The Green Revolution re-assessed: Insider perspectives on agrarian change in Bulandshahr District, Western Uttar Pradesh, India

Geoforum 38 (2007) 73–89 www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum

The Green Revolution re-assessed: Insider perspectives on agrarian change in Bulandshahr District, Western Uttar Pradesh, India Sarah Jewitt a

a,¤

, Kathleen Baker

b

School of Geography, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom b Department of Geography, Kings College London, Surrey Street, London WC2 2LS, United Kingdom Received 3 May 2006; received in revised form 7 June 2006

Abstract In spite of raising Asian per capita food production by 27% and making India food self-suYcient, the Green Revolution has received much criticism for its environmental and socio-economic impacts. Taking on board post-development critiques of ‘speaking for’ Third World ‘others’, this paper seeks to examine the Green Revolution from the points of view of people directly aVected by it. Comparative, historically-informed research in three villages for which 1972 baseline data exist reveal that the Green Revolution has ensured, in the words of one marginal farmer that ‘nobody sleeps with an empty stomach nowadays’. Most villagers associate the Green Revolution with increases in living standards and weakening community-based wealth hierarchies. Nevertheless, socio-economic inequalities between certain Scheduled Castes and other villagers are still very apparent. © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: India; Bulandshahr; Green Revolution; HYVs; Agriculture; Socio-economic impacts

1. Introduction Since being hailed as the solution to world hunger in the 1960s, the Green Revolution has had a turbulent reception. In spite of raising Asian per capita food production by 27% since the mid-1960s, creating substantial extra employment for the rural poor and restraining food prices (Lipton, 1999),1 critics argue that the Green Revolution has been anything but green in practice. The literature on India suggests that in addition to creating agrarian class diVerentiation (Johnston and Kilby, 1975; Byres, 1981, 1983; Brass, 1994, *

Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S. Jewitt), kathy. [email protected] (K. Baker). 1 The rural poor in India consist mainly of landless or near landless labourers who gain entitlements to food according to the number of days they work. Their main concerns are with the price of cereals, the availability of work and the wages they receive. Gupta (1998) suggests that rural labour markets tightened throughout the 1980s and labourers beneWted from an increase in both agricultural and non-agricultural labour opportunities. 0016-7185/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2006.06.002

1995) and severe environmental problems (Berry, 1980; Lipton and Longhurst, 1989; Swaminathan, 1996), its most recent phase has been characterized by stagnating yields and declining soil quality which have brought diminishing returns to agriculture for many farmers (Greenland, 1997; Pingali et al., 1997; Lipton, 1999; Kapila and Kapila, 2002). Indeed, the bitter criticism aimed at India’s Green Revolution for its environmental and socio-economic impacts has been eVective in drawing attention away from other constraints to agricultural production. Examples include the fragmentation of formerly viable land holdings and the continuing need for land reform that the Green Revolution’s remit as a ‘technological shortcut to development’ (Atkins and Bowler, 2001, p. 222) enabled successive Indian politicians to avoid.2 With the failure of land reforms to 2 Dreze and Gazdar (1996) criticise early Uttar Pradesh state governments for their limited eVorts to promote land reform legislation which, when Wnally enacted, allowed higher land ceilings than in any other state and contained loopholes that enabled many landlords to retain much of their holdings.

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aVect the power of large landholders, many of the other institutional reforms championed by Nehru such as Community Development Cooperatives and Panchayati Raj have fallen ‘under their control, served their interests ƒ and failed to realize signiWcant improvements in agricultural performance’ (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000, p. 64). In recent years, the Green Revolution and top-down development initiatives like it have attracted criticism as part of a post-development backlash against development’s tendency to ‘speak for’ Third World ‘others’ thereby silencing their own voices. Radical post-development critics such as Escobar have gone further, arguing that development has created ‘massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression’ (Escobar, 1995, p. 4) while development discourses have portrayed the developing world as ‘a broken world of poverty disease and deprivation, which needs to be mended by infusions of western capital and know how’ (Corbridge, 1999, p. 69). Populist writers like Vandana Shiva, meanwhile, look to the past for solutions to India’s agricultural failings as the ‘large scale experiment of the Green Revolution has not only pushed nature to the verge of ecological breakdown, but also seems to have pushed society to the verge of social breakdown’ (Shiva, 1991, p. 172). In the wake of post-development critiques, students and practitioners of development geography are now more aware of development’s negative impacts and of how statecentred accounts ‘ignore the multiple ways in which development is (re)made every day, on the ground or at the grassroots level, by men, women and children around the world’ (Power, 2003, p. 200). Since McGee (1974) Wrst called for a ‘broader geography of anti-development’, there has been a ‘welcome recentring of ‘local’ knowledge and practices which seeks to ground global development in the embedded, in particular places and localities’ (Power, 2003, p. 229). At the same time, participatory approaches and methodologies have sought to create spaces within which the marginal can speak (RadcliVe, 1999). But despite post-development’s success in questioning outsider views and recovering unheard voices and subjugated knowledges (Crush, 1995) there have been limited recent eVorts to re-assess the Green Revolution in light of the perceptions of those most aVected by it. Of the few contemporary long-term studies that do examine local opinions about the Green Revolution’s impacts, most indicate that its beneWts are perceived to far outweigh its costs (Lipton, 1999; Haddad and Hazell, 2001; Kerr and Kolavalli, 1999, 2000; Hayami and Kikuchi, 2000; Adato and Meinzen-Dick, 2002). Hayami and Kikuchi’s (2000) study of East Laguna village in the Philippines, for example, suggests that many of the negative predictions dating back to the 1970s and 80s have not been borne out. Following McGee’s emphasis on the importance of understanding development ‘in each ecological milieu’ and his appeal for ‘geographers who work in LDCs to return to the grassroots; to assert the ‘tradition’ and core of the discipline as a Weld subject’ (1974, p. 42), this paper seeks add to

this small body of work. Taking on board Crush’s view that the best way to look beyond the language of development is to start by ‘asking what development has meant for those spaces and peoples who it deWnes as object’ (Crush, 1995, p. 21) our research has focused on how diVerent community, gender and landholding groups both perceive the Green Revolution and have experienced its material impacts. Building upon detailed baseline data collected by one of the authors in 1972 for six villages in Bulandshahr District, Uttar Pradesh, India (Baker, 1975), our recent Weldwork seeks to provide an historically informed analysis of the Green Revolution’s impacts from the perspective of local people. Three of Baker’s original study villages (Sabdalpur, Chirchita and Kurwal Banaras) were chosen as our post 2001 Weld sites. Our main research emphasis was to identify the Green Revolution’s material impacts on diVerent socioeconomic groups and investigate additional constraints and opportunities aVecting local livelihoods. Given the wealth of data collected in Baker’s baseline study, particular attention has been given to how and why landholding patterns and farming practices have changed since 1972. An attempt has also been made to examine changes in the socio-economic position of diVerent caste and class groups over the past 30 plus years and investigate villagers’ views on the reasons for these changes. To provide a context for the later empirical sections, the following two sections will summarize the methodologies used for our village-based research and provide an overview of socio-economic conditions and agrarian change in both Uttar Pradesh and the research area more speciWcally. 2. Methodology The data contained in this paper were collected during Wve main periods of Weldwork; the Wrst being in 1972 and the other four in 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005. The data collected in 1972 were obtained from a questionnaire survey of 196 farmers coupled with direct observation, the collection of soil and crop cutting samples and the examination of secondary source materials (Baker, 1975). The primary method of analysing these data was with the use of statistical tests. Although it would have been possible to replicate these methods of data collection in the 2001–2005 surveys, we decided against this as the original survey, reXecting data collection methods of the time, allowed little scope for farmer engagement. As a result of our own desire to obtain local perspectives on agrarian change and reXecting the shift away from more ‘extractive’ and statisticallyoriented forms of development research (Chambers, 1992), we felt it appropriate to conduct a more informal and participatory form of Weldwork for the post 2001 follow-up studies. ReXecting the success of agrarian ethnographies in revealing insider perspectives on agrarian change (Brokensha et al., 1980; Chambers, 1983; Richards, 1985; Breman, 1985),

