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The idea of expansion and of overseas expansion in Polish nationalism
SESSION FIVE FOCAL POINTS WORKSHOP CENTRAL/EUROPEAN
Chuirpetmtzs:
ONE NATIONALISM
Jaroslav Krejci (University of Lancaster, U.K.) George Strong (College of William and Mary, VA, U.S.A.)
5.57
0191-6599/92 $S.WtO.OO I’ 1992 Pergamon Press Led
THE IDEA OF EXPANSION AND OF OVERSEAS EXPANSION IN POLISH NATIONALISM MAREK CZAPLI$SKI*
I am sure that the question of expansion raises few doubts for the average European historian. Expansion is generally understood as reaching beyond one’s national borders, the annexation of new territories, be they adjacent or overseas. This issue becomes quite complicated, however, when we are dealing with the expansion of nations without their own states -as were many nations in East and East-Central Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century. Here we touch upon a very significant issue, one which is interpreted quite differently by the ideologists and historians of the nation in question, than by the politicians, journalists and historians of other European nations. As much, for example, as the Bulgarians saw their efforts to annex Macedonia as less ‘expansion’, than ‘the restoration of national unity’, so for the Greeks, Serbs, or even the Germans and French as well, such aims were clearly plans of ‘Bulgarian expansion’. The case of Transylvania is similar-for the Hungarians, or Rumanians this could be ‘national unification’, while for the other nations it was ‘expansion’, even if such efforts were based on some ethnic or historical arguments. This issue is not unfamiliar to Western Europeans-the examples of say, Schleswig-Holstein or Alsace-Lorraine indicate that what was ‘expansion’ for some was for others a restoration of some historical ‘status quo ante’. At the end of the nineteenth century, when all across Europe thought and politics evolved from ‘national’ to ‘nationalist’ positions, the Poles did not have their own state. Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungary had long before fulfilled on the territory of the former Polish state, their own programs of European expansion. Despite undoubted economic growth, these lands were, in comparison with the core territories of the conquerors, especially in Prussia and Austria, backward and were often exploited in the model of overseas colonies. Thus are today’s Polish historians prepared to regard the Polish lands under partitions as a sort of colony; they attribute later dif~culties in development, to a large degree, to the ties of dependency in regard to the partitioning powers.’ In this situation, the fundamental goal for the Poles had to be the rebuilding of the Polish state. Paradoxically, however, the rebuilding of the status quo ante could be interpreted by the world as Polish expansion. For Poland, in Polish historical consciousness, remained the Republic before the First Partition in 1772, a state of many nationalities, inhabited by Lithuanians, Latvians, Bielorussians, Russians, Ukrainians, Germans and Jews as well as Poles, and stretching to the East, almost as far as Smolensk, Kiev and the Dniestr River. Poles regarded the reestablishment of this state as an act of historical justice.2 Meanwhile, great changes in national consciousness had occurred in these lands *Department
of
History, Wroclaw University, 50-140 Wroclaw,
Poland. 559
560
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Czapliriski
in the course of the nineteenth century. Moreover, as a result of assimilation both natural and forced the position of the Polish element in the former Polish territories was weakened.3 All this made a simple reconstruction of the pre-1772 status impossible. On the other hand, the Poles could not accept the idea that their future state might encompass only those lands where Poles were in the undoubted majority. In practice, such a state would have to be not much larger than the Kingdom of Poland, created in 18 15 by the Congress of Vienna, while the Polish language and ethnic pockets stretched far beyond this area, both to the east (at least as far as Lvov and Vilnius) and to the west and north (Silesia, Warmia, Masuria). To a certain extent, the Polish situation recalled that of the Hungarians, as the historical borders of ‘the lands of St Stephen’s crown’ extended far beyond the region where the Magyar predominated. The problem was also in a way similar to that faced by the uniters of Germany in the nineteenth century-whether to choose the ‘grossdeutsche Lbsung’ or ‘kleindeutsche LBsung’-except that the ‘small Poland’ version would be incomparably worse than that chosen by the Prussians. The new situation caused more than a few difficulties for the creators of the Polish nationalist movement in 1890. They wanted to ignite the nation to action, to cut through the atmosphere of passivity, resignation and defeat after the last national uprising of 1863. Their statements should be seen in this context. Roman Dmowski, the creator of modern Polish nationalism and its main thinker, wrote: ‘It is necessary only to remember that the moral strength of a nation is not its defenselessness, its innocence-as we so often hear, but the demand for broader life, the desire to multiply the nation’s wealth and influence, and the readiness to devote oneself to the realization of national goals’.4 In a chapter of the book that laid foundations for the Polish nationalistic thought, Thoughts of aModern Pole, Dmowski did not conceal his fascination with the expansion of English nation. He asserted that the huge empire it has garnered placed great tasks before the English nation forcing it to devote all its energies to that empire, with no room for waste. At the same time he recognised, looking at the example of Spain, that a decline in the extent of some nation’s reign increases the number of citizens indifferent to national issues.’ For these reasons he could not accept the complete loss of the old eastern lands-inhabited in his opinion, by several million undoubted Poles. He also places great hopes in the Polish emigration. As a result of a trip to Latin America, he foresaw quite interesting perspectives for the ‘fourth district’ (a reference to the three partitioned territories of Poland). He wrote: Even if the creation of a new Polish society on the shores of the South Atlantic, in the Brazilian wilderness, were to prove an unrealizable daydream, the very initiation of such a project would yield us wide new training grounds for some part of our decaying forces, and in this way would effect the rebirth of our statnant soul. And how incalculable in theeir vastness would be the consequences, for the expansion of Polich life, of a successful effort, that is, the founding on a distant shore of a society speaking Polish and drawing its spiritual strength from the mutual wealth of a national civilisation, while enriching that civilisation with fresh elements, quite new in content6
