The CPSU and the International Communist Party System: A change of paradigms in Moscow

HEINZ TIMMERMANN*

The CPSU and the International Communist Party System: A Change of Paradigms in Moscow The “new political thinking” in Moscow has been manifested by the attempt to rebuild the Soviet domestic system and by a change of course in Soviet foreign and security policies. It has also been accompanied by a profound change in the communist party system, by a “difficult process ofperes&oiku in the international Communist movement and its members.“’ Moscow continues to posit the existence of a world communist movement, even considering itself one of its active components, as Gorbachev reiterated most recently at CPSU the Nineteenth Party Conference in June, 1988. During the Twenty-seventh Congress in the spring of 1986, however, he had emphasized that the communist movement had now entered “a qualitatively different state ofdevelopment”-a stage in which the struggle for common goals had nothing to do with “uniformity,” “hierarchy,” or “the claim of one Party to possess a monopoly of the truth.“2 Soon after entering office, Gorbachev, in a remarkable evocation of Togliatti, the long-time Italian communist party secretary general who sought more autonomy for national mark of the forces which parties, spoke of “unity in diversity” as the characteristic strive for peace and progress.” Gorbachev thereby bade farewell to Moscow’s conventional view of the character of the international communist movement. Under Brezhnev, the Soviet leadership had still maintained-implicitly if not in so many words-to the view that whatever the variations communists might choose in their paths toward socialism they must ultimately orient themselves ideologically and politically on the center-i.e. the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In this matrix the Brezhnev leadership, like its predecessors, defined the chief task of all communist parties as the stalwart defense of the Soviet communist model of society, their unquestioning support of the foreign policy of the USSR signifying their proletarian-socialist internationalism.4 Moscow’s ideologists justified this demand in part with the consistent role of the CPSU in continuing the work of the October Revolution begun by Soviet communists, showing the way to solving these problems “with which the workers of other lands, * The author wishes to thank Julius Friend for the expert translation

of this manuscript.

1. Iurii Krasin, speaking at a symposium of Soviet social scientists, cited in Rabochiz klass i sovremennyz mir (Moscow), henceforth RKSM, vol. XVIII, no. 6 (1988), p. 172. 2. Pravda (Moscow), June 29, 1988; February 26, 1986. 3. Speech at the constitution of the revision of the CPSU program, Pravda, October 16, 1985. For an overview of developments in the communist world see Heinz Timmermann, The Decline ofthe World Communist Movement. Moscow, Beijing, and Communist Parties in the West (Boulder/London: Westview Press, 1987). 4. Cf. I3oris Ponomarev, Die lebendige und wirksame Lehre des Marxismu-Leninismus (Frankfurt/Main: Verlag Marxistische Blatter, 1978). STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM, VOL. XXII, No. 2/3, SUMMER/AUTUMN 1989,265-277 0039-359218910213

0265-13 $03.00 @ 1989 University

of Southern

California

266

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

striding toward the construction of a new society, are unavoidably confronted.“5 Moreover, the Soviet system was supposed to be immune to imperialism’s drive toward aggression and expansionism-its foreign and security policy was by its essence peace loving, representing the drive for peace of all mankind. Thus as the chief power in the world revolutionary process the Soviet Union, with its allies, represented the decisive factor in the change in the international correlation of forces in favor of socialism. It thus opened a certain prospect for the other communist parties, and was the guarantor of peace and social progress in the world.6 For the CPSU, organizing multilateral communist party conferences on a world or all-European level with binding final resolutions (on the model of the Moscow world conference in 1969 and the East Berlin conference of European communist parties in 1976) became the most important instrument for enforcement of the Moscow line. In December, 1984, Politburo candidate member Boris Ponomarev, then Central Committee secretary for relations with non-ruling communist parties, called for intensified preparations for a new world communist conference.7 the Gorbachev leadership seems to have definitively After initial hesitation, renounced plans to call such a new conference-against the wishes of many traditionally oriented parties.8 “The times of the Comintern, of the Corninform, and even the times of binding international conferences are past ,” declared the general secretary in his speech for the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution. He emphasized again that all communist parties are “absolutely and irreversibly independent. “g Furthermore, the CPSU has now expressly abandoned the practice of representing the Soviet system as a model for all communist parties, together with its implicit claim to lead those communist parties. Renunciation of this claim stems in part from a pragmatic, self-critical recognition that it would be absurd to maintain the claim to be a model, given the stagnation and multiple crises in Soviet development, as well as the recognition of serious foreign policy errors. As one Soviet editor put it, we preached revolution for others while being conservatives ourselves.10 Renunciation of leadership is also rooted in a remarkable process of rethinking theory: the plurality of paths to socialism is now esteemed by Soviet reformers as a positive phenomenon, as an opportunity for reciprocal learning and mutual enrichment in the content of this learning. Earlier, such pluralism was seen merely as a variety of forms, and tolerated reluctantly if at all. The new ideological-political orientation under Gorbachev has led to paradoxical developments and radical upheavals in the CPSU’s relations with its fraternal parties: the traditionalists fundamentalism;”

among them are criticized and urged to overcome their “dogmatic the reformers however win Moscow’s praise and recognition.”

