- Email: [email protected]
The 2012 elections in Mexico: Return of the dominant party
Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 34 (2014) 291–379
349
The 2012 elections in Mexico: Return of the dominant party Gilles Serra*,1 Department of Political Science, Center for Economics Research and Teaching (CIDE), Fuego 997, Jardines del Pedregal, 01900 Mexico City, Mexico
a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 31 December 2012 Accepted 17 August 2013
Victory in the 2012 election of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the formerly hegemonic party that ruled Mexico for almost a century, has generated concern about Mexico’s democratic consolidation. As described below, the PRI not only won the presidency but also a majority of seats in Congress and most governorships. Given the party’s authoritarian past, some analysts, political actors and civic organizations have warned against a possible deterioration of a still young democracy. These concerns notwithstanding, the following analysis of the election actually suggests there are grounds for some optimism. The economic environment is turning in Mexico’s favour and the new configuration in Congress is conducive to passing structural reforms that might trigger faster growth. In addition, opposition parties, civic society and the international community will insist on the preservation of political freedoms and electoral competition. So while democratic institutions are still vulnerable, a full resurrection of the “perfect dictatorship,” as the PRI’s tenure had been called, is unthinkable today. 1. Background The country was facing a number of challenges coming into the election. Politically, the population has been deeply polarized along partisan lines since the contentious 2006 contest. Resentment was particularly lasting in the political left, with progressive activists still resentful of a perceived collusion among conservative forces to defeat their candidate (Klesner, 2007). One of the challenges for electoral institutions in 2012 was recovering some of the confidence they had lost among part of the electorate. The economy was hit hard by the global economic crisis. In the past two decades Mexico had become one of the most open economies in the world, with a total of 12 free trade agreements involving 44 countries, which boosted exports but also made it vulnerable to global cycles. In 2009 the GDP decreased by 6.2%, the worst recession among large Latin American countries. All presidential candidates were thus expected to lay out credible plans for economic growth.
1 Personal webpage: http://cide.academia.edu/GillesSerra/About. * Tel.: þ52 1 55 22603119 (mobile); fax: þ52 55 57279871. E-mail address: [email protected].
Security questions also loomed large in voters’ minds. Narcotics-related violence has sharply increased since former President Calderón declared war on drug lords by sending the army and federal police to patrol the streets of vulnerable cities and towns.2 In his administration the annual number of murders saw a sixfold increase. Hence a key consideration among voters was identifying the leader most able to bring security back to bearable levels.
2. Electoral system Mexico has a presidential system in which the chief executive is directly elected every six years. Presidential elections are won by a plurality of votes from all citizens without a run-off election. Initiatives to introduce run-off elections have been discussed in Congress several times, including one presented by outgoing President Calderón which was not approved. Importantly, Mexico enforces one of the strictest no-reelection rules in the world whereby executive officers, such as the president and governors, are completely barred from reelection and legislators are barred from consecutive reelection. The legislature is bicameral, consisting of a 128-member Senate (the upper house) and a 500-member Chamber of Deputies (the lower house). The Senate was designed to represent the federal states. Each state is awarded three senators, two for the winning party in the state vote and one for the party in second place, for a total of 96 seats. A recent reform created 32 new seats that are not attached to the states but are allocated using proportional representation among parties from the nationwide vote. Senators are elected for six years concurrently with the chief executive. The Chamber of Deputies represents voters in electoral districts. The country is divided in 300 districts, each electing a single member through simple plurality. In addition to those 300 first-past-the-post members, the Chamber of Deputies has 200 members allocated to parties through proportional representation. The PR deputies are elected from closed lists in five “meta districts” called circumscriptions. For now these circumscriptions have forty members each, but there has been some discussion about
2 The most violent areas are found in Guerrero, Michoacán, Tamaulipas and Veracruz.
350
Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 34 (2014) 291–379
reducing or eliminating these PR seats in a future political reform. Deputies are elected for three years during presidential and midterm elections. Mexican federalism consists of 32 states, each with its own constitution and legislature.3 Governors and mayors are directly elected by simple plurality. In the past, the schedule of local elections was decided by state constitutions and did not necessarily coincide with the schedule of federal elections. But a constitutional amendment in 2007 mandated that all state elections occur on a specific date each year to coincide with each other and with federal elections (Article 116-IV-a). As a result, in the midterm election of 2009, for the first time nearly all state and federal elections occurred on the same date. An electoral reform was passed in 2007 which fundamentally changed the conduct of elections (Serra, 2012). Three significant changes regarding political communication in the mass media were: (1) large amounts of free airtime on television and radio were granted to political parties for promotion of their candidates and platforms; (2) civic organizations and ordinary citizens are now banned from purchasing airtime on television and radio to voice their opinions; (3) political debate was restricted by prohibiting negative advertising on behalf of candidates. The 2009 midterm was the first competition to test these laws, creating unprecedented conflict between parties, electoral authorities and the media (Serra, 2011). The presidential election of 2012 provided an opportunity for electoral authorities to fine-tune their implementation of this new legal framework. The party system in Mexico is stable, with three large parties having nationwide presence. These parties, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), are ideologically located at the centre, the centreright, and the centre-left, respectively. The PRI won every presidential election (and nearly all elections at every level) from 1929 until it was finally unseated by Vicente Fox of the PAN in 2000. The PAN won the presidency for a second time in 2006 with candidate Felipe Calderón. Smaller parties come and go as their vote shares fall above or below a threshold of 2% of the national vote required to compete in the next election. In 2012, four small parties met this threshold to participate. 3. Candidates and campaigns The Senate, the Chamber of Deputies and several local offices were fully renewed in addition to the Presidency. As mentioned above, a reform in 2007 successfully synchronized the local and national schedule of elections (Serra, 2011). Accordingly, all the states renewing their legislative or executive branches in 2012 held their elections on 1 July. There were sixteen such states, including seven that chose new governors. The presidential election had three major candidates. The PRI nominated Enrique Peña Nieto, one of its rising
3 Technically, there are 31 states and one Federal District which is the seat of government but has not yet been allowed to obtain state status.