Expansion in Polish Nationalism
561
Even if we remember that these words come at moment of great depression of the national spirit, in despair and distress, when every new idea which might awaken the nation is important; even if we remember that this is era of great migrations, when one reads of the world over of a ‘New France’, ‘New Britain’ or ‘New Germany’ overseas-these words cannot be but astonishing. This is a paradox the representative of a nation which does not yet have its own state, whose territory is a colony of foreign powers, dreams-perhaps fascinated by the German and Italian models-of a colonial policy for his nation. There is also a paradox in that Dmowski, who is later regarded as a representative in Polish politics of classic ‘Realpolitik’, a man who declares himself an opponent of Polish ‘romantic daydreams’, here seems literally to be guided by the directive of the great Polish romantic poet, Adam Mickiewicz: ‘Match your strength to your goals’. At the same time, however, it is worth nothing that Dmowski fits perfectly onto the thinking of the time-especially into those currents in England, the United States or Germany which were fascinated by social Darwinism, which also placed great emphasis on the role of expansion in the life of nations.’ Dmowski continues even more unambiguously: Let us widen the horizons of national thought, let us clear wide paths for it across barriers, let it reach everywhere that Polishness lives and wishes to live; let us awaken the Polish spirit from its slumber whenever necessary, and go to battle in its defence to the most distant lands; let us build new Poland overseas; let us create from all this one great modern national idea-and our might shall grow as never before.*
Dmowski’s words are unbelievably similar to the statements of latenineteenth-century German proponents of colonialism, who asserted that only through overseas expansion could Germany free itself from stagnation and become capable of keeping pace with other nations toward a wonderful future. How remarkably the following statement by Dmowski recalls the ideas of social Darwinism: ‘Nations which cease to fight, degenerate morally and disintegrate. The dynamic development of a nation demands expansion.‘9 Let us not suppose that the views cited above were in Poland voiced by Dmowski alone. Another representative of the same line of thinking, Jan Ludwik PopXawski, proposed as early as 1896 that Poles be guided by national egoism, acquiring colonies and spreading their civilisation as do the English, French, and Germans.‘O This proposal, though in a slightly altered form, appeared in the program of the first Polish nationalist party in 1897: A nation which wishes to gain nothing, not create anything new in the future, which has no desires, but rather reduces its aspirations to maintaining that which it possesses, must shrivel and eventually perish.“’
In the political thought of Polish nationalists, regardless of tactful shifts, one basic iron consistency is evident. Their Poland was to be for Poles, in the sense that they would constitute at least 60% of the population of the new state. The non-Polish remainder could then be assimilated. Thus in 1901
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Marek Czapliriski
PopJ’awski optimistically sketched a plan of Poland from Oder to the Dniepr, from the Carpathians to the Baltic. To the west his proposal stretched farther than the Polish border of 1772, since in this area there was a large number of people speaking the Polish language. To the north, he even suggested the annexation of East Prussia, inhabited predominantly by Germans, but here he based his claim on the economic and strategic advantages of strengthening the new state’s position along a natural sea border.r2 During the First World War, the nationalists ceased to speak openly about borders on the Dniepr, the more so since they had even before been prepared to reach a compromise with Tsarist Russia. Dmowski, defending Poland’s interests at the Paris Peace Conference, was aware of the British position (i.e. the Curzon Line). Thus he now demanded only those territories which could be assimilated, and invoked the borders of 1772 only as a means of strengthening his position. If he demanded Lwow and Vilnius, it was in the conviction that they were primarily Polish cities-and also because the Poles there were the bulwark of the nationalists. It is worth considering whether this concept could be seen as a new version of the ‘small solution’ (analogous to the ‘kleindeutsche Losung’), although the ‘Great Poland’ idea was ever present in the nationalists’ propaganda. After 1921 (peace with Bolshevik Russia), Dmowski finally distanced himself from the social Darwinism and expansion beyond national borders. The nationalists were in fact satisfied with the eastern borders achieved by the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1920. Their older representatives did not even hide their satisfaction with the Versailles order. I3 But the younger generation now began to advance the idea that a strong foothold on the sea, by gaining Gdansk (Danzig), East Prussia and even Lithuania, was more important than expansion to the east.i4 When the nationalists lost any real chance of influencing Polish politics in 1926, after Pilsudski’s coupd’e’tat, many oftheir ideas turned up in the statements of their political opponents. Pilsudski’s supporters, the opponents of the Dmowski’s nationalists, came out of the socialist movement-in theory quite distant from the modern nationalism. Yet Polish historians maintain, not without reason, that Pilsudski, who came from Lithuania, was steeped in the traditions of the old, great Republic and was a ‘conservative nationalist’, for whom a great, powerful Polish state, whether multinational or not, was most important. I5 It is more difficult to trace the idea of expansion in Pilsudski’s thinking than Dmowski’s. Pilsudski did not consider himself an ideologist; he was rather a man of action. If he examined the history of Polish national uprisings, it was to derive conclusions for practical action. There are many indications, however, that he too was influenced to some extent by social Darwinism; he believed in the brutal play of forces in history. For him socialism gradually became a means to an end: the Polish state. He then rejected it in favor of ‘state nationalism’.r6 Pilsudski was capable of thrusting his point of view on his men. One of the most prominent proponents of his politics wrote in 1934: Without a state-a strong state-the wealth of a nation is controlled by someone else; and a historical role, or cultural expansion and creativity are impossible.. . . The most important element of a nation is its State; therefore the litmus test of the
Ex~onsion in Polish ~oriono~is~
563
activity of its citizens is the valve of that activity for the good and the power of the State.”
