The Belgian election of 1991

Electoral Studies (1992), 11:2, 162-165

The Belgian Election of 1991 JOHN FITZMAURICE 66

Rue Louis Socquet,

1030 Brussels,

Belgium

The calm and dullness of the campaign, which apart perhaps from the TV duel between Prime Minister Martens and PS President Spitaels raised few sparks, was deceptive. Everyone knew that there was certainly some alienation and apathy, but few observers realized how severe it was. The polls, which must respect a SO-day legal blackout period, had not picked it up. As it was the result was a severe shock to the system and will make Belgium much more difficult to govern. There was a strong voter tendency to punish all the so-called ‘traditional parties’, not only the present coalition parties, but also the main liberal opposition. The Flemish liberals hardly gained (+0.4%) and the Francophone liberals actually lost 1.3 per cent. Apparently, they were seen as too much part of the system, having been in power between 1981-88. This election starkly illustrated the fact that there are two quite distinct regional political systems in Belgium. In Wallonia, and to a lesser extent in Brussels, the beneficiary of the swing against the traditional parties, all of which lost in varying degrees (the PS most and the PSC least) was ECOLO (greens), which more than doubled its vote. In Flanders and Brussels on the other hand the beneficiaries were the extreme right parties and the Flemish anti-politician list led by the eccentric millionaire anarchist and libertarian, himself currently in jaiI for fraud, Jean-Pierre Van Rossem, and which won three seats 5.2 per cent of the Flemish vote. More serious was the progress of two extreme right anti-immigrant nationalist and authoritarian parties. In Flanders, the Vlaams Blok won 10.4 per cent of the vote and with 20.6 per cent became the largest party in the Antwerp connurbation. AGALEV (Flemish greens) hardly made any progress. In Brussels, the mainly Francophone Front National won 4.2 per cent and in some boroughs topped 10 per cent. It also won some patchy support in Walloon towns (Namur 5.9%). The Vlaams Blok also did well in Brussels, with 6 per cent. Thus, overall, the far right won 12 Vlaams Blok seats and one FN seat in the House of Representatives (see table on p. 185). Reasons can be found in concern about immigration, the revolt of Walloon teachers, long in dispute last year, who voted ECOLO in large numbers, a general negative reaction towards political elites, sharpening of community disputes and above all, the way in which the government collapsed. Martens was probably right when he said after the elections in a cri de coew that if the government, which had after all been rather successful, had only survived peacefully until its full term in January, then things would have been different. The paradox is-and it is a dangerous paradox-that the voters having pointed to no realistic alternative, the present coalition of the four Socialist and Christian 0261-3794/92/02/0162-04/$03.00

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parties, perhaps with some little adjustment may be put back in the saddle. This could fuel a new wave of populist discontent with the apparent ‘losers’ remaining in power, but there is no alternative. The Background Belgian politics has recovered a certain degree of stability since the early 1980s. The apparently irresistible rise of the community parties has stopped. The three traditional political families have reconsolidated their position and their combined share of the vote was back at over 78 per cent by 1987, after a sharp dip in the 1970s. Yet, the dominance of community issues has far from disappeared, on the contrary. The three political families are now more equally balanced and the dominance of two parties, one in each Community-the PS in Wallonia and the CVP in Flanders has been clearly established. National and regional coalitions seemed to be becoming more stable. Indeed, the outgoing Martens VIII coalition (CVP/PSC+PS/SP+VU) almost lasted the full four year term of the legislature. Its slightly early demise was caused in essence by constituent parties seeking to run for cover and gain an early electoral advantage by distancing themselves from the government before the election campaign proper began. This proved to be a fatal and irresponsible miscalculation. A series of, in themselves, minor community conflicts such as the refinancing of the French community came to a head over the awarding of export licences to two Walloon firms to export arms to the Middle East. For the firms, these contracts were a matter of survival. The SP and the VU opposed the licences on moral grounds, which soon turned into an inter-community battle, as the French speaking ministers retaliated by blocking a massive telecommunication contract that would mainly benefit Flemish firms. The government was split into two embattled camps. There were demands for greater devolution of powers-foreign trade and agriculture on the Walloon side and social security from the Flemish side. With inflammatory motions passed in both Regional Councils, the atmosphere was strained, as the government collapsed with the near departure of the SP and the actual departure of the VU. Yet, even then, in true Belgian fashion, the other parties held together just long enough to adopt a very full Declaration of Revision of the Constitution, which would enable all the contentious issues to be resolved in the next Parliament, if the political will to do so exists. As the campaign opened, the atmosphere had calmed down and the campaign itself was rather dull. Yet, one is forced to ask how many times such conflicts can be papered over? Yet, by many yardsticks, and not just those of stability and longevity, the Martens VIII government was one of Belgium’s more successful. It achieved much of its original, ambitious programme. It sought to achieve a global, coherent reform of the state. It failed to complete the final phase, but it probably made such an achievement possible and indeed inevitable in the near future. It cooled the problem of the Fourons communes (French speakers transferred to Flemish Liiburg in 1963); gave Brussels its own autonomous Parliament and Executive at long last; saw an abortion law on to the statute book despite opposition of one partner (CVP/PSC); continued the process of economic recovery, but with a greater dose of social concern, summed up in the PS slogan of ‘la ge’n&osit6 responsable’. Indeed, on the economic front, the Belgian franc was, in 1990, able to be aligned with the DM. Inflation has remained below 3.5 per cent and the public sector debt as a share