stars. Indeed, the PRI has placed much hope in a new generation of sophisticated and ambitious party members, many of whom are sons or nephews of old-guard party bosses. Among them is Peña Nieto who served two prominent governors before running for office. In July 2005, he won the gubernatorial election of the most populated Mexican state with a spectacular 25-point margin over his two rivals from the PAN and the PRD, automatically identifying him as a viable presidential candidate. Helped by especially generous coverage on behalf of the two large television networks, he was able to forge a reputation as an effective and responsible governor. Instead of defining a specific ideological position, his 2012 campaign was based on valence issues such as trustworthiness. This allowed Peña Nieto to capitalize on the PAN’s reputation for incompetence among many voters. For the second time, the PRD nominated Andrés Manuel López Obrador who had disputed his defeat in the previous presidential election.4 Although highly popular while mayor of the capital, López Obrador gradually lost support among moderate voters by organizing street mobilizations and adopting an anti-system rhetoric (Schedler, 2007). He did retain support among his left-wing base, however. Throughout Calderón’s administration, López Obrador toured the country assuming the role of progressivism’s moral leader in what amounted to a six-year presidential campaign. His main competitor for the PRD’s nomination was Marcelo Ebrard, his successor at the helm of Mexico’s capital. Ebrard’s more liberal policies and modern style of governing made him a more appealing option to moderate voters, but López Obrador’s support with the base allowed him to win an internal poll among PRD members. López Obrador entered the presidential race a distant third. To counteract his reputation, he based his campaign on proposing what he called a “Republic of Love”. In a new kind of rhetoric for him, he professed to love all his rivals. His platform was more conciliatory too, proposing to combat corruption and wasteful spending while downplaying his more controversial plans for a state-led economy. His candidacy was boosted by the emergence of a student movement called Yo Soy 132 (I am the 132nd), spontaneously created to oppose the PRI’s return to power and to denounce media bias in favour of Peña Nieto.5 Although the student group was officially nonpartisan, many members were explicit in showing support for López Obrador as their preferred alternative. The PAN was the only party to hold a primary election. The easy winner was Josefina Vázquez Mota, a former
4 In 2006, López Obrador and the PRD accused the electoral authorities of committing fraud while counting votes, but election observers and several statistical analyses have challenged their claims (Aparicio, 2009). 5 This protest movement originated after a group of students forced the exit of Peña Nieto from a campaign event at their university. The PRI erroneously accused them all of being non-student AMLO operatives, which prompted 131 of them to show their student IDs on YouTube. The video went viral, inspiring thousands of college students across the country to form a loosely organized group which they called I am the 132nd in support of their unjustly accused peers.
Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 34 (2014) 291–379
Secretary of Social Development and Secretary of Education under presidents Fox and Calderón. Vázquez Mota’s nomination generated excitement as the first female candidate from a major party. It allowed the PAN, a conservative party, to claim that it is still at the vanguard of Mexico’s democratization process. Initially there was much debate about whether Mexican voters were ready to vote for a female candidate, but such doubts were dissipated with her double-digit victory in the primary over two male rivals. Her primary bounce did not last long, however. Vázquez Mota’s polling numbers declined following a number of campaign blunders and the perception that a divided PAN was not fully backing her. Finding her message was also a struggle: she tried to strike an uneasy balance between differentiating herself from a relatively unpopular Calderón while defending the PAN’s record in government. In the end, the balance pleased no one and she eventually dropped to third place behind López Obrador.
351
Table 2 Results of the Senate election in Mexico, 1 July 2012. State seatsb
PR seatsc
31.2 26.3 18.6 5.7 4.7 4.0 3.7 0.1
41 29 16 7 2 1 0 –
11 9 6 2 2 1 1 –
–
–
5.8 100.0
– 96
– 32
– 128
– 100
% Votea PRI PAN PRD PVEM PT MC PANAL Votes for unregistered candidates Null votes Total
Total seats
% Seats
52 38 22 9 4 2 1
40.6 29.7 17.2 7.0 3.1 1.6 0.8
a Based on the share of the PR vote (principio de representación proporcional) calculated by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE (http:// computos2012.ife.org.mx/reportes/senadores/EFSenadoresRPEF.html). b Computed by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE, from precinct votes (www.ife.org.mx/docs/IFE-v2/DS/DS-CG/DS-SesionesCG/CG-acuerdos/ 2012/Agosto/CGext201208-23/CGe230812ap_1_x1.pdf). c As assigned by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE, on 23 August 2012 (www.ife.org.mx/docs/IFE-v2/DS/DS-CG/DS-SesionesCG/CG-acuerdos/ 2012/Agosto/CGext201208-23/CGe230812ap_1.pdf).
4. Results The vote on 1 July 2012 was clean, peaceful and well organized according to reports from national and international observers such as the Organization of American States (OAS, 2012). Turnout was a respectable 63.3% of registered voters, higher than in 2006 (59%) and similar to the 2000 rate (64%). Peña Nieto carried the day, winning the presidential election with 38.2% of the national vote. This was a solid seven-point lead over López Obrador and a 13-point lead over Vázquez Mota (Table 1). Yet his margin of victory was narrower than expected: virtually all polling companies were projecting Peña Nieto’s lead over López Obrador to be two or three times higher than it turned out to be. Failing to reach these expectations weakened the mandate that Peña Nieto is perceived to have. The PRI did well in Congress too where it will be the largest party in both houses confirming its remarkable comeback since 2006 (Tables 2 and 3). Yet this plurality fell short of an absolute majority in either house, which will force the president to negotiate with opposition parties if he is to achieve any of his grander projects.