According to Pilsudski’s ideology, social, political and national groups should be subordinate to the interests of the State. It is not difficult to note the influence of Hegelian idealisation of the state in this idea; this influence was strengthened by decades of statelessness and by observation of the results of such a situation. The idea of expansion played a great role in Pilsudski’s ideology. While the polemic cited above deals mainly with cultural expansion, such limitations were not always emphasised. Creating an independent Polish state, Pilsudski seemed to follow the example of ‘grossdeutsche Losung’-he wanted to push Russia far to the east by constructing a federation of East European nations anchored and directed by Poland. It is easy to discern in this idea an attempt to rebuild the old pre-partition Renublic in a new form. Pilsudski believed that such a solution would be acceptable to the young national movements menaced by the Bolshevik revolution. In contrast to Dmowski’s nationalists, he did not see the necessity of numerical domination by Poles in the new state. The experiences of 1918-1921, however, finally dashed his hopes in such a solution. The Ukrainians and Lithuanians, fearing Polish economic, social and cultural domination, turned out not at all interested in a federation with Poland and Poland herself was too weak to force such a system. Thus it became all the more important to strengthen the newly created state in some other way. As Polish historians have shown, all significant political groupings in Poland agreed on one point-that Poland, situated as it was between two more powerful neighbors, must be strong to survive.‘* How threatening those neighbors were was shown by the agreements at Rapallo in 1922. Thus various parties proposed political alliances with smaller neighboring states, particularly those, like Romania or Latvia, threatened by Russian expansion. Thus also an artificial, often exaggerated emphasis on Poland’s status as a power-particularly evident after Pilsduski’s coup &&at. Free access to the sea-via the northern coastal border-was particularly important for all Poles at this time. Because at first the only port to which Poles had easy access to Gdansk (Danzig), a Free State under a German influence, the construction of the first fully Polish port, Gdynia, was begun as early as 1920. The Naval and River League, a social organisation which worked to popularise among Poles the importance of sea, a naval economy, and a strong navy, was founded in 1924.19 The first unexpected murmurs about Polish colonies come out of this League. Taking into account Poland’s unenviable position in Europe, her weak economy, and internal ethnic problems, the idea of colonies is surprising. At first one could speak only of a small group of incorrigible enthusiasts-only a few of whom had ever come into contact with overseas colonisation-who tried to impress their personal fantasies on the others. The ideas they propagated, however, found the support of influential people in Pilsudski’s political camp, the so-called ‘sanacja’. Already in early 1928, a Union of Colonial Pioneers, which was to not only promote the colonial idea and draw up a program of action, but also search for appropriate territories to settle was created within the Naval and River League.2o
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Marek Czapiitiski
Government politicians took interest and, in 1930, the League’s name was formaily changed to the ‘Naval and Colonial League’. It was headed by General Orlicz-Dreszer, one of Pilsudski’s men, a man of strong personality and great energy. Mass propaganda of the colonial idea began.2’ Interestingly, that propaganda made use of almost exactly the same arguments as in England, France or Germany half a century earlier. Consciously or unconsciously, it referred back to the opposition’s earlier praise of expansion. Although Poland’s population density was much less than that of the developed countries of the West, and although Poland was, frankly, economically backward, advocates of colonial expansion claimed that Poland would ‘smother in these tight borders’. As in Germany many years earlier, they spoke of ‘the loss of national blood’ as a result of emigration overseas, and assured that settling emigrants in Polish colonies would bring additional benefits to the Polish state. As had their predecessors in Germany, they claimed that the supply of tropical raw materials from one’s own colonies could even imbalance payments. They believed that new overseas markets would help to develop Polish industry, which was weak and had little chance of competing in Europe. There also occurred rhetoric of an entirely different kind, attempting to show that Poles have the cultural traits necessary for colonisation; in this they surpassed the Portuguese, who could not cope with their own colonies.22 In conclusion, it is worth considering the reasons for this somewhat surprising interest in overseas expansion, an idea otherwise unheard of in East Europe of the time. Polish historians propose various explanations of the phenomenon, some theories more convincing than others. For example, it seems to me unlikely that one could ascribe it simply to a desire to avert attention from internal political and economic difficulties. 23Though the height of the campaign came in the years of great depression, it would have been difficult, on the basis of the experiences of Western countries, to count on tropical territories like Angola or Madagascar absorbing masses of Polish emigrants unable to find work t home. It is also striking that there was no particular interest in colonial settlements on the part of the economic lobby. It seems certain, on the other hand, that the colonial campaign was primarily intended to raise the internal prestige of the ruling ‘sanacja’ in order to rally the nation around the government and incite superpower ambitions.24 Some advocates did not hide such aims, they claimed that Poland’s role in the world, and possession of colonies, would testify to it as a power. They used propaganda and possession of colonies, would testify to it as a power. The propaganda slogans used say much about the campaign’s goals: ‘Poland: From Europe to the World’ or ‘The sea and colonies are Poland’s strength’.25 One other aim can be clearly seen in this propaganda. One brochure of 1934 put it bluntly: ‘We need an ideal which will stand up today and in 100 years. A powerful Poland-that is, a Poland equal to other powers-can be that ideal.. . Such goals make it easier to teach the young to think in state-building categories.