The enigmatic Japanese spirit

Religion in World Afairs

The Enigmatic Japanese

Spirit

by G. Cameron Hurst III

heology, spirituality, and organized religion would seem at first glance to be uniquely irrelevant to contemporary Japanese behavior in the international arena. Sometimes described as a nation without a religion, or for whom the nation itself serves as religion, Japan displays little public dialogue over foreign policy at all, much less a discourse informed by religious beliefs. And yet, Japan is home to virtually all of the worlds major religionsBuddhism, Christianity, even Islam, not to mention its indigenous Sh.int~-so the values of these religions must have some effects on the lives of believers. To identify them, and how they in turn affect politics, is no easy matter.

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Religion in Contemporary Japan Religiosity in Japan is complex. On the one hand, observers point to an increasing secularism among the populace and bemoan the fact that younger Japanese, urban and Westernized as they are, exhibit virtually no interest in Shinto or traditional Buddhist sects. On the other hand, “Japan has often been described as a living museum of religions or religiosity, with a vast array of religious traditions, teachings, and practices found in almost every comer of society.“’ Surveys of Japanese religious affiliations are little help, since many respondents check more than one box. (Thus one might indicate an adherence to ShintU, some sect of Buddhism, and perhaps something else as well.) As one observer put it, the best term to describe the contemporary Japanese orientation is “irreligious religiosity.“’ 1 MarkR. Mullins, Suumu Shimazono, and Paul L. Swanson, e&s., Religion and So&Q in Modern Jqfxzn @etkeley, Calif.: Asii Humanities Press, l!B3), p. 4. * James W. White, 7be Sokagukkai and Mm Society &anford, Calii.: Stanford University Press, 19701, p. 18.

G. Cameron Hurst III is director of the Center for East Asi Smdies at the University of Pennsylvania, where he is professor of Japanese and Korean history. He is also an PPRI senior fellow and author of 7be Armed Martial Arts ofJapan Szwrdmansbip and Archty (Yale University Press, forthcoming 1998).

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HURST When questioned, most Japanese tend to say they are not religious; a Gallup survey in the mid-1970s for example, concluded that “the United States stands at the top of the industrial societies in the importance religion plays in the lives of its citizens. Japan . . . stands at the opposite extreme.“3 Things have apparently changed little in the past two decades. In an NI-IK (Japan’s national broadcasting company) survey from the early 1980s over 65 percent said they had no personal religious faith.* Yet visits and donations to temples and shrines are quite high, neighborhood matsuri (ShintD festivals) flourish, and the established religions hardly seem about to fade away. Japanese are also attracted to the so-called “New Religions,” from Aum Shinriky~ and omoto-kya to Christianity. In fact, so popular are these phenomena today that it is common to speak of “new, New Religions.” The late Edwin 0. Reischauer opined that “religion in Japan offers a confused and indistinct picture,” since although religion seems so closely intertwined with Japanese daily life, few profess belief. “The ethics of the Japanese,” he concluded, “for the most part are derived from Confucianism, to which none now ‘belongs,’ and from Christianity, which is the faith of less than 2 percent . . . Clearly, religion in contemporary Japan is not central to society and culture.“5 Part of the problem is linguistic: what do we mean by “religion” and “religiosity”? Surveys in which the majority of Japanese claim to lack religious conviction also show that even self-confessed unbelievers engage in religious practices. Some 75 percent of Japanese have Buddhist or Shinto altars in their home, and almost 90 percent pay visits to ancestral graves on the specified festivals.6 Charms, amulets, and oracle-lots dispensed by both temples and shrines remain popular, and young and old alike flock to famous temples and shrines on New Year’s for their “first visit” (hatsumD&). We must conclude that Japanese attitudes toward religion are highly pragmatic. Religious practice is widespread, while metaphysical speculation is weak. Even factual, historical knowledge of one’s religion may be lacking. It is common to find that those expressing an aIfiliation with a certain Buddhist temple will know neither the sect with which it is affiliated nor the names of its founders, and few S?%_5Zen believers even engage in meditation, supposedly the core of Zen practice.’ The primary relationship most Japanese have with Buddhism is through funerals and mortuary rites, which explains the popularity of home altars since they are dedicated to the souls of deceased family members. Several things are going on here. First, the Japanese have parceled out ritual activities among various religions. That the rituals for specific occasions 3 Quoted in Winston Davis, Japanese Religion and Societyt Paradigm of Structure and Change (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 19921, p. 232. * Jan Swyngedouw, “Religion in Contemporary Japanese Society,” in Religion and So&p, p. 50. 5 Edwin 0. Reischauer and Marius Jansen, ‘IheJupunese 7bduy: Changeand Conrink&, enI. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Beknap

Press of Harvard University, 19951, p. 215.

6 Swyngedouw, “ReIigion in Contemporary Japanese Society,” pp. 54-55.

7 Ian Reader, “Buddhism as a ReIigon of the Family,” in Religion and Society, p. 144.

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Japan come from different religious traditions presents little conflict, save for the minority who avidly profess a monotheistic or exclusive religion. Thus, most Japanese associate ceremonies of birth and child development with Shims, the “traditional” religion of the harvest, fertility, and the cyclical pattern of life, while Buddhism is almost the exclusive “agent” for those who pass away, the primary business of most Buddhist temples being to pray for the souls of the deceased. Hence most Japanese are cremated and buried on Buddhist temple grounds (even if the mausoleum is now a multistoried building built to conserve space in crowded Japan). Weddings are currently a hybrid. While there are Buddhist services celebrating marriage, they are rare. * Marriage in modern Japan is a highly commercial performance, often held at the worlds most ornate marriage halls where couples may first be married in “traditional” costume according to ShintG ritual, then change into Western wedding clothes for receptions and cake-cutting ceremonies.9 Some also go through Christian-or Christian-like-ceremonies, and in the halcyon years before their economic bubble burst, many Japanese would fly to distant places such as Australia or Hawaii to have weddings performed in quaint Christian churches, whether or not the couples were Christian. Secondly, religion is a family matter in Japan, especially for believers who affiliate with the various forms of Buddhism. During the long and stable Tokugawa Shogunate (1600-1867), the militarygovernment required all families to be registered at local Buddhist temples, which in effect functioned as local extensions of the state. Although this system was formally abolished during the modem era, the habit remains strong, so that many families maintain a relationship with a specific temple-whether Shingon, Zen, or Pure Land. In fact, when asked about religion, respondents normally say that “our family is associated with such and such temple,” rather than “I belong to such and such sect of Buddhism.” Finally, the very meaning of the word “religion” is problematic. The Christian, predominantly Protestant, heritage of English-speaking nations predisposes us to “give most weight to doctrine (and the related articles of faith and belieD, so much so that doctrine is commonly assumed to constitute the universal essence of religion.“1oThis narrow view of religion is generally true only of the great monotheistic traditions of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, and is often of little use in understanding the religion of peoples for whom rites and communal observances are of paramount importance.” The very word 8 Walter Edwan&, Modem/qcun 7hrough ZlsMarriages &anford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 19891, p. 158 n. 8, suggests that mcst Buddhist maniages are by members of the S&a Gakkai, a ‘new” religion whose mernbzrs usually refkse to participate in a ShintOwedding ceremony. 9 Ibid. For Korean weddings, see Jaurel Kendall, Getring Married in Korea: Of Gender, Mod& and Mode&Q (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Caliiornia Press, 1996). 10 Helen Hardacre, SbinrOand tbe Slate, 18G8- 29f?8 (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 19891, p. 10. 11 Ibid. Joachim Wach regards religion as beiig made up of doctrine, rites, and communal activities.