5. Politburo member Mikhail Suslov at a conference of Soviet social scientists, in Prauda, November 11, 1977. “Moskau und der Eurokommunismus,” Politische Bildung (Stuttgart, vol. 6. Cf. Heinz Timmermann, XII, no. 1 (1979), pp. 21-36. 7. Speech at a conference of the Prague periodical Problems of Peace and Socialism, in Pravda, December 5, 1984. For similar language, see Erich Honecker, quoted in Neuer Deutschland (East Berlin), November 23, 1984. 8. In 1984 over sixty CP’s had already promised their attendance. Cf. Szafarz, Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), February 24, 1984. 9. Pravda, November 3, 1987. 10. Conversation of Rinascita collaborator Massimo Boffa with Kommunist staff member Arab Ogly, Rinascita (Rome), vol. XXXXVI no. 13 (1988), p. 17. 11. Krasin, Politicheskoe Obrazouanie (Moscow), vol. XxX11, no. 18 (1988), p. 5.

The CPSU and the International Communist Party System

267

Thus the Italian Communist Party (PCI), in the past always the subject of vehement criticism, is today the only party among the large communist parties in the West which is respected and taken seriously by the CPSU-to a considerable degree just because the PC1 did develop an independent profile for itself and showed itself resistant to Soviet pressure during the Brezhnev period of stagnation. The CPSU has now even taken over central theses and ideas (some formulated as concepts) first developed by the PC1 and other reform-minded communist parties, such as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY).i2 Among these are the need for a historical re-examination of Lenin and the recognition of plural models for socialism, as well as the concept of “unity in diversity” and a “new internationalism” among progressive forces. Other innovations are a new view of imperialism, of capitalism and international social democracy, and the recognition of global interdependence in foreign policy. The universal validity of peaceful coexistence is recognized in a kind of “historical compromise” between East and West, where the interests of mankind take priority over class interests. This rethinking of concepts found organizational expression in November, 1987, when 178 parties and movements from 120 states came to the celebration of the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution. An informal meeting of communist, socialist, and other parties took place (here again following an earlier suggestion by reform-minded parties) attended by 100 communist parties, twenty-nine socialist and social democratic parties, forty parties and movements from the Third World and such parties as the Indian National Congress, the Finnish Center Party and the “Greens” from the German Federal Republic.13 Some speakers at this meeting expressed sharp criticisms of certain aspects of Soviet policy, such as the military intervention in Afghanistan, suppression of human rights, civil use of nuclear energy, and the strong influence of the military bureaucracy. In the eyes of Moscow reformers however these comments were easy to tolerate. For one thing, these criticisms corresponded in most cases with their own similar analyses and could thus serve as additional arguments in the struggle with conservatives in their own ranks. For another, criticism was more than compensated by the chance to reach beyond the communist parties into the bourgeois camp to attract sympathy for Moscow’s “new political thinking” and outline the vision of a “more complete culture of relations among progressive forces” in the whole world.14 Because of its extensive participation and open exchange of opinion, the Moscow meeting was judged as positive even by frequently critical parties such as the PC1 and the LCY. For the CPSU it denoted a breakthrough in the dialogue it has sought with the largest possible number of participants, “regardless of whether there are differences of view or not.“i5 Obviously it had conceived the meeting, symbolizing increasing global interdependence, as an alternative to the traditional communist conferences and a promising pilot project and model for further positive competition among differing intellectual and political currents in the East and West. 12. Referred to, not without satisfaction, by PC1 Dire&m member Giorgio Napolitano, I’Uninitir(Rome), April 5, 1988. 13. Cf. Yuri Zhilin, “Potential for Peace, for Reason and Good Will,” New Times (Moscow), vol. XXXXV, no. 50 (1987), p. 26-27, as well as Ievgenii Plimak, “Moment raboty. 0 vstreche predstavit&i partii i dvizhenii v Moskve 4-5 noiabria 1987 g.,” RKSM, vol. XVIII, no. 2 (1988), pp. 13-29. The individual contributions can be found in Twffen der Vertreteruon Part&n und Bewegungen, die an der Feierlichkeiten mm 70. Jahrestag der Grossen Ok~oberrevolutionteilnahmen, ~01s. 1 and 2 (Moscow: APN Verlag, 1988). 14. Gorbachev, to representatives of the 178 parties and movements. See Pravda, November 5, 1987. 15. Vadim Zagladin, cited in Pmuda, June 28, 1988.

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

268 Moscow The

and the “World

ambition

relations

of the Soviet

” is visibly

the

“world

the

appeal

to

from

mental

crisis

content

documents.

of Soviet

It is noteworthy

and

world

and

are

ruling

building they

communist

socialism”

almost

Thus entirely

“authentic

no longer

“new

of

toward

of the fact that

as the

can

for

culture

parties.

has

consequence

recognize

searching

political

of the CPSU

socialism

is a logical

what

laws

that Soviet

declarations

internationalism,”

as the principle

to intervene

Meanwhile,

the

“monopoly “freedom

of

social

socialist

in those

countries

leadership

and

stresses

and

political

l7 Competition

who has a better completed

system,

coexistence,

the

develop-

clearly

criteria

define

the

for the essence

now seldom

of

up

the fundamental

right

any

claim

to

a certain

socialist

to

of the party’s

ones

also-to

their

social

systems

and

socialist

states,

Moscow

claims,

from

attribution

references sovereignty”

militarily.

in

each can learn

contain

of limited

of all states-thus

among

restricted

included

given

choice”

leadership’s

“doctrine

even

right

now reigns

no longer

states

has the

in which

by the Soviet

of principle

in the Brezhnev

between

CPSU

of truth”

organization.

which

of relations

Union

peaceful

This

given

complete

orientation

of fifteen

in

society

general

a “more

(sotsialisti~hnost’).‘~

“socialist Soviet

the group laws”

themselves,

of these

socialism”

” i.e.