S. Jewitt, K. Baker / Geoforum 38 (2007) 73–89

post 2001 Weldwork was based primarily on qualitative methodologies including semi-structured interviews, direct observation and participatory appraisal triangulated with secondary source data and interviews with key informants. We were particularly fortunate in the selection of our main research assistant, Dr. Yadav; an agronomist with extremely detailed knowledge about agricultural practices in Bulandshahr and expertise in facilitating participatory appraisal methods. Informal discussions took place with a total of 181 villagers from diVerent generations, communities and landholding groups. To minimize the tendency for mixed group discussions to be dominated by men, ‘women only’ discussion groups were conducted whenever villagers’ work commitments permitted and a total of 62 women from four diVerent landholding groups were interviewed. In an attempt to reassure ourselves that conditions in Sabdalpur, Chirchita and Kurwal Banaras were not speciWc to those villages, we interviewed 44 people in Wve other villages (Nausana, Naibasti, Lalpur, Basrauli and Chola), which were not included in Baker’s original study. The main participatory techniques used were time lines (illustrating changes in technology, crop variety, wealth, income and labour), matrix ranking (of crop varieties and gender divisions of labour) and pie diagrams (illustrating the share of wealth held by diVerent community and landholding groups, plus the proportions of crops grown in each season). 2.1. Methodological considerations Despite the attractiveness of a longitudinal study such as this, we acknowledge a number of shortcomings. Firstly, the adoption of participatory appraisal techniques in the post 2001 study means that some of our results lend themselves more to discursive analysis (using information such as ranked variables, diagrams and time lines) than statistical testing. Although eVorts were always made to triangulate information derived from participatory appraisal with more quantitative data collected during semi-structured interviews, certain readers may be unsettled by the ‘proportionate accuracy’ (Chambers, 1992) associated with some participatory appraisal techniques. Secondly, it is important to recognize that despite its origin as a part of a new ‘learning paradigm’ seeking to promote more appropriate development (Pretty and Chambers, 1994) participatory appraisal is by no means immune to the inXuences of the powerful (Scoones and Thompson, 1993). As we were undertaking academic research rather than development work (involving the disbursement of funds), however, there was less incentive for villagers to try to inXuence the outcome of the participatory appraisal. In addition, our longstanding links with the study villagers and the combination of participatory appraisal with more long-term Weldwork methodologies in our ongoing research should (we hope) have helped us to avoid some of the problems of using this technique in a more ‘snapshot’ manner (Gujit and Kaul Shah, 1998).

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Thirdly, it is impossible to compare like with like over a period of 30 plus years. India has changed along with the study area and the villagers themselves (almost 90% of those interviewed in 1972 are now dead) so precise comparisons are very diYcult. Fourthly, the Weldwork objectives and approaches are diVerent as theoretical/methodological debates have moved on with the result that the pertinent questions are no longer the same as they were in 1972. Nevertheless, we feel that Baker’s baseline data provides a valuable starting point for our 2001–2005 Weldwork and as we have now interviewed more villagers in Sabdalpur and Chirchita than Baker interviewed in 1972 and have made extensive eVorts to triangulate our results, we are conWdent of our Wndings. Consequently, we feel justiWed in presenting them here. 3. The research area Uttar Pradesh (UP) is primarily an agricultural state with 80% of its population classed as rural, so the distribution of agrarian assets, especially land, has a major inXuence on the material condition of its inhabitants. The major landowners in UP have traditionally belonged to high ranking castes with a martial tradition, commonly identiWed as Kshatriya, Thakur or Rajput (Dreze and Gazdar, 1996). These ‘dominant castes’ have long held substantial power at the local level through a combination of numerical strength and economic advantage – usually land ownership (Srinivas, 1960). The rapid subdivision of land associated with the prevailing system of partible inheritance, however, has encouraged many large landowners to seek oV-farm incomes for their sons since the early 1970s (JeVrey and Lerche, 2000; JeVrey, 1997, 2002). The combination of ritual authority with landowning power held by UP’s dominant castes initially made it hard for lower caste/class groups to challenge socio-economic inequalities. But the spread eVects of agricultural growth opened up lucrative non-agricultural employment opportunities (such as brick making and construction work) which allowed many marginal/landless Muslim and lower caste Hindu households to shift away from agricultural labour and the dependence on large farmers that this brought (Gupta, 1998). Further changes occurred when the Bahujan Samaj Party came to power in UP in 1995 and 1997 under the leadership of Mayawati (a Scheduled Caste woman) and demonstrated that UP’s Scheduled Castes (SCs) were voting for themselves rather than for those who held economic power over them (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000). Since 1995, the party has succeeded in redistributing small amounts of land to SCs and has successfully strengthened the ‘Ambedkar Village’ scheme under which a village in each administrative Block with a high percentage of SCs is earmarked for special funding. Many Ambedkar Villages have been successful in improving SC access to basic services such as health and education as well as fostering a more general

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sense of ‘self-respect’ (JeVrey and Lerche, 2000): Wndings conWrmed in our own research. The three villages chosen for our post 2001 research formed part of a larger study conducted by Baker (1975) in six villages of Bulandshahr District, western Uttar Pradesh in 1972. In its turn, Baker’s study was nested in a larger, District-level survey conducted by Allan, also in 1972 (Allan, 1973). Both studies sought to investigate the main advantages and constraints encountered in growing high yielding varieties (HYVs) of wheat. Bulandshahr District was chosen for these studies as it had been targeted (on account of its well developed irrigation and agrarian infrastructure) in 1966 for India’s High Yielding Varieties Programme which sought to increase cropping intensities by introducing daylight insensitive HYV wheats with short maturation periods (Lipton and Longhurst, 1989; Swaminathan, 1996).3 Our information on agricultural conditions in Bulandshahr District in the early days of the Green Revolution draws heavily on Baker’s 1972 Weldwork (Baker, 1975) which provides valuable background for our more recent Weldwork. Some of the main Wndings from this study are presented below. 4. Agriculture in Bulandshahr in the early days of the Green Revolution Agriculture in Bulandshahr district was, and still is characterized by three main cropping seasons: the Kharif season which takes advantage of monsoon rainfall between June and October, the drier Rabi season between October and April (for which irrigation is required) and the short premonsoon Zaid season between late March and June. In 1972, maize was the dominant Kharif crop with sugar cane an important cash crop and rice and millets being grown as minor additional food crops. In the Rabi season, wheat was dominant with small amounts of barley, pulses, oilseeds and sugarcane. The Zaid was devoted to cash crops such as grams, pulses and chillies (Bulletin of Agricultural Statistics, 1972; Atkinson, 1903). Adoption of the new HYVs within Bulandshahr District was very rapid. By 1971, almost 65% of Bulandshahr’s total cultivated area in the Rabi season was planted with wheat, and of this over 90% was sown with HYVs (Bulletin of Agricultural Statistics, 1972; PNB, 1971). Discussions in the Weld showed that even farmers with marginal landholdings (less than 0.4 ha) were reaping more wheat from the same unit area, and those unable to produce a marketable surplus beneWted from a signiWcant increase in food security.

3 Bulandshahr has beneWted from irrigation since the mid-19th century when it was linked to an extensive canal network built by the British in response to the 1837–1838 famines (Atkinson, 1903; Whitcombe, 1971). The Ganga Canal was completed in 1854 and its irrigation waters reached Bulandshahr the following year. Thereafter, agricultural change was very rapid as the irrigated area increased by 565% between 1871 and 1883 and the cultivable area increased from 54% to 73% of the District between 1854 and 1902 (Atkinson, 1903).

In Baker’s (1975) study, 191 out of 196 sample interviewees (97.4%) believed that the shift to HYVs had been worthwhile as fears of food shortages, the dominant concern in their lives during the late 1960s, had abated as a consequence. Following the introduction of wheat HYVs, signiWcant shifts in Rabi and Kharif cropping patterns occurred in the study villages. Although wheat has been the principal Rabi crop and Bulandshahr’s main staple since at least 1883, it became much more dominant as a monocrop between 1955 and 1972. Also evident was a corresponding decline in intercropping and a fall in the area under other Rabi crops, particularly pulses and barley. In the Kharif, cropping patterns also changed between 1965 and 1972, with traditional varieties of rice and maize gradually being replaced with HYV of these crops. 4.1. HYV adoption, yields and inputs by landholding group and community Virtually all farmers involved in Baker’s study had been won over by HYVs, especially the new HYV wheats which proved to be reliable and high yielding, as long as they received adequate and timely inputs of irrigation water and fertilizer. Average wheat yields in Bulandshahr in 1968 were 1825 kg/ha (compared to the national average of 810 kg/ha), but rose to 3000 kg/ha in the study villages by 1972. Although the earliest HYV wheats were pink and coarse grained, domestically bred HYVs were rapidly introduced. Their high yields made these varieties economically attractive to farmers as well as providing them with greater food security in a situation where ‘the stork was beginning to outrun the plough’ (Brown, 1970, p. 5). Another economic factor boosting wheat growing was the shift in US aid policy from long- to short-term food aid allocations (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000) which raised Indian wheat prices from their previously depressed levels (Baker, 1975). Although Baker’s research clearly showed that Bulandshahr’s farmers had great enthusiasm for the new wheats in 1972, it also challenged early critiques of the Green Revolution’s resource neutrality and accessibility to diVerent landholding groups (Ladejinsky, 1969; Chakravarti, 1973). For example, the assumption that larger farmers were the earliest to adopt HYVs while smaller farmers were the laggards was only borne out to a limited extent in Bulandshahr. Large farmers (owning and cultivating over 25.9 ha) were generally, but not exclusively, the Wrst to adopt HYVs prior to 1968–1969. Some small farmers were early adopters too, however, and demand for wheat HYVs was such that shortly after 1969, two-thirds of the smallest landholders (cultivating 0.1–0.2 ha) had started growing these. By 1972, farmers from all land holding groups were cultivating at least some HYV wheat, thus the beneWts of HYVs spoke for themselves. When Baker’s yield data were examined in relation to landholding size, there was some evidence that larger farmers