‘26 Another prominent writer stated that colonies would become a test of Poles’ spirit and physical fortitude.27 It is interesting that similar arguments were used 50 years earlier in Germany to prove the necessity of colonial policy. There, too, colonialism advocates spoke of the need for a new, great integrating idea after uni~cation; there, too, they argued that colonies would be a challenge to the young
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generation of Germans. ** Should one conclude that the example of a powerful neighbor was tempting? One final fact certainly played an important role in promoting the colonial idea in Poland. The Germans began once again openly to make claims on their former colonial empire. Rumors that the Western powers might be ready to accede disturbed the Polish government. A new division of mandates of the League of Nations would not be bad in itself, but it would be an insult to a government of a state so sensitive to its status as a power, if it did not benefit from the redivision. Were the Germans to regain some of their former possessions, and Poland was left with nothing, it would mean a serious loss of international prestige for Warsaw. Thus the colonial campaign, supported by the government, had defensive aims as well. The goal was either stymie the German effort to regain colonies, or gain some part for Poland. *’ The following statement by one of its advocates indicates the importance of this defensive aim: ‘By gaining colonies, we would once again prove our right to this gate to the world which the Germans perfidiously call a corridor’.30 And so access to the sea was paramount after all! One should remark too, that the idea of expansion, advanced at a difficult time in the country’s history, compensated for a psychological feeling of weakness. It was meant to raise spirits, to create the impression that Poland really was mighty. But the entire campaign, as it did in other countries too, began to live on its own; colonies became an end in themselves. Only September 1939 would show how far that idea was from Poland’s actual abilities. Marek
Czaplinski
Wroclaw University
NOTES 1. T. tipkowski, MySl o historii Polski i Polakow, in: Zestzy Hisforyczne (1984), No. 84, pp. 81-85. 2. S. Kozicki, Historia Ligi Narodowej (London, 1964), p. 487, see too: S. Kieniewcz, WpYyw zaboru rosyjskiego na Swiadomosc spoYeczenstwa polskiego, in: Dzieje Najnowsze (1977), No. 4, p. 113. 3. C.f. Beauvois, Le Noble, Ie serf et le revisor (Montreux, 1987) passim. 4. R. Dmowski, Mysli nowoczesnego Polaka, Lwow 1904, p. 11. 5. Ibid., pp. 134-136. 6. Zbid., p. 147. 7. R. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Boston, 1962) passim. H.W. Koch, Die Rolle des Sozialdarwinismus als Faktor im Zeitalter des neuen Imperialismus urn die Jahrhundertwende, in: Zeirschrlff fier Politik (1970), No. 1, pp. 51-70, G. Zmarzlik, Der Sozialdarwinismus in Duetschland als geschichliches Problem, in: Vierte[jahrshefe fuer Zeitgeschichte (1963), pp. 246-275. 8. Dmowski. Mysli.. .p. 149. 9. Zbidem, pp. 172-173, cf.: K. Schilling, Beitraege zu einer Geschichte des radikalen Nationalismus in der wilhelminischen Aera 1890-1909 (Koeln, 1968), passim. 10. T. Kulak, Jan Ludwik Pop(awski 1854-1908, p. 538. 11. Zbid.
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Czaphiski
12. Ibid., pp. 595-599. in: Przeglad Wszechpolski (1922) No. 4, 13. R. Dmowski, SchyXek imperializmu, pp. 292-298, R. Wapinski, Narodowa Demokraja 1893-1939 (Wrocl’aw, 1980), pp. 172, 190. 14. Wapitiski, Narodowa Demokracja.. p. 248. 15. A. Garlicki, MySl polityczna sanacji wobec problemow bezpieczenstwa I1 Rzeczpospolitej, in: Polska rnyslpolityczna XIX i XX w., No. 4, p. 192. 16. B. Urbankowski, Filozofia czynu. Swiatopoglad Jozefa PUsudskiego (Warszawa, 1988), passim, cf. opinion of Wapinski, in: Zycie polityczne w Polsce 1918-1939 (Warszawa, 1985), pp. 7-31. 17. Garlicki, Mysl polityczna sanacji. pp. 194, 197. 18. J. Tomaszewski, Miejsce Polski w Europie Srodkowej w koncepcjach politykow, in: Polska mysl politcyzna XIX i XX wieku, No. 4, pp. 173-190. 19. T. BiaXas, Liga Morska i Kolonialna 1930-1939 (Gdatisk, 1983), pp. 20-26. 20. Ibid., pp. 167-169, E. Szynaka, Polityka morska i kolonialna jako element koncepcji mocarstwowych Polski w latach 1928-1935, in: Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu MikoIaja Kopernika w Toruniu, No. 5 1 (1972) p. 157. 21. Biatas, Liga.. pp. 27-31. 22. Ibid., pp. 28-30, Szynaka, Polityka.. ., p. 157, L. Bulowski, Kolonie dla Polski (Warszawa, 1932), p. 14, E. Janowski, Wytyczne naszej ekspansji zamorskiej, in: Morze (1928), No. 5, p. 5, cf: R. Dobrowlski, Obraz Afryki w Swietle katolickich czasopism misyjnych i publicystyki kolonialnej w Polsche lat trzydziestych, in: Przeglad Socjologiczny ( 1975), pp. 179-222. 23. Szynaka. Polityka . . . pp. 158, 162. 24. J. Majchrowski, Silni, zwarci, gotowi. MySl polityczna Obozu Zjednoczenia Narodowego (Warszawa, 1985) p. 66. 25. Szynaka, Polityka., p. 169, F.A. Ossendowski, SiXa ducha polskiego, in: Morze (1928) No. 3, p. 33. 26. Bulowski, Kolonie, p. 211. 27. Ossendowski, SiXa.. p. 33. 28. Cf. Schilhng, Beitraege.. ., passim. 29. BiaXas, Liga ., passim, cf. M. Fularski, Kryzys emigracyjny a polska polityka kolonialna (Warszawa, 1931), pp. x, 21, Dobrowolski, Obraz.. p. 211. 30. Bulowski, Kolonie.. p. 211.