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HURST that Japanese use to translate “religion’‘--s&@X3-is a modem creation, though derived from an ancient Buddhist term. Traditionally, the Japanese did not have a term that characterized such a separate sphere of human activity or a universal concept of which Shim0 or Buddhism could be seen as a Japanese local variant. S&&G only entered the language slowly, as the modernizing Japanese of the Meiji (post-18671 era needed some word to translate foreign terms for religion, not least in their treaties with Western powers.‘2 Japanese secular and religious (mainly Buddhist) intellectuals eagerly debated the Western conception of religion to the point that they soon equated religion with the Western notion of a doctrine rather than ritual and communal activities.r3 Consequently, when asked if they have a “religion’‘-a sb%*rnost Japanese say no. All this means that one is on slippery ground when trying to assess the “religiosity” of the Japanese. While the emphasis Westerners expect to find on doctrinal matters may be missing, there is ample Japanese concern for a wide variety of religious rituals, and activities such as mdtsuri remain crucial to communities across the nation. This perplexes not only Westerners, but some Japanese as well. One social critic, for example, fmds that “concepts of independent, universal truths or immutable religious belief, transcending the worldly reality of social dictates and the decrees of powerholders . . . have never taken root in any surviving world view,“14 and sees therein the “crucial factor in the exercise of Japanese power: the absence of a tradition of appealing to transcendental truth or universal values.“15 Indeed, many scholars, Japanese and foreign alike, regard Japanese thought and behavior as unbound by any universal principles.

Japanese

Foreign Policy

Even if the Japanese people were highly imbued with religious doctrine, their zeal might fail to influence foreign policy for the simple reason that foreign affairs are not that important to Japanese public opinion. It is di&ult to imagine, for instance, Japanese parliamentarians proposing a bill to impose sanctions against a nation that denies religious liberties, as American Congress members habitually do. True, Japanese politics has changed significantly in the past few years. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominance of the political process has given way to several years of coalition government in which the LDP and spinoff conservative parties have shared power. Japan has even been led by its frost Socialist prime minister since the early postwar era. But foreign policy issues are still far less important than domestic ones. Even if one shrinks from the extreme opinion of one expert to the effect that “there is no public opinion in Japan on foreign policy and that there l2 Ibid., p. 63. l3 Ibid., p. 65. 14Kxel van Wolferen, ‘Ihe Enigma of Japanese Pou.dLonch: l5 Ibid., p. 241.

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Macmillan, 19801,p. 9.

Japan is no foreign poliq~,“‘~it is true that Japan has largely followed America’s lead in international affairs in the postwar era. Thus, insofar as discussion takes place about foreign policy issues-e.g., whether to apply for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, whether to send peacekeeping operation troops to Cambodia, whether to increase overseas development assistance, whether to open the rice market-it is rarely in a context of what may be termed international affairs, but rather with reference to what Japan needs to do vis&vis the United States.”

And in any case, over the almost four decades of stable LDP governance, the primary issue for the public has always been the economy, and foreign issues-to the extent they intrude- have been dealt with essentially as a subset of economic diplomacy. Japan’s foreign policy throughout the postwar period has been one of “low posture.” ‘Thanks to its peculiar relationship with the United States, Japan was allowed to concentrate on building up its economy while leaving a great portion of the defense of the nation to America and generally following the foreign policy direction of the United States. Japan has thus been a “reactive” state in international affairs rather than a proactive one. This “minimakt or coping strategy” in foreign affairs has resulted in part from a lack of consensus in a society which values consensus (the Socialist Party, with about a third of the seats in the Diet, had a long-standing opposition to the LDP on foreign policy issues), in part from the fact that they “follow American policy, never terribly popular but highly rational, inhibited proactive policies,” and in part from Japan’s “historical legacy of rash actions in Asia which also argued against pursuing too aggressive a foreign poli~y.“~* But successive governments have hardly been immune to issues of foreign policy. Because of the United States-Japan Security Treaty, the cabinet and the Diet have been drawn into international issues as the major Pacific ally of the United States. The opposition parties were constantly at loggerheads with the government over the Korean War, the creation and budgets of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the Viemam War, and the relationship with the People’s Republic of China. Since the end of the Vietnam War, the Nixon Doctrine, and the emergence of the People’s Republic of China as a major player in the international system, opposition to the SDF and the security treaty has waned considerably. Yet Japan betrays a growing desire to be more independent of the United States in foreign policy issues, now that it has become the second economic power in the world. Still, the Japanese public plays virtually no role in foreign policy, nor do politicians attain prominence for their mastery of international politics. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982-87) was unusual for his high profile in I6 Jean-Pierre Lehmanq “Japanese Attitudes Towards Foreign Policy,” in lbe procesS ofJa#mme Fomip Institute of IntemaWnal Afhirs, 1997), p. 136. l7 Ibid. 18Kimm Takayuki, “Japan-US. Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Jcgxanese Foreign policy, pp. 54-55.

policy, ed. Richard L. Grant (London: Royal

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HURST international affairs, though that was not the reason he became prime minister. Indeed, the most respected LDP leader in terms of foreign policy expertise, Abe Shintar~, was never able to gain the highest office. In fact, the last prime minister to come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was Yoshida Shigeru in the immediate postwar years. The reason is that Japan’s foreign policy, more so than those of other Group of Seven states, is under the control of a number of public and private institutions. “Pervasive cultural isolation, and the special skills of diplomats, other officials and their networks in transcending that isolation, have made this so.“i9 While the prime minister’s office, the LDP, and the Parliament have roles in foreign policy, the major institutions charged with making foreign policy are the Ministry of Foreign Alfairs (MOFA), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and the Ministry of Fiance (MOF). There are also a number of “para-public” organizations, mostly affiliated with MITI: the Japan External Trade Organization (METRO), which engages in trade promotional activities, is the best known. But MOFA, MOF, and other rninistries-even the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications-have foreign policy affiiates that mobilize information and pressure for certain foreign policy initiatives. Furthermore, Japan’s private economic sector is both exceedingly large and well organized. Since Japan’s foreign policy is often a matter of economic diplomacy, business plays an important role through such organizations as Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations), Nihon Shaka Kaigisha (the Japan Chamber of Commerce), and Keizai Doyiikai (the Japanese Council for Economic Development), often in a manner distinct from that of the state.2o The main official body responsible for foreign policy is of course the MOFA, a small but highly professional organization. In the postwar era, much of the power of the Japanese government has rested in the hands of the bureaucracy, partly for structural reasons. That is, compared to the United States, only a few bureaucrats are appointed by the winning party after an election. Virtually all the high-ranking officials in a ministry like MOFA are careerists with extensive experience throughout the ministry. Ambassadors, too, are invariably professional diplomats, rather than major financial supporters of the victorious party, as is often the case with the United States. Besides being highly professional, MOFA is quite small in comparison with other nations. The ministry has about forty-five hundred employees, about 60 percent of whom serve overseas. That is less than a third of the size of the U.S. State Department and about half that of Britain’s Foreign Ministry.21 MITI, with over twelve thousand employees, is far larger than MOFA, but only the trade bureau is exclusively involved with international relations, and it essentially supports Japanese industry abroad. The far larger Ministry of Finance-with over twenty-two thousand employees-has fewer international responsibilities, t9 Kent E. Older, “The Institutions of Japanese Foreign Policy,” in /apanese Foreign policy, p. 2. 20 Ibid., p. 17; and in more detail in Kent CaIder, Smzregic [email protected] Prit~te Bushes andPuMic Putpose inJapanese IndusW Finance (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 158-73. 21 Ibid., p. 3.