S. Jewitt, K. Baker / Geoforum 38 (2007) 73–89

obtained higher yields, although this was not always the case. Across the sample of 196 farmers, it was clear that yields had increased as a result of the HYVs, but the data were reluctant to reveal any further patterns at this scale. However, when yields and farming practices were analysed according to community, clear patterns began to emerge.4 Resonating with Lipton’s idea of a ‘casteocracy’ (Lipton, 1973) and Srinivas’s (1960) account of India’s ‘dominant castes’, Baker’s (1975) study revealed caste to be the most inXuential variable regarding rate of HYV adoption, the yields achieved from HYVs and a range of management practices including the application of inorganic fertilizer and irrigation water. The data indicated that the most progressive farmers were the politically dominant Brahmins, Rajputs and Jats (identiWed by Baker, 1975 as ‘group 1’) who owned the lion’s share of village landholdings. At the time of the study, the Jats were the most progressive farmers within this lead group. A second group who were less often innovators but were swift to follow the lead of the Jats, Brahmins and Rajputs, were lower caste Lodhas and Gujars, identiWed as ‘group 2’. The most backward group of cultivators in 1972 included Scheduled Caste Chamars, Muslim–Rajputs,5 and Muslims (‘group 3’) who typically owned the smallest farms. Although there were some aZuent Muslim and Muslim–Rajput farmers in Sabdalpur and Chirchita who could be classed as progressive, the majority of Muslims tended to be numbered among the smaller farmers. Data on farming practices showed that in 1972, there was a positive relationship between inputs and yield with the abiotic needs of HYV wheats not being met equally across the sample population. Irrigation was identiWed as the key input aVecting yields with questionnaire data revealing that the 16% of farmers who had privately owned tube wells achieved a mean yield of 3200 kg/ha compared to 1420 kg for farmers with no reliable irrigation source. Yields also varied signiWcantly according to the type of irrigation used, with private tube well irrigation producing the highest yields and canals providing limited yield gains over open wells (see Table 1). The low yields associated with government tube wells were due to frequent power cuts which interrupted irrigation and often caused farmers to miss their turn. Predictably, ‘group 1’ households had access to the most reliable water sources as it was they who largely owned private tube wells. Lower caste Hindu farmers and the poorest Muslim and Muslim– Rajput landholders, by contrast, were either towards the 4 This was despite the fact that at every stage in the study, participants (including academics, government oYcials, interpreters, village oYcials and farmers) denied that community was of any relevance to the analysis. 5 Muslim–Rajputs, otherwise known as Mewati Muslims were descended from Meos, Rajput tribes living in Mewat, a Gangetic plateau in northern India. These Meos converted to Islam in the 12th and 13th centuries. At that time they retained many socio-religious practices from their Hindu past. Islamization of Mewati Muslims was brought about by the teachings and work of Mawlana Ilyas in the Mewati region in the 1920s (Ahmad, 2004).

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Table 1 Mean yields from wheat irrigated from diVerent sources Irrigation source

Yield data from 1972 questionnaire (kg/ha)

Yield data from 1972 crop cutting samples (kg/ha)

Privately owned tube well Neighbour’s tube well Canal Open well, pits, etc. No reliable source Government tube well

3200

3560

2550

2950

1960 1840 1420 1115

1530

Source: Baker (1975).

lower end of a list of recipients of canal irrigation (by which time the supply had diminished), were dependent on buying tube well water from richer neighbours (at a time convenient to the latter), or depended on unreliable government tube wells. The use of fertilizer, the second key input, increased signiWcantly after 1966 when HYVs became available. Previously, farmers had relied exclusively on green and organic manures, but started to adopt chemical fertilizers in response to their distribution as part of the Green Revolution package. By 1971, Bulandshahr’s farmers as a whole were consuming over 10,000 tonnes of nitrogenous fertilizer and over 3000 tonnes of phosphatic fertilizer a year, compared with under 1000 tonnes of each in 1960 (Ministry of Agriculture and IBRD, 1972). Although no direct relationship was found between yield and fertilizer application, the 37% of sample farmers who used adequate, or more than adequate fertilizer (i.e. above government guidelines), reaped signiWcantly higher yields 99% of the time. Despite the fact that ‘group 3’ farmers tended to use the newer and more costly fertilizer no less than ‘group 1’ farmers (Baker, 1975), there were clear community-related variations in farmers’ abilities to obtain good quality fertilizers on time.6 In summary, Baker’s ‘group 1’ (Jats, Brahmins and Rajputs) included many of the largest and wealthiest landholders who were in a strong position to aVord essential inputs of irrigation water and fertilizer, and who belonged to strong social networks which gave them access to fertilizer at a time when availability was limited in North India. Smaller and less wealthy ‘group 3’ farmers whose access to essential resources for HYV wheat was more limited, often achieved slightly lower yields. An attempt was made to triangulate questionnaire results with data generated from crop cutting samples taken from 35 Welds. The samples were threshed locally and conWrmed the positive relationship 6 The safest place for farmers to get fertilizer was from the cooperative, but if they had not re-paid existing loans, they could no longer get credit from this source. The cooperative system eVectively restricted small farmer involvement by linking loan disbursement with the ability to sell surplus wheat, which few small farmers could produce.

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between high yields and high levels of inputs applied at the correct time. The crop samples also conWrmed that ‘group 1 and 2’ farmers produced higher wheat yields than ‘group 3’ farmers. In our post 2001 Weldwork, we were interested to understand how the Green Revolution’s material impacts varied within the study villages. In order to maximize the range of local perspectives on the GR’s beneWts and failings, we sought to hear the stories of villagers from diVerent landowning, community, religious and gender groups. After seeking a general assessment of the GR’s impacts on local quality of life, we examined the main environmental problems that villagers had encountered, who had gained and lost out in socio-economic terms and how traditional landholding and community hierarchies had been aVected. The results of our investigations are presented below but for reasons of space, the paper focuses mainly on the GR’s socio-economic impacts with environmental issues being covered only brieXy. 5. Impacts of the Green Revolution After revisiting Bulandshahr in 2001, Baker’s Wrst impression was that quality of life in the study villages had improved signiWcantly since the early 1970s. In particular, she noticed that open wells had largely been replaced by domestic hand pumps, brick houses had replaced mud-built ones and cars and tractors were numerous. With respect to the villagers themselves, she found that standards of dress were much higher, the eye infections and septic wounds so frequently evident on limbs in 1972 were virtually absent and most people seemed a great deal healthier and better fed. Subsequent discussions with diVerent socio-economic and gender groups revealed that the widespread food crises of the 1960s were a distant memory. Discussions with marginal and landless farmers in Chirchita suggested that ‘before the GR, poor people had only enough food for 3–4 months of the year ƒ Nobody sleeps with an empty stomach nowadays’. With the exception of some of the poorest landless Muslim and ‘sweeper caste’ Balmiki villagers (who have long formed the lowest rung of local socio-economic hierarchies), there was a strong feeling in the study villages that the Green Revolution has beneWted almost everyone as it ‘brought higher yields, cheaper food and more work’ (Marginal/landless men’s group, Chirchita). Farmers of all communities were regularly harvesting over 4500 kg/ha of wheat with an average yield of around 4000 kg/ha. This compared very favourably with traditional wheats which yielded 1000–1500 kg/ha and early HYVs which yielded 2500–4000 kg/ha in 1972. In addition to bringing much needed food security, most villagers associated the Green Revolution with signiWcant increases in incomes and quality of life. Improvements to village infrastructure, especially electricity provision and metalled roads were directly associated with the introduction of HYVs. Increases in the availability of non-agricul-

tural work in and around Bulandshahr town were also largely attributed to the re-investment of wealth generated by the Green Revolution rather than to India’s wider economic development. Eighty-four percent of the villagers that spoke to us about the impacts of the Green Revolution felt that it had improved their living standards and 97% were emphatic that the introduction of HYV wheats had improved food security as ‘even the poor eat better nowadays’ (Muslim man, medium landholder, Sabdalpur). Discussion groups in Sabdalpur estimated that there were over 50 televisions, 20 refrigerators and 15 washing machines in the village and that around 20% of households had gas stoves, 10% had electric stoves and 70% had hand pumps within their homes. The majority of the village women involved in participatory appraisal made a strong association between wealth created by the Green Revolution and the advent of labour saving devices that reduced the drudgery of their daily tasks. The most signiWcant was the mechanization of Xour milling which saved most women at least two hours of work per day. Other devices that women associated with wealth generated by the Green Revolution were chaV cutting machines, domestic hand pumps for water and new types of cooking stove. Participatory appraisal with Jat women (from all landholding groups) in Chirchita revealed that by increasing villagers’ incomes and food security, the Green Revolution brought increased literacy levels and education opportunities as many parents could better aVord to send their children to school. This was conWrmed by school teachers in the villages and recent secondary source data which indicated a 60% adult literacy rate in the District compared to 46% in 1991 (Jagran Research Centre, 2003).7 Several women also mentioned that the Green Revolution had brought improvements to both health care and diet and ‘as a result, infant mortality has declined, life expectancy has increased and cases of malaria, TB and night blindness are fewer’ (Women’s agricultural extension workers group, Chola): responses that were conWrmed by a local doctor. 5.1. Environmental impacts In environmental terms, however, a number of changes have taken place since 1972 which echo the concerns of radical Green Revolution critics such as Shiva (1991). Over the past 20 or so years, pulse and barley cultivation have largely been displaced by rotations of HYV wheat in the Rabi season followed by HYV rice in the Kharif.8 Over the same period, traditional soil fertility treatments such as

7 The corresponding Wgures for Uttar Pradesh as a whole are 77.4 for 2001 and 40.7 for 1991. Projected life expectancy in UP for 2001–2006 is 63.8 compared to an Indian average of 64.75. Infant mortality projections for the same period are 53 for the State (Tata Services Limited, 2002). 8 HYV rice has taken over from maize as the dominant Kharif crop since the release of a high quality HYV rice called ‘Pusa basmati’ which yields well (up to 5000 kg/ha) and fetches a good market price.