Chuirpetmtzs:
ONE NATIONALISM
Jaroslav Krejci (University of Lancaster, U.K.) George Strong (College of William and Mary, VA, U.S.A.)
5.57
0191-6599/92 $S.WtO.OO I’ 1992 Pergamon Press Led
THE IDEA OF EXPANSION AND OF OVERSEAS EXPANSION IN POLISH NATIONALISM MAREK CZAPLI$SKI*
I am sure that the question of expansion raises few doubts for the average European historian. Expansion is generally understood as reaching beyond one’s national borders, the annexation of new territories, be they adjacent or overseas. This issue becomes quite complicated, however, when we are dealing with the expansion of nations without their own states -as were many nations in East and East-Central Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century. Here we touch upon a very significant issue, one which is interpreted quite differently by the ideologists and historians of the nation in question, than by the politicians, journalists and historians of other European nations. As much, for example, as the Bulgarians saw their efforts to annex Macedonia as less ‘expansion’, than ‘the restoration of national unity’, so for the Greeks, Serbs, or even the Germans and French as well, such aims were clearly plans of ‘Bulgarian expansion’. The case of Transylvania is similar-for the Hungarians, or Rumanians this could be ‘national unification’, while for the other nations it was ‘expansion’, even if such efforts were based on some ethnic or historical arguments. This issue is not unfamiliar to Western Europeans-the examples of say, Schleswig-Holstein or Alsace-Lorraine indicate that what was ‘expansion’ for some was for others a restoration of some historical ‘status quo ante’. At the end of the nineteenth century, when all across Europe thought and politics evolved from ‘national’ to ‘nationalist’ positions, the Poles did not have their own state. Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungary had long before fulfilled on the territory of the former Polish state, their own programs of European expansion. Despite undoubted economic growth, these lands were, in comparison with the core territories of the conquerors, especially in Prussia and Austria, backward and were often exploited in the model of overseas colonies. Thus are today’s Polish historians prepared to regard the Polish lands under partitions as a sort of colony; they attribute later dif~culties in development, to a large degree, to the ties of dependency in regard to the partitioning powers.’ In this situation, the fundamental goal for the Poles had to be the rebuilding of the Polish state. Paradoxically, however, the rebuilding of the status quo ante could be interpreted by the world as Polish expansion. For Poland, in Polish historical consciousness, remained the Republic before the First Partition in 1772, a state of many nationalities, inhabited by Lithuanians, Latvians, Bielorussians, Russians, Ukrainians, Germans and Jews as well as Poles, and stretching to the East, almost as far as Smolensk, Kiev and the Dniestr River. Poles regarded the reestablishment of this state as an act of historical justice.2 Meanwhile, great changes in national consciousness had occurred in these lands *Department
of
History, Wroclaw University, 50-140 Wroclaw,
Poland. 559
560
~arek
Czapliriski
in the course of the nineteenth century. Moreover, as a result of assimilation both natural and forced the position of the Polish element in the former Polish territories was weakened.3 All this made a simple reconstruction of the pre-1772 status impossible. On the other hand, the Poles could not accept the idea that their future state might encompass only those lands where Poles were in the undoubted majority. In practice, such a state would have to be not much larger than the Kingdom of Poland, created in 18 15 by the Congress of Vienna, while the Polish language and ethnic pockets stretched far beyond this area, both to the east (at least as far as Lvov and Vilnius) and to the west and north (Silesia, Warmia, Masuria). To a certain extent, the Polish situation recalled that of the Hungarians, as the historical borders of ‘the lands of St Stephen’s crown’ extended far beyond the region where the Magyar predominated. The problem was also in a way similar to that faced by the uniters of Germany in the nineteenth century-whether to choose the ‘grossdeutsche Lbsung’ or ‘kleindeutsche LBsung’-except that the ‘small Poland’ version would be incomparably worse than that chosen by the Prussians. The new situation caused more than a few difficulties for the creators of the Polish nationalist movement in 1890. They wanted to ignite the nation to action, to cut through the atmosphere of passivity, resignation and defeat after the last national uprising of 1863. Their statements should be seen in this context. Roman Dmowski, the creator of modern Polish nationalism and its main thinker, wrote: ‘It is necessary only to remember that the moral strength of a nation is not its defenselessness, its innocence-as we so often hear, but the demand for broader life, the desire to multiply the nation’s wealth and influence, and the readiness to devote oneself to the realization of national goals’.4 In a chapter of the book that laid foundations for the Polish nationalistic thought, Thoughts of aModern Pole, Dmowski did not conceal his fascination with the expansion of English nation. He asserted that the huge empire it has garnered placed great tasks before the English nation forcing it to devote all its energies to that empire, with no room for waste. At the same time he recognised, looking at the example of Spain, that a decline in the extent of some nation’s reign increases the number of citizens indifferent to national issues.’ For these reasons he could not accept the complete loss of the old eastern lands-inhabited in his opinion, by several million undoubted Poles. He also places great hopes in the Polish emigration. As a result of a trip to Latin America, he foresaw quite interesting perspectives for the ‘fourth district’ (a reference to the three partitioned territories of Poland). He wrote: Even if the creation of a new Polish society on the shores of the South Atlantic, in the Brazilian wilderness, were to prove an unrealizable daydream, the very initiation of such a project would yield us wide new training grounds for some part of our decaying forces, and in this way would effect the rebirth of our statnant soul. And how incalculable in theeir vastness would be the consequences, for the expansion of Polich life, of a successful effort, that is, the founding on a distant shore of a society speaking Polish and drawing its spiritual strength from the mutual wealth of a national civilisation, while enriching that civilisation with fresh elements, quite new in content6
