads produced limited destruction on the ground, although a single Scud attack against Dhahran, Saudi Arabia tragically in¯icted the greatest number of American casualties in one instance during the war; twenty-eight were killed and ninety-seven wounded. Iraqi ballistic missile strikes had a signi®cant political effect, however, and created an emotional and psychological unease in Saudi Arabia and Israel. Most signi®cantly, the strikes put pressure on the Israeli leaders to retaliate militarily, thereby threatening the political cohesion needed to hold Arab forces in the coalition. To forestall Israeli military retaliation, the United States was compelled to divert substantial military resources from strikes on the Iraqi strategic infrastructure and preparatory strikes for the ground campaign to hunt for Iraqi mobile Scud launchers. 12 McNaugher, ``Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons,'' p. 15. The debate over strategic bombing and the ``decisiveness'' of airpower was renewed in the wake of the Gulf and Kosovo wars. See Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996) and Daniel A. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, ``Kosovo and the Great Airpower Debate,'' International Security, Spring 2000, pp. 5±38. The debate is likely to receive another infusion of interest in light of U.S. air operations in Afghanistan. 13 Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 76. 14 Ibid., p. 78.

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RUSSELL Sharpening Swords for the Next War For regional powers in the area, the Gulf War underscored the utility of ballistic missiles in combat. Two lessons were likely learned: ®rst, that conventionally armed ballistic missiles can be used for political advantage, and second, that in light of the negligible military effects of conventionallyarmed ballistic missiles, either they have to be used in massive barrages or greater emphasis needs to be placed on WMD warheadsÐparticularly nuclear warheadsÐfor deterrence and military preparedness for future con¯ict. As Steve Fetter observes, the inaccuracies of ballistic missiles make them inef®cient vehicles for conventional weapons delivery, a fact that ``has long been recognized by the nuclear powers, which rely on ballistic missiles almost exclusively for the delivery of nuclear warheads. The inef®ciency of conventionally armed missiles seems to be well understood by the new missile states as well, since most of them are also actively seeking nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.''15 Any attempt to gauge contemporary ballistic missile modernization programs in the Middle East and South Asia is an inexact science. Although a great deal of information is available in the public domain (in many instances leaked from government intelligence agencies), it forms an incomplete picture. Nation-states placing high priority on ballistic missile programs work assiduously to keep their research, development, and procurement efforts far from the view of potential adversaries and participants in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a voluntary cooperative effort by Western states to stem the international ¯ow of ballistic missile-related technology.16 This cat-and-mouse game in international politics prevents the perfect assessment of ballistic missile capabilities. As Aaron Karp has cautioned, ``The number of ballistic missiles in the Middle East alone may number not in the hundreds, as is widely assumed, but thousands.''17 This important caveat aside, what do we know about ballistic missile programs today in the Middle East and South Asia? Israel probably has the most sophisticated and robust ballistic missile infrastructure and capabilities in the region. Janne Nolan assesses that ``Israel's command, control, intelligence and logistical capabilities far surpass those of any Arab state.''18 15 Steve Fetter, ``Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?'' International Security, Summer 1991, p. 6. For a comparative analysis of ballistic missiles and aircraft, see John R. Harvey, ``Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectiveness,'' International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 41±83. 16 The MTCR's initial participants were the United States, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan. The MTCR controls the export of components for ballistic missiles capable of ¯ying more 300 kilometers and carrying a payload of at least 500 kilograms. 17 Aaron Karp, ``Regional Perspectives: The Middle East,'' Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies and Mountbatten Center for International Studies, University of Southampton, Occasional Paper No. 5, International Perspectives on Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Defenses, Mar. 2001, p. 57. 18 Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), p. 76.