S. Jewitt, K. Baker / Geoforum 38 (2007) 73–89

the use of fallow, green and organic manure9 have declined in favour of chemical fertilizers. This trend has generated concern about the linkages between increased agro-chemical applications, water pollution and human health problems as ‘jaundice caused by water pollution has been on the increase over the past Wve years’ (Muslim man, large landholder, Sabdalpur). Several farmers conWrmed that their inputs of inorganic fertilizer had doubled over the past 10 years as ‘without fertilizer, we get no crop’ (Small and marginal male farmer group, Sabdalpur). In addition, over 90% of our larger farmers (owning over 1 ha) complained of diminishing economic returns to agriculture caused by stagnating yields, rising agricultural input costs and cuts to fertilizer and irrigation subsidies. In part, these problems reXect diminishing returns from HYV seeds since the mid-1980s as plant breeders failed to replicate the success associated with the early HYVs (Lipton, 1999). They also point to soil micronutrient and organic matter deWciencies caused by over 30 years of intensive irrigated cereal cultivation coupled with a reduction in nitrogen-Wxing pulse cultivation and a decline in organic manure use. In 1972, Baker’s sample plots showed the soils of the study villages to be sandy and dry with a mean organic matter content of 0.69%. On average, only 70.5% of the urea and 17.6% of the calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) required by these soils was actually applied in the early 1970s. Most of the farmers that we spoke to about yield stagnation associated it with deWciencies in micronutrients (zinc, sulphur, boron), organic matter and soil fauna and although the beneWts of organic manure were widely recognized, villagers frequently pointed out that ‘unless you have lots of animals, you can’t produce enough compost ƒ Unless you have a gas stove to cook on, most dung gets used to make fuel cakes’ (Yadav man, medium landholder, Naibasti). Farmers’ complaints about declining proWt ratios and concern over agro-chemical-related health problems, meanwhile, seem to be well grounded given the excessive use of inorganic fertilizer to combat the yield stagnation problem. In contrast, land salinity which was a major environmental issue during the early 1970s (Baker, 1975) has now been largely eliminated. Initially associated with naturally occurring alkali soil conditions aggravated by the region’s extensive canal irrigation network, salinization aVected around 5% of Bulandshahr’s agricultural land in 1972 (Allan, 1973). Nowadays, all but 0.5% of saline land in the Weldwork area has been reclaimed.10 In non-canal irrigated 9

Although 31% of Baker’s respondents used organic manure in 1972, they tended to use it in addition to chemical fertilizers and reported a considerable decline in its use after the introduction of HYVs and chemical fertilizers. Field discussions showed that farmers considered the use of green manure an ‘old fashioned technique, and not in keeping with the more modern approach to farming ƒ for which they had been encouraged to use chemical fertilizers’ (Baker, 1975, p. 389). 10 This is usually done by draining the Welds, applying gypsum or pyrite and organic manure (paddy straw or sugar cane waste) followed by Xooding for 15–30 days and the planting of crops such as Crotalaria juncea to increase the nitrogen content of the soil.

79

areas, however, declining water table levels are becoming problematic and have caused some Welds to be abandoned as wells have dried up and their owners cannot aVord deep tube wells. In spite of these problems, however, less than half of our respondents associated the Green Revolution with worsening environmental problems. The rest showed quite low levels of environmental concern, viewing problems such as water pollution and soil fertility decline as resolvable and a small price to pay for the socio-economic beneWts that the Green Revolution had brought. 5.2. Socio-economic impacts Having established that signiWcant material improvements had taken place in all of the study villages, we went on to examine the extent to which wider socio-economic critiques of the Green Revolution were borne out in the research area (Ladejinsky, 1969; Chakravarti, 1973; Pearse, 1980; Byres, 1981; Johnston and Kilby, 1975). To do this, we investigated changes to intra-village landholding patterns, wealth distribution and farming practices/constraints by landholding and community group. Particular attention was also given to the changing fortunes of landless households from diVerent communities. 5.2.1. Changes in landholding patterns by landholding size and community In order to investigate the Green Revolution’s impact on socio-economic diVerentiation within the study villages, our initial participatory appraisal exercises sought to compare current landholding patterns with Baker’s (1975) data. In each of our three study villages, three clear patterns emerged; namely a decline in the proportion (though not in the absolute number) of landless households, a reduction in the number and proportion of large landholders (over 2 ha) and an increase in the number of small (0.4–0.99 ha) and marginal (0–0.39 ha) farmers. The data from Chirchita (see Table 2) provide a typical example of how the percentage of large farmers has decreased signiWcantly since 1972 relative to the proportion of households in the 0.4–0.99 ha category. Participatory appraisal identiWed four main reasons for these changes. Firstly, land fragmentation has reduced the size of many landholdings, creating a larger number of

Table 2 Households by landholding group in Chirchita Landholding category 1972 households 1972 2003 households 2003 (out of 125) (%) (out of 550) (%) Large farmers > 2 ha Medium farmers 1–1.99 ha Small farmers 0.4–0.99 ha Marginal farmers 0–0.39 ha Landless

26 12

20 10

2 28

<1 5

37

29

320

58

36

29

150

27

15

12

50

9

Source: Baker (1975) and Jewitt and Baker Weldwork (2001–2005).

80

S. Jewitt, K. Baker / Geoforum 38 (2007) 73–89

small landholdings as village populations have increased. In 1972, the mean landholding in the study villages was 3.54 ha (Baker, 1975) whereas recent Weld visits revealed it to be under 1.2 ha. Although the Green Revolution has delayed the impacts of this process by making each unit of land more productive, land fragmentation has been the inevitable result of population increase coupled with partible inheritance systems where all sons inherit a share of the family’s land. Secondly (and relatedly), there has been a signiWcant increase in the number and proportion of small, marginal and landless Muslim, Muslim–Rajput and (to a lesser extent) Scheduled Caste households in the study villages with Scheduled Castes such as Chamars and Balmikis becoming numerically dominant among the Hindu villagers. According to the study village Pradhans11 and several of the elders in Sabdalpur and Chirchita, this increase is due to the fact that many Muslim and Scheduled Caste households do not practice birth control. In Chirchita, many Scheduled Caste (Khatik, Dhobi and Chamar) landholdings became fragmented to such an extent that some became unviable and were sold. The greatest concern regarding population increase, however, has tended to be directed against Muslim and Muslim–Rajput villagers whose populations have increased signiWcantly relative to those of ‘group 1’ households. In Sabdalpur, the percentage of Rajput households declined from 50% to 5% between 1972 and 2001 while Scheduled Caste populations increased from 20% to 45% and Muslim households increased from 30% to 50% of the village population. A similar situation was apparent in Chirchita where Brahmins declined from 5% to 1% of the village population between 1972 and 2003, Jats declined from 16% to around 10% and Muslims/Muslim–Rajputs increased from 50% to 75%. Chirchita’s Pradhan (a Jat) suggested that the average number of children in Muslim families was eight compared to four in Hindu families and highlighted this as a cause of ‘poverty, declining farm size and worsening land quality’ amongst Muslim landholders. Similar sentiments were echoed on many occasions in Sabdalpur and Chirchita and reXect wider issues of concern to Hindu households who can see their relative importance diminishing steadily. Kurwal Banaras, by contrast, does not have any Muslim households, but socio-economic changes there echo those in the other two villages. ‘Group 1’ Brahmin and Rajput households have declined in proportion to ‘group 2 and 3’ Lodha and Scheduled Caste households which have become more dominant both numerically and in terms of their share of landholdings. Thirdly, the economic opportunities generated by the Green Revolution have enabled some of the wealthiest ‘group 1’ farmers to diversify into non-agricultural spheres

11 A Pradhan is an elected leader of the lowest level of local government: the Panchayat.

Table 3 ‘Group 1’ outmigration Village

Caste

Current employment

Sabdalpur

Rajput

Chirchita

Jat

Kurwal Banaras

Brahmin

Two brothers: one owns a pot-making factory and the other works as a Wnancial adviser in Bulandshahr Three families migrated. One family now relies on government service and business (plastic production) as their main income source. Another owns a property sales business and the third owns a major construction business One Brahmin man manages a popular hotel in Bulandshahr and another has a job as a Wnancial adviser in Bulandshahr