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Even if we remember that these words come at moment of great depression of the national spirit, in despair and distress, when every new idea which might awaken the nation is important; even if we remember that this is era of great migrations, when one reads of the world over of a ‘New France’, ‘New Britain’ or ‘New Germany’ overseas-these words cannot be but astonishing. This is a paradox the representative of a nation which does not yet have its own state, whose territory is a colony of foreign powers, dreams-perhaps fascinated by the German and Italian models-of a colonial policy for his nation. There is also a paradox in that Dmowski, who is later regarded as a representative in Polish politics of classic ‘Realpolitik’, a man who declares himself an opponent of Polish ‘romantic daydreams’, here seems literally to be guided by the directive of the great Polish romantic poet, Adam Mickiewicz: ‘Match your strength to your goals’. At the same time, however, it is worth nothing that Dmowski fits perfectly onto the thinking of the time-especially into those currents in England, the United States or Germany which were fascinated by social Darwinism, which also placed great emphasis on the role of expansion in the life of nations.’ Dmowski continues even more unambiguously: Let us widen the horizons of national thought, let us clear wide paths for it across barriers, let it reach everywhere that Polishness lives and wishes to live; let us awaken the Polish spirit from its slumber whenever necessary, and go to battle in its defence to the most distant lands; let us build new Poland overseas; let us create from all this one great modern national idea-and our might shall grow as never before.*
Dmowski’s words are unbelievably similar to the statements of latenineteenth-century German proponents of colonialism, who asserted that only through overseas expansion could Germany free itself from stagnation and become capable of keeping pace with other nations toward a wonderful future. How remarkably the following statement by Dmowski recalls the ideas of social Darwinism: ‘Nations which cease to fight, degenerate morally and disintegrate. The dynamic development of a nation demands expansion.‘9 Let us not suppose that the views cited above were in Poland voiced by Dmowski alone. Another representative of the same line of thinking, Jan Ludwik PopXawski, proposed as early as 1896 that Poles be guided by national egoism, acquiring colonies and spreading their civilisation as do the English, French, and Germans.‘O This proposal, though in a slightly altered form, appeared in the program of the first Polish nationalist party in 1897: A nation which wishes to gain nothing, not create anything new in the future, which has no desires, but rather reduces its aspirations to maintaining that which it possesses, must shrivel and eventually perish.“’
In the political thought of Polish nationalists, regardless of tactful shifts, one basic iron consistency is evident. Their Poland was to be for Poles, in the sense that they would constitute at least 60% of the population of the new state. The non-Polish remainder could then be assimilated. Thus in 1901
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PopJ’awski optimistically sketched a plan of Poland from Oder to the Dniepr, from the Carpathians to the Baltic. To the west his proposal stretched farther than the Polish border of 1772, since in this area there was a large number of people speaking the Polish language. To the north, he even suggested the annexation of East Prussia, inhabited predominantly by Germans, but here he based his claim on the economic and strategic advantages of strengthening the new state’s position along a natural sea border.r2 During the First World War, the nationalists ceased to speak openly about borders on the Dniepr, the more so since they had even before been prepared to reach a compromise with Tsarist Russia. Dmowski, defending Poland’s interests at the Paris Peace Conference, was aware of the British position (i.e. the Curzon Line). Thus he now demanded only those territories which could be assimilated, and invoked the borders of 1772 only as a means of strengthening his position. If he demanded Lwow and Vilnius, it was in the conviction that they were primarily Polish cities-and also because the Poles there were the bulwark of the nationalists. It is worth considering whether this concept could be seen as a new version of the ‘small solution’ (analogous to the ‘kleindeutsche Losung’), although the ‘Great Poland’ idea was ever present in the nationalists’ propaganda. After 1921 (peace with Bolshevik Russia), Dmowski finally distanced himself from the social Darwinism and expansion beyond national borders. The nationalists were in fact satisfied with the eastern borders achieved by the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1920. Their older representatives did not even hide their satisfaction with the Versailles order. I3 But the younger generation now began to advance the idea that a strong foothold on the sea, by gaining Gdansk (Danzig), East Prussia and even Lithuania, was more important than expansion to the east.i4 When the nationalists lost any real chance of influencing Polish politics in 1926, after Pilsudski’s coupd’e’tat, many oftheir ideas turned up in the statements of their political opponents. Pilsudski’s supporters, the opponents of the Dmowski’s nationalists, came out of the socialist movement-in theory quite distant from the modern nationalism. Yet Polish historians maintain, not without reason, that Pilsudski, who came from Lithuania, was steeped in the traditions of the old, great Republic and was a ‘conservative nationalist’, for whom a great, powerful Polish state, whether multinational or not, was most important. I5 It is more difficult to trace the idea of expansion in Pilsudski’s thinking than Dmowski’s. Pilsudski did not consider himself an ideologist; he was rather a man of action. If he examined the history of Polish national uprisings, it was to derive conclusions for practical action. There are many indications, however, that he too was influenced to some extent by social Darwinism; he believed in the brutal play of forces in history. For him socialism gradually became a means to an end: the Polish state. He then rejected it in favor of ‘state nationalism’.r6 Pilsudski was capable of thrusting his point of view on his men. One of the most prominent proponents of his politics wrote in 1934: Without a state-a strong state-the wealth of a nation is controlled by someone else; and a historical role, or cultural expansion and creativity are impossible.. . . The most important element of a nation is its State; therefore the litmus test of the
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activity of its citizens is the valve of that activity for the good and the power of the State.”