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Missile Defenses The Israelis exercise tight security over their deterrent forces, but many suspect that they have an inventory of 50±100 nuclear-capable Jericho I missiles. They began development of the Jericho II in 1985, and test launches of the missile into the Mediterranean were made between 1987 and 1992 at ranges of about 1,300 kilometers. Israel might also be building a follow-on known as the Jericho III.19 Tel Aviv's adversaries in Damascus and Tripoli are honing their ballistic missile capabilities. Syria may possess dozens of warheads ®lled with the nerve agent Sarin for its Soviet-supplied Scuds.20 Libya's ballistic missile programs probably have been hampered by economic shortcomings and UN sanctions, but they are underway. Libya in the 1990s sought to acquire various missile technologies, including both solid and liquid propellants with foreign and indigenous designs. Libya, however, has not tested ballistic missiles other than the Soviet-supplied Scuds already in Libyan inventories.21 Although Iraq's plans were interrupted by the Gulf War and post-war UN sanctions, Baghdad continues to nurture its ballistic missile and WMD programs. The Iraqis have produced modi®ed versions of Scuds including the Al Husayn and the Al Abbas missiles, with ranges of 600 and 900 kilometers, respectively.22 The Iraqis conceded to UN inspectors that they had ®lled twenty-®ve missile warheads with biological agents: thirteen with botulinum toxin, ten with anthrax, and two with a¯atoxin. The Iraqis also claimed to have had seventy-®ve chemical missile warheads, and the UN was unable to verify Iraqi claims that all of these warheads had been destroyed.23 There are credible claims that the Iraqis hope to produce nuclear warheads for their ballistic missiles.24 Baghdad today routinely evades UN sanctions and smuggles prohibited ballistic missile-related equipment from Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, and Russia into Iraq via Jordan and is developing other smuggling routes via Syria and Lebanon.25 Should UN sanctions be lifted, Iraq will have even better opportunities and resources to augment a covert but robust ballistic missile program.26 Iran is ambitiously modernizing its ballistic missile capabilities, in part, as a hedge against Iraqi capabilities. Iran's ballistic missile infrastructure 19 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (hereafter the ``Rumsfeld Commission''), Appendix III: Unclassi®ed Working Papers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, July 15, 1998), p. 25 (http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/newnote.html). 20 Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, p. 7. 21 Aaron Karp, ``The Spread of Ballistic Missiles and the Transformation of Global Security,'' The Nonproliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2000, p. 114. 22 Rumsfeld Commission, Executive Summary, p. 14. 23 W. Seth Carus, ``Ballistic Missiles in Iran and Iraq: 1988±98,'' Rumsfeld Commission, Appendix III, p. 82. 24 Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker: The Terrifying Inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons Agenda (New York: Scribner, 2000), p. 195. 25 See Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, ``Shopping with Saddam Hussein,'' Commentary, July/Aug. 2001, pp. 23±27. 26 For a broader analysis of the potential for Iraq to rebuild its once formidable forces, see Michael Eisenstadt, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes? The Future of Iraqi Military Power, Policy Paper 36 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993).

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RUSSELL is more sophisticated than that of North Korea and has bene®ted from signi®cant assistance from Russia and China.27 Iran's primary ballistic missile capability consists of 200±300 Scud B and C missiles with ranges of 300 and 500 kilometers, respectively. The missiles, which might have chemical warheads as well as conventional payloads, are mounted on 10±15 mobile launchers. Iran signed a contract in 1989 for about 200 Chinese CSS-8 missiles, which are modi®ed SA-2 surface-to-air missiles. Iran, moreover, has assembled Scud C missile kits from North Korea and is building two liquidfueled missiles (the Shehab-3 and -4) with Russian help.28 Like Iraq, Iran has nuclear weapons ambitions and probably seeks nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles.29 Other Arab states also are modernizing their ballistic missile forces with foreign assistance. The UAE, for example, purchased twenty-®ve Scud B missiles from China in 1989.30 In the late 1980s, Egypt was working with Iraq and Argentina in the Condor II program to develop a solid-fuel missile capable of carrying 2,000 kilogram warheads about 1,000 kilometers. After Egypt withdrew from the program in 1988Ðunder heavy U.S. pressureÐand Argentina withdrew in 1989, Iraq continued alone under the auspices of the Badr 2000 program. The missile was never tested and the Gulf War interrupted the program, but Iraq most likely retains the expertise needed to resurrect the program.31 Egypt in the 1980s probably provided some of its Soviet-supplied Scud B missiles to North KoreaÐwhich Pyongyang reverseengineered to form the foundation of its ballistic missile programÐand may have helped the Iraqis to modify Scud B missiles to create Al Husayn and Al Abbas missiles.32 With North Korean assistance, Egypt is developing a ballistic missile infrastructure and is modifying its Scud B and C missiles.33 Saudi Arabia too may soon seek to modernize its ballistic missile forces purchased from China. Saudi Arabia turned in the 1980s to China and purchased about sixty CSS-2 ballistic missiles. The Saudis and the Chinese claim that the CSS-2s are conventionally armed, but a nuclear deterrent option would make eminent strategic sense from the Saudi perspective.34 The race for ballistic missiles and WMD is all too evident in South Asia. A key driving force behind ballistic missile programs in South Asia is India's rivalry with China. Some believe that Beijing's growing in¯uence in Asia consumes more of New Delhi's long-term attention than India's rivalry with Pakistan. On the other hand, Islamabad views India military 27