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Japan but does oversee aspects of international finance like its U.S. counterpart, the Treasury Department, Japan is, comparative to other nations, weakest in the politico-military area. Given its peace constitution and security treaty with the United States, Japan’s Defense Agency is a sort of second-rank agency with only nominal membership in the cabinet. Limited in size by the constitution, it is smaller than the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.** Given the long domination of the political process by the LDP, one would expect that the prime minister’s office and Diet would be more dominant in foreign policy. Indeed, in the 1980~4, especially under Prime Minister Nakasone, the prime ministers office did become more active in foreign policy, with a few structural changes that gave the prime minister greater ability to coordinate activities, especially in times of emergency. But compared to the leaders of most other major nations, the Japanese chief of state remains far less active in foreign policy formulation. 23 This is again partly a function of size, since the prime minister’s direct staff consists only of 11 people, in contrast to a White House staff of 375. But another factor is the inability of the prime minister to budge the permanent bureaucracy. Finally, Japanese intelligence gathering remains rather limited in scope, further weakening the prime minister’s scope of action. Over the course of its domination, the LDP certainly did develop significant ties with the foreign policy formulating bodies. The phenomenon of the zo& or “policy tribes” of parliamentarians with specific areas of expertise, is noteworthy in this regard. The most important zokru are in construction, commerce, and agriculture,24 the primary areas of interest to LDP politicians in terms of raising funds and delivering pork-barrel projects. But there are politicians with significant international expertise who work closely with bureaucrats and interest groups with some impact on foreign policy.

Japanese Religions and Foreign Relations Let us now return to religion, which as noted above is compartmentalized and woven pragmatically into daily life. Inasmuch as all the major religious traditions are present in Japan to one degree or another, and most possess belief systems that postulate moral and ethical guidelines for how people should live out their lives, one would expect these traditions to have some impact on how Japanese view their relations with other peoples on earth. Can foreign relations in fact be viewed through a Buddhist, or a Christian, or a ShintB lens? Or from a New Religions perspective? 22 Ibid., p. 4. 23 For the information below, see ibid., especially pp. 12-15. 24 Gerald L. Curtis, 7he Japanese Way ofPokics(New York: Columbia University Press, 19881,p. 115

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HURST Buddhism

Buddhism was formally introduced to Japan in the middle of the sixth century from the Korean kingdom of Paekche, although clearly it had been known in the archipelago much earlier. From the outset, Buddhism was only partially a religious issue in Japan. While the Paekche ruler praised it for bringing salvation to people, Buddhism was approved of as a means of increasing the power of the state, hence the support it received from successive emperors and nobles. But Buddhism was controversial too, and the opposition claimed that the importation of a foreign religion would offend the native gods and harm Japan. As priestly figures in the indigenous cult-later to be called Shintn-the opposition had much at stake. Buddhism triumphed and was established in ancient Japan largely through the efforts of Prince Shatoku. In the early seventh century this remarkable man studied Buddhism deeply, made extensive commentaries on several sutras, and built several important temples in the Nara area. By the Nara period (710-94) six highly academic sects of Buddhism were studied in the capital, Buddhism remained closely tied to protection of the state and was spread throughout the country through the efforts of Emperor Shomu. When the capital was moved north to Heian (present-day Kyoto) in 794 two new forms of Buddhism imported from China took root among the court nobility: SaichiS’s Tendai sect, located on Mt. Hiei, just northeast of the city; and Kukai’s Shingon sect headquartered in the city and at Mt. Kaya. Eclipsing the earlier sects, these two preached slightly different forms of esoteric Buddhism. Although one reason for moving the capital was to escape the powerful influence of the Buddhist establishment in politics, Buddhism remained closely connected with the state. Successive emperors were devout, and the most revered text was the Lotus Sutra, which held that government and religion were united under Buddhist law. Priests were drawn largely from the aristocracy, and much of the court ritual involved Buddhist practices. In fact, Buddhist temples become large holders of tax-exempt estates under court protection and even raised large armies of lay monks for the protection of their holdings and the enforcement of their religious and secular authority. Though transcendental in doctrine, Buddhism was thus intimately linked to the secular world, and although Mahayana Buddhism preached the theoretical ability of all sentient beings to obtain Buddhahood, the religion was largely confined to the ruling class. An exception was the teaching of Pure Land Buddhism. Natural disasters, fires, famine, and concern with the end of the efficacy of the Buddhist law in the eleventh century led to faith in the saving grace of Amida Buddha and the prospect of rebirth in his Western Paradise. Pure Land Buddhism won adherents at court through the writings of Genshin and among the commoners by the preaching of Knya. The spread of Buddhism to the broad populace of Japan was a phenomenon of the next period-Kamakura (1185-1333)-with Pure Land (in several different varieties), Zen, and Nichiren Buddhism leading the way. Pure Land and Nichiren Buddhism were somewhat similar since both placed 308 I Ot-bis