“general

Soviet

reformers

to realize

in the new programmatic

system,

follow

System”

leadership

manifest

socialist

disappeared Moscow

Socialist

the other.

of universal

to relations

specific to see

This

new orientation

is

validity

to the principle

of

between

states

of different

social

systems.‘s The visit

key passages in March,

of the Soviet-Yugoslav

1988,

bear

MOSCOW.~~ Referring tions

of Belgrade

and

LCY

relations bility

further and proven

In this power

sense

communique

socialist

building

stated

referred countries,

“unconditional

(1956)

by concrete rests

and their

equal

the CPSU enrich

their

the responsi-

the mutual

respect

for

situation.”

The

its own views

in societal

that

to his Yugoslav of forms

he placed

on the idea that “20 In

an

“its

important

leadership’s

and in practice.

autonomy,

and

in

declara-

and

on

political

results.”

noting

in theory

value,

to force

shown

place

bilateral

international

the right “is

Belgrade

taken

non-intervention,

the

for success

in its multiplicity

to the Soviet

has

develop

of its country,

for

side is to claim

else,

Gorbachev’s that

imperishable

further

rights,

and

was underlining

relations.

to

class and people

anyone

marking

rethinking

” of the well-known

readiness

socialism

that neither

upon

of the meeting,

of bilateral

Gorbachev

to the working

’ ’ It is worth

experience.

their

to the

principles

of “independence,

Gorbachev

of socialism

work

and Moscow

reaffirmed

toward

development

practice

were

Party

paths

declaration social

(1955)

together

of each

declaration

witness

to the “universal

on the basis

different

prime

complete

emphasis,

the view

speech

Among

that

reaches

on

beyond

the

in Kiev

in February, relations

of rights,

themes

absolute

final

the frame-

to refashion important

“the

of its international

in comment

meaning

intention

equality

hosts

and the richness

1989, with

the

in this context

non-intervention

16. Aleksandr Iakovlev, cited in Pravda, December 17, 1988, and Gorbachev, cited in Prauda, November 16, 1988. 17. Gorbachev’s speech to the Central Committee, in Prauda, February 19, 1988. 18. One of the first to make this point was Shevardnadze, speaking to personnel of the Foreign Ministry, cited in VestnikMinisterstua Inostrannykh Del SSSR (Moscow), vol. I, no. 2 (1987), p. 32. 19. Pravda, March 19, 1988. 20. Ibtd.

The CPSU

and the International

Communist

Par& System

269

into internal affairs, and rectification of the deformations and mistakes which have been committed in the past period of the history of socialism.” Each country, continued the general secretary, should solve its problems in its own sovereignty, should look for specific answers to the questions of the life of its people, and “itself determine the form, the means, and methods for building a new society, corresponding to its historically established national values, economic and intellectual potential. “*l All of this certainly applies to the relationship of the CPSU with the larger group of ruling parties, such as the Cubans and Vietnamese, and especially the Chinese communist party. Beijing will declare itself ready to resume the party to party relations which Moscow has long desired only when they are conducted on such principles as are to be found in the Soviet-Yugoslav declaration and the Kiev speech. Nevertheless, doubts are still in order whether the Soviet leadership believes that the principles enounced in the Belgrade declaration and Gorbachev’s Kiev speech apply to the more restricted group of the socialist community of states and their ruling communist parties. Gorbachev in his Kiev speech referred not only to reciprocal solidarity but also to “mutual aid”-a code word of the Brezhnev doctrine-as a principle for relations between socialist countries. It is true that the reformers in Moscow seem ready in principle to tolerate internal democracy in these countries, including the formation of a truly plural party system, but with the condition that the new elites respect the foreign and security policy interests of the USSR.** For the moment however it is still an open question whether the principles proclaimed in Belgrade and Kiev on the right to one’s own way will withstand the difficult test of political practice, especially if the reform processes in the countries of the socialist community lead to instability and get out of control. Controversial Discussions with the Traditionalists With the ending of the Brezhnev period the relations of the CPSU to the non-ruling communist parties in the West and the Third World have come to represent a sideshow, increasingly less important. They are not mentioned at all in Gorbachev’s bestseller, Perestroika, nor is the international communist movement itself. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership cannot avoid taking a position on Western communists and their reactions to the new political and ideological orientation in Moscow. In the front rank is the Central Committee Institute for Social Sciences, responsible for the training of foreign cadres. Its rector Iurii Krasin and his team are not confined to producing important theoretical contributions to the new Soviet appraisals of political, economic, and social developments in the West. They have the specific task of transmitting to non-ruling communist parties the content and aims of Moscow’s “new political thinking”notably in multilateral discussions conducted by the Prague periodical Problems of Peace and Socialism/World Marxist Review. 23 Founded in 1958, the periodical is published by sixty-nine communist parties, under a Soviet editor-in-chief, and distributed in sixty-nine editions in forty-one languages in the whole world. The “theses” which the Soviet Institute for Social Sciences submitted in December. 21. Pravda, February 24, 1989. 22. Cf. Paolo Cal&i, “Gorbaciov e 1’Europa Orient&,” Zl Mulino (Bologna), vol. XXXVII, no. 319 (1988), pp. 836-58. 23. Cf. the conference reports in World Marxist Review (North American edition, Toronto, henceforth WMR), vol. XXXI, no. 3 (1988), pp. 96-118. For Dobrynin’s Prague speech to CP representatives see Pravda, April 13, 1988.

