The Arab nationalist challenge to the Israeli Communist Party (1970–1985)

EI,IE REKHESS

The Arab Nationalist Challenge to the Israeli Communist Party (19704985)

Ever since the establishment of the communist movement in the Middle East, its relations with the Arab nationalist movement have been fraught with tension and rivalry. During the 193Os, the changing Cornintern-dictated contempt of nationalist circles. to undermine the standing

Arab communists’ obedience to Moscow, and their everimage and the tactics, earned them an opportunistic The growth of Arab nationalism in the 1950s continued of local communism. The ideologies of the Ba’ath,

Nasserism, and Arab Socialism incorporated in their platforms some of the basic values of the communist parties while offering attractive rival doctrines rooted in Arab culture and heritage. In addition, Arab nationalism showed a marked predilection for spiritual-religious over materialistic values, and strove for the sovereignty of the Arab people and for pan-Arab solidarity. The position of the Arab communists

regarding

the establishment

of Israel,

their

approach to the Palestinian question, and the Arab-Israeli conflict widened the rift between them and Arab national forces. The estrangement began in 1947 when the Soviet Union supported the UN partition plan and later recognized the State of Israel. At a time when the Arab world was uniting for the joint political and military struggle against the Jewish state, the Arab communist parties followed the Soviet line. This obedience to Moscow led to their being branded as traitors.’ The negative attitude of the nationalist camp to the communists was further consolidated after the June, 1967, War, when the Soviet Union adopted UN Security Council Resolution 242, took a hesitant stand on the PLO (until 1969), and later called for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The differences between the Arab communists when Palestinian

leftwing

organizations

and the nationalists

were aggravated

arose in the late 1960s with a maximalist

platform based on the demand to liberate all of Palestine and to annihilate the State of Israel through the armed struggle. The challenge to Arab communism was twofold: organizations like George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Naif Hawatima’s Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) offered not only a political platform which opposed the Soviet line, but also preached social revolution based on Marxist-Leninist terminology and slogans. The orthodox Arab communist parties were caught in a bind. Their loyalty to the Soviet Union obliged them_ to accept the main points Israeli-Palestinian issue, although their adoption of this alienation from the Arab-Palestine national camp and prestige. Some tried to by-pass the problem with vague

of its policy even on the line inevitably led to their to the diminution of their formulations and evasions.

1. Alexander Flares, “The Arab CPs and the Palestinian Problem,” Khamsin, 7 (1980), p. 22; Ghazi alKhalili, “The Arab Communist Parties and their Attitude toward the Palestine Problem, 1948-1972,” Dimsat Arabiyya (1976), p. 35 (in Arabic). STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM, VOL. XXII, 0039-3592/89/04

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No. 4, WINTER 1989, 337-350

1989 U nwersity of Southern California

338

STUDIES

IN

COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

However, the pro-Soviet Arab communist conservative leadership was soon challenged by internal opposition in the form of “national communism” splinter groups which adopted the basic theses of the leftwing Palestinian organizations, such as the demand for the continuation of the armed struggle with Israel. The emergence in the 1970s of such organizations as the Riyad Turk faction in Syria and the Central Leadership faction in Iraq, together with the counter-action of Maoist and Trotskyite revolutionaries and other communist terrorists, had significantly eroded the power of traditional Arab communism.2 The problematic situation which the communist

movement

had to contend with in

the Arab world, as outlined above, was exacerbated in Israeli communism because of the unique characteristics of the Jewish-Arab society in Israel and the type of communist activity which developed there.” These special conditions included the continuous impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the existence of an Arab national minority within the Zionist state, the bi-national and bi-ethnic structure of the Israeli Communist Party, and its standing among the Arab population as the representative of its national aspirations. A considerable

portion of the party’s members

and voters in the 1950s were Arabs.*

Its strength within the Arab minority was based upon the national Arab component in its platform. The nationalist orientation was not an expression of “national communism,” nor did it stem from the need to arose because the ideas of revolution, socialism, local tradition. The chief concern of Israeli Arabs minority in a Jewish Zionist majority state. The

deal with nationalist rivals. Rather, it and collectivism remained foreign to then was their new status as a national communist party provided the Arabs

with an understanding of the complex post-war reality and showed them a politicalideological way out. The party’s prestige derived from its deep hostility to the Zionist idea, its support of the positions of the Arab states, and its struggle for the national and civil rights of Israeli Arabs. Nonetheless, in its appeal to the Arabs, the party operated under a number of constraints. In general, it strove to increase its influence among the Arabs by adopting a line which markedly resembled the positions of the Arab side to the conflict. However, at the same time, the communist party had to take care not to go too far lest the Israeli authorities ban it It therefore had to formulate its positions so as to remain within the consensus of Soviet policy. This delicate balance was disturbed when ideological disputes broke out between some of the Jewish leadership of the party and an opposition 2. On the split in the Syrian Party see The Problems ofControuen;y zn the Syrian Communtzt Party (Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1972) (in Arabic); “Special Document: The Soviet Attitude to the Palestine Problem, from the Journal ?f Palestinian Studier (/ps), Vol. 2, No. 1 Records of the Syrian Communist Party, 1971-197’2,” “The Crisis of the Syrian Communist Party and the (Autumn 1972), pp. 187-212; Usama al-Ghazi, Palestine Problem: A Comparative Study with Sevrral Arab Communist Parties,” Shuun Filasfinzjp, Vol. 12 (August 1972), pp. 127-138 (in Arabic). On the situation in other parties see John Colley, “The Shiftin% Prohlem~ ufCummunivn, Vol. 24 (March-April 1975), pp. 41-42; Naji Alush, Sands of Arab Communism,” “The Arab Communist Parties and the Palestine Problem after the 1967 Aggression,” Shun Nastiniyya, Vol. 4 (Scptembcr 1971), pp. 158-166. 3. On the historv of the ICP see Alain Greilsammer. “Communism in Israel: 13 Years after the Split,” &roe);, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 1977-1978), pp. 172~192; Les Communistes Ismeliens (Paris: Presse de la Fondation Nation& des Sciences Politiques, 1978); D unia Habib Nahas, The Israeli Communzrl Par~ (London: Groom Helm, 1976); Moshe Czudnowski and Jacob M. Landau, The Israeli Communist Par9 and the Elections 10 the Fzfth Knesut, 1961 (Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution, 1965). 4. On the ethnic structure of the party see Elie Rekhess, “Jews and Arabs in the Israeli Communist Party,” in Milton J. Esman and Itamar Rabinoich (eds.), Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

group

consisting

positions eventually

those

for

the New

the

competing organize

armed reacted

nationalists

to leave

Sons

camp

firmly

“the

communist

party

aspirations

of Israeli

forced

which

to answer

The

Ideological

The

growth

process June,

pro-Israeli, between

itself

orientations as

wherever

the the

The

Israeli

included

many

of the

states.