Japan great faith in the salvation offered by belief in external power (tati&). In the Pure Land sects, it was the saving grace of Arnida to be achieved by repetitive or fervent invocations of his name: iVumu AmiduButsu (“Hail to Amida Buddha”). For Nichiren, it was the Lotus Sutra itself that deserved the highest level of veneration, and thus adherents chanted “Devotion to the Sutra of the Lotus of the Wonderful Law” (Numu M@ha Rengekp). Nichiren himself was unusually outspoken in his criticism of the government for supporting the Zen and Pure Land sects, and denounced all other forms of Buddhism as heretical. He even predicted a foreign invasion (the Mongols) as punishment for the state’s patronizing of false teachings. Nichiren’s dogmatism remains a feature of its main contemporary derivative sect, S&a Gakkai. Zen was unique in that it espoused meditative practices to seek enlightenment, as had the historical Buddha himself, thus relying on one’s own power (jirikz). A common Japanese understanding holds that Tendai and Shingon were for nobility, Zen for samurai, and Pure Land Buddhism for commoners. The reality was quite a The Showm bit different, as all manner of samurai embraced Amida and used later some even adopted Christianity after Europeans made their Buddtisrn to first appearance in the sixteenth century. But there is some truth to the generalization since Pure Land was far easier for illiterate control the and hard-working farmers to practice, Zen meditative practices populace and had an austerity that appealed to some warriors, and the mystical prowbit and textual-based esoteric sects appealed to the nobility. Whatever the form, medieval Japan was essentially a world in which CMstianiq* the basic understanding of most people was Buddhist. In the Tokugawa period (1600-1867) Buddhism was eclipsed by Neo-Confucianism, but the various Buddhist sects remained intact. As part of an extensive control system designed to guarantee national security and the longevity of their house, the Shoguns’ administration utilized the Buddhist establishment to control the populace and enforce its strict prohibition of Christianity: all families were required to register at local temples, which became, in effect, extensions of state power. The regime guaranteed land holdings for the support of Buddhist temples, of which there were some three hundred thousand in the mid-eighteenth century.25 Although there was considerable criticism of Buddhism from Neo-Confucian intellectuals, it was part of the Tokugawa political system, dispensing education “according to the requirements of the feudal authorities,“26 and intimately intertwined with the lives of most Japanese. What can we say about Buddhism in general in premodem Japan? First, there was a unity of secular law (a&j) and Buddhist law (Iruppa). Government and religion were coterminous (s&z& itch) rather than competing institutions. 25 Shigeyoshi Murakami,Japanese Religion in tbe Mohrn Centuy CTokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 19EQ p. 5. 26Ibid., p. 6.

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HURST “In Japan the social and political hierarchies were congruent, not separate” as in many countries where religious institutions might challenge secular rulers.” At court, starting with the rites of imperial accession, there was a plethora of religious activities designed to ensure the security of imperial rule and the protection of the state. Secondly, there was extensive mixing of beliefs and rituals from all religious streams in Japan, so that a kind of syncretic Buddhistic Shim0 developed among the Japanese. Thirdly, at least for most of the premodem era, “the basic intellectual problems, the most authoritative texts and resources, and the central symbols were all Buddhist.“28 Injunctions against the taking of life, for example, did in fact limit Japanese dietary habits; and court ceremonies, called hD$?e,where animals and birds were released back into the wild, at least symbolized this concern for the sanctity of life. On the other hand, warfare was endemic, especially in the late medieval period, and Japanese samurai were little affected by Buddhist notions of compassion when it came to killing men-or women and children for that matter-in battle. Moreover, Buddhist ethical precepts had little play in foreign affairs. Toyotomi Hideyoshi sent an army of one hundred thousand to invade Korea in the late sixteenth century, and his warriors butchered Koreans ruthlessly. Finally, one can detect in Japanese Buddhism a movement from the universal to the particular. That is, as in China and Korea, it was common to study many different forms of Buddhism with an eye towards syncretism; but from the Kamakura period onwards, there is a definite tendency towards the proliferation of specific sects with very emphatically devoted followers-probably none more fervently convinced of the falsehood of other sects than Nichiren. Today virtually every sect from earlier times is alive to some degree or another, and a host of derivative faiths-especially from Nichiren-inform the New and new, New Religions. The apparent result is that Japanese religious sensitivities display both the universalist and particularist impulses. There are attempts at certain times to associate more broadly with the universal, or at least international, streams of Buddhism, as when a “Buddhist Friendship Exchange Conference” of some eight hundred participants from China, Japan, and Korea (including North Koreans) convened in Tokyo in May 1995 to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonialism. But the conference failed-the South Koreans walked out of the meeting-and in any case it is undeniable that far more of the reputed ninety million Buddhists in Japan” identify themselves narrowly with a particular temple than with world Buddhism per se.

n van Wolferen, Enigma ofPower, p. 51. m William R. Iafleur, L%eKanm of Word: Buddhism and the Literay Arts m Medieml Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 19831, p. 9. 23 Ni@on &&a zensbo (Encyclopedia Nipponica 2001) (Tokyo: Shq$ukan, 19881, 20: 374. Figure as of 1987.

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Japan shinta

Shinto, by contrast, approaches the nexus of religion and politics more closely than any other Japanese religion. That is because of the close association of Shinto thought and practices with the emperor-centered state religion of the prewar and wartime era. There are two aspects of Shinto that need to be distinguished: ShintO as practices and beliefs associated with local communities, often referred to as “Japan’s indigenous religion”; and state Shintn, an artificially constructed modem religion of ultranationalism focused on worship of the emperor.30 State Shintn can effectively be seen as a state-directed attempt to channel the religious sensibilities of all Japanese into the welfare of the nation as a family. All the new rituals and practices conceived by the officials of the Meiji Restoration were purported to be recreations of ancient, and purely native, traditions. To a degree, the state-oriented, or supralocal nature of ShintG, did date back to ancient times, Since at least the seventh century, the architects of the early Japanese state commissioned “historical”accounts of the divine founding of the nation as their own source of legitimacy. The earliest expression of what came to be called Shinto was a highly localized worship of deities or kumi, often spirits of nature, deceased souls of emperors and other heroes, mythical deities or anything that might be considered “awesome” by early man. While there was a great concern with ritual pollution and its avoidance through various practices, Shim?5had no doctrine or large-scale organization. It was “primarily a liturgical practice.“31 ShintD was heavily influenced by Buddhism, yin yang theory, Taoism, and Confucianism. Although the term Shinto itself is normally interpreted as having been adopted to distinguish indigenous practices from those of the Buddhists3* Buddhism also interacted with ShintD at a variety of levels, producing by medieval times a number of syncretic forms of worship wherein indigenous Japanese kumi were interpreted as local manifestations of Buddhist divinities. In fact, “Shinto-Buddhist syncretism . . . was so pervasive that treating ShintG separately from Buddhism in the medieval period leads to gross misinterpretations of Japanese religiosity.“33Importantly, such syncretic forms were quite local in nature, associated with particular temples and shrines, rather than at an abstract or national level. These are distinct reservations to regarding Shint75 as an “indigenous” religion shared by all Japanese. At the end of the Tokugawa period, amid a burst of nationalism prompted by Western imperialism, certain scholars in the National Learning (kokugaku) movement tried to reconstruct a ShintD that would represent the true national identity of Japan. They were concerned with identifying and restoring “an 3° D.C. Holtom, Modern Japan and Shim Nationulti (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942). 3l Hardacre, Shim and be Stafq p. 10. 32 For a challenge to this interpretation, see Kuroda Toshio, “ShintUin the History of Japanese Religion,” in Religion and &x&y, pp. 10-13. 33 ‘Shinto” entry in K&n&a Encvdopedia ofJapan (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1983),7:127. Kuroda, pp. 27-28, pushes this point even farther.