Source: Jewitt and Baker Weldwork (2001–2005).

and move to urban areas. Resonating with research on Jat farmers in nearby Meerut District (JeVrey and Lerche, 2000),12 many of the largest Rajput, Jat and Brahmin landowners in the study villages used proWts from the GR to educate their children and assist them in securing salaried jobs (or setting up businesses) outside the village. Examples of jobs currently undertaken by successful ‘group 1’ outmigrants from the study villages are shown in Table 3. As paying agricultural labourers became increasingly expensive and yields started to fall due to poorer quality land management (by hired labour), some ‘group 1’ outmigrants either rented out or sold part of their land: often the poorest quality or most remote Welds that were subject to crop theft or grazing by Nilgai deer. This trend increased as yield stagnation together with cuts to agricultural input subsidies reduced economic returns to agriculture. Our interviews suggested that Brahmin and Rajput outmigrants have sold a greater proportion of their land than Jat families who have tended to retain family members in the village to farm their land. Most of the land sold by Brahmin, Rajput and Jat outmigrants has been acquired by ‘group 2’ Lodhas and Gujars as well as by ‘group 3’ Muslims, Muslim–Rajputs, Chamars and other Scheduled Castes which formed the middle and bottom of the socio-economic and landowning hierarchy in 1972 (see Table 4). As these ‘group 2 and 3’ households tend to have larger families than ‘group 1’ villagers, many have used the household labour at their disposal to diversify and improve their livelihoods. Those with small/marginal holdings often cultivate their land very carefully to maximize yields (for example by weeding their crops thoroughly, applying inputs on time and using organic manure on their Welds) whilst at the same time 12 JeVrey and Lerche (2000) found that the sons of larger (over 4.86 ha) Jat farmers had been more successful in obtaining prestigious white collar jobs than the sons of smaller Jat landowners. Although the latter group had been reasonably successful in getting low ranking government, army, police, teaching and factory employment, the sons of some smaller landowners had been compelled to seek wage labour. Consequently, JeVery and Lerche argued that class diVerences based on land were being reproduced in the quest for jobs outside the village.

S. Jewitt, K. Baker / Geoforum 38 (2007) 73–89

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Table 4 Village landholdings by community Community Brahmin Rajput Jat Chamars (SC) Other SCs Muslim Muslim–Rajput

Sabdalpur 1972 (%)

Sabdalpur 2001 (%)

Chirchita 1972 (%) 5

50

44

<1 0 50

1 <1a (redistributed ‘waste’ land) 55

60 15 0 0 20

Chirchita 2005 (%) <1 29 8 2 (purchased) <1a (redistributed ‘waste’ land) <1a (redistributed ‘waste’ land) 60

Source: Baker (1975) and Jewitt and Baker Weldwork (2001–2005). a This comprises village ‘waste land’ recently redistributed to the landless (rather than land purchased from other villagers) and so does not appear in the 1972 data.

seeking oV-farm work to maximize cash incomes. Several landless households have also succeeded in pooling together enough money from oV-farm work to buy small amounts of land and the poor quality land on oVer has not deterred them as they have suYcient labour resources to improve and manage it eVectively. Of the land sold by Sabdalpur’s two wealthiest Rajput outmigrants, 11 ha were purchased by Muslim households who had family members working in the Gulf, 2.2 ha were bought by two Chamar families and the rest was acquired by a Rajput family from a neighbouring village. In Chirchita, 12 small and medium Muslim–Rajput farmers who had household members working in the Gulf purchased 12 ha from Jat outmigrants. Fourthly, government schemes aimed at redistributing land above an 18 acre ceiling coupled with the periodic identiWcation and redistribution of village ‘wasteland’ to landless households have played a minor (but socio-economically important) role in changing landownership patterns. In addition, the completion of a land consolidation programme within the past two years has seen a further redistribution of small parcels of land. Decisions about who will receive redistributed land are made by the village Pradhan in consultation with the landless community in light of the government’s recommendation that each landless household should ultimately receive two bighas (0.08 ha). In Sabdalpur, around 25% of formerly landless SC (Balmiki and Chamar) and Muslim households now own redistributed land and although the quality is rather poor, most seem delighted to have it. One woman commented that ‘we received 2 bighas as part of the land redistribution programmes ƒ Our land is of poor quality ƒ not very fertile ƒ but we are very pleased to have it. We have only had it for 2 months and are in the process of improving it’ (Chamar woman, marginal landowner, Sabdalpur). In Chirchita, a number of landless Balmiki and Muslim households were each allocated 1 bigha (0.04 ha) of land during the 1990s and 20% of the poorest landless households (mostly Balmikis and Muslims plus a few Dhobis, Khatiks and Chamars) will receive land during 2006. 5.2.2. Shifts in wealth distribution and the importance of nonagricultural work With respect to studies that associate the Green Revolution with increased socio-economic polarization (Chakrav-

arti, 1973; Pearse, 1980; Byres, 1981, 1983; Brass, 1994), there appears to be limited conWrmation amongst households in our study villages. Although Baker’s (1975) research showed clear links between community and HYV adoption, yields and agricultural inputs, the economic beneWts generated by the Green Revolution seem to have paved the way for a subsequent redistribution of land and wealth as well as a weakening of traditional communitybased socio-economic hierarchies. Indeed, 85% of our respondents disagreed with the idea that the Green Revolution had made poor villagers poorer. Nevertheless, earlier participatory research (Baker and Jewitt, forthcoming) had pointed to widening wealth gaps between farmers cultivating more and less than three acres (1.21 ha) due to inequalities in access to (and prices paid for) seed, fertilizer and irrigation water. Yet in spite of the diYculties faced by small farmers, the desire to own agricultural land – even a very small amount – clearly remained very strong. To investigate this issue further, subsequent Weldwork focused more closely on the centrality of agriculture to the livelihoods of diVerent landholding groups. This distinction produced some interesting Wndings in that small/medium farmers whose livelihoods depended primarily on agriculture were increasing wealth much more slowly than both large farmers (who had better, cheaper access to agricultural inputs) and small/marginal farmers who cultivated mainly for subsistence purposes and relied on nonagricultural work as their main income source. According to one medium landowner: Small and medium farmers have suVered because of large families and land fragmentation ƒ Many have swallowed their pride and now work on the Welds of other farmers or even outside the village ƒ Those that refuse to do this ‘low work’ are struggling to make ends meet as it is hard to make a good income just from farming these days (Jat man, medium landholder, Chirchita). In a similar vein, Sabdalpur’s Pradhan suggested that ‘the Green Revolution closed the gap between rich and poor and opened up work opportunities outside agriculture ƒ Non farm work is now more important than landholdings, community or agricultural productivity as a means of increasing wealth’. ReXecting this shift, non-agri-

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Table 5 Income sources for diVerent communities in Chirchita Community

% Farm income

% Other income

Typical income sources for men

Typical income sources for women

Brahmin Jat Chamar (SC)

1 70 70

99 30 30

Balmiki (SC)

<1

99+

Dhobi, Khatik (SC) Muslim–Rajputs

<1

99+

Government service, shopkeeping, business Government service, armed forces, business Shopkeeping, tailoring, carpentry, construction work, agricultural labour ‘Sweeping’ (mainly outside the village), rickshaw pulling Ironing, house cleaning, menial hotel work

Assist with business, independent careers Animal rearing, milk, independent careers Seasonal agricultural labour, animal rearing, milk, fodder and dung cake sales ‘Sweeping’, animal rearing, milk and dung cake sales Ironing, cleaning, animal rearing, milk and dung cake sales

70

30

Muslims

<1

99+

Gulf employment, construction work, driving Mainly construction and other non-agricultural labour

Animal rearing, milk sales, stitching beadwork purses Animal rearing, milk and dung cake sales, beadwork

Source: Jewitt and Baker Weldwork (2001–2005).

cultural incomes are signiWcant to all communities (see Table 5) and wealth ranking exercises in each village identiWed non-agricultural work or ‘number of wage-earners within the household’ as the second most important wealth indicator (after landholdings). This is especially signiWcant for lower caste Hindu and poorer Muslim households whose women do not observe purdah (Jewitt, 2000a, 2002) and can make a substantial contribution to household incomes. Interestingly, participatory estimates of communitybased wealth change in Sabdalpur since 1972 suggest that labour-rich marginal/landless households from Muslim and SC communities have increased their share of village wealth relative to ‘group 1’ Rajput farmers as a result of their gains in agricultural productivity and involvement in non-agricultural employment (see Table 6). A similar exercise in Chirchita showed how Muslim–Rajput success in obtaining Gulf-based employment enabled them to increase their share of village wealth at the expense of Jats and SCs and thereby substantially improve their social standing within the village. An additional problem for small SC farmers was that during the 1970s and 1980s, many lost wealth as a result of land fragmentation-induced poverty and small proWt ratios compared to larger farmers. Over the same period, the landless SC and Muslims households that formed the bottom of Chirchita’s socio-economic hierarchy made limited economic gains. Table 6 Changes in proportion of wealth by community Community Brahmin Rajput Jat Scheduled Caste Muslim Muslim–Rajput

Sabdalpur 1972 (%)

Sabdalpur 2001 (%)

50

40

1 49

5 55

Chirchita 1972 (%)

Chirchita 2005 (%)

12

1

50 18 1 19

29 10 1 59

Source: Baker (1975) and Jewitt and Baker Weldwork (2003–2005).