According to Pilsudski’s ideology, social, political and national groups should be subordinate to the interests of the State. It is not difficult to note the influence of Hegelian idealisation of the state in this idea; this influence was strengthened by decades of statelessness and by observation of the results of such a situation. The idea of expansion played a great role in Pilsudski’s ideology. While the polemic cited above deals mainly with cultural expansion, such limitations were not always emphasised. Creating an independent Polish state, Pilsudski seemed to follow the example of ‘grossdeutsche Losung’-he wanted to push Russia far to the east by constructing a federation of East European nations anchored and directed by Poland. It is easy to discern in this idea an attempt to rebuild the old pre-partition Renublic in a new form. Pilsudski believed that such a solution would be acceptable to the young national movements menaced by the Bolshevik revolution. In contrast to Dmowski’s nationalists, he did not see the necessity of numerical domination by Poles in the new state. The experiences of 1918-1921, however, finally dashed his hopes in such a solution. The Ukrainians and Lithuanians, fearing Polish economic, social and cultural domination, turned out not at all interested in a federation with Poland and Poland herself was too weak to force such a system. Thus it became all the more important to strengthen the newly created state in some other way. As Polish historians have shown, all significant political groupings in Poland agreed on one point-that Poland, situated as it was between two more powerful neighbors, must be strong to survive.‘* How threatening those neighbors were was shown by the agreements at Rapallo in 1922. Thus various parties proposed political alliances with smaller neighboring states, particularly those, like Romania or Latvia, threatened by Russian expansion. Thus also an artificial, often exaggerated emphasis on Poland’s status as a power-particularly evident after Pilsduski’s coup &&at. Free access to the sea-via the northern coastal border-was particularly important for all Poles at this time. Because at first the only port to which Poles had easy access to Gdansk (Danzig), a Free State under a German influence, the construction of the first fully Polish port, Gdynia, was begun as early as 1920. The Naval and River League, a social organisation which worked to popularise among Poles the importance of sea, a naval economy, and a strong navy, was founded in 1924.19 The first unexpected murmurs about Polish colonies come out of this League. Taking into account Poland’s unenviable position in Europe, her weak economy, and internal ethnic problems, the idea of colonies is surprising. At first one could speak only of a small group of incorrigible enthusiasts-only a few of whom had ever come into contact with overseas colonisation-who tried to impress their personal fantasies on the others. The ideas they propagated, however, found the support of influential people in Pilsudski’s political camp, the so-called ‘sanacja’. Already in early 1928, a Union of Colonial Pioneers, which was to not only promote the colonial idea and draw up a program of action, but also search for appropriate territories to settle was created within the Naval and River League.2o
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Government politicians took interest and, in 1930, the League’s name was formaily changed to the ‘Naval and Colonial League’. It was headed by General Orlicz-Dreszer, one of Pilsudski’s men, a man of strong personality and great energy. Mass propaganda of the colonial idea began.2’ Interestingly, that propaganda made use of almost exactly the same arguments as in England, France or Germany half a century earlier. Consciously or unconsciously, it referred back to the opposition’s earlier praise of expansion. Although Poland’s population density was much less than that of the developed countries of the West, and although Poland was, frankly, economically backward, advocates of colonial expansion claimed that Poland would ‘smother in these tight borders’. As in Germany many years earlier, they spoke of ‘the loss of national blood’ as a result of emigration overseas, and assured that settling emigrants in Polish colonies would bring additional benefits to the Polish state. As had their predecessors in Germany, they claimed that the supply of tropical raw materials from one’s own colonies could even imbalance payments. They believed that new overseas markets would help to develop Polish industry, which was weak and had little chance of competing in Europe. There also occurred rhetoric of an entirely different kind, attempting to show that Poles have the cultural traits necessary for colonisation; in this they surpassed the Portuguese, who could not cope with their own colonies.22 In conclusion, it is worth considering the reasons for this somewhat surprising interest in overseas expansion, an idea otherwise unheard of in East Europe of the time. Polish historians propose various explanations of the phenomenon, some theories more convincing than others. For example, it seems to me unlikely that one could ascribe it simply to a desire to avert attention from internal political and economic difficulties. 23Though the height of the campaign came in the years of great depression, it would have been difficult, on the basis of the experiences of Western countries, to count on tropical territories like Angola or Madagascar absorbing masses of Polish emigrants unable to find work t home. It is also striking that there was no particular interest in colonial settlements on the part of the economic lobby. It seems certain, on the other hand, that the colonial campaign was primarily intended to raise the internal prestige of the ruling ‘sanacja’ in order to rally the nation around the government and incite superpower ambitions.24 Some advocates did not hide such aims, they claimed that Poland’s role in the world, and possession of colonies, would testify to it as a power. They used propaganda and possession of colonies, would testify to it as a power. The propaganda slogans used say much about the campaign’s goals: ‘Poland: From Europe to the World’ or ‘The sea and colonies are Poland’s strength’.25 One other aim can be clearly seen in this propaganda. One brochure of 1934 put it bluntly: ‘We need an ideal which will stand up today and in 100 years. A powerful Poland-that is, a Poland equal to other powers-can be that ideal.. . Such goals make it easier to teach the young to think in state-building categories.