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HURST idealized, pure mentality and world view ascribed to the ancient Japanese, to return to the thought and consciousness of the ancients before the country became . . . ‘polluted’ by contact with foreign culture and religion.“41 Kokuguku thought heavily influenced the formation of state Shinto. The early Meiji leaders portrayed the Meiji Restoration as a “return” to a distinctly Japanese tradition dating from the age of the gods. ShintO was quickly decoupled from Buddhism and heralded as the “indigenous” faith. In a nation that was religiously pluralistic and facing the aggressive outside imperialistic world, the Meiji government was concerned with finding an ideology that would unify the people behind the enormous state-building project they had undertaken. “Politicians believed that ShintD would be useful in uniting the populace in a common creed that would transcend regional loyalties and differences of class, in bonding the people together in the service of national goals, and in overcoming resistance to such novelties as conscription, a national taxation system, and compulsory education.“35 The Meiji leaders attempted to create what they saw as the ancient tradition of the “unity of religious practice and government” (suisei itch). They established a ShintO Worship Bureau (which developed in stages into the Ministry of Religion). The state supported Shinto shrines, organized the priesthood, created new symbols and rituals, and promulgated an orthodox creed focusing on the divinity of the Meiji emperor as the current head of an “unbroken line” of rulers from the time of the mythic first emperor Jimmu, whose succession was deemed to have occurred (though no factual basis for it existed) on February 11, 660 B.C.E. This union of cult and state produced a distinct form of nationalism that emphasized the unique characteristics of the Japanese polity, or kokutai, and the spirit- Yumuto damasbii-of the Japanese people. ‘Ihe Meiji constitution defined the person of the emperor as “sacred and inviolable,” and Shintn was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Home Ministry whereas Buddhism, Christianity, and other creeds remained under the control of the Ministry of Religion, As Japan became increasingly nationalistic in the l%Os, Christians in particular objected to being forced to worship ShintO deities. Ultimately the state decided that Shintn was not like other religions and its shrines were to be considered state institutions whose purposes were not religious per se but rather designed to foster among all Japanese a sense of patriotism and loyalty to the emperor. Even in Japan’s colonies, where people might be nominally Buddhist or Christian, ShintZS torii were constructed and everyone was forced to bow down before pictures of the emperor and attend ShintO festivals. The state was inordinately successful in fostering a sense of nationalism by establishing the idea of the “nation as a family” with the emperor as father figure of all. Primarily, this was accomplished through the school system, whose indoctrination instilled a strong sense of duty and patriotism. The Imperial 34 Hardacre, Shinrcr and the State, p. 16. 35 Ibid., p. 59.

Japan Rescript on Education was recited daily by the students, and the emperor’s portrait was prominently displayed in classrooms. Likewise, the establishment of Yasukuni Shrine as a major national shrine dedicated to the souls of all those who lost their lives in service to the nation helped to foster a sense of collective identity and obedience to the imperial will. Although a number of devout Christians and Buddhists did stand up to the imposition of a state religion, dissent was unremarkable, and most Japanese found satisfaction and security in personal and familial association with a religion of nationhood that set apart the Japanese “race” as special, distinct, and sacred-and imbuing the people with a strong will to carry out what the leadership defined as the sacred mission of the nation. State ShintD was in effect a novel religion of civil nationalism represented as dating to antiquity. But it went even farther. Maruyama Masao argued that Japanese nationalism differed from that in Western countries in which a compromise was reached between ruler and ruled. In other words, “questions of thought, belief, and morality were deemed to be private matters and, as such, were guaranteed their subjective, ‘internal’ quality; meanwhile state power was steadily absorbed into an ‘external’ legal system , . . [But] . . . Japanese nationalism strove consistently to base its control on internal values rather than authority derived from eternal laws.“36Thus for Maruyama, under the imperial system, no purely private realm was possible. He quotes the author of Z%eWay

of the Subject: What we normally refer to as “private life” is, in the fina analysis, the way of the subject. As such it has a public significance, in that each so-called private action is carried out by the subject as part of his humble efforts to assist the Throne. . . . Thus we must never forget that even in our personal lives we are joined to the Emperor and must be moved by the desk to serve our country.37

The Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Jqan

(Kokutai no

hongi)makes it quite clear that Japan’s leaders left little room for individualism. “An individual is an existence belonging to the State and her history which form the basis of his origin, and is fundamentally one body with it.“% Thus the document does not even regard giving one’s life for the emperor as a sacrifice but rather a “casting aside of our little selves to live under his august grace.“39 Understandably, state Shim?5 was a primary target of the Occupation reformers under General Douglas MacArthur, and was soon abolished. But sect Shint0, seen as a harmless form of local cultic belief dating back to ancient times, was permitted, and in that form it thrives today. Most Japanese consider ~6MamyamaMaao, “Theoryand PsychologyofUltranationalism,”inju@znEcho 24 W97J p. 15. Reprinted in Moakrn Japanese PoIitiq trans. Ivan Morris (oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1963). 3’ Ibid., p. 17.

from ‘Ihougbt andBebauior

9 Robert King Hall, ed., Kokutui no bongi(CIarchd

Principlesof the National Entity of Japan) Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1%9), p. 81. 39Ibid., p. 80.

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1998 1 313

HURST themselves Shinw believers, even if that means no more than participation in a local festival, stopping for a momentary communion with the deity of a shrine, or writing and offering a votive tablet (emu) in hopes of passing the university entrance examination or achieving a safe childbirth. But the ghost of state Shinto deeply affects and limits the Japanese dialogue on foreign policy. On the one hand, it is the fear of the reestablishment of such a corporate statism that prompts the vigilance of many opposition politicians and concerned intellectuals. At the same time, nostalgia for the security of that inclusive embrace emboldens some conservative politicians to seek to revive certain practices of prewar religion such as national sponsorship for Yasukuni Shrine. LDP advocacy of such inflammatory positions leaves some Japanese unconvinced that the prewar situation could not happen again-as, indeed, are many of Japan’s Asian neighbors. Thus, for example, the historian Irokawa Daikichi could write in 1983 that “to resurrect the emperor-system in its full power, as some conservative politicians now advocate, is dangerous dallying with illusion. . . . There is the real possibility that Japan will turn into a new and monstrous military power.“40

Yasukuni Shrine and Japanese Foreign Policy Yasukuni Shrine was frostestablished in Tokyo in 1869 to commemorate those who lost their lives on the loyalist side in the Meiji Restoration. Thereafter it also came to enshrine the souls of those who gave their lives in the Sineand Russo-Japanese Wars, and, of course, in World War II. The emperor himself paid tribute to these souls, and the significance of enshrinement lay in the “apotheosis symbolically changing the soul’s status to that of a national deity. Accordingly, it ceases to be a mere ancestor of some household and instead attaches to the nation.“4* Annual festivals for the dead ranged over several days and increased in size and popularity in prewar Japan. Likewise, there were local shrines dedicated to the souls of war dead, all renamed in 1939 as gokoku jinju (nation-protecting shrines).42 The postwar constitution disestablished state Shinto and provides for freedom of religious expression. There have, however, been continual attempts to reestablish the state connection to ShintG. The most celebrated cases have been at Yasukuni Shrine. Virtually all LDP prime ministers since 1945 have visited Yasukuni, and in the past twenty-five years the press has always grilled the cabinet ministers in attendance as to whether they were attending as private citizens or in their official capacities-which would violate the constitution. Increasingly, politicians have been asserting their public role and making donations from public funds, thus prompting vigorous debate in the Diet. Efforts 40 Quoted in Stephen S. Large, Emperor Himbito and SbZku Ja&wr A Political BQrqby New York: Routledge, 19921, p. 2. 4* Hardacre, Shim and tbe State, p. 90. 42Seeibid., pp. 92-93.