The PAN had a bad day, not only failing to keep the presidency but also losing seats in Congress. Yet, ironically, the PAN might be in a privileged position to push its agenda forward, being the PRI’s most likely negotiation partner. The PRD and its left-wing allies are also in worse shape than they were in 2006. They not only failed to reach the 50% needed to block ordinary laws in Congress, but also the one third of seats needed to block constitutional amendments that the PRI and the PAN may wish to pursue. At the local level, the PRI solidified its position as the party with most governorships. It retained one governorship, won two new ones (including Jalisco that had been held by the PAN for eighteen years) and lost only one. As a result, following the 2012 election, the PRI will govern twenty-one states while the other parties combined will only govern eleven. There are some important exceptions to the PRI’s dominance of state politics, however. Most notably, the country’s capital remained firmly in the hands of the PRD and its left-wing coalition. Their candidate, Miguel Mancera, won the election with a crushing 44-point
Table 1 Results of the presidential election in Mexico, 1 July 2012.
Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI-PVEM) Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD-PT-MC) Josefina Eugenia Vázquez Mota (PAN) Gabriel Ricardo Quadri de la Torre (PANAL) Votes for unregistered candidates Null votes Total counted votes Number of registered voters (lista nominal) Turnout a
Official results after recounts by the IFE, 8 July
Final results after revisions by the TEPJF, 31 August
Change from 8 July to 31 August
Votesa
%
Votesb
%
Votes
%
19,226,784 15,896,999 12,786,647 1,150,662 20,907 1,241,154 50,323,153 79,454,802
38.2 31.6 25.4 2.3 0.0 2.5 100.0
19,158,592 15,848,827 12,732,630 1,146,085 20,625 1,236,857 50,143,616
38.2 31.6 25.4 2.3 0.0 2.5 100.0
68,192 48,172 54,017 4577 282 4297 179,537
0.0008 0.0170 0.0167 0.0009 0.0004 0.0003 –
63.3
Computed by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE (http://computos2012.ife.org.mx/reportes/presidente/distritalPresidenteEF.html). b Computed by the Federal Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Branch, TEPJF (http://portal.te.gob.mx/sites/default/files/computo_final_calificacion_ jurisdiccional.pdf).
352
Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 34 (2014) 291–379
Table 3 Results of the Chamber of Deputies election in Mexico, 1 July 2012. % Votea PRI PAN PRD PVEM PT MC PANAL Votes for unregistered candidates Null votes Total
District seatsb
PR seatsc
Total seats
49 62 44 15 11 9 10
–
– 100
31.9 25.9 18.4 6.1 4.6 4.0 4.1 0.1
158 52 56 19 8 7 0 –
–
207 114 100 34 19 16 10 –
5.0 100
– 300
– 200
– 500
% Seats 41.4 22.8 20 6.8 3.8 3.2 2
a Based on the share of the PR vote (principio de representación proporcional) calculated by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE (http:// computos2012.ife.org.mx/reportes/diputados/DistDiputadosRPEF.html). b Computed by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE, from precinct votes (www.ife.org.mx/docs/IFE-v2/DS/DS-CG/DS-SesionesCG/CG-acuerdos/ 2012/Agosto/CGext201208-23/CGe230812ap_2_x1.pdf). c As assigned by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE, on 23 August 2012 (www.ife.org.mx/docs/IFE-v2/DS/DS-CG/DS-SesionesCG/CG-acuerdos/ 2012/Agosto/CGext201208-23/CGe230812ap_2.pdf).
margin. Holding the second most important executive position in the country, mayor Mancera will be well positioned to seek the PRD’s presidential nomination in 2018. 5. Post-election conflict Throughout the campaign there were allegations of foul play by the PRI. The PAN submitted evidence of a laundering scheme to funnel money into PRI coffers, which led Vázquez Mota to accuse Peña Nieto of exceeding campaign finance limits. Meanwhile López Obrador accused the PRI of engaging in blatant vote-buying and media manipulation. While both the PAN and the PRD expressed concern about the legality of the PRI’s campaign practices, the two parties adopted opposite attitudes towards the outcome. Upon learning the results on election night, Vázquez Mota acknowledged her defeat and congratulated Peña Nieto on his victory. President Calderón urged judicial authorities to investigate and punish any election-related crimes, but acknowledged these had probably not been significant enough to determine the winner. In contrast, the PRD claimed the election had been plagued by fraudulent practices at all levels making it invalid and illegitimate. As in 2006, López Obrador decided to challenge the results in court. Accordingly the PRD submitted a 638-page-long file to the electoral tribunal asking it to annul the election. The IFE had already recounted the presidential votes from half the precincts as petitioned by López Obrador, but the results did not change in his favour – in fact, Peña Nieto’s vote margin increased slightly. Subsequently the electoral tribunal investigated the charges in the PRD’s file but did not find enough evidence of vote-buying or fraud. After annulling tens of thousands of votes as requested, the results barely budged (see the last two columns of Table 1). Hence, on 31 August, Peña Nieto was certified as the official winner of the election. The president-elect proceeded to give a conciliatory speech promising to be an inclusive president who will govern democratically.