Due to the increased availability of oV-farm work in recent years, however, the latter trend had started to reverse as many labour-rich Muslim and SC households have developed more varied (and successful) livelihood portfolios. Chirchita’s Pradhan attributed this shift to the willingness of such households to ‘work hard and accept any form of work that presents itself’ while a landless Balmiki man commented that ‘increased wages and oV-farm work opportunities have allowed many of us to become wealthier and spend money on luxuries such as family celebrations, religious festivals and our children’s education’ (Male marginal/landless Balmiki group, Chirchita). Echoing Wndings from Meerut District (JeVrey and Lerche, 2000), an additional illustration of how non-agricultural work has inXuenced community-based wealth distribution can be found amongst smaller ‘group 1’ farmers who have been unsuccessful in obtaining remunerative ‘outside work’. According to Sabdalpur’s Pradhan, these families only ‘sought work equal to their status’ and refused to involve themselves in ‘low work’ such as nonagricultural labour. Few have maintained their formerly high levels of agricultural productivity due to insuYcient labour resources to manage their (still above average) landholdings and an inability to pay the increasing daily rates commanded by agricultural labourers. As a result, they are currently living beyond their means and have sold land (or are considering doing so) as a means of maintaining their customary living standards and consumption patterns. According to one villager: Many Rajput farmers who used to own large farms have migrated and got work in towns ƒ Some have continued to keep their farms going as well ƒ Others put their proWts [from the GR] into alcohol and luxury consumption and didn’t bother about being good farmers ƒ Some became poorer and had to sell some of their land (Muslim landless woman, Sabdalpur). In the Pradhan’s opinion, ‘only two Rajput households have increased their wealth over the past 30 years [as a

S. Jewitt, K. Baker / Geoforum 38 (2007) 73–89

result of successful outside employment] and these will be the only Rajputs left in the village in 10 years time ƒ The rest will have sold all their land to fund their luxury consumption and alcohol purchases’. The Pradhan went on to contrast their situation with the tendency of many small/marginal Muslim and lower caste Hindu households to cultivate their holdings extremely carefully in order to maximize productivity. He estimated the average wheat yield for these ‘very hard working’ farmers to be 4500 kg/ha (compared to 3950 kg/ha for ‘lazy and uninterested’ Rajput farmers) and attributed their high yields to the fact that they have ‘labour at their disposal to remove weeds, apply water and fertilizer at the correct time and undertake labour demanding yield enhancing measures such as the application of compost’. In the other two villages, a similar trend was apparent with a dedicated subgroup of small and marginal farmers being described as ‘very careful cultivators who are not afraid to take on new challenges’ (Jat male, large and medium farmers group, Chirchita). According to another Jat farmer ‘small and marginal farmers often get higher yields as they work harder on their land ƒ Large farmers like me [laughs] have become lazy and don’t work so hard on their land nowadays’ (Jat man, large landholder, Chirchita). To illustrate this point, he drew our attention to a group of marginal SC (mostly Chamar) farmers who have recently started cultivating Xowers and vegetables and obtain suYcient income from this to pay for most of their subsistence food requirements. Other villagers present spoke of these farmers with admiration and described them as being ‘willing to take other employment in addition to their farm work’ and ‘not shy about doing low status work such as agricultural labour for others’ (Jat man, large and medium farmers group, Chirchita). The group also stressed that hard-working small and marginal farmers like these had ‘increased their share of village wealth in recent years’ and were likely to ‘increase their share of village landholdings further’ as ‘group 1’ villagers sold oV their poorest quality Welds. This is not to suggest that every small/marginal farmer is thriving or that all ‘group 1’ landowners still resident in the study villages are poor cultivators who are rapidly depleting their declining wealth stocks by trying to keep up socioeconomic appearances. Indeed earlier landholding-based participatory wealth distribution exercises (Baker and Jewitt, forthcoming) indicated that income gaps are widening between households owning above and below 1.21 ha who depend on agriculture as their main livelihood. And although non-agricultural incomes have increased the wealth status of small/marginal landowners with more diverse livelihood portfolios, land is still viewed as the most important wealth indicator in the study villages. Villagers also emphasized (like Jat farmers in Meerut – JeVrey and Lerche, 2000) that the sons of many of the largest ‘group 1’ landowners had succeeded in obtaining ‘high Xy’ non-agricultural jobs, thus consolidating the socio-economic positions of their households within the village. In addition, many wealthy ‘group 1’ households have opted

83

for relatively small, highly educated families since the early 1970s and have retained larger than average landholdings as their farms suVered less from land fragmentation. As a result, they have retained a signiWcant share of the village’s land and wealth despite their small numbers. This situation was particularly apparent in Sabdalpur where in 1972, Muslims and Rajputs owned roughly equal shares of the village’s land and wealth. At that time, three Muslim families were particularly wealthy and owned the majority of non-Rajput village land. According to the Pradhan, these families considered themselves to be of equal socio-economic status to the largest Rajput landowners. Over time, however, land fragmentation caused by large family sizes reduced these Muslim households to medium landowers while the two wealthiest Rajput households with ‘small families and good ‘outside’ jobs’ (Muslim man, large landholder, Sabdalpur) retained their status as large landowners with a disproportionate share of village wealth. In Chirchita, meanwhile, the proportion of large Brahmin and Jat farmers has declined signiWcantly since 1972, but those who remain own well over 2 ha and several wealthy Jats with large landholdings see themselves as ‘progressive farmers’ and take great pride in their agricultural achievements. One wealthy Jat farmer, for example, regularly achieves wheat and rice yields of 5900 kg/ha. He manages this with the use of large compost applications at the rate of around 8 ton/ha/year coupled with a system of diverse crop rotations that seek to replenish soil fertility through the planting of pulses and green manure crops. His Welds are all reliably irrigated as he owns four deep tube wells plus a pump attachment for his tractor so that he can irrigate when the electricity supplies fails. Being a large farmer with a small family, he can also aVord the luxury of integrating fallow periods into his crop rotations which enhance subsequent yields by 20%. 5.2.3. Variations in farming practices and constraints by landholding group Unfortunately, few small and marginal farmers can undertake such non-intensive farming practices as they tend to ‘consume all that they grow ƒ Their only source of income is from agricultural or oV-farm labour ƒ Whether they do this depends on their social status ƒ whether they feel ashamed about doing ‘low work’ for others ƒ and whether they have spare household labour’ (Muslim man, medium landholder, Sabdalpur). Consequently, there are important cropping pattern variations between large, medium and small/marginal landowners. Other than the small group of SC farmers who have diversiWed into Xower and vegetable cash cropping, most small and marginal landowners grow Kharif rice followed by Rabi wheat as they rely on these ‘assured’ crops as their main food supply. Wealthier farmers, by contrast, often have more diverse cropping patterns including fodder crops (barseem, johar and oats) and soil-enhancing pulses (pigeon pea, lentils, black gram and pea) plus cash crops such as sugar cane, maize and mustard.

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S. Jewitt, K. Baker / Geoforum 38 (2007) 73–89

Table 7 Changes in income sources for landless households in Sabdalpur Income sources

1972 (men)

1972 (women)

2005 (men)

2005 (women)

1 2

Agricultural labour 90% Other labour 10%

Agricultural labour 60–65% Husking and Xour making 30–35%

Agricultural labour 15% Construction and brick work 55% Salaried employment 5%

Agricultural labour 50% Animal rearing and milk sales 20–45% Non-agricultural labour 0–30%

Milk sales 15% Gulf work 10%

Fodder sales 0–0.5% Dung cake sales 0–0.5%

3

Animal rearing, milk and ghee sales 0–10%

4 5 Source: Baker (1975) and Jewitt and Baker Weldwork (2001–2005).