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(London and

Japan to pass legislation-usually with the support of the Bereaved Society of Japan-for official financial support has failed a number of times, but conservatives in the government continue to seek ways to commemorate Japanese war dead as deities, thus stoking fears that Japan might again become a militaristic nation.

The

New Religions

Among those opposed to state support for Yasukuni Shrine is a union of some of Japan’s New Religions. There are now two types of such cults in Japan, those dating from the Meiji Restoration up to the 197Os,and a second grouping formed since then and known as new, New Religions. In the late nineteenth century a number of movements arose among the peasantry, most prominently Kurozumi-kyu, Nyorai-kya, and Tenri-ky0. Representative New Religions founded before 1945 include Umoto-kyq Ittaen, Reiy&ai, and Seicha no Ie. The postwar period, down to about 1970, spawned .%ska Gakkai, Rissha KDseikai, and PL Kyadan (PL for Perfect Liberty), among others. Finally, the new, New Religions formed since 1970 number Agon-shq Aum Shinrikyq Sekai Mahikari Bunmei KY&an, as well as foreign cults such as the Unification Church (‘IXitsu KY&ail and Momomi no ‘Ib. Quite a few of these religions are Shint0 derivatives; others stem from Buddhism, local folk beliefs, or foreign influences. But they all share certain characteristics: (1) charismatic leadership, (2) concrete benefices such as the healing of illness, (3) strong communal associations, and (4)mass activities.43 Undoubtedly, within the New Religions in postwar Japan, one finds a greater degree of commitment to universal goals and an investment of deep commitment, or faith, in a society often characterized as spiritually impoverished. Here, too, one finds areas where religion touches on foreign policy, or at least in the way that believers view politics. This concern is most fully articulated in the Nichiren sects, especially S&a Gakkai. S&a Gakkai is the lay arm of the Nichiren ShTisha, a sect of Buddhism which traces its origins to the Kamakura period priest Nichiren (1222432). Long before Americans confronted cults such as Rev. Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church, leading to a flurry of deprogramming cases in the 1970s and 1980s the mka Gakkai appeared threatening to many parents who worried that their children would be captured by “militant”proselytizers. “As a religion the Gakkai was described as fanatical, millenarian, and intolerant; when its political interest became publicized it was called fascist, chauvinistic, and totalitarian.“44Not only had members launched aggressive campaigns to convert Japanese, but they were now expanding overseas. Newspapers and television news featured their 43H. NeilI M~Fadand,The RushHour of the G&2 A Stwy of the New ReligiousMowementr in Japan (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1%7>, pp. 71-96, deals with these and other feam. 44 White, Sokagakka( p. 1.

spring

1998 I 315

HURST huge festivals, which often had up to a hundred thousand fervent members in the stadium, cheering as youth in colorful costumes marched, danced, and sang, looking eerily similar to the crowds at North Korean or Communist Chinese rallies, What is more, Sgka Gakkai presents a rare case in which religion and politics, including a concern for foreign policy, intertwine in Japan. SDka Gakkai began to involve itself in politics in the 195Os, and its Komei Federation had by 1964 developed into a full-blown KTinneiW “New religion” political party (officially translated in English as the Clean GovS;irkaGakkai ernment Party). Defining itself as “socialist h~a~~~an,” K%meitzihas tried to appeal to a national constituency concerned intertwines with peace, justice, and anticorruption. Yet its elected parliareligion and mentarians and voters remain IargeIy members of Siska Gakkaid5 politics-a In 1970, Saks Gakkai announced that it was severing all ties from the Ici5meita, ostensibly because the party was large enough rarity in Japan. to stand on its own. But outside observers claim that it did so to deflect the charge that it was mixing politics and religion.& In fact, the party received severe criticism in 1969 when it tried to suppress publication of Fujiwara Hirotatsu’s Sku Gakkai o kiru, (later published in English as IDenounce Soka Gakkaz), leading KameitiS to break with Siska Gakkai.4’ Nevertheless, most Japanese still tend to regard the KnmeitZ3 and Saks Gakkai as inseparable. As a centrist party, KameitTi’s “socialism” is hardly doctrinaire since it seeks not to overthrow, but to correct the abuses of the free enterprise system. In foreign policy, KTTmeitDinitially opposed the LDP’s cold war policy of pro-Americanism by favoring “strict neutrality” and calling for the abrogation of the security treaty. Based on support for the United Nations, the party has promoted peaceful coexistence and thus has also opposed Japanese rearmament and participation in armed conflicts. But by the 1980stheseemingpermanence of the treaty and general support among the populace prompted first a decision by KTSmeitn to talk of “eventual abrogation” of the treaty and then, in 1981, to accept the status quo and cease calling for abrogation. The f(baneita has also long been a supporter of a nuclear-free Asia, consistently opposing the development, testing, and/or storage of nuclear weapons. Given the various policies it has espoused, KameitZ.5cannot avoid claims that it is influenced by the Saks Gakkai’s unique Buddhist philosophy (as the leadership itself has noted, ZZka Gakkai and ICbmeit0 are “different forms with the same mind, one body, not two litad&shin, ittaifun$?“)48 But as a lay organization attempting to appeal to a broad spectrum of people, Knmeita does not cast its policies in a distinctly religious light. 45 Daniel Memiux, Ibe His&y and Tbe&gv of S&a G&k& &wiion, N.Y.: Edward Mellon Press, 1988), p 151. 46 Ibid., p. 135. Q Curtis, JapaneseWay of Politi, p. 26. 48Murakami Shigeyoshi, “?agisen ni mint KameitU to KyiSsanta,” Bwgei SbunjC, Sept. 1969, p. 210.