in 1972,

at

Arab

In this

the

Hebrew

and political

on the representation of the

platform national

reflected

of

“the

organization

al- Wutuniyya

ul-

University

of

leadership

of the

of the national

Palestinian

because

leftwing

it was, to their

spirit. essentially

in the Arab

communism

a group called

student

platform

the communist

when

organization

its monopoly

of national

which

Association

and the NPM

had been

the same

world

and the radical

were reside,

strengthened body

after

claiming

including

in the 1970s

in full swing

with the Arabs

of the Palestinian-Arab

a recognized it may

later

faced

After joined

policy

Al-Haruku

the ideology

parties

a to

was removed.

(NPM;

of proper

1970s.

to the Arab

to change A similar

in Israel

with

where

proble-

they

were

Palestinian

left.

Challenge

to the intensification These

an

movement

and caused

of activity

the

to deal

Arabs

hard-line

a new nationalist

years

and devoid

of the Sons of the Village War.*

The

adopted

rejected

the communist

of Palestinization 1967,

and

Hadasha,

banned.‘j

of Israeli

detention

began

challenged

the two trends

the challenge

radicals.

Movement

They

in its being

in Israel

several

had

faded out in the early

Movement.”

to break

Arabs.

scarcely

of the Al-Ard

centers

founded

established

and completely

situation

their

Progressive

and tried

new

situation

(Abnaa al-Balad)

new movements

matic

Hebrew

Komunistit

attempt

resulted

communists

graduates

The

conflict

(the

Party),

for Reshima

was felt as scores

the

and move

Jerusalem.7

moderate,

pro-Arab

controversy

MAKI

in Israel

and administrative

was

The

faction,

isolated

but this trend

7hqaddum2yya)”

mind,

of more internal

Communist

acronym

in 1958-1964

comfortable

Nationalist

organizations,

the

nationalism

to the Arab

relatively

of the Village

this

Israel

communists

against

Israel

and university

called

Arab

injunctions,

any real threat

students

adoption

1965

a Jewish

the

Hebrew

camp;

organizations,

orders,

RAKAH’s

(the

of militant

restraining way,

the

nationalist

the nationalist

government

into

Zsraelit,

the In

line.

to split

RAKAH

197Os,

war a revival

Palestinian

demanded

party

List).5

early Arab

who

official

Komunistit

faction,

Communist

Until

the

communists

Mz$!aga

Arab-Jewish

of Arabs

of

led Israeli

acronym

1967

largely

than

339

Challenge to the Israeli Communist Party

The Arab Nationalist

of the West identity

the Palestinian

Bank

Israeli

the Arab

population

as the PLO dispersed minority

Arabs

and the Gaza

of the Arab

the 1973 War

to represent

was an expression

among

of the

since

the

Strip

led

of Israel.

was consolidating Palestinian

in Israel.

The

people Rabat

5. Kevin Devlin, “Communism in Israel: Anatomy of a Split,” Survey, Vol. 62 (January 1976), pp. 141-151; Martin Slam, “Ideology and Ethnicity in Israel’s Two Communist Parties: The Conflict between Maki and Rakah,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. VII, No. 4 (Winter 1974), pp. 359-374. 6. On the Al-Ard organization see Jacob M. Landau, TheArabs in Israe/(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 92-107; Sabri Jiryis, TheArabs in Israel (Beirut: 1973), pp. 315-330 (in Arabic); Habib Qahwaji, “The Complete Story of the Al-Ard Movement,” Shun Filastiniyya, Vol. 1 (1971), pp. loo-125 (in Arabic). 7. Among the founders and first activists of the Sons of the Village group were Muhammad Tawfiq Kiwan, Hasan Jabarin, Ghassan Fawzi, Mahmud Muharib, Husayn Abu Husayn, and Raja Ighbariyya. The founders of the NPM were Ibrahim Nassar, Muhammad Naamna, and Ali Sakh. 8. On the Palestinization process see Elie Rekhess, “The Politicization of Israel’s Arabs,” in A. Hareven (ed.), Every Sixth Israeli(Jerusalem: The Van Leer Foundation, 1983), pp. 135-142; “The Israeli Arabs after 1967,” Sekirot, The Shiloah Center, Tel Aviv University, 1976 (in Hebrew).

340

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

Conference in November, 1974, Arafat’s speech at the UN, and the acceptance of the PLO as an observer at the UN-all enhanced the prestige of the organization in the eyes of Israeli Arabs. The standard-bearers in this process among the Israeli Arabs were the Sons of the Village and members of the NPM. Nationalist circles in Israel found a rival, against whom they could battle as a means to unify their forces and achieve their legitimacy. This “outside enemy” was the Israeli Communist Party, RAKAH. The new radical groups, the Sons of the Village and the NPM, adopted vague slogans in favor of socialism and against capitalism. However, unlike the Arab and Palestinian left and “national communism” circles (which not only challenged the Arab communist parties politically but rejected their Marxist-Leninist roots, offering their own social alternatives), the radical groups in Israel confined themselves to attacking the national-political platform of RAKAH. The radical groups first took issue with their communist rivals on the link between the national and the class struggle. They challenged the genuineness of RAKAH’s commitment to the Arab national cause since, they asserted, its foremost commitment was to the Soviet Union and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They condemned what they called a transparent communist attempt to conceal MarxistLeninist motifs and claimed that it was impossible to obscure the gulf between the national and the class spheres. RAKAH’s reply was anchored in firm ideological foundations. As always, the Party doctrine served the communists as a source of refutations for every argument raised by their rivals. Thus they emphasized Leninist class theory as the foundation of every national question. Accordingly, the solution to the Palestinian problem must, in their opinion, be based upon the Leninist principles of the right to independence, the antiimperialist struggle, social progress, and international peace and security.g RAKAH claimed that the radicals had evolved a theory of a “pseudo-revolutionary” elite which condescends