Rumsfeld Commission, p. 12. Ibid. 29 See Michael Eisenstadt, ``Living with a Nuclear Iran?'' Survival, Autumn 1999, pp. 124±48. 30 Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, ``No UAE Sanctions,'' Washington Times, Apr. 14, 2000. 31 Rumsfeld Commission, Appendix III, pp. 2±3. 32 Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, p. 24. 33 Rumsfeld Commission, Appendix III, p. 27. 34 For an analysis of the use of Saudi CSS-2s as a foundation for a nuclear deterrent, see Richard L. Russell, ``A Saudi Nuclear Option?'' Survival, Summer 2001, pp. 69±79. 28

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Missile Defenses modernization effortsÐeven if directed against ChinaÐas potential threats to Pakistan, especially because Pakistan's largest cities and military installations tend to be located near the Indian border, giving the Pakistani military little territorial depth for defense. Pakistani military planning consequently is focused on trying to keep pace with India.35 India's ballistic missile program was spun off from its civilian space satellite program in 1983 and included the Prithvi and Agni missiles. Two versions of the liquid-fueled PrithviÐthe SS-150 for the army and the SS-250 for the air forceÐhave been ¯ight-tested. The solid-fueled Agni II was ¯ighttested in January 2001 at range of 2,100 kilometers. India also is developing the Agni III missile with a 3,500-kilometer range to hold Chinese assets at greater risk.36 Indian leaders have declared that they have developed nuclear weapons for delivery on Prithvi and Agni missiles.37 To keep pace with India, Pakistan is developing and deploying a variety of ballistic missiles. Pakistan's ballistic missile programÐlike Iran'sÐis now more advanced than that of North Korea. Pakistan has acquired nuclearcapable M-11 missiles from China. In 1998, Pakistan tested and deployed the 1,300 kilometer liquid-fueled Ghauri, based on North Korean technology, for which it has production facilities.38 A second Pakistani missile program, the 600 kilometer range, solid-fuel Shaheen I, is based on Chinese assistance, was ®rst tested in April 1999, and is now operational. The ®rst ¯ight-test of the 2,500 kilometers Shaheen II is expected.39 Picking up Shields? Regional Thinking on Ballistic Missile Defenses While regional states are convinced of the political and military utility of ballistic missiles for deterrence and war ®ghting, their views on ballistic missile defenses are in the nascent stages. The nation-states of the region do not share the Cold War history that link the United States, NATO allies, Russia, and to a lesser extent China, a history permeated by the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction and the strategic logic behind the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty codi®ed the vulnerability of American and Soviet societies to

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Nolan, Trappings of Power, p. 86. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, ``The Implications for Postures and Capabilities in South Asia,'' Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies and Mountbatten Center for International Studies, University of Southampton, Occasional Paper No. 7, Missile Proliferation and Defenses: Problems and Prospects, May 2001, p. 61. 37 Rumsfeld Commission, p. 15. 38 Ibid., p. 16. Pakistan started receiving M-11 missiles from China in the early 1990s. Beijing later may have helped Islamabad to build an M-11 production facility. The M-11's range of 300 kilometers and payload of 500± 800 kilograms suggest that the transfer was a violation of the MTCR. Pakistan is estimated to have between thirty and eighty-four M-11s. The Pakistanis also test-®red an 800 kilometer missile which might be a Chinese M-9 or an improved M-11. See Rumsfeld Commission, Appendix III, p. 23. 39 Sidhu, ``The Implications for Postures and Capabilities in South Asia,'' p. 62. 36