Echoing the situation in the early 1970s, another important diVerence between large and smaller farmers is the cost and accessibility of agricultural inputs which remain an important problem for many small and marginal landholders (Baker and Jewitt, forthcoming). With regard to irrigation, for example, larger farmers who have their own pump sets regularly achieve yields of over 5500 kg/ha compared to 4750 kg/ha and below for farmers who have to hire pumps. An additional advantage for pump set owners is that they pay around Rs. 75013 for six irrigations compared to Rs. 1200 per acre for a farmer who hires a pump set.14 A similar situation is apparent with respect to fertilizers as larger farmers can better aVord greater applications to combat yield stagnation. Small and medium farmers with no animals to provide organic manure, meanwhile, feel trapped by their reliance on inorganic fertilizer saying ‘if we apply no fertilizer, we get no yield’ (Small and marginal male farmer group, Sabdalpur).15 A number of labour-poor small/medium farmers whose main livelihood is agriculture also claimed to be worse oV than landless and marginal households who ‘can take full advantage of outside income earning opportunities’ (Chamar man, small landowner, Chirchita). 5.2.4. Landless livelihoods ReXecting this perception, earlier participatory research (Baker and Jewitt, forthcoming) plus further participatory wealth distribution exercises in 2005 indicated that the most remarkable shift in landholding-based wealth distribution since 1972 has been in favour of the landless. Like many labour-rich small/marginal landholders with diverse livelihood portfolios, landless households have beneWted from the increased availability of wage earning opportunities and have expanded their share of wealth in all three study villages. Despite agricultural mechanization, the greater yields and cropping intensities associated with HYVs, coupled with a substantial growth in oV-farm employment have signiWcantly increased the demand for 13

One pound (sterling) is worth approximately 78 Rupees. Perhaps unsurprisingly, ‘interrupted electricity supply’ was perceived to be the biggest problem facing most large farmers. 15 Muslim households in particular have very few animals, the reason being that women play a major part in looking after animals and purdah limits the involvement of Muslim women in such activities (Jewitt, 2000b, 2002). 14

wage labour. Echoing Gupta’s (1998) Wndings elsewhere in UP, this has been particularly beneWcial for landless and near-landless households who depend on wage labour to meet their subsistence needs but are no longer at the mercy of large higher-caste farmers for employment provision. Typical wages for construction labour are now Rs. 80–100 per day compared to Rs. 70 for agricultural labour and discussions in all three villages suggested that landless incomes are now increasing more rapidly than those of many small landowning households. One man commented that: The landless have been doing better than small and medium farmers lately and their incomes are increasing rapidly ƒ As labourers’ wages increased in the urban areas, this forced wages up in rural areas too ƒ A landless family with Wve members working as daily labourers on construction sites in Bulandshahr can earn Rs. 400–500 per day (Chamar man, small landholder, Chirchita). In Sabdalpur, around 55% of landless men now take advantage of casual employment in the brick-making and construction industries and obtain only around 15% of their incomes from agricultural labour (see Table 7).16 A large number of landless families have also diversiWed into animal rearing as increased milk yields together with rising demand have made it proWtable enough to justify the eVort of keeping stall-fed cattle.17 Amongst landless Muslim households, meanwhile, remittances from the Gulf have been very important since the 1980s with 20 landless and near landless Muslim households from Sabdalpur having dramatically increased their socio-economic status from employment in the Gulf as drivers, security guards and construction workers. In the words of one landless woman: 16 The main tasks for which agricultural labour hiring takes place are Weld preparation, threshing, harvesting, transplanting and sugarcane spraying. In the Kharif season, many landless labourers go outside the village in search of work. Women tend to stay behind to tend their own Welds and animals. 17 Milk yields have increased from 4 to 8 litres/day in the early 1980s to between 6 and 12 litres now. In Sabdalpur and Chirchita, demand for milk within the villages has seen sales rise, but Kurwal Banaras, which is much closer to Bulandshahr, sells most of its milk within the town where a major market exits. ReXecting this, the number of milch animals in Kurwal Banaras has increased fourfold with the result that a household with three cows can earn Rs. 40,000–50,000 per year from milk sales.

S. Jewitt, K. Baker / Geoforum 38 (2007) 73–89

I work as a daily labourer in the village, but my husband works in Saudi as a driver ƒ He earns Rs. 15,000 per month ƒ One of my sons also worked in Saudi for Wve years and earned Rs. 7–800,000 while he was there ƒ We used some of this money to build our [two story brick-built] house ƒ At least 25 men from Sabdalpur have worked in Saudi ƒ We have never owned land in the village and used to be very poor – especially with 12 children – but that changed when my husband went to Saudi ƒ He worked Wrst as a driver in Bulandshahr, then he shifted to Delhi where he met an agent who helped him to Wnd work in Saudi (Muslim landless woman, Sabdalpur). Indeed, 32 of the 35 landless households that we interviewed claimed to be better oV nowadays as they have more work and get a Wxed daily rate compared to 30 years ago when wages were not Wxed and non-agricultural labour was limited mainly to husking and Xour making. Landless villagers’ estimates suggested that wages have doubled over the last 10 years and agricultural labour rates have been forced to rise more or less in line with non-agricultural labour rates. All of our respondents admitted to having more disposable income nowadays and one woman joked that ‘it makes sense for the landless to have big families as this brings in more money to the household’ (Chamar woman, small landowner, Chirchita). With regard to wealth variations amongst the landless, the general consensus was that type and availability of employment has become a far more important indicator of wealth than community amongst all but the Balmikis. Due to this caste’s traditional role as ‘sweepers’ (which involves the cleaning of latrines and the removal of human excrement) they face much discrimination from other villagers as well as potential employers and have thus struggled to beneWt from alternative work opportunities. At the same time, recent food price increases have made it more diYcult to meet subsistence needs and despite the education subsidies available to them,18 many Balmiki children do not attend school as they are needed at home to perform household tasks while their parents undertake their work. Few Balmiki women work outside their villages as most rear poultry and goats within the household and many have longstanding employment working for higher class/caste households who do not have proper latrines and whose women do not undertake their own ‘sweeping’ on account of purdah. Balmiki women are paid very poorly for this work and receive only 40 kg of grain per year from each household. Many continue to transport excrement from household lavatories to the Welds in baskets carried on their heads (rather than in barrows) despite attempts by the Indian government to ban this practice. On average, each Balmiki woman ‘sweeps’ for around 10 households and the 18 Government subsidies of Rs. 300 per year for class 1–4 and Rs. 480 per year for class 5–8 are available to Scheduled Castes, Muslims and ‘Other Backward Castes’.

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monetary value of this work is around Rs. 250 per year from each household. Apparently, this represents a great improvement on the situation a few years ago when they were only paid 20 kg of wheat (Rs. 125) per household. Further discussions revealed that they loathe this work and would love to earn money by other means but are prevented from doing so by a lack of opportunity compounded by wider social prejudice against them. One Balmiki woman stated that: We hate this [latrine cleaning] work, but what else can we do? ƒ We’d love to do other work such as agricultural labour ƒ But we don’t have any experience of this type of work ƒ And who would want to employ us? ƒ Perhaps we could learn to do sewing or knitting work ƒ Anything to help us pay for our children to be educated. (Landless/marginal Balmiki women’s group, Sabdalpur). Fortunately, work opportunities for Balmiki men have opened up in recent years and men from Wve of the 15 Balmiki households involved in participatory appraisal had managed to take advantage of employment opportunities outside the village. Amongst the Chirchita Balmiki community, for example, one man works as a sweeper in a bank, another works as a sweeper in a school and a third is a sweeper in a hospital. Two Balmiki men from Chirchita have also been successful in obtaining non-sweeping work and are currently employed as cycle rickshaw drivers in Bulandshahr. One has earned enough to buy a television. According to one of these men ‘these jobs are not always regular ƒ so if there is no work, there is no pay ƒ But even so, the situation is much better than in the past’ (Landless/ marginal Balmiki men’s group, Chirchita). For many of the other Balmiki families, meeting household subsistence needs is a constant battle although most still maintain that hunger is less of a problem now than prior to the Green Revolution and living conditions in the village have improved. A frequently mentioned example of this is the government’s installation of ‘India Mark II’ hand pumps in the ‘SC area’ of each study village. Ironically, these pumps provide Balmiki households with much better quality water than that drawn from the shallower homestead-based hand pumps owned by wealthier households. And in contrast to critiques of major government schemes such as the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IDRP), Panchayati Raj and the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (Dreze and Gazdar, 1996), UP’s Ambedkar Villages scheme and the 1996 land ceiling legislation (both strongly supported by the Bahujan Samaj Party) have had signiWcant beneWts for Balmikis in the study villages. Under the Ambedkar scheme, brick houses are being built, mud paths are being paved with brick and Rs. 20,000 per village has been provided for the construction of proper latrines and septic tanks for SCs who are expected, in return, to provide labour for a signiWcant part of these improvements. Land redistribution has also had a profound impact on the livelihoods of its beneWciaries. From a variety of group