to the people. This elite would represent a narrow-minded monopoly on patriotism, revolutionism, and introversion claiming an “absolute “10 The communists accused their rivals of trying to draw the Arab people into loyalty. irrational, misguided separatism and adventurism which would lead to their total isolation. Their aproach, it was further argued, was opportunistic and as such enabled

them to espouse anything from the slogans of the Iraqi Ba’ath to those of Palestinian rejectionism and Arab reaction-all as need and circumstances dictated. For some of the radicals, nationalism has become a seasonal fashion, jeered the communists; one of them gives himself an “injection of nationalism,” enthuses for a moment, shouting, “I’m a nationalist! I’m a Palestinian! I’m a revolutionary! I’m a progressive! I’m a Son of the Village! I’m the father of the village !” When the injection wears off, he goes back to the way he was.” The question of whether the existence of the State of Israel is justified also gave rise to bitter controversy between the two sides. The radical camp denied the historical right of the Jewish people to Palestine and to self-determination since these rights, it was felt, could only be exercised at the expense of the Palestinian people. The radicals rejected 9. Zu-Haderech (Tel Aviv, The Hebrew Organ of the ICP, weekly), December 9, 1965; The Israeli Communist Party, The Seventeenth Congress (Tel Aviv: The Central Committee, 1972), pp. 125, 293 (in Hebrew). 10. Salim Jubran, Al-Ittihad (Haifa, the Arabic organ of the ICP, twice weekly), January 28, 1976; Dr. Emile Touma, “The Political Map of the Arab Minority in Israel,” Al-Jadid (Haifa, monthly), June 1980; Salim Jubran, “The Arab Intellectuals in Israel,” AI-lttihad, December 18, 1981; July 2, 1982. 11. Ali Muawiyya, “Injection,” Al-Ittihad, April 20, 1979; Azmi Bishara, ibid, March 11, 1980.

The Arab Nationalist

Challenge to the Israeli Communist

341

Par9

the State of Israel and refused to recognize it, although they agreed that “the Jews should not be thrown into the sea. “l2 RAKAH, on the other hand, recognized the right of the Jewish people to self-determination and the establishment of the Jewish state, in accordance with Soviet policy. The radicals vehemently attacked their communist rivals for what they considered their alliance, so to speak, with Israel. After all, it was argued, they flew the flag of the state and sang the Israeli national anthem which was so full of Jewish and Zionist symbols. The arms which Jewish Israeli communists assumedly purchased from the eastern bloc for the Israel Defense Force during the war in 1948 Members of the Sons of the Village and came in for especially bitter condemnation. NPM jeered Israeli army RAKAH play up the

at the honor which RAKAH accorded, in their words, “the heroes of the who fell in the War of Independence.“i3 could not and would not ignore the recognition of Israel; instead, it chose to distinction between its attitude to the state and its stance on the leadership

and policies of its government. Recognition of the state, claimed the communists, does not mean the automatic acceptance of the regime or the ideology of its rulers. At the same time, they took care to reiterate their clear-cut stand against Zionism, which they fundamentally rejected. l4 However, on this score the communists had no advantage since the radical current also rejected Zionism and called for military and political war against “the Zionist enemy.“15 The radicals regarded the Israeli Arabs as an integral part of the Palestinian Arab people. There was no difference, in their view, between Palestinians inside Israel and those outside it; “ Al-Khalil (the city of Hebron on the West Bank) is like Al-Jalil (the Galilee region in the north of Israel); both comprise a single people engaged in a common struggle and sharing a single fate.“‘6 Any future solution to the Palestinian problem, pre-1967

they asserted, must include official recognition Palestinian residents of the Jewish state.

of the national identity of the

According to the Arab Student Committee of the Hebrew University, “The right of self-determination of the Palestinian people applies . . . to ‘the masses of the Galilee and the Triangle,““’ or, in other words, also to Israeli Arabs. Hence, the spokesmen of the radicals stressed the decisive identity of the Arab minority as Palestinian, not Israeli: “We Arabs living under Israeli rule . . . emphasize the need to instill in the masses the consciousness that they are Palestinian and that ‘Israeliness’ does not include us and does not affect us.“t8

is a transient

thing which

12. “Manifesto issued by the Arab Student Committee at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem,” December 6, 1977; Ibrahim Nassar interviewed by The Gumdim, January 7, 1979; Mahmud Muharib, cited by Mahriu, January 26, 1979. 13. Al-Ittihud, February 2; Al-Durtur(Amman, daily), February 19, 1979; Manifesto by NPM, Jerusalem, Manifesto by NPM, Haifa, December 1979; December 15, 1979; “Wisdom in the Cell of the Accused,” Reply by the ICP General Secretary Meir Vilner, Zu Hadmch, February 25, 1981. 14. For a comprehensive summary of RAKAH’s views on Zionism see the chapter on “The Jewish ICP Resolutions, The Sixteenth Congress (Tel Aviv: The Central Question and Zionism in Our Days,” Committee, 1969), pp. 372-396 (in Hebrew). 15. The Political Program of the Arab Student Committee at Haifa University, December 1978; Mahriv, January 30, 1979; Voice of Israel, January 31, 1979; DR, February 1, 1979; Al-Sharq aldwsat (London, daily), February 14, 1979; Al-Drum, February 19, 26, 1979; Al-Dustur (London, pro-Iraqi, weekly), November P6-December 2, 1979. organ ofthe 16. Statement by the Arab Student Committee at Haifa University, cited in Al-Hadaf(Beirut, PFLP, weekly), March 30, 1981. For similar views see Al-Durtur, February 19, 26, 1979. 17. The Triangle is an area in central Israel, largely populated by Israeli Arabs. Manifesto by the Arab Student Committee, Al-Fajr (East Jerusalem, daily), December 17, 1977, op. cit., note 12. 18. Al-Jarmaq, March 30, 1977; Ibrahim Nassar interviewed Muharib, Al-Dwtur, November 26-December 2, 1979.