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RUSSELL intercontinental nuclear ballistic missile barrages that, in theory, bolstered the deterrent of opposing strategic forces. Middle East and South Asian thinking about BMD also is preliminary because for all intents and purposes, ballistic missiles today remain invulnerable to local defenses. The defensive systems that do existÐsuch as the American Patriot and the Russian SA-300 air defense system touted by Moscow to have anti-ballistic missile capabilitiesÐare not readily available and their effectiveness is debatable. The Patriot missile system was hailed for its effectiveness in countering Iraqi ballistic missiles in the midst of the Gulf War, but post-war analysis has called into question the Patriot's battle®eld performance; assessments of the Patriot's success rate range from 40 to 80 percent.40 The Patriot and SA-300 are to be distinguished from systems designed to provide national or homeland defense; the Patriot is generally characterized as ``theater'' (TMD) and is designed to intercept short- to medium-range missiles. American systems for national missile defense (NMD) are under development.41 The intended point of interception is another way of distinguishing BMD. There are generally three intercept points; in initial boost-phase, in midcourse, and the terminal or end of the missile's trajectory. The Bush administration is leaning toward on the deployment of an NMD system to destroy enemy warheads in the midcourse phase, the point after an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) has burned its fuel and released the warheads but before the warhead reenters the atmosphere. Intercepting ballistic missiles in the earlier and powered phase of trajectory has several advantages over the midcourse intercept, however. Interception in the boost-phase would destroy the entire missile payload including submunitions, decoys, and warheads and be easier to detect because the burning missile is brighter, larger, slower-moving, and more fragile than the warhead. A boost-phase defense, furthermore, could cover a much larger area than a midcourse defense.42 The United States is on the cutting edge of research, development, and deployment of basic missile defense technologies that are likely to increasingly blur the distinction between TMD and NMD. Some BMD systems, for instance, might be highly mobile and could be forward-deployed to the Middle East and South Asia in time of crisis to defend against ballistic 40 Alaa Issa, ``The Drivers Behind Missile Proliferation,'' Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies and Mountbatten Center for International Studies, University of Southampton, Occasional Paper No. 7, Missile Proliferation and Defenses: Problems and Prospects, May 2001, p. 4. The controversial article at the vanguard of studies calling into question the Patriot's performance during the Gulf War is Theodore A. Postol, ``Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot,'' International Security, Winter 1991±92, pp. 119±71. 41 See Michael O'Hanlon, ``Star Wars Strikes Back,'' Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 1999, p. 68. For background including ®gures and graphics on BMD, see the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, formerly the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, website, http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/bmdolink.html 42 Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, ``National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,'' International Security, Summer 2001, pp. 49, 52±53.

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Missile Defenses missile threats to U.S. forces operating in the region as well as to be in position to intercept missiles aimed at American territory in their boostphases.43 As with ballistic missiles, Israel is by far the most forwarding thinking nation-state in the Middle East and South Asia on BMD. The Israelis have cooperated with the United States since the late 1980s on the Arrow interceptor missile, which was declared operational in March 2000. Israel is building three Arrow batteries to provide coverage for its heavily populated areas. If each battery operates ®fty interceptors, the initial deployment could be 300±450 missiles.44 The Israelis are also working on a boost-phase intercept system based on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) armed with Rafael Python 4 air-to-air missiles, a program that has been accelerated because of increasing Israeli concern about Iranian ballistic missile capabilities.45 The Israelis may eventually broaden international collaboration on the Arrow to help defray costs. Israeli cooperation with Turkey, for example, would require more than the three Arrow batteries Israel now plans, but would be a logical area in which the two countries could strengthen their deepening security ties.46 Elsewhere in the region, authoritative dialogue on security issues is a hard commodity to come by. As Karp observes, ``Throughout the Arab world, security remains a highly sensitive subject, rarely discussed except in private.''47 Middle Eastern states such as Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria in recent years lent their political backing to efforts in the UN General Assembly to bolster the ABM Treaty, while a few regional states such as Bahrain, Morocco, Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates tended to abstain or to be absent during these UN votes.48 It is no coincidence that those countries that have large stakes in 43