270

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

1987, to the representatives of the communist parties on the board of the Prague magazine afford an instructive insight into discussions there.24 Since these “theses” graphically express the tendencies of Soviet rethinking as well as the problems this rethinking poses for relations with traditionalists in the Western parties, they will be cited extensively here. Their basic points are given below. The Dialectics of Priorities. Given the urgent questions of survival universal human values achieve “a priority over the differences rooted in class or national interests. Does the recognition of this priority mean that we are giving up our class-based positions, the class struggle, and the revolutionary nature of the Communist Party? In pondering an answer to this question, one must not lose sight of the fact that in the nuclear and space age the priority of the interests common to the human race is essential to social progress . In this connection it appears necessary to reflect on the system and order of priorities, tasks, and values inherent

in the struggle of the working class, of the Communists.” From Violence to Accommodation. In today’s conditions the question is posed: “Is it possible to use force, now that domestic and international developments are growing

ever more interrelated? Does this situation motivate the trend towards national reconcilia. How does the use of revolutionary force fit into the concept of a non-violent world?” Can the Class Adversary be a Partner? Since the struggle for the survival of mankind goes on independently of its class content, joint action and compromise involving social forces divided by class barriers are in order. For the solution of social and class problems tion?

to remain possible there must be a peacefulcompetition of social systems. The class adversary should become “a partner in the effort to solve this universal problem.” This puts “the methods of the ideological struggle in a new perspective. Ideology has a classbased character. It is an area for confrontation between classes. However, is it not true that the integrity of our contradictory world generates universal ideas, promoting intellectual, ideological and ethical contacts which cannot be reduced to an ideological rivalry?” Hegemony, not Hegemonism. The new approach to alliances and to interaction of progressive and democratic forces raises the issue of who should possess hegemony in these alliances. “ Some obsolete notions concerning the hegemony of the advanced class-notions that link this hegemony with claims to domination by a single Party with claims to the commanding position of one Party-should perhaps be revised.” Hegemony is achieved by practical efforts “on a democratic basis and by democratic methods. ” Instead of “the organizational andpolitical hegemony of this or that party or organization, we have the hegemony of the values held by a particular social class, the values that express the imperatives of human survival and progress as fully as possible.” Abandoning Old Notions. The danger of nuclear self-destruction, the hopeless plight of the Third World, the deterioration of the environment “areprojected onto the main essence of and motive our age, changing the Marxist view of the rates, content, and directions, forces of the world’s revolutionary renewal. ” In the communist movement a strenuous effort is presently being undertaken “to analyze today’s realities” and break away from concepts and models which no longer fit the times. “A historic responsibility prompts the Communists to critically reappraise their past views of themselves as an infallibleforce which has a monopo& on truth. It is necessary to dispense with monologues and learn to listen to what others are saying, to see the logic of their reasoning, marshal convincing

24. Selections from the “theses” appear in WMR, vol. XxX1, No. 3 (1988). pp. 96-118. supplied. The discussions are continued in WMR, vol. XxX1, no. 9 (1988), pp. 92-109.

Emphasis

The CPSU and the International arguments

in support

These

are

the

theoreticians.

The

Spaniards, because the

reform

discussion

welcomed

conception

and characterized in the “highly

“the

successful

of

However, CPSU

ideological invokes

reference

for his party,

still

aggression of their

have broken

from

the

world,”

world”,

revised

as a

thinking

in

prerequisite

for a

as well as for the introduction between

emphasized

that closer

East

that

of 1789

PC1 effect

West. with the

to the days of chief

Achille

as the central

and inspirational

of a

and

relations

to a return

it is symptomatic Revolution

that

there

Can

society, answer

social

forces

the

militaristic of nuclear

point

of

in the October

and

Western

systems aggression

orientation-as

especially with

not develop toward

since

aggressive?

Or but

rather, also

innovation-can without the

the

the question:

self-destruction,

and technological

avoiding

new

shower,

as connected

as naturally

the

it not

militarization

opposing

system

in and

World?27 is clearly

in the

“theses.“**

the ideas of the classics the fraternal

on the priority

humanism,

seen

the dangers in economic

which

are no class-neutral

however, of a cold

and more

to the CPSU

the concept

of an abstract

effect

to all this

representatives experience

parties,

the

is more

in the Third

in the discussion

emphasized

different

regard

-has

away not only from

the concrete

realm

the

in

of description

in the

and do not amount

French

communist

of capital

and

traditionalists’

answers

of a wide variety

cooperation

any exemplary

be viewed

peaceful?

economy

The

this

conditions-given

basically

without

the

rethinking

for the increase

politics,

Since

in

“theses”

reformers’ present

become

In

of the

and denies

in these

imperialism

chance

Thus

views.

movement

see in it a central

the PC1 leadership

Thus Sandoval

the surrounding

welcomed

Europe

orientation,

Pedro

movement

too

and

political character

new

of 19 17 .26

Moscow under

in East

overall

Soviet

Italians,

out autonomously.

from

of thought

communists

system-the

communist

isolated

PC1

detente

the ideals

traditionalists

expounded

from

time

the

requires.”

by the

representative

democratic

The

process

an exclusively

Occhetto

must

entire

Italy’s

comprehensive

common

Revolution

on itself,

the situation presented

party

of

Mexican

of schools

and

because

at the same

have

For

cooperation

democratization

phase

evaluation

of the international

proposition.“25

least

communist

the

inward

when

“theses”

long since worked

Prague

Socialist,

auspicious

Moscow-not

in

turned

Communist,

the

own views,

the departure

of a “sect

in

271

Party System

views

of the

a positive

to their

these

elements

currents

Mexicans-make

Ramfrez

and adjust

significant

it corresponds

multilateral

new

of our views

most

Communist

values, where

win out over

cannot

it is harmful agreement

the struggle

as shown eyes,

the

of Marxism-Leninism,

parties

of preserving

of “priority”

negative, In their

have

peace

gathered over

be found to displace

struggle

in Marx

the class struggle

and a convergence for revolution

but also

over the decades.

the class

either

by the

“theses”

into the

of viewpoints

and socialism.

they

or Lenin.