by Al-Dustur, February

26, 1979; Mahmud

342

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

RAKAH’s position on these issues reflected an entirely different approach. After the split in 1965, the party defined the Arab population in Israel as a national minority which, though separated from the other parts of the Palestinian people, yet belonged to it. RAKAH drew a distinction between support of the right of self-determination for the Palestinian Arab people and the non-inclusion of Israeli Arabs in this demand. Despite criticism of inconsistency and an inherent contradiction in RAKAH’s definition of the identity of Israeli Arabs, the party leadership stuck to its vague formulations for theoretical considerations and for a pragmatic motive: expressions of disloyalty to Israel on the part of Israeli Arabs or a demand for full Palestinian identity could have provoked a harsh reaction on the part of the authorities. RAKAH was also faced with the question of the extent to which the PLO represented the Israeli Arabs. The position of the Sons of the Village and the NPM was unequivocal: the PLO was the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people wherever they reside, and therefore the PLO was also in the clearest sense the representative of the “1948 Palestinians.“lg RAKAH, on the other hand, although they supported the PLO as the exclusive representative of the Palestinian Arab people and consequently claimed that the Arab population of Israel was an inherent part of this people, ignored the logical corollary, namely, that the PLO is the representative of the Israeli Arabs. Their explanation was inadequate: as citizens of the State of Israel, the Arabs were subject to different conditions from those of other sectors of the Palestinian people primarily because the Arab population had its own representation and leadership embodied in the Israeli communist party. RAKAH’s complex and shifting

position

on the PLO,

except within the narrow

dimension ofthe Israeli Arabs, accurately reflected Soviet policy and thus their loyalty to the USSR. Until 1969 RAKAH conformed to Soviet policy by relating to the Palestinian organization with some reservations: the Palestinian problem was seen as a question of refugees;

the PLO’s terrorist activities were not supported and the emphasis was placed instead on the political effort to “eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression” so that Israel would withdraw from the occupied territories. When in the late 1960s the Soviet Union recognized the PLO as a national liberation movement, RAKAH made the appropriate change in its platform. In 1973 the ties between the PLO and the Soviet Union were strengthened when the latter recognized the PLO and the right of the Palestinian Arab people to self-determination. This turning point was also clearly reflected in RAKAH’s policy.‘” In keeping with the Soviet line, the Israeli communists denied the policies of the within the PLO (for example, the PFLP), branding their “rejectionist organization” members “unrealistic extremists. ” The Sons of the Village and the NPM, however, stated that “the PLO is a uniform framework for all the factions of the Palestinian revolution, including the rejection front. “*I They also gave prominence to the maximal Palestinian

demand for the establishment

of a secular, democratic Jewish-Arab

state in

19. Ibrahim Nassar, cited in Al-Sharq aldwsat, 14 February and in AI-Dusk, February 26, 1979; “May the Zionist Occupation Fall! ” , “Manifesto by the Arab Student Committee at the Hebrew University, June 4, 1980. 20. Meir

Vilner, “The Present Stage of Development in the Palestinian Question,” Zu Haderech, September 2, 1970; Saliba Khamis, Al-Ittihad, March 17, 1972; Emile Touma, “Has a New Stage in the Palestinian Struggle Begun?,” ibid., February 6, 1974. 21. “Manifesto issued by the Arab Student Committee at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem,” December 6, 1977; Report by the Arab Student Committee at the Haifa University, December 1978; AlDustur, February 19, 1979; Al-Fajr, December 17, 1979.

The Arab Nationalist the entire as there

territory

of Mandatory

was no “peace,

the establishment Israel

Arabs

problem.

defeatist.

without

homeland.23 official

platform

tion according

there

on the

right

no just

right

demand

to choose

to the

Palestinian to their

The

party’s

and restitu-

directed

mentioning

leave

refugee

to return

repatriation

in Arabic

restitution,

for

alongside

would

ambivalent.

between

so long

to the 1948

solution was

publications

Strip

spokesmen,

of the refugees

question

concerning

just

RAKAH’s

not be a solution

be

refugee

of the PLO,

and the Gaza

said the radical

can

However,

the part

Bank

and would

of the refugees’

omitted

of Israe1.“22

of the natural

to UN resolutions.

often

a solution,

argued,

stand

spoke

the leadership

in the West

minority

they

RAKAH’s

population

state

the realization

under

or recognition

Such

a persecuted

Therefore,

problem

Palestine

negotiations

of a Palestinian

was branded

the Israeli

343

Challenge to the Israeli Communist Party

at the Arab

only the demand

for repatriation.24 The

radicals

were

the only means Palestinian

loyal

to the position

for achieving

political

people.

They

evaded

activities,

regretting

the

bloodshed

terrorism

or to define

PLO

reserved

In keeping occupied

with

RAKAH

denounced

in Arabic

often

background

some

a leading

being

of their

but

for

was of the

the

refusing

of struggle

justified

military

against

civilian

since,

PLO’s

terrorist

either

to condemn

in their

opinion,

sabotage targets

Nonetheless,

acts in Israel the attacks,

the Sons

the

with covert

namely,

operations

in Israel

and

communist sympathy,

Israel’s

in the abroad,

publications

emphasizing

aggressive

policy

the

against

to engage

involved

26 Such

mentioned which

in terrorist

earlier.

The

did not jeopardize

it was

possibility the leaders

activities. from feared, from

of the Village,

their

existence:

Fawzi,

for

a “graduate

openly would

them-

of the law

Ghassan

of being

of

encouraging provoke

that the government organizing

In this way they hoped Sons

regarded

the framework

was proud

refrained

acts,

The

or association.

activities

within

of the Village,

also discouraged

as a party

as well as the NPM

legitimately

the movement

in terrorism.

Al-Ard movement to areas

of the Village

of the authorities.

the movement

registered

were

in the Sons

However,

on the part

Struggle

operating

activists

figure

prisons.”

against

form

kind of terrorism.

vs. Revolutionary

movements

although

steps

support

sides,

revolution” and the aims

on this issue.25

which

terrorist

beginning,

example,

reaction

of

Palestinian the future

people.

as political

members

both

actions

underlying

Activism

the Israeli

line

negated

the latter

motives

From the very selves

question

on

to decide

Soviet

but

mentioned

the Palestinian

Militant

the

territories

the

and ensuring

what was the desirable

the sole right

an “armed

that

goals

to escape therefore,

cultural-social

its

a harsh

would

take

formally

and

the fate of the confined

their

activities,

22. Mahriu, January 30, 1979; Al-Durtur, February 26, 1979. 23. Salah Hamada, Sawtal-Shaykh Muannis (organ of the radical students at Tel Aviv University), cited by Fouzi Al-Asmar, “Israel Revisited, 1976,“JpS, 23, Vol. VI, No. 3 (Spring 1977), pp. 55-56; Ibrahim Nassar, Jerusalem Post, February 23, 1979, and interviewed by Zvi Zinger, Mahriu, April 30, 1980. 24. For example, Al-Zttihad, April 11, August 1, 1969; Dr. Emile Touma, ibid., March 24, 1972. 25. Mahn’u, Jeru.mlem Post, January 30, 1979; AI-Dmtur, February 19, 1979; Manifesto by NPM, December 15, 1979; Ibrahim Nassar, interviewed by Mahriu, April 30, 1980; Al-Had& March 30, 1981. 26. Mahmud Muharib, Al-Durtur, November 26-December 2, 1979. Several members of the Sons of the Village were nevertheless involved in terrorist activity. Amongst them were, for example, Ghassan Fawzi, Ahmad Burghal, and three members from Lod and Ramle.