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Japan mka Gakkai, by contrast, has a highly developed political philosophy articulated in 1965 in President Ikeda Daisaku’s Se((i to s&&p (Politics and Religion). Ikeda sees two types of political systems: an ideal one that would benefit all of society-that which we normally see in history-and a second type which serves only minority interests-that of the rulers or a particular class. He supports democracy, but in surveying the various forms of contemporary democracy, he fmds all wanting, since there is rarely a balance between the two fundamental rights for which he sees man searching: freedom and equality. S&a Gakkai regards few men as truly free, since illness, poverty, and various forms of suffering are found everywhere. People are “so obsessed with greed, animosity and hatred that they have virtually no ability, time, or strength to overcome their torments. Only by overcoming their evil karmas by subscribing to the doctrines of Nichiren will they have a chance to obtain freedom in the true sense of the word.“49 In fact, early in the postwar period, many critics feared that Saks Gakkai wanted to establish a theocracy since it stated that its goal, when the ideal of kibsen rufu-world conversion-was achieved, was to establish a national temple where all the nation’s leaders would come to worship. This worried some critics that S&a Gakkai sought to impose its own religion on the nation. But in the mid-1960s President Ikeda-the third-generation leader of Z%ka Gakkai-altered his goals to allay the fears of critics at home and abroad.% First, he played down the fervor with which conversion (shakzuti) was to be carried out and urged members to be patient in their proselytization (“Let’s not rush thing$‘>. Second, he redefined the ideal of &en rufu, suggesting that if one-third of the Japanese could be converted, another third supported mmeitn, and a final third opposed the faith, that would be tantamount to &sen rufu. It would mean virtual attainment of the “harmonious union of politics and religion” @butsu mflga). Third, Ikeda decided to build an ordination hall called the Grand Main Temple at the S&a Gakkai headquarters temple Taisekiji at the foot of Mt. Fuji. This seems to have quelled fears that he was planning to build a national temple for the religion as some kind of national faith in the future. (It also shocked people in Japan because S&a Gakkai raised over thirty-five billion yen in a four-day fund-raising drive in October 1965-this was more than ten times the stated goal, and amounted to some U.S.$lOO million?l) If S75ka Gakkai is seen mainly as a religion devoted to converting Japanese into followers of Nichiren and the Lotus Sutra, it does have international goals, goals which have been reflected in the foreign policy espoused by the Icameira. Peace, international good will, and antimilitarism are at the heart of these beliefs. The policy of antimilitarism has its historical antecedent. S&a Gakkai was founded as an educational organization in 1930 by Makiguchi Tsunesabuw, @ Quoted in Mea-ax, Soka Gakkai,p. 141. 50Kiy& Murata, Japan’s Nau Buddbti An Objwiw WalkerPX’earheMl,1969, pp. 124-36. Q Ibid., p. 135.

Account of Soka Gakkai (New York and Tokyo:

Spring 1998 I 317

HURST a schoolteacher who had converted to Nichiren Shnshn. Urging his followers not to support the government’s war efforts nor to venerate state ShintD, Makiguchi was arrested in 1944 for violating the notorious Peace Preservation Law and died in prison in 1944. The second president, Toda Jnsei, was also imprisoned for not yielding to government pressure-though most other Snka Gakkai leaders succumbed to torture or interrogation to renounce their faith. In the postwar period, under President Toda, Saks Gakkai turned into more of a religious than an educational organization. After a brief period of excessive zeal for spreading the faith through extensive shakubu~ activities, Saks Gakkai has flourished under the leadership of Ikeda Daisaku, who has tirelessly presented the case for his form of Buddhism worldwide. Believing that the Buddha nature is inherent in all things, Siska Gakkai has espoused a “human revolution” from within, whereby individual change can lead to societal change and the establishment of happiness and world peace. Believers are urged not only to have faith in the power of the Gohonzon-a scroll written by Nichiren on the Lotus Sutra-by chanting the daimoku-a sacred formula Namu Mph75 Rengek@ (“Devotion to the Sutra of the Lotus of the Wonderful Law”)-and to study the basic doctrines of Nichiren ShBshn, but they are also encouraged to communicate their message to others, often in what is perceived as an aggressive fashion. The process of shaku6~&~literally “to crush and flatten”-meant in Buddhist terms to root out evil practices and beliefs and win someone over to the Buddhist teachings, which in Nichiren Shashn can lead to very aggressive conversion techniques. Thus when it was first exported to America, mka Gakkai was invariably referred to as a ‘militant” Buddhist sect. With its own university and worldwide publications network Saks Gakkai has tried to serve as a force for world peace. Insofar as the mka Gakkai and Nichiren Shnshii continue to exert religious influence over the Kbmeit73 party, one may regard this as an attempt to instill religious belief into foreign policy. But the party has been singularly unsuccessful in attracting electoral support from nonbelievers, the party’s share of votes being virtually the same in the mid-1980s as it was in the mid-1970s.52 Nor have any cabinet members been chosen from among its parliamentarians. Still, Icbmeita’s “religious orientation makes it a party without parallel and without precedent in Japan.“53

CMstianity Christianity was introduced by Jesuits in the mid-sixteenth century; they were soon followed by Franciscans as well. Initially Christianity was somewhat successful in winning conversions, helped by the initial support from Oda Nobunaga, who faced considerable difhculty in bringing certain Buddhist 52 curtis, JapaneseWay of Polihq 53Ibid., p. 24.

318 I Orbk

p 27.

Japan institutions in line during his campaigns to seize control of the nation. Some local lords adopted Christianity and were helpful in stimulating the conversion of their samurai and peasant subjects. Residents of the southern island of Kyushu were especially attracted to the new religion, so much so that even after the new Tokugawa regime put down a major Christian-inspired revolt in the 1630s and then forbade Christianity among Japanese, underground Christians kept the faith alive until the present day. The strong tradition of martyrdom dating from Japan’s “ChristianCentury” attests to the degree of fervor with which some Japanese adopted Christianity. In modem Japan, however, Christianity has never been able to win the adherence of more than about 1 percent of the people. A number of prominent Christians emerged in the prewar era, associated primarily with the tradition of Christian social action, but Christianity, with a few notable exceptions of believers who refused to bow to Japanese militarism, was no more successful than other religions in resisting state Shintn and Japanese imperialism. Despite the huge and rapidly growing number of Christians in neighboring Korea, and the revival of Christianity even in the face of government repression in China, the Japanese remain indifferent to the proselytizing of foreign missionaries. On the other hand, even though today Christians constitute a tiny minority of Japanese, the influence of Christianity in the areas of pacifism and social action, social welfare, and personal ethics far outweighs the actual number of believers among the populace.

Japanese Pacifism Japan quite reasonably considers itself unique among nations, being the sole recipient of nuclear attack. This horrendous experience remains an active motive in inhibiting the nation from complete rearmament as a “normal” country and has served to fuel an extensive peace movement as well. One would expect religious belief to be a primary force for the peace movement. Indeed, in the Meiji era, as Japan sought to develop a “rich country and strong army”-expressly to counter the imperialist Western powers-Western missionaries introduced pacifist ideas into Japan. But as Japan was successful in the &o-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, nationalism proved satisfying to most Japanese. “Christianity and pacifism seemed to threaten Japanese national independence. . . . Those who adopted Christianity or its concomitant pacifism faced ostracism by nonbelievers, who had lived through three decades when militancy appeared to achieve national goals.“% 54 “Pacifism” entxy in James L. Hulhan, ed., Modan Japan: An Encrclopeia ofHickory, Culhur: and N&on&m (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 199fQ p. 201. Two notable exceptions were Udhura Kanm (1861-19301, founder of the Nonchurch Christian Movement, and hii spiritual .wxessor Yanaihara Tadao, a Tokyo Imperial University professor who was driven from his post as a consequence of his opposition to govemment policy.