‘26 Another prominent writer stated that colonies would become a test of Poles’ spirit and physical fortitude.27 It is interesting that similar arguments were used 50 years earlier in Germany to prove the necessity of colonial policy. There, too, colonialism advocates spoke of the need for a new, great integrating idea after uni~cation; there, too, they argued that colonies would be a challenge to the young
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generation of Germans. ** Should one conclude that the example of a powerful neighbor was tempting? One final fact certainly played an important role in promoting the colonial idea in Poland. The Germans began once again openly to make claims on their former colonial empire. Rumors that the Western powers might be ready to accede disturbed the Polish government. A new division of mandates of the League of Nations would not be bad in itself, but it would be an insult to a government of a state so sensitive to its status as a power, if it did not benefit from the redivision. Were the Germans to regain some of their former possessions, and Poland was left with nothing, it would mean a serious loss of international prestige for Warsaw. Thus the colonial campaign, supported by the government, had defensive aims as well. The goal was either stymie the German effort to regain colonies, or gain some part for Poland. *’ The following statement by one of its advocates indicates the importance of this defensive aim: ‘By gaining colonies, we would once again prove our right to this gate to the world which the Germans perfidiously call a corridor’.30 And so access to the sea was paramount after all! One should remark too, that the idea of expansion, advanced at a difficult time in the country’s history, compensated for a psychological feeling of weakness. It was meant to raise spirits, to create the impression that Poland really was mighty. But the entire campaign, as it did in other countries too, began to live on its own; colonies became an end in themselves. Only September 1939 would show how far that idea was from Poland’s actual abilities. Marek
Czaplinski
Wroclaw University
NOTES 1. T. tipkowski, MySl o historii Polski i Polakow, in: Zestzy Hisforyczne (1984), No. 84, pp. 81-85. 2. S. Kozicki, Historia Ligi Narodowej (London, 1964), p. 487, see too: S. Kieniewcz, WpYyw zaboru rosyjskiego na Swiadomosc spoYeczenstwa polskiego, in: Dzieje Najnowsze (1977), No. 4, p. 113. 3. C.f. Beauvois, Le Noble, Ie serf et le revisor (Montreux, 1987) passim. 4. R. Dmowski, Mysli nowoczesnego Polaka, Lwow 1904, p. 11. 5. Ibid., pp. 134-136. 6. Zbid., p. 147. 7. R. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Boston, 1962) passim. H.W. Koch, Die Rolle des Sozialdarwinismus als Faktor im Zeitalter des neuen Imperialismus urn die Jahrhundertwende, in: Zeirschrlff fier Politik (1970), No. 1, pp. 51-70, G. Zmarzlik, Der Sozialdarwinismus in Duetschland als geschichliches Problem, in: Vierte[jahrshefe fuer Zeitgeschichte (1963), pp. 246-275. 8. Dmowski. Mysli.. .p. 149. 9. Zbidem, pp. 172-173, cf.: K. Schilling, Beitraege zu einer Geschichte des radikalen Nationalismus in der wilhelminischen Aera 1890-1909 (Koeln, 1968), passim. 10. T. Kulak, Jan Ludwik Pop(awski 1854-1908, p. 538. 11. Zbid.
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Czaphiski
12. Ibid., pp. 595-599. in: Przeglad Wszechpolski (1922) No. 4, 13. R. Dmowski, SchyXek imperializmu, pp. 292-298, R. Wapinski, Narodowa Demokraja 1893-1939 (Wrocl’aw, 1980), pp. 172, 190. 14. Wapitiski, Narodowa Demokracja.. p. 248. 15. A. Garlicki, MySl polityczna sanacji wobec problemow bezpieczenstwa I1 Rzeczpospolitej, in: Polska rnyslpolityczna XIX i XX w., No. 4, p. 192. 16. B. Urbankowski, Filozofia czynu. Swiatopoglad Jozefa PUsudskiego (Warszawa, 1988), passim, cf. opinion of Wapinski, in: Zycie polityczne w Polsce 1918-1939 (Warszawa, 1985), pp. 7-31. 17. Garlicki, Mysl polityczna sanacji. pp. 194, 197. 18. J. Tomaszewski, Miejsce Polski w Europie Srodkowej w koncepcjach politykow, in: Polska mysl politcyzna XIX i XX wieku, No. 4, pp. 173-190. 19. T. BiaXas, Liga Morska i Kolonialna 1930-1939 (Gdatisk, 1983), pp. 20-26. 20. Ibid., pp. 167-169, E. Szynaka, Polityka morska i kolonialna jako element koncepcji mocarstwowych Polski w latach 1928-1935, in: Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu MikoIaja Kopernika w Toruniu, No. 5 1 (1972) p. 157. 21. Biatas, Liga.. pp. 27-31. 22. Ibid., pp. 28-30, Szynaka, Polityka.. ., p. 157, L. Bulowski, Kolonie dla Polski (Warszawa, 1932), p. 14, E. Janowski, Wytyczne naszej ekspansji zamorskiej, in: Morze (1928), No. 5, p. 5, cf: R. Dobrowlski, Obraz Afryki w Swietle katolickich czasopism misyjnych i publicystyki kolonialnej w Polsche lat trzydziestych, in: Przeglad Socjologiczny ( 1975), pp. 179-222. 23. Szynaka. Polityka . . . pp. 158, 162. 24. J. Majchrowski, Silni, zwarci, gotowi. MySl polityczna Obozu Zjednoczenia Narodowego (Warszawa, 1985) p. 66. 25. Szynaka, Polityka., p. 169, F.A. Ossendowski, SiXa ducha polskiego, in: Morze (1928) No. 3, p. 33. 26. Bulowski, Kolonie, p. 211. 27. Ossendowski, SiXa.. p. 33. 28. Cf. Schilhng, Beitraege.. ., passim. 29. BiaXas, Liga ., passim, cf. M. Fularski, Kryzys emigracyjny a polska polityka kolonialna (Warszawa, 1931), pp. x, 21, Dobrowolski, Obraz.. p. 211. 30. Bulowski, Kolonie.. p. 211.