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of GDP has continued to fall from 8.7 per cent in 1987 to 6.0 per cent in 1991. Despite a wobble due to the Gulf war, the prospects for the Belgian economy look relatively good.

The Campaign Despite the dramas of September and October, the campaign was dull and low-key, with tension falling and a certain Belgian routine returning. Politicians on both sides of the community divide recognized that it would be necessary to compromise after the election, in an effort to carry on the unfinished business of Martens VIII. Indeed, the very wide-ranging Declaration of Revision adopted by the outgoing Parliament had paved the way for that. Almost all the key issues requiring constitutional revision or special majority laws can be resolved. This would cover direct election of Regional and Community Parliaments, fusion of region and community in Wallonia or greater co-operation, devolution of new policy areas such as foreign trade, agriculture (accepted by almost all parties), social security (opposed by all Walloon parties and to a lesser extent by the SP). It would also cover the issue of the royal assent to Bills, raised by the Abortion Bill that the King refused to sign. All these issues were debated in the campaign. Despite the importance of community issues, the community parties (FDF and VU) remained marginal and on the defensive. In any event, in Wallonia and Brussels, the mantle of federalism has been assumed by the PS. The main liberal opposition (PRL and the PVV) opposed too extreme federalism, arguing for a minimum Belgian identity. It proposed a tripartite coalition to fmalize the reform of the state and most importantly to continue the economic recovery and reduce the public sector deficit to 3 per cent of GDP. The PRL (the PW less) argued that it was now possible to reach a consensus on this type of programme with the PS/SP. The PS also hoped that the new government could have the necessary constitutional majority, but perhaps not with the liberals. In any event, as usual, considerations of coalition alliances were a key element in the debate, with for the PS and the CVP/PSC, a virtual assumption of continuation in one form or other, of their alliance, which greatly reduced attacks on each other. The problem of immigration, economic refugees, racism and integration, heightened by events in central Europe, became a key issue in the campaign. It was a tough issue for all except the far right, who could fully exploit it. Even the PRL, inclined to exploit the issue to a certain degree, especially in Brussels, faced internal opposition from its humanist wing. In a new departure, the PS, PSC and ECOLO fielded non-ethnic Belgian candidates and directed some campaign attention to these voters, but only ECOLO/AGALEV fully endorsed immigrant demands. Linked closely with the immigration issue was the threat of the extreme right. The Vlaams Blok, originally a nationalist splinter from the VU, had by the mid1980s become an extreme rightist party. In the 1988 communal elections the Vlaams Blok became the third party in Antwerp and it obtained a major breakthrough at the 1989 Euro-elections. Though peaking early, all polls predicted gains for the Blok, which greatly limited the margin for manoeuvre of other Flemish parties, especially the VU, the CVP and to a lesser extent the SP in larger towns. In Brussels, the extreme right was divided and quarrelsome, but even here it had a good starting base, with its one seat in the Brussels Regional Council elected in

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Another more positive development that became perceptible during the campaign was the transformation of the ecologist parties (ECOLO/AGALEV) from mere marginal, one-issue protest parties into serious candidates for power. They now called themselves parties of ‘proposals’ rather than of ‘opposition and indignation’. They were ready to compromise and seek alliances with any other democratic parties. They offered a new, more moderate programme and their credibility was reinforced by the presence on their lists of several well-known lawyers and economists. They seemed set to make inroads into the post materialist electorate, especially in the education and social work professions, which in the Francophone community had been in serious conflict with the previous government over salaries and resources. Importantly, these new signals were taken up before the elections by several key political figures such as PS Vice Premier Philippe Moureaux. Here one sees the traditional Belgian political process of co-optation of new political forces, with flexibility and pragmatism on both sides. A quite rigorous new campaign financing law adopted in July 1989 had its first outing. Both the parties themselves and individual candidates for the first time faced fairly severe restrictions on campaign spending and the obligation to account for both income and expenditure. The law also imposed restrictions on the use of publicity gimmicks and large unsightly hoardings and posters, which marked previous Belgian elections. The law did seem to have some beneficial effect in reducing electoral junk mail and the defacing of towns with posters. As for the past two elections, the law continued to impose a ‘blackout’ on opinion polls for 30 days before election day.