344

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

municipal elections, campus life, and the countrywide protest of the Arabs of Israe1.z7 The radical groups staunchly objected to the participation of Israeli Arabs in Knesset elections and they attacked RAKAH for taking part in Israeli parliamentary life, for in their opinion voting for the Knesset was tantamount to recognizing the “Zionist entity and the State of Israel. “28 The municipal elections, on the other hand, were considered legitimate since they affected the welfare of the Arab residents in the pragmatic area of day-to-day needs. In this context, the radicals attacked RAKAH and offered an alternative to it. A list representing the Sons of the Village first participated in the 1973 municipal elections in Umm al-Fahm, and its representative, Muhammad Tawfiq Kiwan, was elected a member of the local council. Encouraged by the success of the Umm al-Fahm group, similar frameworks were founded in other villages. In Tayyiba, for example, a group of intellectuals organized a cultural club called Al-N&da (Resurgence), and in the villages of Ara and Arara, Al-F& (Dawn) and Al-Buyadir (Orchards) groups were established. In the 1978 and 1983 municipal elections the radicals increased their representation significantly. Five (in 1978) and later nine (in 1983) of their representatives were elected in Umm al-Fahm, Tayyiba, Kabul, Mailiyya, Daburiyya, Tira, and Baqa AlGharbiyya. The radicals’ success in local government was nevertheless limited, particularly in comparison with the communists. Against their nine representatives in the 1983 elections, RAKAH and its front organization returned more than 140 representatives in approximately 40 local councils. In a sizeable portion of these localities, including Nazareth, the largest Arab city in Israel, members of the communist party were elected mayor or head of the local council. By contrast, the communists’ success on university campuses was less impressive. RAKAH, like Arab communist parties elsewhere, invested a good deal of energy in consolidating its position among the Israeli Arab intelligentsia. The party became the main home for Israeli Arab “resistance poets ” such as Mahmud Darwish and Samih alQasim, and substantial resources were diverted to cultural affairs. Similar efforts were also directed at increasing the influence of the party among Arab school teachers. Up to the 196Os, the communists’ gains among Arab university students were rather limited. There were few university students and their leadership was in the hands of the nationalist camp. After the 1967 war, communist students redoubled their efforts at winning the leadership of the Arab Students Committee, particularly at the Hebrew University, but Khalil Tuma, a nationalist, was at that time elected chairman. The threat from the radicals at the universities grew substantially after the establishment of the Sons of the Village Movement in the early 1970s. Muhammad Tawfiq Kiwan was elected chairman of the Arab Student Committee at Tel Aviv University, and at Haifa University, where the number of Arab students had increased rapidly, a new committee was set up, most of whose members were radicals. It was only natural that the new movement should take root in that generation of young intellectuals which showed a predilection for radical views and most of whose representatives were imbued with the spirit of revolutionary

mission.

An acrimonious

controversy

soon arose in the uni-

27. Muhammad Kiwan, interviewed by Pamella Smith, JB’, 29, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Autumn 1978), pp. 167-171; Zahi Iskandar, “Sons of the Village-Look Forward in Anger,” Bamhau (Tel Aviv, monthly‘), Tanuary 6, 1979. 28. Manifesto by the Arab Student Committee at the Hebrew University ofJerusalem, “A Voice Calling our Palestinian People,” mid-May, 1977; Statements by the Sons of the Village and the NPM, mid-June, June 2 1, 1981.

The Arab Nationalist Challenge to the Israeli Communist Parg versities between these radicals and RAKAH

345

members.zg

The tension between the two groups reached a climax in the summer of 1976, following the expulsion of communist party supporters from the Jerusalem Arab Students Committee. The official reason given was that these members had shown a compromising and defeatist attitude on the question of guard duty for Arabs on the Jerusalem campus, and had “surrendered to pressure from the authorities.” The expulsion led to denunciations in the communist press, which attacked “schismatic nationalistic groups trying to traffic in the slogans of extreme nationalism for which the Palestinian people have already paid a heavy price in the form of a long-lasting tragedy.” The editorial in al-lttihad, the communist party organ, harshly criticized the “remnants of Trotskyism, Maoism and left-wing extremism which are actually serving the interests of the Israeli regime which would like to bring back the days of Ahmad Shuqayri and Ahmad Sa’id.” In the 1977 elections to the Jerusalem Arab Students Committee, the communists were unable to recapture their hegemony, but were pushed onto the sidelines. In defense of their position they repeatedly argued that the extremism of the radicals was self-defeating, since it made it easier for the Likud government to “launch its attacks