Thus

of the

25. WMR, vol. XxX1, no. 9 (1988), p. 107. 26. “Parigi, sei tu la nostra Rivoluzione,” Occhetto interview in L’Espresso (Rome), vol. XXXIV, no. 4 (1988), supplement, pp. 44-48. 27. As an example, see Gorbachev’s speech at the seventieth anniversary celebration of the October Revolution, Prauda, November 3, 1987. 28. WMR, vol. XxX1, no. 3 (1988); the following views were expressed by CP representatives from Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Great Britain, Guyana, India, Ireland, the Philippines, Senegal, the Sudan, and South Africa. The Japanese CP reacted equally sharply. Cf. Peter Berton, “The Japanese Communist Party’s View of Gorbachev’s Perestroika,” Acta Shim Japonica (Hokkaido), vol. VII (1989), forthcoming.

272

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE

fight

for peace

will only

is a “ basic

disappear

Given

these

views,

traditionalists

are

with

more,

go together when

that

undertake

arises

whether

did under

the Soviet

of the hegemony

of the working the leading

express

ideas

thinking,

leading

away

world

“The

from

renounce

should

no longer

language

between

certain

class-and

Marxism.

The

between

party-“also

the British

is that social

take the form of revolution.

” Furtherthe revision

established.”

this paper

and that

agreements

apply

is firmly

impression

struggle

and

approve

agreements.

from

about

the

of the

imperialism

its communist

came

thing

wars,

circumstances

clearly

role of the Party

consistent

the class

unjust

“the

of the “theses”

by the traditionalists

who noted

we should

porary this

of this criticism

Ramelson,

and

of

faithless

authors

countries,

A summation

of just

distinguished

to the socialist tive Bert

idea “theses”,

“treasonable,

and

and the use of force

removed.

to a “partnership

Lenin

of the doctrine

where

the

the

he always

may

class struggle,”

been

with

reading

while

the capitalists,

the question

have

they are enjoined

remark

the revolution

of the general

antagonisms

which

when

’ ’ They

compromises that

class

reminded,

Right”-especially socialism.

component

after

COMMUNISM

representa-

is that its authors

for the sake of new

change

in the contem-

As a Marxist,

I cannot

accept

interpretation.”

The

sharp

disagreements

call for basic

political

communist

parties.

tionalist

This

criticisms,

revisionism

prognosis

now openly

means

his summation

in the communist

and ideological

to refrain

“theses”

cause

further

shocks

is justified

by the

calm

Soviet

response

them

tackling

of the controversial

on the Soviet

should

inviting

from

movement

rethinking

to contemplate

the issues

discussion

with

revisionism.

in a new way,” communist

and the among

For

“to

as Krasin

party

the

to tradifear

noted

in

representatives

in

Prague.2y When

one remembers

concept social

democracy,

problems

which

shallowly

rooted

assurance that

the result

in the

end now

they

really

of

one’s

rethinking

own countries,

drew

would

number

among most

Moscow

smaller their

exposed

the loyal

becomes

motivation

clear-as

and

victors

in history. not only

of their

of foreign

do

the

from

the self-

the expectation With

the

Soviet

lose this certainty,

own political models

and

in particular,

and force

movement

the

communism

parties

followers

adoption

by damning

reform

communist

to the criticism

uncritical

orthodoxy,

against

revolutionary

Moscow’s

whether

party

barrier in

The

to a worldwide

increasingly

the question replace

degree

in process,

but see themselves

communist

for traditionalists.

in their

of belonging

rethinking example

how for decades

” raised an ideological

of “revisionism,

worlds,

and concepts

for can

own thinking.

The New Appraisal of Western Systems and its Consequences for Relations with Western Communists The

purport

of Moscow’s

obsolete

doctrines

and

systems

and their

inner

tions

for the relationship

now

the communists

crises,

and as Moscow

invitation

behavior dynamics.

This

of the CPSU have

to the

is amplified

assumed

non-ruling

new evaluation to the West

that

put it, had pursued

29. WMR, vol. XxX1, no. 3 (1988), p, 114. 30. Iurii Krasin, “Rabochee dvizhenie v poiskakh no. 14 (1988), p. 74.

communist

by the new

Soviet

parties

appraisal

has particularly

European has

an incurable

a strategy

based

on waiting

demokraticheskoi

radical

communist

capitalism

al’ternativy,”

to revise of Western implica-

parties.