The Pentagon is working on a variety of BMD systems to include: the PAC-3, an improved version of the Patriot; a ground-based Theater High-Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD); the Navy Theater Wide system (NTW); and the airborne laser (ABL) being developed by the Air Force. These programs tend to be less controversial than plans for an American homeland defense system that uses radars abroad and in Alaska for surveillance and tracking for hundreds of interceptor missiles based in the continental U.S. For discussions of these programs and the implications for the U.S. defense budget and relations with China and Russia, see James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001) and Dean A. Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defense and Strategic Stability, Adelphi Paper 334 (New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000). 44 Aaron Karp, ``The Middle East in Strategic Transition: From Offense to Defense Dominance?'' Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies and Mountbatten Center for International Studies, University of Southampton, Occasional Paper No. 7, Missile Proliferation and Defenses: Problems and Prospects, May 2001, pp. 79±80. 45 Ed Blanche and Duncan Lennox, ``Shifting Balance,'' Jane's Defense Weekly, Mar. 10, 1999, p. 63. For a discussion of Israeli BMD efforts, see Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. Bacevich, Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel's Security Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), pp. 125±26. 46 ``The Missile Threat: Rockets Overhead,'' Economist, July 31, 1999, p. 19. 47 Karp, ``The Middle East in Strategic Transition'' p. 81. 48 Ibid., p. 82.

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RUSSELL ballistic missile inventoriesÐEgypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and SyriaÐwere the most committed to the ABM Treaty, which barred the deployment of effective countermeasures that could offset their considerable investments in ballistic missiles. South Asian nation-states, as with many security-related issues, are of opposing minds on the potential impact of ballistic missile defenses. In May 2001, Pakistan's General Pervez MusharrafÐwhile standing by the visiting Chinese prime ministerÐpublicly expressed concern that BMD ``could jeopardize strategic stability, trigger a new arms race and undermine international efforts aimed at arms control and disarmament.''49 On the other hand, India has applauded American proposals for ballistic missile defenses. New Delhi's support probably stems, in part, from a con®dence that it has more resources to devote to BMD than does Pakistan. NESA seminars have helped put some ¯esh on the outsider's skeletal understanding of Middle Eastern and South Asian views on ballistic missile defenses. The views gathered in this forum are by no means comprehensive, but are nonetheless representative of the thoughts of in¯uential, senior military and diplomatic of®cials from the region that are worthy of attention. 







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Many believe that American homeland BMD would spark an arms race with China, which, in turn, would fuel a South Asian arms race. They worry that a build-up of the Chinese strategic missile inventory needed to counter U.S. defenses would compel India to build up its ballistic missile forces to balance China's increased inventory. New Delhi's ballistic missile build up, in turn, would induce Islamabad to bolster ballistic missile forces as a counterweight to India's growing inventory. Others worry about the potential unintended consequences of BMD used in the region during combat. Given the tight geographic confines of some areas in the Middle East, for example, ballistic missiles intercepted by TMD could fall on third parties trying to stay out of a conflict. Others argue that American BMD would not diminish the threat of WMD. While they might limit the options of rogue states, these states would shift strategies and adapt to BMD. The implicit concern is that rogue states would develop covert means of delivering WMD instead of ballistic missiles. American homeland BMD would diminish American interest in regional security. Likewise, regional officials voice the concern that ``without shared vulnerability,'' the United States is less likely to come to the aid of regional partners in times of crisis.

Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, The Implications for Postures and Capabilities in South Asia, p. 59.

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Missile Defenses 

The United States' pursuit of BMD would divert defense funds from traditional forces that have been used in the past for regional intervention. An increasing U.S. reliance on less traditional forms of military power might limit the United States' ability to come to their aid in a crisis. Several participants were concerned that BMD would turn the U.S. inward, and away from the world.