Reverting to his polarizing rhetoric, López Obrador dismissed the electoral tribunal as being “staffed by whitecollar criminals” and vowed to oppose Peña Nieto’s government “without truce”. Telling his followers that civil disobedience is their “honourable duty” he seemed ready to launch a new series of street protests. In contrast with 2006, however, López Obrador did not receive his party’s support for mass mobilizations (Chabat, 2012). The PRD, now commanding a significant number of legislators and governors, was keen on avoiding the kind of political stigma and isolation endured over the past six years. Hence its leaders and elected candidates promptly accepted the tribunal’s verdict and recognized Peña Nieto as the president-elect. López Obrador’s rift with the PRD deepened a few weeks later when he announced his departure from the party to create a new one. In Mexico, the election process is not considered over until the president is inaugurated on 1 December, five months after voting day. The Constitution mandates a specific protocol (including the location) for the swearing-in of the president. For someone determined to prevent the election winner from taking office, spoiling the presidential inauguration represents the last chance. Left-wing legislators attempted to create such a constitutional vacuum six years earlier. On this occasion, however, they refrained from physically blocking the president-elect’s way into the podium. It was in the streets outside Congress that violence took place. In what appears to have been a well-planned provocation, a mob of young protesters carrying clubs and homemade explosives confronted the federal police and army personnel guarding Peña Nieto’s inauguration. After failing to reach the Congressional building, they ran away breaking windows, burning cars and painting anarchist slogans in the walls. In interviews the youngsters identified themselves as members of #yosoy132 and supporters of López Obrador, although both the student group and the politician have denied any involvement (Crespo, 2012). The federal government (of the PRI since the previous day) and the Mexico City government (of the PRD) were damaged by accusations of arbitrary arrests and police heavy-handedness. 6. Discussion Several concerns have been voiced about Mexico’s governance under a party with an undemocratic reputation. The PRI has been accused of being cosy with less-thantransparent interest groups such as corrupt trade unions and monopolistic firms. And it is unclear whether deeprooted authoritarian instincts in some PRI leaders will resurface, especially at the sub-national level. Enrique Peña Nieto claims to represent a generation of modernizers within his party but has already shown an inclination to concentrate executive power. Upon taking office he attempted to merge previously autonomous agencies in two super-ministries for social and financial affairs, a step opposed by the PAN and the PRD. And as governor he thwarted legislative initiatives to increase accountability such as allowing the re-election of legislators. Yet positive prospects can be pointed out in many regards. The new configuration in Congress allows a number of coalitions that could pass needed reforms regarding
Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 34 (2014) 291–379
energy, taxes, education and security. Peña Nieto can probably count on the PAN which has traditionally been willing to vote for bills it agrees with (The Economist, 2012). He might also count on some support from the PRD which seems increasingly willing to engage in congressional negotiations. On the other hand, the PAN and the PRD could join forces to oppose initiatives they consider undemocratic. Such potential for negotiated agreements has already been exemplified by a surprisingly productive “Pact for Mexico” between the three parties, which was launched by the president-elect before taking office. An ambitious new administration, strong opposition parties, professional electoral institutions, an increasingly vocal civil society, and an ever-watchful international community are likely to keep promoting Mexico’s progress, hopefully overcoming considerable vested interests that do pose a threat to democracy.
353
References Aparicio, J., 2009. Análisis estadístico de la elección presidencial de 2006 ¿fraude o errores aleatorios? Política y Gobierno, thematic volume: elections in Mexico, pp. 225–243. Chabat, J., 2012. López Obrador: Camino Propio. El Universal., 14 December. Crespo, J.A., 2012. Si hay imposición, habrá. ¿Revolución? El Universal, 4 December. The Economist, 2012. Going Up in the World: Mexico Special Report, 24 November. Klesner, J., 2007. The July 2006 presidential and congressional elections in Mexico. Elect. Stud. 26, 797–837. OAS, 2012. Misión de Observación Electoral: Proceso Electoral Federal 2011-2012 en los Estados Unidos Mexicanos – Informe Verbal. Schedler, A., 2007. The mobilization of distrust. J. Democr. 18 (1), 88–102. Serra, G., July 2012. The risk of partyarchy and democratic backsliding: Mexico’s 2007 electoral reform. Taiwan J. Democr. 8 (1), 93–118. Serra G., 2011. La Reforma Electoral en México: ¿Un Retroceso Democrático?. In: FLACSO, México, D.F. (Eds.), Caleidoscopio de la Innovación Democrática en América Latina. In: Yanina, Welp, Laurence, Whitehead, (Eds.), 75–95.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.08.010
The German federal election, September 2013 Matthias Mader University of Bamberg, Politische Soziologie, Feldkirchenstr. 21, 96052 Bamberg, Germany
a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 16 December 2013 Received in revised form 17 December 2013 Accepted 17 December 2013
1. Background In the federal election held on September 22, 2013, German voters elected the members of the 18th Bundestag. It was a regularly scheduled election after a full four-year legislative term in which the Christian Democratic Party (Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union, CDU/CSU)1 and the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) had formed a centre-right coalition government headed by chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU). In 2009, the FDP had been able to secure enough list votes to oust the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) as the CDU/CSU’s junior partner in government. After four years of a grand coalition, the last term (2009–2013) was thus marked by the traditional bipolar competition in the German party system.