Spring 1998 I 319

HURST Defeat in World War II discredited militarism in the eyes of most Japanese, and pacifism seemed a quick way to regain international respectability. The form that pacifism ought to take-unarmed or armed-and to what degree-aligned or unaligned-has attracted widespread popular debate and political activity. The witness of many Buddhists, Christians, and members of Snka Gakkai notwithstanding, the general impulse for pacifism in Japan remains highly secular and stems directly from the terrible experience of ultranationalism and militant expansionism that led to the nuclear devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If total defeat in World War II did not lead to widespread conversion to Christianity, as many foreign missionaries hoped, nor to a deepening acceptance of Buddhism, it did turn many Japanese into highly pragmatic pacifists. Article 9 of the ShBwa constitution of 1947, essentially the product of MacArthur’s Occupation staff, abolishes the right of belligerence in Japan and limits its military forces. While Japan has been pressured by the United States ever since the 1949, Communist victory in China to build a substantial SDF, the Japanese populace as a whole has consistently resisted extensive spending on the military (limited until recently to 1 percent of GNP), attempts to expand the size of the forces, and deployment of forces overseas. Only in 1993, after years of LDP lobbying and continuing American pressure, was a PKO (for peace-keeping operations) force established, allowing the Japanese to join in international cooperative peace-keeping activities such as the Cambodian elections. It would appear, however, that this pacifism has its roots not in any mass religious revulsion against violence, but rather from a complex psychological situation deriving from defeat. Japanese fear that if their country becomes “normal” again-an LDP slogan for allowing Japan to have military forces no different from other sovereign nations-that the nation might once again become involved in war. ‘Ihe pragmatic compromise allows for a fairly sizable and decently funded SDF that protects Japan’s immediate borders, assists the populace in times of emergency, such as earthquakes, and otherwise relies on the American nuclear umbrella for defense. The determinants of this policy have been the memory of defeat in 1945, contrition for Japan’s prewar and wartime behavior in Asia, the continuing reminder by former colonies and victims of Japanese aggression (most recently, the international outcry over the “comfort women” or military sex slaves) that the Japanese government has not sincerely apologized for those actions, and the obvious benefits of a policy that places economic growth above defense. Yet pacifism is reaching its limits in the wealthy Japan of the 1980s and 1990s. Even holding military spending to 1 percent of GNP meant that Japanese military spending became huge compared with most other countries. In the 1980s alone military spending increased 58 percent, eight times more than spending on education and over twice that allocated for social services. With the gain of the yen against the dollar, Japan’s military budget reached the third 320 I O&s

Japan highest in the world. Such outlays naturally aroused fears among her Asian neighbors. The problem reached a peak around the time of the Gulf War. All Japanese were aware that oil from the Gulf fueled their economy, and it became harder to resist American arguments that Japan should be more heavily involved in the international effort against Iraq. Opposition in the Japanese Diet prevented Japan from dispatching any troops, but ultimately Japan contributed $9 billion to assist Desert Storm. In the words of one observer, their national desire for recognition as a great power goaded the Japanese to provide liberal assistance, while their pride in their pacifiit tradition and fiscal prudence made them hesitate . . the heat of the debate demonstrated how deeply success in its major desire for wealth and global position has complicated desire for the moral ascendancy as a national pacifist policy.55

aftermath of that experience the PKO law was passed, allowing Japan the possibility to play a limited military role in international cooperative efforts at peace keeping. Japan’s pride in its “pacifist tradition” is unique among nations, but it can be seen as totally without the force of moral suasion on both the domestic and the international level. That may have something to do with the Japanese tendency to avoid advocating universalistic principles. In any event, pacifism, however noble a goal, has its serious shortcomings in Japan. First, it is not an indigenous tradition, but part of a constitution imposed upon the Japanese by foreigners after defeat in World War II. The specific pacifist provision, Article 9, was in fact meant to be punitive. Moreover, the Japanese have not defended pacifism with any notable passion in international organizations such as the United Nations, where their peculiar situation might have lent some credibility to an ideal often dismissed as impractical. Instead, the Japanese have been pragmatic pacifists, whose support of the policy seemingly derives more from a desire to direct resources to nonmilitary items and to avoid unpleasant overseas involvement. It does not seem to derive from any widespread sense of moral, let alone religious, conviction. Had the Japanese advocated a strong moral stance in favor of pa&m, based upon a true sense of remorse for their behavior in Asia in the 1930s and 194Os, the nation might have won widespread international respect. Instead, Japanese enthusiasm for pacifism and denuclearization seems largely based upon their sense of having been victimized at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, even as they continue to display moral amnesia over such issues as the comfort women and the Rape of Nanjing more than a half century after the end of the war. In the

55 ‘Pacifism,”p. 202.

Spring 1998 I 321

HURST Conclusion Religion, in sum, has little effect on or connection with diplomacy in Japan by comparison to many states in which monotheistic, revealed religious traditions deeply affect ethical norms. Japan is not necessarily unique in this regard-China shares some similar features-but in comparison to other major world powers, Japan displays a quite different religious perspective. Unlike the monotheistic and universal religious traditions, Japanese religion tends to function at a familial and communal level rather than at a level of universal beliefs in certain strongly held ethical imperatives or articles of faith. In fact, that kind of religion was approximated in Japan only during the prewar ascendancy of state Shintb, which efficiently melded patriotism and religion into a creed inculcated deeply among the Japanese populace. The state was not content to stop there but even tried to make it a universal religion, or at least a Pan-Asian faith by extending it forcibly-if largely unsuccessfullyamong occupied and colonized Asian peoples. The Japanese apparently remain deeply affected by that experience. On the one hand, conservative politicians, feeling that the postwar prosperity has driven new generations of Japanese to embrace the excessive individualism, hedonism, and secularism they associate with Westernization, seek to revive some of the rituals and trappings of the prewar state-sponsored religion. Others, haunted by the memories of mindless sacrifice in the name of the emperor and by the devastation visited upon Japan, are leery of anything that smacks of a unity of politics and religion. Both the academic and popular press offer frequent warnings against what Irokawa suggested was a possibility that Japan might turn once again into a “new and monstrous military power” because they had not yet totally shed a “subject mentality” that was the product of the prewar religion of nationalism. Thus, one hears calls for a political economy and foreign policy less reliant upon the United States, as well as fears that underneath the veneer of a technologically advanced, democratic society lies a Japanese national character all too prone to religious nationalism. The tension between these two views is liable to keep politics and religion separate for the foreseeable future. But it must never be forgotten, in making such judgments, that “religion” itself does not mean the same thing in Japan as it does elsewhere. A 1967 poll of six thousand Japanese students (people now entering or at the top of their various fields of endeavor) generally responded favorably to the role of religion in society, yet less than one in five thought “religion is necessary to obtain true happiness” or that “religion, which makes man grasp truth, beauty and goodness, is most important for man.“56 Thus, it appears that Japanese continue to regard the term “religion” in its Western sense: as an overarching faith and belief system of which they themselves have no need. No wonder Samuel P. Huntington has named Japan a civilization unto itself and the most important “lone country” 56 Vicente M. Bonet, ed., Religion m theJapanese T&book (Tokyo: EnderIe Book CO., Ltd., 1%‘3), P. 161.

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Japan in the world. “Japan’s loneliness is f&ther enhanced by the fact that its culture is highly particular&k and does not involve a potentially universal religion (Christianity, Islam) or ideology (liberalism, communism) that could be exported to other societies and thus establish a cultural connection with people in those societies.“” The Japanese nation is, if you will, a church unto itself-but without a religion.

5? SamuelP. Hunrington,7be Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the Sion

World Orakr (New York:

& Schuster, 1996J p. 137.

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