Regional partners express concern that development of American ballistic missile defense programs would leave them unprotected and unable to afford theater defensive systems. Accordingly, they are interested in American offers of regional or country protection under a BMD umbrella. At the same time, they worry that the costs of developing, procuring, and deploying TMD would be unsustainable, again raising concerns that high expenditures on BMD would squeeze out investment in traditional forces. The prospective deployment of American TMD raises a host of operational considerations for our partners. U.S. deployment of TMD to a country in the midst of crisisÐsimilar to American Patriot deployments to Saudi Arabia and Israel during the Gulf WarÐraises the question of command-and-control arrangements for the missiles and broader questions about coordination with American military commander-in-chiefs. Would the permanent presence of American TMD erode the sovereignty of regional partners? An underlying concern, heightened by September 11, is that regional partners will increase military and political dependence on the United States. Many of®cials anticipate that some form of American BMD might have to be deployed in the region. The United States, for example, might opt for boost-phase interceptorsÐon a variety of ground-, air-, and sea-based platformsÐnear Iraq and Iran. Potential sites for deployments could include Turkey, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to the north, and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman to the south of Iraq and Iran.50 Paving the Way for American Ballistic Missile Defense Policy in the Region American policy makers and military commanders responsible for the Middle East and South Asia will encounter myriad concerns and regional 50 For discussions of potential deployment areas, see Lindsay and O'Hanlon, Defending America, p. 108 and Kori N. Schake and Judith S. Yaphe, The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran, McNair Paper 64 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2001), p. 69. For an argument for the forward deployment of anti-ballistic missiles to permit boost-phase intercepts, see Richard L. Garwin, ``Boost-Phase Intercept: A Better Alternative,'' Arms Control Today, Sept. 2000, pp. 8±11.

Summer 2002

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RUSSELL country views as they move to equip American forces with TMD and as the NMD question is debated. The history of ballistic missile use in combat makes Middle Eastern and South Asian partners potentially more receptive to BMD than American counterparts in Europe. Countries in the region have seen ®rsthand the strategic consequences of having spottyÐat bestÐdefenses against ballistic missiles. And concerns about vulnerability to ballistic missiles will only increase with regional efforts to procure chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Middle East and South Asian partners, moreover, who were not direct participants in the ABM Treaty, are unaccustomed to the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction embedded in the treaty. These factors afford U.S. policy makers more latitude in dealing with security partners in the Middle East and South Asia than may be the case with NATO allies and Russia, who adhere to the strategic traditions of the Cold War. Although the Bush administration prefers not to distinguish between NMD and TMD, of®cials in the region do. That distinction should be kept in mind as American BMD programs are developed, whether for defending forces abroad or Americans at home. America's regional partners well understand the need for theater systems, but are nervous about NMD and what they see as the implicit doctrine of ``fortress America'' underlying it. With NMD, will the United States retain incentive or interest in direct regional security involvement? There is a strong counterargument: that American homeland and theater defenses would strengthen, not diminish, the United States' ability to honor pledges of security assistance and to intervene if necessary in regional crises. As ballistic capabilities increase, so would U.S. vulnerability, without NMD, thus inhibiting an American decision to send forces to a regional trouble spot. If, for example, Iraq had had long-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads in 1990, the elder President Bush might have made profoundly different calculations in weighing the risks and potential advantages of military intervention to roll back Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait. With an effective NMD system, in the future a president could act with a measure of con®dence that American forces and territoryÐas well as those of our partnersÐwould be protected in the event of armed con¯ict. At a minimum, American ballistic defenses could work to increase the level of uncertainty in the minds of adversaries as to how effectiveÐpolitically and militarilyÐtheir ballistic missiles would be against U.S. forces. As in the Cold War, uncertainty would work to bolster deterrence and reduce the chances of armed con¯ict. The pursuit of boost-phase interceptors would be a particularly welcomed approach by some regional players. Such BMD would offer regional partners homeland defense, protect American forward-deployed military assets, and permit early interceptions of potential ICBMs aimed at 496