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discussions with landless Balmiki and Muslim families in Sabdalpur, it became apparent that even a tiny amount of land can make a crucial diVerence to a household’s self-perception and livelihood opportunities. One Balmiki man told us in great detail how thrilled he was to have become a landowner: We were given 2 bighas [0.08 ha] of redistributed land in the 1990s ƒ Although we don’t have much land, what we have has made a huge diVerence to our lives ƒ The land was not very fertile when we got it ƒ and it needed to be treated for salt damage ƒ That was not too diYcult, but I was surprised at how much it cost to put water on to Xush out the salt ƒ We grow wheat in the Rabi and rice in the Kharif ƒ It feels really good to grow our own food after a lifetime of being landless (Landless/marginal Balmiki men’s group, Chirchita). 6. Conclusions Although there are unavoidable diYculties in trying to identify how diVerent groups have beneWted or lost out from the rapid agrarian changes of the past 35 years, the task is an important one if the claims and criticisms made of the Green Revolution are to be properly assessed in light of local experiences. It is also useful to investigate how local people diVerentiate problems and beneWts created by changes in farming technology from those created by other factors including population increase, land fragmentation and prevailing economic trends aVecting agriculture. As these latter changes have occurred largely independently of the Green Revolution, it is important to reXect on whether their impact would have been worse in the absence of increased food production brought by HYVs, irrigation and agro-chemicals. In the case of population increase and land fragmentation, this is almost certainly so. All of the diVerent landholding groups that we spoke to were adamant that the Green Revolution had increased their food security in spite of declining people:land ratios. It also seems clear that despite the environmental drawbacks of inorganic fertilizers, villagers would have struggled to maintain yields without them (in the absence of a totally diVerent agricultural research emphasis in India) as by the early 1970s, almost all available cattle manure was being used as cooking fuel. Interestingly, most farmers associate diminishing economic returns to agriculture with falling agricultural input subsidies rather than with yield stagnation caused by declining soil quality; mainly because they link the latter problem to dung and household energy shortages rather than to intensive irrigated cereal cultivation per se. And while several ‘group 1’ farmers complained that agricultural proWts had been negatively aVected by higher yields creating lower market prices, this must be considered against the beneWts of increased purchasing power and food security for the landless (Gupta, 1998; Corbridge and Harriss, 2000).

When asked to compare the Green Revolution’s beneWts with those brought by wider changes such as state-sponsored development programmes, rapid economic growth and liberalisation, over two thirds of our respondents felt that the Green Revolution had been more eVective in generating wealth at the local level amongst all socio-economic groups. With regard to the main constraints aVecting local livelihoods, on the other hand, most of those mentioned related to the government’s economic policies (especially cuts to agricultural subsidies) and failure to improve rural infrastructure (such as roads and electricity supply) rather than to the impacts of the Green Revolution. Although recent Bahujan Samaj Party initiatives such as land redistribution and the Ambedkar Villages scheme were highly praised amongst the landless, village elders criticised older schemes such as the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) and Community Development Cooperatives for being largely ineVective. Discussions about the impacts of India’s economic liberalisation, meanwhile, revealed that such issues were seen as rather remote from the livelihoods of most villagers except in terms of their impact on agricultural subsidies. Even though non-agricultural work is clearly more important than the Green Revolution as a means of increasing wealth in the research area nowadays, the majority of our respondents linked the increased availability of such work to the re-investment of proWts generated by the GR rather than to India’s wider economic development or to globalization more generally. The main exception to this is the growth of Gulf-based employment opportunities since the mid-1980s which has brought much greater improvements to the socio-economic status of participating Muslim households than the Green Revolution did. Another, more tenuous link to globalisation that one villager mentioned was its role in the growth of Delhi’s tourism industry, which several Jat families in the District had taken advantage of by setting up a coach travel business. The fastest growing non-agricultural business amongst the Jat community – land sales and development – by contrast, was strongly associated with the Green Revolution in terms of its role in increasing the liquidity of local land markets and facilitating the outmigration of ‘group 1’ households. One reason for this strong positive association between agrarian change and economic development amongst the study villagers may be that the Green Revolution had such a major impact locally that other, more remote factors responsible for economic growth are given less importance than they deserve. As our study set out to investigate local perceptions of the Green Revolution’s impacts, however, perhaps the most important lesson to draw is that the overwhelming majority of study villagers associate the Green Revolution with signiWcant socio-economic beneWts, decreasing wealth disparities and a weakening of traditional caste/class hierarchies. Participants from Kurwal Banaras and Chirchita elaborated on this point by describing a gradual ‘dilution’ of earlier community-based power

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structures as successful ‘group 1’ farmers started to invest their wealth and power outside the village and marginal/ landless households from Muslim and lower caste Hindu communities increased their share of village wealth by seeking outside employment and buying land. Another important factor has been the role of land fragmentation in reducing the wealth and status gap between ‘group 1’ households and other villagers. There was also a general sense that a weakening of community-based wealth inequalities over time had brought a decline in intra-village tension which is now only an issue during Panchayat elections (when Wghts sometimes break out and insults are traded between the supporters of candidates from diVerent communities). Although several respondents mentioned an increase in crime, this was attributed to frustration regarding the inability of educated villagers to gain ‘acceptable’ (i.e. government service) employment rather than to community-based tension. In Sabdalpur, the (Muslim) Pradhan identiWed Muslim youths as the main group responsible for intra-village crime but was quick to point out that opportunities for work in the Gulf had reduced this problem in recent years. He also emphasized that the victims of such crime were random and not directed against any particular community, although other respondents emphasized the role of visible status symbols such as satellite dishes and cars in provoking theft. Echoing Menski’s (1998) study of South Asia’s ‘dowry problem’ a related concern amongst women was that increases in visible wealth had brought demands for much higher dowries (especially for educated boys) which obviously causes concern for poorer families as well as those with more daughters than sons.19 Overall, however, we found little evidence of the type of Green Revolutioninduced violence described by Shiva (1991). Nor was there any real sense that the study villagers identiWed with post-development critiques linking the types of ‘top down’ development typiWed by the Green Revolution to ‘massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression’ (Escobar, 1995, p. 4). Instead, most landholders made strong positive associations between development and the Green Revolution and were emphatic about the socio-economic beneWts of the latter. Although there were clear disparities in the costs of agricultural production to small and large farmers, all landholding groups obtained signiWcantly higher yields than before the Green Revolution. In addition, many small/marginal households have reduced their dependence on agriculture as their main livelihood by diversifying into more lucrative non-agricultural employment. Even the poorest landless Balmiki and Muslim villagers oVered little support for radical post-development critiques. Instead, most associated the Green Revolution with ‘cheaper food and more work’ (Marginal/landless Balmiki men’s group, Chirchita)

19 Hiring a popular venue in Bulandshahr for a wedding party of 250 people costs Rs. 100,000 (£1280).

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while initiatives such as Ambedkar Villages and land redistribution schemes oVered signiWcant opportunities for livelihood improvement. And in contrast to the vitriolic critiques that the Green Revolution has received over the years for its environmental impacts, most of our respondents demonstrated fairly low levels of concern for environmental problems; the main exceptions being water pollution (from agro-chemicals) and yield stagnation (mainly on account of its economic impacts). Solutions to these problems were seen primarily in the form of more ‘development’; largely through further plant breeding initiatives, possibly using GM, to allow crops to yield well on poor quality soils with reduced agrochemical inputs. In addition, older soil improvement techniques such as composting and pulse intercropping were practiced by a few farmers. Indeed, echoing Blaut’s (1973) and Buchanan’s (1977) emphasis on ‘planning research with people rather than for them’ (Power, 2003, p. 67) villagers were very keen for the authors to seek funding for participatory crop trials to investigate the economic and soil quality beneWts of integrating these methods into existing cropping patterns. But as one farmer pointed out: Everyone is aware of declining soil fertility ƒ and of the need to grow more pulses ƒ and increase the use of organic matter ƒ The problem is that pulses are low yielding and risk prone ƒ and there is not enough spare dung [after making fuel cakes] to compost ƒ Composting is also labour intensive, so not everyone can aVord the time to do it (Male small and medium landholder group, Chirchita). It is our intention in future research to explore, in conjunction with local villagers, possible solutions to these interlinked problems of soil quality decline and shortages of dung, labour and household energy. In particular, we hope to use participatory crop trials to investigate whether the use of dung as an organic manure rather than as a cooking fuel can generate suYcient funds (through increased yields and reduced chemical fertilizer inputs) to pay for alternative stoves and cooking fuels. Acknowledgements We are very grateful to the villagers of Sabdalpur, Chirchita and Kurwal Banaras for sharing their time, perceptions and insights with us. We are also deeply indebted to Dr. Raghvendra Yadav for his expertise and hard work, without which this work would not have been possible. References Adato, M., Meinzen-Dick, R., 2002. Assessing the impacts of agricultural research on poverty. Using the sustainable livelihoods framework. International Food and Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Addad, L., Hazell, P., 2001. Agricultural Research and Poverty Reduction. International Food and Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Ahmad, M. 2004. The Tablighi Jama’at. (accessed 05.11.04).

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Glossary and acronyms Barseem: Clover GR: Green Revolution HYV: High yielding varieties of seed Johar: Sorghum Jawahar Rozgar Yojana: Employment Assurance Scheme Kharif: The monsoon cropping season which lasts from June to October Pradhan: Elected leader of the lowest level of local government: the Panchayat Purdah: Literally means curtain or veil but has the broader meaning of female seclusion Rabi: The winter cropping season which lasts from October to April Rs. Rupees Rupee: Indian currency. One pound (sterling) is worth approximately 78 Rupees Scheduled Castes: Castes that are generally considered to belong outside the mainstream Hindu Caste system and which have been recognised by the Indian government as socio-economically backward SC: Scheduled Castes Zaid: A short pre-monsoon cropping season between late March and June