E-mail address: [email protected]. Although CDU and CSU are independent parties, they will be treated as one here. The CDU does not compete in Bavaria, and the CSU competes only there. Until now, both parties have always formed a faction in the Bundestag together. 1
A topic of chronic relevance during the 2009–2013 legislative term was the handling of the European debt crisis. Due largely to the initiative of chancellor Merkel, financial support to indebted countries in the euro area was given only if they executed strict austerity and liberalization policies. Judging from macro-economic figures, the German economy was unaffected by the European debt crisis in the last four years. A respectable GDP growth, a dropping unemployment rate, and a shrinking public deficit allowed chancellor Merkel to claim in 2011 that ‘Germany has never been doing this well’ (Merkel, 2011: 14469) and to repeat this statement until the day of the election in 2013. While the popularity of the CDU/CSU and especially of chancellor Merkel remained high during the legislative period, the FDP had to endure a sharp drop in the polls soon after the election in 2009 and never recovered. By early 2010, instances of alleged political clientelism and personal failures of party leaders had deprived the FDP of the political capital needed to implement their policy agenda against a dominating CDU/CSU coalition partner. In September 2012, on the eve of the SPD announcement to nominate Peer Steinbrück as their chancellor
349
The 2012 elections in Mexico: Return of the dominant party Gilles Serra*,1 Department of Political Science, Center for Economics Research and Teaching (CIDE), Fuego 997, Jardines del Pedregal, 01900 Mexico City, Mexico
a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 31 December 2012 Accepted 17 August 2013
Victory in the 2012 election of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the formerly hegemonic party that ruled Mexico for almost a century, has generated concern about Mexico’s democratic consolidation. As described below, the PRI not only won the presidency but also a majority of seats in Congress and most governorships. Given the party’s authoritarian past, some analysts, political actors and civic organizations have warned against a possible deterioration of a still young democracy. These concerns notwithstanding, the following analysis of the election actually suggests there are grounds for some optimism. The economic environment is turning in Mexico’s favour and the new configuration in Congress is conducive to passing structural reforms that might trigger faster growth. In addition, opposition parties, civic society and the international community will insist on the preservation of political freedoms and electoral competition. So while democratic institutions are still vulnerable, a full resurrection of the “perfect dictatorship,” as the PRI’s tenure had been called, is unthinkable today. 1. Background The country was facing a number of challenges coming into the election. Politically, the population has been deeply polarized along partisan lines since the contentious 2006 contest. Resentment was particularly lasting in the political left, with progressive activists still resentful of a perceived collusion among conservative forces to defeat their candidate (Klesner, 2007). One of the challenges for electoral institutions in 2012 was recovering some of the confidence they had lost among part of the electorate. The economy was hit hard by the global economic crisis. In the past two decades Mexico had become one of the most open economies in the world, with a total of 12 free trade agreements involving 44 countries, which boosted exports but also made it vulnerable to global cycles. In 2009 the GDP decreased by 6.2%, the worst recession among large Latin American countries. All presidential candidates were thus expected to lay out credible plans for economic growth.
1 Personal webpage: http://cide.academia.edu/GillesSerra/About. * Tel.: þ52 1 55 22603119 (mobile); fax: þ52 55 57279871. E-mail address: [email protected].
Security questions also loomed large in voters’ minds. Narcotics-related violence has sharply increased since former President Calderón declared war on drug lords by sending the army and federal police to patrol the streets of vulnerable cities and towns.2 In his administration the annual number of murders saw a sixfold increase. Hence a key consideration among voters was identifying the leader most able to bring security back to bearable levels.
2. Electoral system Mexico has a presidential system in which the chief executive is directly elected every six years. Presidential elections are won by a plurality of votes from all citizens without a run-off election. Initiatives to introduce run-off elections have been discussed in Congress several times, including one presented by outgoing President Calderón which was not approved. Importantly, Mexico enforces one of the strictest no-reelection rules in the world whereby executive officers, such as the president and governors, are completely barred from reelection and legislators are barred from consecutive reelection. The legislature is bicameral, consisting of a 128-member Senate (the upper house) and a 500-member Chamber of Deputies (the lower house). The Senate was designed to represent the federal states. Each state is awarded three senators, two for the winning party in the state vote and one for the party in second place, for a total of 96 seats. A recent reform created 32 new seats that are not attached to the states but are allocated using proportional representation among parties from the nationwide vote. Senators are elected for six years concurrently with the chief executive. The Chamber of Deputies represents voters in electoral districts. The country is divided in 300 districts, each electing a single member through simple plurality. In addition to those 300 first-past-the-post members, the Chamber of Deputies has 200 members allocated to parties through proportional representation. The PR deputies are elected from closed lists in five “meta districts” called circumscriptions. For now these circumscriptions have forty members each, but there has been some discussion about
2 The most violent areas are found in Guerrero, Michoacán, Tamaulipas and Veracruz.
350
Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 34 (2014) 291–379
reducing or eliminating these PR seats in a future political reform. Deputies are elected for three years during presidential and midterm elections. Mexican federalism consists of 32 states, each with its own constitution and legislature.3 Governors and mayors are directly elected by simple plurality. In the past, the schedule of local elections was decided by state constitutions and did not necessarily coincide with the schedule of federal elections. But a constitutional amendment in 2007 mandated that all state elections occur on a specific date each year to coincide with each other and with federal elections (Article 116-IV-a). As a result, in the midterm election of 2009, for the first time nearly all state and federal elections occurred on the same date. An electoral reform was passed in 2007 which fundamentally changed the conduct of elections (Serra, 2012). Three significant changes regarding political communication in the mass media were: (1) large amounts of free airtime on television and radio were granted to political parties for promotion of their candidates and platforms; (2) civic organizations and ordinary citizens are now banned from purchasing airtime on television and radio to voice their opinions; (3) political debate was restricted by prohibiting negative advertising on behalf of candidates. The 2009 midterm was the first competition to test these laws, creating unprecedented conflict between parties, electoral authorities and the media (Serra, 2011). The presidential election of 2012 provided an opportunity for electoral authorities to fine-tune their implementation of this new legal framework. The party system in Mexico is stable, with three large parties having nationwide presence. These parties, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), are ideologically located at the centre, the centreright, and the centre-left, respectively. The PRI won every presidential election (and nearly all elections at every level) from 1929 until it was finally unseated by Vicente Fox of the PAN in 2000. The PAN won the presidency for a second time in 2006 with candidate Felipe Calderón. Smaller parties come and go as their vote shares fall above or below a threshold of 2% of the national vote required to compete in the next election. In 2012, four small parties met this threshold to participate. 3. Candidates and campaigns The Senate, the Chamber of Deputies and several local offices were fully renewed in addition to the Presidency. As mentioned above, a reform in 2007 successfully synchronized the local and national schedule of elections (Serra, 2011). Accordingly, all the states renewing their legislative or executive branches in 2012 held their elections on 1 July. There were sixteen such states, including seven that chose new governors. The presidential election had three major candidates. The PRI nominated Enrique Peña Nieto, one of its rising
3 Technically, there are 31 states and one Federal District which is the seat of government but has not yet been allowed to obtain state status.