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Missile Defenses U.S. territory. Boost-phase systems, moreover, are likely to be seen as less threatening to Russia and China. Both of these states encompass massive geography that would be dif®cult to cover entirely with American boostphased interceptor systems.51 Negotiating memoranda of understanding in advance of contingencies governing the deployment, hosting, and commandand-control issues revolving around boost-phase interceptorsÐwhether land-, air-, or sea-based platformsÐwould need to be made in peacetime to dramatically increase the response time in the heat of future regional contingencies. Apart from coordinating an international and regional strategy for working with allies and partners abroad, there can be no gainsaying the increasing pro®les that ballistic missiles and WMD have in the Middle East and South Asia. These capabilities will increasingly pose a threat to American forces in the region and over time grow as threats to the continental United States. Some observers argue that the deployment of U.S. ballistic missile defenses to the region will set off an arms race. This concern, however, ignores the fact that regional arms races in the Middle East and South Asia are already well underway, with or without robust American ballistic defenses deployed there. To be sure, regional adversariesÐIraq and Iran in particularÐmight redouble efforts to build their ballistic missile inventories in hopes of overcoming American BMD. Such efforts would come at the cost of other military modernization programs, and in the longer run, regional adversaries might become muscle-bound in ballistic missiles and weaker in ground and air capabilities. To the extent possible, American missile defense systems contemplated for the region should also be suf®ciently capable to counter the all but inevitable proliferation of cruise missiles, the next looming evolution of arms competition in Middle East and South Asia. Cruise missiles are smaller than ballistic missiles, making them easier to ®re from concealed positions such as trucks and naval vessels, and designed to be more accurate at long ranges. Their small size, maneuverability, and low ¯ying altitudes give cruise missiles the ability to evade air defenses.52 If the United States successfully develops and deploys highly effective BMD, regional rivals might shift resources toward investment in cruise missiles. Finally, the strategic discourse over BMD often ignores the moral dimensions of American national security policy. American security policy on WMD has to date been predicated on the effective operation of deterrence. It is convenient for Americans to assume that in any and all strategic 51 For a similar point, see Glaser and Fetter, National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 44. 52 W. Seth Carus, Cruise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s (Westport, Conn.: Praeger for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), pp. 17±18. For a study that anticipated the strategic signi®cance of cruise missiles, see Richard K. Betts, Cruise Missiles and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982). For a recent treatment, see Dennis M. Gormley, Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles, Adelphi Paper 339 (New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001).

Summer 2002

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RUSSELL circumstances, adversaries will refrain from using ballistic missiles armed with WMD warheads out of fear of suffering ``massive retaliation'' from American strategic forces. But is nuclear deterrence infallible? Is the assumption that nuclear deterrence is inherently easy and foolproof the basis for prudent defense policy? Recent events revive a question not asked since the early 1980s: What does the United States do in a future con¯ict in which deterrence fails? If in a future con¯ict the Iraqis or Iranians ®re ballistic missiles with WMD warheads against American forces or homeland, does it make strategic and moral sense to retaliate and in¯ict massive nuclear retaliation against Iraqi or Iranian centers of government or military power that share space with millions of innocent civilians? American nuclear retaliation might kill those regime and military ®gures responsible for using WMD against Americans and help deter follow-on uses of WMDÐassuming there remains suf®cient command and control and government authority to keep tight reins on WMD inventoriesÐbut the nearly 5 million people in Baghdad and 7 million in Tehran would perish in the grisly process. Would such a result be reconcilable with the care that the United States took to reduce the pain and suffering of and ``collateral damage'' to civilian populations in the con¯icts in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan? If future adversaries calculate that the United States would be politically unwilling to in¯ict massive civilian casualties on them, then the threat to do so will not be credible. Such a perception would substantially lessen our ability to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction against us. These are profound moral dilemmas that opponents of ballistic missile defenses do not address, and which may be the weakest point of the anti-BMD position. A prudent step is to work toward BMD to provide a cushion of safety, even if they will not be foolproof. American forces and territory need a hedge against the all too real possibility that they will be targeted in a future con¯ict by ballistic missiles armed with WMD. Such an ugly contingency could cause substantially more casualties than those the United States painfully suffered at Dhahran during the Gulf War. BMD would complicate the calculus of potential aggressors and increase their levels of uncertainty over their prospects for prevailing over American forces in potential con¯ict. That uncertainty is likely to bolster deterrence rather than undermine, reducing the chances that American leaders will ever have to face the grim contemplation of resorting to nuclear weapons again. To any would-be aggressor, an opponent armed with both a sword and shield is likely to be a more formidable foe on the battle®eld than one armed only with a sword.

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