on the Arab

students”30

and obstruct

Arab-Jewish

cooperation

on the

campuses. The communists’ attempts to regain control of the Jerusalem Students Committee succeeded in the 1978 elections when the RAKAH-sponsored Front list won the majority. But their achievement was not repeated in Haifa where RAKAH supporters lost the elections. The partial successes on the university campuses stimulated the Sons of the Village to try to gain a foothold on a countrywide level. From the very beginning their approach was characterized by the demand for militant activism in the form of constant confrontation with the government. In the mid-1970s, RAKAH, too, decided to activate the local Arab protest against government policies. The communists, however, preferred to wage the battle within the framework of what was permissible by law and the democratic practices of Israel, and by organizing as broad a front of participants as possible. In the autumn of 1975 RAKAH created The Nationwide Committee for the Protection of the Arab Lands, in order to fight the government’s decision to expropriate Arab land in Galilee.sl Under communist direction, the Committee proclaimed March 30, 1976, as “Land Day.” The organizers’ intention that it should be a quiet general strike by Israeli Arabs against the expropriation of Arab lands was never realized but the procedures adopted by the security forces and provocation on the part of militant elements, resulted in soldiers and police clashing with the demonstrators. Six Arabs were killed. Members of the Sons of the Village and other radicals were apparently implicated in inciting the demonstrators. One year later, in 1977, discussions were held on how best to mark the bloody events of the first “Land Day.” Pressured by the communists, it was finally decided to have a day of quiet gatherings in memory of the victims. The communists, who sought to 29. The radicals brought out single-issue editions of newspapers under such names as Al-Jarmq (a mountain in Galilee); Jamhir al-Tdi’a (The Masses of the Avantgarde); T&u al-Karmil(The Mount Carmel Pioneers); Saruf al-ShaykhMuannis (The Voice of Shaykh Muannis, an Arab village). 30. See Elie Rekhess, “Israeli Arab Intelligentsia,” TheJem.mlemQwrfn~, Vol. XI (1979), pp. 51-69; AlZttihad,June 22, 1976, January 24, 1978. The names of Ahmad Shuqayri, first head ofthe PLO, and Ahmad Sa’id, commentator on the Egyptian “Voice of the Arabs” radio station, were both identified before 1967 with the slogan proposing that Israel be driven into the sea. 31. SeeElie Rekhess, “The Israeli Arabs and the Land Expropriation in the Galilee: Background, Events and Repercussions, 1975-1977,” Sekirot,The Shiloah Center, Tel Aviv University, 1977 (in Hebrew).

346

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

demonstrate might

their

control

and fitness

lead to a deterioration

to official were

steps against

for leadership,

in Jewish-Arab

the party.

The

opinion:

they demanded

Al-Jurmaq, savagely

attacked

“those

bell-ringing

of escalating

criticism

was

determined

that

realistic

approach

adopted.

As Dr.

explained when

vociferous

which Emile

Touma,

their view every

passed

peacefully.

In the summer three tions tion

West

active

body,

Arabs

RAKAH’s that

behavior”

would

population, reply, they

argued, the

borders,

’ ‘36

an umbrella

uniting

own ideological

platform

Congress

positions

it was due to convene, basis.

The

decision

tion of Israel.

In February,

the “Umm

al-Fahm

of the Village

was never

the government

marked

Beginning

the National

parties.

of the Sons

of the Masses

against

the Arab

within

while the

for the Congress

Movement,

1948 of the

Committee,

Al-N&da, the Dayr

the Committee This

In

which,

patriotism”

document

drafted reflected

its the

and the NPM.37 In December,

1980,

decided

to forbid

the conference

of a new policy

the authorities

Toubi

“infantile

movement.“”

Coordinating

1981, Pact.”

Tawfiq whose

held.

the introduction

in 1980,

masses

in the preparations

separately

conscious,

6 Document”

“Israeli

Palestinian

the Sons of the Village

other titled

the “June

preached

the

hostility

asserted

the organizing

member

a separatist

on

popula-

which

a living,

of persons

to incite

attacked who

“as

to

Day”

prepara-

of the Arab

of joining

Knesset

admission

to establish

“of

the radicals

to organize

organization

political

communists

to include

the latter and various

The

aspiring.

and the NPM

the

Al-Asad front, main

the

to self-determination

refusal

spurred

Communist

permit

for the government

were

of the Village

right

RAKAH’s

not

it possible Arabs

represented

ignoring

Masses

make

as if the

was cold.

must

people

possibility

the

managed

began

6 Document”,

Arab

the

and

Despite

underground

RAKAH

congress

a

leadership

to advance

so that “Land

of the Jewish

the “June

considered

Arab

the communists

representational

be

must be

his objectives.“’

measure,

to the Palestinian

response

of the party’s how and when

by members

platform,

radicals

the party

the Sons

a basic

belonged

“x4 The

explained

attacks

and

at the time;

exaggerations”

1977 and 1981,

and as a pre-election

of a nationwide

It published

part.

but

following

mayors,

for the organization of Israel.

that the Israeli and

Arab

organ

festivals

to this trenchant

prevailing

and achieve

between

however,

modus operandi must

the

and the NPM,

year in the period

of 1981,

Bank

his strength

strike

student

into

answer

the conditions member

radical

struggle

into revolutionary

of the Sons of the Village

impose

the mass

is the one who knows

to conserve

The

revolutionism;”

a high-ranking

officer

general

be even worse,

and their supporters,

“32 RAKAH’s

and

does not “descend

in order

protests

is not

to circumstances

it, the successful

to retreat

the struggle.

another

what would

confrontation.

who translate

“adventurism

according

that

and,

Sons of the Village

of the opposite instead

feared

relations

employed

towards a variety

several

days before on a security

the Arab populaof preventive

and

32. Al-&nag, March 30, 1977; Ha’aretz, March 8, 1978; Al-Tahaddi (organ of the radical Arab students at the Hebrew University), November 1978; Kiwan, cited by Iskandar, Bamerhau. 33. Ibn Khaldun (Dr. Emile Touma), “On the ‘Revolutionism’ of those who Exaggerate,” Al-Ittihad, January 18, 1981. 34. For the text of the document see Al-Ittihad, June 6, 1980. 35. Hahretz, September 7; Interview with Mansur Kardush, Al-Dwtur, October 22, 1980. 36. Qasim Zayd, ‘Al-Humishmr, November 28, 1980; Al-I+ (East Jerusalem, weekly, English edition), January 21-28, 1981. 37. Attallah Mansur, “All of Raqah’s Rivals, ” Ha’aretz, April 23; Yair Kotler, “Why was the National Coordination Committee Outlawed,” .Mahriu, April 24, 1981.

The Arab Nationalist punitive First

measures

and

designed

foremost,

Village

and

the NPM.

issued

against

radical

In July,

1980,

determined whether

by

In April,

sustained

another

Committee, radicals.

examine

The

alternative

resolution

their

This

points

at the

In the elections

the radicals’ peaceful

with

with

operates

as

strategy

indications

in 1982,

on the division between

included

representative constitute

an integral

of the struggle

against

the Jerusalem

Student

not

Previously

been

represented

of

situation the

basis

and for

a

and to emphasize,

them

points:

people;

Zionism.