stars. Indeed, the PRI has placed much hope in a new generation of sophisticated and ambitious party members, many of whom are sons or nephews of old-guard party bosses. Among them is Peña Nieto who served two prominent governors before running for office. In July 2005, he won the gubernatorial election of the most populated Mexican state with a spectacular 25-point margin over his two rivals from the PAN and the PRD, automatically identifying him as a viable presidential candidate. Helped by especially generous coverage on behalf of the two large television networks, he was able to forge a reputation as an effective and responsible governor. Instead of defining a specific ideological position, his 2012 campaign was based on valence issues such as trustworthiness. This allowed Peña Nieto to capitalize on the PAN’s reputation for incompetence among many voters. For the second time, the PRD nominated Andrés Manuel López Obrador who had disputed his defeat in the previous presidential election.4 Although highly popular while mayor of the capital, López Obrador gradually lost support among moderate voters by organizing street mobilizations and adopting an anti-system rhetoric (Schedler, 2007). He did retain support among his left-wing base, however. Throughout Calderón’s administration, López Obrador toured the country assuming the role of progressivism’s moral leader in what amounted to a six-year presidential campaign. His main competitor for the PRD’s nomination was Marcelo Ebrard, his successor at the helm of Mexico’s capital. Ebrard’s more liberal policies and modern style of governing made him a more appealing option to moderate voters, but López Obrador’s support with the base allowed him to win an internal poll among PRD members. López Obrador entered the presidential race a distant third. To counteract his reputation, he based his campaign on proposing what he called a “Republic of Love”. In a new kind of rhetoric for him, he professed to love all his rivals. His platform was more conciliatory too, proposing to combat corruption and wasteful spending while downplaying his more controversial plans for a state-led economy. His candidacy was boosted by the emergence of a student movement called Yo Soy 132 (I am the 132nd), spontaneously created to oppose the PRI’s return to power and to denounce media bias in favour of Peña Nieto.5 Although the student group was officially nonpartisan, many members were explicit in showing support for López Obrador as their preferred alternative. The PAN was the only party to hold a primary election. The easy winner was Josefina Vázquez Mota, a former
4 In 2006, López Obrador and the PRD accused the electoral authorities of committing fraud while counting votes, but election observers and several statistical analyses have challenged their claims (Aparicio, 2009). 5 This protest movement originated after a group of students forced the exit of Peña Nieto from a campaign event at their university. The PRI erroneously accused them all of being non-student AMLO operatives, which prompted 131 of them to show their student IDs on YouTube. The video went viral, inspiring thousands of college students across the country to form a loosely organized group which they called I am the 132nd in support of their unjustly accused peers.
Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 34 (2014) 291–379
Secretary of Social Development and Secretary of Education under presidents Fox and Calderón. Vázquez Mota’s nomination generated excitement as the first female candidate from a major party. It allowed the PAN, a conservative party, to claim that it is still at the vanguard of Mexico’s democratization process. Initially there was much debate about whether Mexican voters were ready to vote for a female candidate, but such doubts were dissipated with her double-digit victory in the primary over two male rivals. Her primary bounce did not last long, however. Vázquez Mota’s polling numbers declined following a number of campaign blunders and the perception that a divided PAN was not fully backing her. Finding her message was also a struggle: she tried to strike an uneasy balance between differentiating herself from a relatively unpopular Calderón while defending the PAN’s record in government. In the end, the balance pleased no one and she eventually dropped to third place behind López Obrador.
351
Table 2 Results of the Senate election in Mexico, 1 July 2012. State seatsb
PR seatsc
31.2 26.3 18.6 5.7 4.7 4.0 3.7 0.1
41 29 16 7 2 1 0 –
11 9 6 2 2 1 1 –
–
–
5.8 100.0
– 96
– 32
– 128
– 100
% Votea PRI PAN PRD PVEM PT MC PANAL Votes for unregistered candidates Null votes Total
Total seats
% Seats
52 38 22 9 4 2 1
40.6 29.7 17.2 7.0 3.1 1.6 0.8
a Based on the share of the PR vote (principio de representación proporcional) calculated by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE (http:// computos2012.ife.org.mx/reportes/senadores/EFSenadoresRPEF.html). b Computed by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE, from precinct votes (www.ife.org.mx/docs/IFE-v2/DS/DS-CG/DS-SesionesCG/CG-acuerdos/ 2012/Agosto/CGext201208-23/CGe230812ap_1_x1.pdf). c As assigned by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE, on 23 August 2012 (www.ife.org.mx/docs/IFE-v2/DS/DS-CG/DS-SesionesCG/CG-acuerdos/ 2012/Agosto/CGext201208-23/CGe230812ap_1.pdf).
4. Results The vote on 1 July 2012 was clean, peaceful and well organized according to reports from national and international observers such as the Organization of American States (OAS, 2012). Turnout was a respectable 63.3% of registered voters, higher than in 2006 (59%) and similar to the 2000 rate (64%). Peña Nieto carried the day, winning the presidential election with 38.2% of the national vote. This was a solid seven-point lead over López Obrador and a 13-point lead over Vázquez Mota (Table 1). Yet his margin of victory was narrower than expected: virtually all polling companies were projecting Peña Nieto’s lead over López Obrador to be two or three times higher than it turned out to be. Failing to reach these expectations weakened the mandate that Peña Nieto is perceived to have. The PRI did well in Congress too where it will be the largest party in both houses confirming its remarkable comeback since 2006 (Tables 2 and 3). Yet this plurality fell short of an absolute majority in either house, which will force the president to negotiate with opposition parties if he is to achieve any of his grander projects.