Up to

susceptibility

to

for it to collapse.3”

Communist

(Moscow),

The CPSU and the International

Communist

Party System

Soviet writers now say that this strategy has shown itself to be incorrect,

273 since capitalism

“possesses a considerably greater stability than was earlier assumed,” and “not only brings forth contradictions, but also mechanisms which resolve them.‘13i This reasoning is in large part based on the flexibility of Western “bourgeois democracy,” on the functional mechanism of its political institutions, its concepts of growth-oriented regulations of the economy, and its state welfare systems. Thus Soviet theoreticians note ever more clearly that the state in capitalism can no longer be seen as a simple agent of the monopolists (as postulated by the thesis of “state monopoly capitalism”). Rather, they ascribe to it an autonomous role: it is embattled; therefore the workers’ movement in the West, where it is strong enough, can use the capitalist state to implement extensive political rights and fundamental social improvement. Altogether, the state in Western Europe is characterized by “a multiplicity of interests and positions, by the autonomous existence of civil society, and by conflict resolution on the basis of social and political compromise.“32 This new evaluation of Western systems has, as Soviet theoreticians see it, radical consequences for the West European communist parties’ strategy of social change. The Soviets had, to be sure, earlier supported the struggle of these parties for reforms and for an improvement of workers’ living standards. However, Moscow did not see this as a long-range strategy for the construction of democratic socialism. This struggle was rather to be pushed to the point of a revolutionary break with the existent system, where the communist party, in accordance with Marxist-Leninist laws, would take over the leading role in state and society in the name of “the dictatorship of the proletariat.” The change in Soviet theoreticians’ appraisal of the “bourgeois” state and its institutions thus logically produces a change in their position on Western communists and their political strategy. In the transition to socialism they are no longerto set their hearts on a “breakthrough,” say the Soviets, especially as this socialism may possibly be of quite a different stamp from earlier known varieties. Western communists must rather focus their policies on the process of change as a gradual development of “the selforganization of the workers,” on the results of “an organic maturation of the elements and presuppositions of socialist societal relations. ” In this context Krasin mentioned as a central task not the traditional nationalizations, but-as a strategic and not merely tactically conditioned orientation-such reformist goals as self-management, cutting the work week, retraining the work force, and the creation of funds and the accumulation of company shares by employees. “33 In logical consequence, he argued for the liquidation of the doctrine of the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” a central theme in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism: “New realities also require new concepts,” Krasin emphasized, noting that the transition to socialism in the West “is

31. Anatolii Dobrynin, speech at a conference of the publication Problems ofPeace and Socialism in Prague, Prauda, April 13, 1988; also Volkov, at a symposium of leading Soviet social scientists, RKSM, vol. XVIII, no. 6 (1988), p. 165. Cf. also, on this new appraisal, Olga Aleksandrova, “Die neuen sozialen Bewegungen im Westen aus der Sicht der sowjetischen Ideologie und Gesellschaftswissenschaft,” Bericht des BZOst (Cologne), no. 57 (1988). 32. Boris Orlov, in a conversation with Iurii Borko, “Razmyshleniia o sud’bakh Ievropy,” Mirounia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia (Moscow), henceforth MEMO, no. 9 (1988), p. 51. Cf. also Borko’s article in Kommunist, no. 15 (1988), pp. 105-16 as well as the contributions by Galkin and Ardeev in RKSM, vol. XVIII, no. 4 (1988), pp. 22-32 and 33-42. Analogous new appraisals have been made by the Chinese, see Xu Jiatun, “Den Kapitalismus neu einsch%tzen,” Beijing Rundschau, (Beijing), vol. XXV, no. 46 (1988), pp. 21-25. 33. Krasin, “Rabochee dvizhenie,” Kommunist, no. 14, p. 74.

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE

274 likely to become

more The

Western

Soviet

possible

theoreticians,

develop

convincing

values

technologies

of the

pressures,

the

innovative

search

the

clumsy areas

the

traditionally criticized appear

and

pushed

values

of “falling

not least

for the West

secretariat “have

member

told

studied

real life. “38

Special

Relations this perspective,

and most inside

influential

Marxist-Leninist

1989.

relating is more

among

and

According

must

only

is true

Committee Commisthose no

comfort

development,

“throw

This

“bear

by finding

than

today

communists:

in Western even

to the class

life.”

International who

being run the

who direct in the

and stands

Left

that the CPSU

Western

party

movement

themselves

economy, “of

and Central

and

and

which

thus

“loyalty from

to Iakovlev

reality”

important

They

is that they

of the new

According

it to

in the

as they are.“37

as Politburo

deceive

.

it is only logical

ideology.

remote

Reform-Oriented

communist

the communist

in which

character,

chairman

party

the danger

” a role

the

to the workers.“36

issues.”

communists

that

and no slogans

incur

corporatist

Party,

Iakovlev,

of dogma

communists

too and

and sharply

communist

change

and see realities

Communist in January,

the

small

of Western

logical

openly

especially

of rapid parties

to the Western cliches

appraisals it is only

are today

and

processes

on a dogmatic

without

with

and became

of all the directions

no programs

communist

for the fate of mankind

above

From

German

Marxism

tax

in the

and an operational

processes

on the French

of defending

ideological

congress

the

from

of risk

medium-sized

account

Europe

“have

of ‘ouvrierism,’

the CPSU

that the infallibility

with the Italian

the

these

takes

Aleksandr

its Party

responsibility illusion

the role

from

in

of earlier

of the population

position

of obsolete

relief

acceptance

dynamics,

of West

that they

account

in the West,

into

new word

levels

inner

commentary

holds

into

of the proletariat

off the blinkers

sion,

take

a revision and

parties

Soviet

views

into the peripheral

positions The

mechanisms

to broad

flexible

demands

regulation,

of production

of taking

in society

introducing

progress,

also

revolution,

of change

apparatus

the

to

if they

“35

communist

do not

but

regulation

of so radical

Thus

state

initiative,

as well as incapable

functioning

attractive

of the productive

large

according

consensus

and technological

in technological

in

in the close

development.

of similar

they

society, risk

directions

not

broad

conditions

of strict

population.“34

can,

with the process

capitalist

chains

only

in Moscow.

parties

the

for promising

oriented

the scientific

mobility

ofthe

in general

creating

on coping

“under

process,

background

their

for

of entrepreneurial

and too ineffective,

systems,

Since

from

controls

of economic

For

by a high

promotion

State

Against

other

people.