In keeping

Committee the latter At Tel at all,

Arab

were

they

and

were

now

fitted

in

up political

organization.

In

and Equality,

was

framework

RAKAH

in the universities at an agreement

Committees.

Negotiations

in a “minimal

platform”

as the exclusive

legitimate

on the need to regard in Israel

who,

support

to the NPM

the Arab

on their

six of the 11 seats in and five to RAKAH

where by

part,

for the continuation

on the Jerusalem

Universities, represented

and

change

arrived

any representation

Beersheba

that

cooperation setting

with the new agreement, apportioned

had lacked

Aviv

people;

then decided The

to be seen

of the PLO masses

in

inter alia,

circles.

Student

agreement

participation

reflected,

for

whose

and resulted

of the Arab

of the Palestinian

drop

for Peace

political

in the Arab

part

in Arab

and RAKAH

recognition

Arab

to the

of a front

sides were

year

lost

factor

in 1976:

within

with other

different

A contributing

RAKAH

Front

in parallel

entirely

RAKAH

possibilities

umbrella

of the NPM

and active part

the

on both

for

1981,

This

had adopted

under

developed

and the NPM.

the Democratic

the previous

of the Palestinian

Committee.

Coordinating

their

30,

decline

the elections.

organization

between

on June

the

consider

the party

forces

the following

as a conscious

Student

which

which

in 1981.

of the Village

representatives

students

supporters.

and the NPM

was

although

localities.

was

one,

to boycott

HADASH,

had begun

held

in the Arab

in cooperation

of power

the sides

reassess this

was

radical

in the activities

and RAKAH,

198Os,

Knesset

of the new policy

when

to

tendency

of the

it would

parliamentary

in the Knesset,

Clear

public

non-communist the

against

Movement reduction

which

a slogan,

law

the National

probably

to 70 per cent

the Sons

with this notion,

established

Most

a similar

main

confrontation,

the overall

alliances keeping

the

in 1977

call to the Arab

coexistence

well with

with beginning

not

77 per cent

of direct

them

themselves

to the Tenth

although

from

instead

activity.

between

13 per cent of the votes

of power,

of the Village organization,

caused

Act,

organization

or uttering this

were

and in Galilee.

Anti-terror

invoked

of the

orders

of agreement. coincided

elections

which

of

friction

RAKAH

approximately

early

restrictions

in

reasons.

umbrella

District, a terrorist

firm line led to a significant

development

fashion

loss

The

restraining

with

an anthem

government

sector.

of the Sons

to the

or solidarity

or singing

the

and

amendment

in the Arab

members

in the Central

of the Sons

their

channels

to minimize

instead,

on

the heads

binding

an

symbols

when

was banned.

against

injunctions

of sympathy

then

1981, blow

eight

approved

a flag, From

of radicalization

directed

in the universities,

Knesset

law.

was

1980,

any expression

figures.38

the

In June,

by displaying

forbidden

policy

activists

the

that

to stop manifestations

the new

347

Challenge to the Israeli Communist Parti

two

Arab

the radicals

members

on

had each

Committee.Ss 38. Restraining orders were issued against the followinn radical activists: Ibrahim Nassar, Umar Badah, Raja Ighbariyya,-Hasan Jabarin, Muhammad Abu Sal&a (Dauar, Jew&m Post, July 6, 1980). Other measures were later taken against Muhammad Burghal, Maysara al-Sayyid, and Faraj Khunayfis (Al-F&, August 20-30, 1981; Manifesto by the Umm al-Fahm branch of the Sons of the Village, January 1982). 39. Al-Ittihad, February 5, 1982; ‘Ai-Hamishmr, February 9, 16, 1982.

348

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

The rapprochement between the two rival camps was also seen when, on the authority of RAKAH, Muhammad Tawfiq Kiwan was made a member of the secretariat of the Nationwide Committee for the Protection of the Arab Lands as a representative of the Sons of the Village. To be sure, the radicals retained their preconceived notions regarding the nature of the required struggle and called for a general strike as a “minimal response to the challenges of the period,” but their very participation in the discussions and preparations alongside RAKAH members demonstrated the extent of their reversal. In 1982 even the controversy over the style of protest disappeared. As a result of a sudden, unexpected decision, stemming from the need to react to developments in the West Bank, RAKAH changed its traditional policy, and instead of peaceful protest within the framework of a memorial gathering, the party supported a general strike declared for March 30, 1982. The communist move was not a reply to or a yielding to radical pressure but reflected self-serving pragmatic considerations. Thus, by adhering to a more militant policy, they managed to deprive the radicals of one of their most telling criticisms. The war in Lebanon in the summer of 1982 and subsequent developments in the Palestinian sphere, led to increasing cooperation between RAKAH and its nationalist opponents. The split in the ranks of Fath in 1983 influenced the political tendencies of the Israeli Arabs. In the internal Palestinian controversy between the mainstream Fath camp and the opposition coalition of the “democratic alliance, ” RAKAH sided with the latter. The solidarity with the Soviet line and the Arab communist parties dictated RAKAH’s support of the three organizations comprising the “democratic alliance,” namely, the Palestinian communist party, the PFLP, and the PDFLP. RAKAH did not deny its basic sympathy for Yasir Arafat and for the central camp in Fath, nor did it support for all the clauses of the platforms of George Habash and Naif Hawatima. Yet the Israeli communist party’s loyalty to the “democratic alliance” significantly narrowed

the gap between

RAKAH

long-standing supporters of the PFLP The rapprochement between RAKAH

and the Sons of the Village

and the NPM,

and the PDFLP. and the radicals was simultaneously

two

fostered by

the confrontation with a new political rival which began to threaten them both. In the spring of 1984, a new Jewish-Arab organization, the Progressive List for Peace (PLP), was founded in order to stand for the forthcoming elections to the Eleventh Knesset. The Jewish part was represented by leftwing circles headed by Uri Avneri, the editor of HaOlam HaZeh, and General (Res.) Matti Peled. The Arab faction was headed by three personalities: lawyer Muhammad Miari, a veteran political activist and a former member of Al-Ard; lawyer Kamil al-Dahir, a leading figure in the Nazareth Organization of Arab Academicians; and Riah Abu al-Asal, an Anglican minister known for his outspoken support of the PLO. The rise of the Progressive List and its determination to operate within the parliamentary arena tangibly threatened the monopoly which the communists had enjoyed in the representation of Israeli Arabs in the Knesset. The PLP’s advantage over RAKAH was also considerable because it offered a pro-Palestinian nationalist platform minus the Marxist dogma. The new List maintained that its concept of Arab-Jewish partnership was more authentic than RAKAH’s. Despite the fact that most voters for the communists were Arabs, its list had always been headed by a Jew. The PLP on the other hand, placed an Arab at the top. The communists, in reply, emphasized the anti-Zionist element in their doctrine and contrasted it with their opponents’ partnership with Avneri and Peled which, they claimed, showed the Zionist character of the Progressive