The PAN had a bad day, not only failing to keep the presidency but also losing seats in Congress. Yet, ironically, the PAN might be in a privileged position to push its agenda forward, being the PRI’s most likely negotiation partner. The PRD and its left-wing allies are also in worse shape than they were in 2006. They not only failed to reach the 50% needed to block ordinary laws in Congress, but also the one third of seats needed to block constitutional amendments that the PRI and the PAN may wish to pursue. At the local level, the PRI solidified its position as the party with most governorships. It retained one governorship, won two new ones (including Jalisco that had been held by the PAN for eighteen years) and lost only one. As a result, following the 2012 election, the PRI will govern twenty-one states while the other parties combined will only govern eleven. There are some important exceptions to the PRI’s dominance of state politics, however. Most notably, the country’s capital remained firmly in the hands of the PRD and its left-wing coalition. Their candidate, Miguel Mancera, won the election with a crushing 44-point
Table 1 Results of the presidential election in Mexico, 1 July 2012.
Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI-PVEM) Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD-PT-MC) Josefina Eugenia Vázquez Mota (PAN) Gabriel Ricardo Quadri de la Torre (PANAL) Votes for unregistered candidates Null votes Total counted votes Number of registered voters (lista nominal) Turnout a
Official results after recounts by the IFE, 8 July
Final results after revisions by the TEPJF, 31 August
Change from 8 July to 31 August
Votesa
%
Votesb
%
Votes
%
19,226,784 15,896,999 12,786,647 1,150,662 20,907 1,241,154 50,323,153 79,454,802
38.2 31.6 25.4 2.3 0.0 2.5 100.0
19,158,592 15,848,827 12,732,630 1,146,085 20,625 1,236,857 50,143,616
38.2 31.6 25.4 2.3 0.0 2.5 100.0
68,192 48,172 54,017 4577 282 4297 179,537
0.0008 0.0170 0.0167 0.0009 0.0004 0.0003 –
63.3
Computed by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE (http://computos2012.ife.org.mx/reportes/presidente/distritalPresidenteEF.html). b Computed by the Federal Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Branch, TEPJF (http://portal.te.gob.mx/sites/default/files/computo_final_calificacion_ jurisdiccional.pdf).
352
Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 34 (2014) 291–379
Table 3 Results of the Chamber of Deputies election in Mexico, 1 July 2012. % Votea PRI PAN PRD PVEM PT MC PANAL Votes for unregistered candidates Null votes Total
District seatsb
PR seatsc
Total seats
49 62 44 15 11 9 10
–
– 100
31.9 25.9 18.4 6.1 4.6 4.0 4.1 0.1
158 52 56 19 8 7 0 –
–
207 114 100 34 19 16 10 –
5.0 100
– 300
– 200
– 500
% Seats 41.4 22.8 20 6.8 3.8 3.2 2
a Based on the share of the PR vote (principio de representación proporcional) calculated by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE (http:// computos2012.ife.org.mx/reportes/diputados/DistDiputadosRPEF.html). b Computed by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE, from precinct votes (www.ife.org.mx/docs/IFE-v2/DS/DS-CG/DS-SesionesCG/CG-acuerdos/ 2012/Agosto/CGext201208-23/CGe230812ap_2_x1.pdf). c As assigned by the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE, on 23 August 2012 (www.ife.org.mx/docs/IFE-v2/DS/DS-CG/DS-SesionesCG/CG-acuerdos/ 2012/Agosto/CGext201208-23/CGe230812ap_2.pdf).
margin. Holding the second most important executive position in the country, mayor Mancera will be well positioned to seek the PRD’s presidential nomination in 2018. 5. Post-election conflict Throughout the campaign there were allegations of foul play by the PRI. The PAN submitted evidence of a laundering scheme to funnel money into PRI coffers, which led Vázquez Mota to accuse Peña Nieto of exceeding campaign finance limits. Meanwhile López Obrador accused the PRI of engaging in blatant vote-buying and media manipulation. While both the PAN and the PRD expressed concern about the legality of the PRI’s campaign practices, the two parties adopted opposite attitudes towards the outcome. Upon learning the results on election night, Vázquez Mota acknowledged her defeat and congratulated Peña Nieto on his victory. President Calderón urged judicial authorities to investigate and punish any election-related crimes, but acknowledged these had probably not been significant enough to determine the winner. In contrast, the PRD claimed the election had been plagued by fraudulent practices at all levels making it invalid and illegitimate. As in 2006, López Obrador decided to challenge the results in court. Accordingly the PRD submitted a 638-page-long file to the electoral tribunal asking it to annul the election. The IFE had already recounted the presidential votes from half the precincts as petitioned by López Obrador, but the results did not change in his favour – in fact, Peña Nieto’s vote margin increased slightly. Subsequently the electoral tribunal investigated the charges in the PRD’s file but did not find enough evidence of vote-buying or fraud. After annulling tens of thousands of votes as requested, the results barely budged (see the last two columns of Table 1). Hence, on 31 August, Peña Nieto was certified as the official winner of the election. The president-elect proceeded to give a conciliatory speech promising to be an inclusive president who will govern democratically.