state,

of a majority

movement

possibilities

for stimulating

economy

decision-making enterprises.

the

of the welfare

conditioned

liberation

use

concepts

among

the consensus

and the workers’

only

on the reconstruction and

through

communists

COMMUNISM

beyond

to Soviet

maintains

a special

relation

the PC1 is not only the largest

Europe,

but also has been

it, in revising reformers

it has

central

a pioneer, doctrines

contributed

of

much

34. WMR, vol. XXI, no. 9 (1988), p. 100. 35. Krasin, note 33, p. 668. 36. Aleksandr Bovin, “Vybory vo Frantsii: pered vtorym turom,” Izvestiia (Moscow), May 3, 1988. 37. Krasin, p. 68, also Iurii Iegorov, at a symposium of Soviet social scientists, RKSM, vol. XVIII, no. 6, 1988, p. 172. 38. Prauda, January 7, 1989.

The CPSU and the International

Communist

Party System

275

“with its active scientific and theoretical research” to the “development of social the defense of human rights and thought,” has “always stood up for democracy, individual freedoms. ” This radical new appraisal of the basic positions of the PC1 is rounded off by the admission that it was the Italian communists who were right in the bitter controversy with the CPSU over the harsh suppression of the reform process in Poland in December, 1981. In fact, as the Berlinguer leadership had then correctly analysed it, “the ideological and political conceptions of socialism and the organization and “socialism as a form of society had at a certain point of the state [were] outmoded,” lost its forward drive. “3g The participation of representatives

from the Soviet

Politburo

in the December,

1988, Party congresses of the Portuguese communist party (Vadim Medvedev) and of the West German communist party (Aleksandr Iakovlev) shows that the CPSU, like the Chinese communist party, does not wish simply to drop “old friends,” and would like to keep alive the ties with them. The CPSU’s real interest within the Western Left however is directed to the PCI, as the most innovative communist party in Western Europe, and increasingly to the socialists and social democrats, and particularly to those parties in Sweden, Austria, and the German Federal Republic.40 The main reason for the new appraisal of social democracy evidently does not arise from any sudden discovery in Moscow that these parties are especially open to Soviet “new thinking ” in foreign affairs, for in the Brezhnev era the social democrats were already considered an important partner in a dialogue on the questions of peace and disarmament. But the common ground then sought was sharply demarcated from social democratic ideas on society and politics (the bacillus of “social democraticism”), while today it is precisely these ideas which are intensively studied by Soviet political figures and scientists. They include: political consensus building, economic regulation, the rebuilding of the welfare state, and ecological renewal. Thus it was no accident when Politburo member Medvedev, head of the newly named Central Committee Ideological Commission, referred to the programs and policies of international social democracy in reference to plans for perestroika in his own country. The Soviet leadership now has the task, Medvedev asserted, of “seriously concerning itself with the practice and concrete activity of social democracy today.” It is worth noting that the chief ideologist of the CPSU referred here not only to the social achievements of the social democrats, but also to their successes in the enforcement of “universal democratic” rights.41 Soviet social scientists stress that the search for answers to new challenges to socialism and capitalism naturally takes place in different contexts. Nevertheless the workers’ movement as a whole must concentrate on “ changing its own ideas on the meaning of progress and its criteria. “42 Given rapid economic and technological change and the 39. Vladimir Naumov, “IKP pered s’ezdom,” K ommunist, no. 1(1989), pp. 102-l 12. On the background of the controversies between the CPSU and the PC1 on the Polish question, cf. Heinz Timmermann, “Die italienischen Genossen gehen auf Distanz,” Osteuropa (Aachen), vol. XXXII, no. 6 (1982), pp. 433-60. 40. For an extensive discussion of this question, see Heinz Timmermann, “Die KPdSU und die internationale Sozialdemokratie: Akzent%nderungen im Zeichen des ‘ncuen Denkens,’ ” Die Neu Gesellschaftt/Fruankfurter Heftte (Bonn) vol. XXXV, no. 12 (1988), .pp. . 1157-62. 41. “Sovremennaia kontseptsiia sotsializma,” speech to social scientists from socialist countries, Pravda, October 5, 1988. Cf. B. Orlov, “Perestroika i teoreticheskie podkhodv sots&l-demokratii.” RKSM. vol. XVIII, no. 5 (1988), pp. 125-31, as well as the same authoi’s introduction to the SPD’s Irsee draft program, Programmnye dokumen& sot&l-dmwkmtii, vol. 1 (Moscow: Academy of Science, 1988). 42. Krasin presented these and the following thoughts at a conference of social democratic and communist parties in December, 1988, in FreudenbergEiegen; cited from manuscript. Cf. as well as his interview in Vow&s (Bonn), vol. CXIII, no. 1 (1989), p. 32ff. Cf. also Orlov, “Perestroika,” op. cit., note 41, p. 128.