The Arab Nationalist

Challenge to the Israeli Communist

List. In the elections held on 23 July,

Party

349

1984, the PLP proved strong enough to win two

seats (18 per cent of the Arab vote). RAKAH managed to keep its four Knesset seats, but lost nearly 5 per cent of the support it had held in the Arab sector in 1981 (from 38 per cent to 33 per cent). The partial decline was attributed to the rise of the PLP. The emergence of the PLP adversely affected not only the communists but also the Sons of the Village and the NPM. In the eyes of the public the new body was seen as a nationalist party with a platform resembling that of the Al-Ard movement. The PLP’s intention of running in the elections to the Knesset made the Sons of the Village and their partners’ refusal to participate in the elections seem unrealistic and ridiculous. Already in the summer of 1983 the issue of whether or not to participate in the Knesset elections had led to a serious controversy within the Sons of the Village. It ended in a split. A minority faction headed by Ghassan Fawzi and Hasan Jabarin, apparently realizing the fruitlessness of boycotting the elections, demanded cooperation with the Jewish leftwing forces in order to run a united election campaign. The group, which took the name al-Ansar, represented approximately one-third of the movement’s members. In order to create a conduit to Israeli leftwing circles, it expressed support for a relatively moderate platform which called for, in the first phase, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories. Representatives of al-Ansar were the first to hold negotiations with Avneri and Peled in an attempt to establish a joint Jewish-Arab organization, but they later resigned and did not take part in the establishment of the Progressive List. The majority faction of the Sons of the Village, headed by Husayn Abu Husayn, Muhammad Tawfiq Kiwan, and Raja Ighbariyya, continued to adhere to the hard line demanding a boycott of the elections and rejecting all political ties with any Jewish partner.4’J During the years 1985 to 1986, the controversy between RAKAH and the radicals subsided and the two sides gradually closed ranks. The change was best illustrated on the university campuses. At the Hebrew University of Jerusalem the conciliation between student supporters of RAKAH and the Sons of the Village and NPM activists proceeded apace. In preparation for the elections to the Arab Student Committee which were held in February, 1985, the representatives of both sides drew up a joint list which won approximately 80 per cent of the Arab student votes and defeated the rival Progressive List. A similar development took place at Haifa University in the 1986 election. Here, too, the united list of communists and radicals won eight out of 11 seats on the Committee. At Tel Aviv and Beersheba Universities, the candidates retained their separate frameworks during this period (1985-1986), although they cooperated . opposition to the activists of the Progressive List for Peace.4i

in joint

Concluding Remarks The power struggle between RAKAH and its radical rivals ended in the mid-1980s with the victory of the communist party. The communist advantage was demonstrated in every area -ideological, tactical, and organizational. It is true that the political platform of the Sons of the Village and the NPM was based on the most logical conclusions to be inferred from the comprehensive Palestinian nationalist viewpoint. RAKAH, on the 40. A4ahriq March 15, 1983; Al-‘Awda (East J erusalem, weekly), October 29, 1983; ‘Al-Hamishmar, December 17, 1984. 41. Kol Ha’ir (Jerusalem, weekly), February 8, 1985, February 6, 1987; Zu Haderech, January 24, March 26, 1986; Kolbo (Haifa, weekly), January 9, 1987; ‘Al-Hamishmar, January 23, 1987.

350

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

other

hand,

continually

nationalist clear

vacillated

between

line and the need to conform

of positions

fundamentally

which

could

conflicting

and balanced

platform

the desire

to Soviet

lead to the banning

demands,

the Arab

of the communists

to please

policy,

of the party.

public

than

the adherents

of the Arab

while at the same

time

However,

was drawn

more

to the extremism

steering

despite

these

to the moderate

of the radical

formula-

tions. Right two

from

sides

efficient

the start,

weighed party

the numerical

against

apparatus

the

numbering

stood a small

group

of the Village

and the NPM

newspaper, Activity many

comprising

activists

when

tion with the authorities, communists contained cause

called

against

served

those

nucleus, from

the radicals public’s

of government

by the

the radicals

to match

and hundreds

since

reduced

their

influence

of the

controversy

Militant To

considerably,

fervor”

protest

a great

which RAKAH’s

which

playing

the

had always

extent,

measures

of

confronta-

activism

thereby

Sons

no regular

violent

and the orderly

preventive

there

The

of the communists.

Between

was clear.

the

people.

no press,

at the disposal

university.

the and

of members,

young system,

countermeasures.

authorities

between

while the “revolutionary

preached,

choice

of forces

to a sophisticated

inexperienced

organizational

they graduated

which

balance

In contrast

of officials

the founding

for, the Arab

the threat

was

scores

only a few dozen resources

around

ended

groups.

had no ramified

and no financial

was centered

and organizational

nationalist

they

took

into the hands

of the communists. The

subsidence

combined external 198Os,

result

of internal

influence the Sons

realized

that

strength

of

of changes

RAKAH,

uncompromising enemy

in the form

democratic for

their

adaptability, campaign

alliance, part,

as

struggle

to further

strict

enhanced

consolidate

in

the

List

the common the

their their

competing

new

seem

that

to

the

and the joint

readiness

for conciliation.

conditions.

positions

within

desirable

the Arab

the midthey

Knesset,

rise of a common

stand

Demonstrating into

the

and the

and the solid

Eleventh

The

was

probably

by the authorities

was pointless.

rivals

scene

towards

Most

for Peace,

former

camps

population

politically.

elections

the communists

to exploit

converted

two

It would

matured

surveillance

demonstrated against

of the Progressive

learned they

East.

and the NPM

constant,

the

on the Israel-Arab

in the Middle

of the Village

due to their

between

developments

regarding

The

the

communists, flexibility

partners

population.

in

and their