Reverting to his polarizing rhetoric, López Obrador dismissed the electoral tribunal as being “staffed by whitecollar criminals” and vowed to oppose Peña Nieto’s government “without truce”. Telling his followers that civil disobedience is their “honourable duty” he seemed ready to launch a new series of street protests. In contrast with 2006, however, López Obrador did not receive his party’s support for mass mobilizations (Chabat, 2012). The PRD, now commanding a significant number of legislators and governors, was keen on avoiding the kind of political stigma and isolation endured over the past six years. Hence its leaders and elected candidates promptly accepted the tribunal’s verdict and recognized Peña Nieto as the president-elect. López Obrador’s rift with the PRD deepened a few weeks later when he announced his departure from the party to create a new one. In Mexico, the election process is not considered over until the president is inaugurated on 1 December, five months after voting day. The Constitution mandates a specific protocol (including the location) for the swearing-in of the president. For someone determined to prevent the election winner from taking office, spoiling the presidential inauguration represents the last chance. Left-wing legislators attempted to create such a constitutional vacuum six years earlier. On this occasion, however, they refrained from physically blocking the president-elect’s way into the podium. It was in the streets outside Congress that violence took place. In what appears to have been a well-planned provocation, a mob of young protesters carrying clubs and homemade explosives confronted the federal police and army personnel guarding Peña Nieto’s inauguration. After failing to reach the Congressional building, they ran away breaking windows, burning cars and painting anarchist slogans in the walls. In interviews the youngsters identified themselves as members of #yosoy132 and supporters of López Obrador, although both the student group and the politician have denied any involvement (Crespo, 2012). The federal government (of the PRI since the previous day) and the Mexico City government (of the PRD) were damaged by accusations of arbitrary arrests and police heavy-handedness. 6. Discussion Several concerns have been voiced about Mexico’s governance under a party with an undemocratic reputation. The PRI has been accused of being cosy with less-thantransparent interest groups such as corrupt trade unions and monopolistic firms. And it is unclear whether deeprooted authoritarian instincts in some PRI leaders will resurface, especially at the sub-national level. Enrique Peña Nieto claims to represent a generation of modernizers within his party but has already shown an inclination to concentrate executive power. Upon taking office he attempted to merge previously autonomous agencies in two super-ministries for social and financial affairs, a step opposed by the PAN and the PRD. And as governor he thwarted legislative initiatives to increase accountability such as allowing the re-election of legislators. Yet positive prospects can be pointed out in many regards. The new configuration in Congress allows a number of coalitions that could pass needed reforms regarding
Notes on recent elections / Electoral Studies 34 (2014) 291–379
energy, taxes, education and security. Peña Nieto can probably count on the PAN which has traditionally been willing to vote for bills it agrees with (The Economist, 2012). He might also count on some support from the PRD which seems increasingly willing to engage in congressional negotiations. On the other hand, the PAN and the PRD could join forces to oppose initiatives they consider undemocratic. Such potential for negotiated agreements has already been exemplified by a surprisingly productive “Pact for Mexico” between the three parties, which was launched by the president-elect before taking office. An ambitious new administration, strong opposition parties, professional electoral institutions, an increasingly vocal civil society, and an ever-watchful international community are likely to keep promoting Mexico’s progress, hopefully overcoming considerable vested interests that do pose a threat to democracy.
353
References Aparicio, J., 2009. Análisis estadístico de la elección presidencial de 2006 ¿fraude o errores aleatorios? Política y Gobierno, thematic volume: elections in Mexico, pp. 225–243. Chabat, J., 2012. López Obrador: Camino Propio. El Universal., 14 December. Crespo, J.A., 2012. Si hay imposición, habrá. ¿Revolución? El Universal, 4 December. The Economist, 2012. Going Up in the World: Mexico Special Report, 24 November. Klesner, J., 2007. The July 2006 presidential and congressional elections in Mexico. Elect. Stud. 26, 797–837. OAS, 2012. Misión de Observación Electoral: Proceso Electoral Federal 2011-2012 en los Estados Unidos Mexicanos – Informe Verbal. Schedler, A., 2007. The mobilization of distrust. J. Democr. 18 (1), 88–102. Serra, G., July 2012. The risk of partyarchy and democratic backsliding: Mexico’s 2007 electoral reform. Taiwan J. Democr. 8 (1), 93–118. Serra G., 2011. La Reforma Electoral en México: ¿Un Retroceso Democrático?. In: FLACSO, México, D.F. (Eds.), Caleidoscopio de la Innovación Democrática en América Latina. In: Yanina, Welp, Laurence, Whitehead, (Eds.), 75–95.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.08.010
The German federal election, September 2013 Matthias Mader University of Bamberg, Politische Soziologie, Feldkirchenstr. 21, 96052 Bamberg, Germany
a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 16 December 2013 Received in revised form 17 December 2013 Accepted 17 December 2013
1. Background In the federal election held on September 22, 2013, German voters elected the members of the 18th Bundestag. It was a regularly scheduled election after a full four-year legislative term in which the Christian Democratic Party (Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union, CDU/CSU)1 and the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) had formed a centre-right coalition government headed by chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU). In 2009, the FDP had been able to secure enough list votes to oust the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) as the CDU/CSU’s junior partner in government. After four years of a grand coalition, the last term (2009–2013) was thus marked by the traditional bipolar competition in the German party system.
E-mail address: [email protected]. Although CDU and CSU are independent parties, they will be treated as one here. The CDU does not compete in Bavaria, and the CSU competes only there. Until now, both parties have always formed a faction in the Bundestag together. 1
A topic of chronic relevance during the 2009–2013 legislative term was the handling of the European debt crisis. Due largely to the initiative of chancellor Merkel, financial support to indebted countries in the euro area was given only if they executed strict austerity and liberalization policies. Judging from macro-economic figures, the German economy was unaffected by the European debt crisis in the last four years. A respectable GDP growth, a dropping unemployment rate, and a shrinking public deficit allowed chancellor Merkel to claim in 2011 that ‘Germany has never been doing this well’ (Merkel, 2011: 14469) and to repeat this statement until the day of the election in 2013. While the popularity of the CDU/CSU and especially of chancellor Merkel remained high during the legislative period, the FDP had to endure a sharp drop in the polls soon after the election in 2009 and never recovered. By early 2010, instances of alleged political clientelism and personal failures of party leaders had deprived the FDP of the political capital needed to implement their policy agenda against a dominating CDU/CSU coalition partner. In September 2012, on the eve of the SPD announcement to nominate Peer Steinbrück as their chancellor