276

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

growing internationalization of the economy, Krasin finds that state socialism in Eastern Europe is in crisis, but so is the Western communist concept of “antimonopolistic democracy” and the social democratic model of “neo-Keynesian regulation.” the subject

From this Krasin argues that a whole series of problems “could become of common theoretical discussions.” Among these Krasin counts “the

search for ways to democratize modern societies” which guarantee human and civil of a rights in an organic “tie between state and civil society,” the “development democracy of production, ” which guarantees economic efficiency and resists inhumane economism, the problems of state property and state regulation of the economy, and the “relation between planning and the market.” In the process of revising their own earlier views and concepts, the Moscow reformers now even consider that the prospect of a rapproachement of the two currents of the historic “workers’ movement” is no longer completely utopian. Evidence for this is Krasin’s December, 1988, proposal to organize a common meeting on the occasion of the 125th anniversary of the founding of the First International (1864) and the 100th anniversary of the Second International (1889). Asked about the Third Internationalthe seventieth anniversary of which also falls in 1989, the Soviet reacted in a reserved manner and spoke of its “mistakes and errors.” What was important, said Krasin, was for communists and social democrats to “fit together in a unitary socialist tradition.“43 Conclusions

and Future

Prospects

The central features of the Brezhnev “period of stagnation” are now considered in Moscow to have been, in domestic affairs, an administrative and bureaucratic centralization, which rejected any forms of initiative or pluralism, and in foreign affairs a fixation on East-West antagonism, the two camps schema, and a denial of global interdependence. All these patterns of thought and behavior also found expression in Moscow’s relation with the communist parties. Thus the CPSU leadership claimed to set forth definitively for the fraternal parties the “general laws” of Marxism-Leninism on the transition from capitalism to socialism and on building socialism. Deviant positions were sharply condemned, those who maintained them branded as heretics, and excluded from the mainstream of the communist movement. Here radical change has taken place since the change of leaders in Moscow of March, 1985. Pewstroika in domestic affairs, reorientation in foreign affairs, a search for new a more realistic appreciation of the West and its political criteria for socialism, movements-all this together with the renaissance of Soviet and Cornintern history has brought new movement into the communist party system. 44 Even the significance of the October Revolution-until now for Moscow the obligatory reference point in theory and practice for all communist parties-has been relativized. Today, Gorbachev asserted in his December, 1988, speech to the UN, “another world is arising, for which other ways toward the future must be sought. ” Here we must base ourselves “on the experience we have gathered, but also see the basic differences between that which

43. Press conference in Bonn. Frankfurter Rundschau, December 17, 1988. 44. There is no space here to discuss this extremely important and explosive aspect of party relations. Cf. Heinz Timmermann, “Die Geschichte der Komintern in neuem Licht. AnsHtze zu einer Umwertung in Moskau,” DeutschlandArchiv (Cologne), vol. XXI, no. 12 (1988), pp. 1285-92.

The CPSU and the International

Communist

existed yesterday and that which is happening Chinese, Hungarians, Italians, Mexicans-applaud

Par& System

today.“45 While the rethinking

277 the reformersin Moscow, the

traditionalists, such as the communist parties of Romania, the German Democratic Republic (DDR), Cuba, France, Portugal, India, and the German Federal Republic (BRD), accord formal approval to Soviet domestic rebuilding but resist in all other areas, or accuse the CPSU openly for tacitly or falling away from the ideas of Marxism and Leninism. The reformers in Moscow do not let themselves be influenced by such criticisms. In their relations with the communist parties they are not much interested in revitalizing or reforming the historic “world Communist movement” and its revolutionary methods and goals. During PC1 Secretary General Occhetto’s visit to Moscow Gorbachev, in referring to the question of convoking a new world communist conference, did speak of the “great influence” which the communist movement had in the past had on events in the world. But since the world is changing, continued the general secretary, the forms of cooperation in “the international workers’ movement” must also change.46 The replacement of the traditional concept “world Communist movement” with “international

workers’

movement”

is symptomatic

of the change

of paradigms

in

Moscow, for the removal of obsolete ideological barriers, and for the growing interest of the CPSU in an intensification of relations with the parties of democratic socialism. When dealing with the other communist parties the Soviet leadership (even while recognizing their own diverse paths) is concentrating on winning them over to the new domestic and foreign policies of the CPSU and to help in laying the bases for a reciprocal dialogue of equals, and exchanging experience, particularly of the successful kind. This dialogue would take place with socialists and social democrats, but also with greens and even with liberal-conservative parties and movements.“’ It is still too early to conclude that any new structured framework is being built, particularly since the reform movement in the Soviet Union is still embattled and thus in no way irreversible. The undertaking of the Soviet leaders to review the historical Lenin, to open up historical research, to participate in a competition of ideas and concepts in the name of an “unavoidable evolution in the world’ (Gorbachev), all these, operating simultaneously, underline that as in most other areas of politics the CPSU is carrying out a change in paradigms in its Party relations, and is beginning to open itself up to different intellectual and political tendencies and currents. One can as yet hardly obtain an overview of the profound and extensive implications relations with international communism.

all this poses for the change in its

45. Prauda, December 8, 1988. 46. Cf. Ezio Mauro, “Gorbaciov sorride all’eurosinistra,” La Repubbfica (Rome), March 1, 1989. Cf. also the remarks of Occhetto following his return from Moscow cited by Fabrizio Rondolino, “Una perestrojka per le sinistre,” l’Unita’, March 2, 1989. 47 The CPSU has since taken up official party relations, among others, with the Italian Christian Democratic Party. Cf. l’Unit& October 17, 1988. It is characteristic of the change in climate that the Soviet ambassador in the German Federal Republic, Iulii Kvitsinskii spoke to a special CDU congress in Bonn in April, 1988. See Sowjetunion hate (Cologne-Bonn), vol. XxX111, no. 5, (1988), pp. XIII-XVI. in October, 1988, Central Committee member Vadim Zagladin spoke to a meeting organized by the CDU Nordrhein-Westfalen cm the theme “ Europe as a forum for a peaceful coexistence.” See TASS, October 6, 1988, and Frankfurther Allpn&a Zeitung, October 7, 1988.