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The impact of social and ecological factors on environmentally responsible behavior
Journal Pre-proof The impact of social and ecological factors on environmentally responsible behavior Chang-Jiang Liu, Fang Hao PII:
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.120173
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Journal of Cleaner Production
Received Date: 28 March 2019 Revised Date:
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Please cite this article as: Liu C-J, Hao F, The impact of social and ecological factors on environmentally responsible behavior, Journal of Cleaner Production (2020), doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.jclepro.2020.120173. This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the addition of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is not yet the definitive version of record. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that, during the production process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. © 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
The impact of social and ecological factors on environmentally responsible behavior Chang-Jiang Liu 1, 2 1 2
Fang Hao 1
School of Psychology, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, China
Research Institute of Moral Education, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, China
Running Head: Leadership takes effect in critical situations
Address for correspondence: Chang-Jiang Liu, School of Psychology, Nanjing Normal University, 122 Ninghai Road, Gulou District, Nanjing, 210097, China. Phone number: (86)18120187004. Email: [email protected].
Conflict of Interest: I declare that I have no conflict of interest.
Informed consent: Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.
Funding This work was supported by the grant from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant No. 71690242], the grant from the National Social Science Fund of China [Grant No. 18BSH113], and the grant from Jiangsu Provincial Department of Education, China [Grant No. 2018SJZDI205].
Acknowledgements Data collection was assisted by graduate students Yan Wu and Jingjing Shao. I appreciate those students’ effort on this work. I also thank Professor Robert Gifford for his permission to use the FISH 4.0.
The impact of social and ecological factors on environmentally responsible behavior
Abstract Exploring the possibility of self-governance of common-pool resources has received increasing attention in the literature. In echoing to this issue, the current study attempts to investigate the effects of ecological conditions on individuals’ environmentally responsible behavior, and to examine the role of leadership in managing resource deterioration in a small group. An ocean fishing experimental task, with different climate conditions and resource regeneration rates, was used to simulate a commons dilemma. Moreover, the role that participants played was manipulated. The results show a dissociation effect of the two ecological conditions: A low regeneration rate of fishery resources prevented participants from exploiting the fish stocks, whereas a deteriorated climate condition encouraged participants to overfish. Moreover, the results show that, when the regeneration rate of fishery resources was lower, the deteriorated climate condition led the crews to restrain themselves less than the neutral climate condition. The deteriorated climate condition led the captains to maintain the same high level of self-restraint as the neutral climate condition. In summary, the findings of the present study suggest that the assumption of a leadership position encourages people to protect common-pool resources, especially under critical situations. This study contributes to our understanding of the feasibility of self-governance of common-pool resources in small groups. Keywords: environmentally responsible behavior; leadership; climate change; the commons.
1 Introduction Human activities have increasingly deteriorated the environment. Anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere intensify climate change and global warming, while overfishing is increasingly leading to the depletion of fish resources. The overexploitation of the common resources is a classic case of tragedy of the commons, which has been widely studied through the commons dilemma paradigm (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 2008). This paradigm presents people with a conflict between individual short-term gains and collective long-term good. Rational individuals will choose to harvest a resource unrestrictedly, inevitably leading to the deterioration and possible depletion of the resource base. Thus, rational individuals behave in an environmentally irresponsible way. Various governance and management approaches of common-pool resources, such as governmental regulations, market mechanisms, and institutional design, have been proposed to avoid the tragedy of the commons (see Murase and Baek, 2018). However, a controversy exists on whether self-governance can be achieved without external intervention (Boyd et al., 2018). The present study attempts to explore in what way people in a small group can directly manage resources deterioration. When groups are small, there may exist some individual action in favor of the achievement of common goals (Morano et al., 2018). Specifically, this study examines a leadership solution for the self-governance of common-pool resources. The idea behind this solution is that a person would have a sense of responsibility once she/he takes on a position of leadership. Moreover, leadership should take effect in critical situations.
Consequently, this study tests whether the effects of leadership on individuals’ environmentally responsible behavior (ERB) are dependent on deteriorated ecological conditions (i.e., climate change and resource depletion). 1.1 Climate change, its consequences, and public concern Scientific evidence shows that climate is changing, and that public concern about climate change and the environment is growing (Cook et al., 2016; Weber and Stern, 2011). Most people think that climate change and sustainability are important problems (Gifford, 2011). However, technological solutions alone are insufficient to address climate change. Thus, it is proposed that actors at all levels are required to reduce carbon emissions and to adapt to climate risks. Individual citizens have been recognized to play a key role in any potential shift towards a low-carbon society (Whitmarsh and Lorenzoni, 2010). Moreover, different actions, albeit quite variable, have been taken to improve resource systems (Newell et al., 2014; Nilsson and Grelsson, 1995). For example, people can spare gas or electricity, buy energy efficient products, or join an environmental group. The governments of the world have devoted themselves to facilitate individual behavior change, primarily through economic and informational approaches (Whitmarsh et al., 2011). Changes in ecological conditions, such as global warming, have further accelerated resources deterioration (Feeny et al., 1990). Climate science has demonstrated that greenhouse gases concentrations, and their effects on global warming, put increasing pressures on humans and on resource systems (Schlüter et al., 2016; Whitmarsh, 2009). Resources deterioration may arouse people’s willingness to
restrain their consumption. Evidence showed that, although individuals’ consumption usually tends to increase over time, there is little or no increase in consumption when the resource is being overused (e.g., Blanco et al., 2015; Hine et al., 2009; Messick et al., 1983). Optimistic and encouraging approaches in social sciences research persistently indicate that human beings have the ability to cope with the tragedy of the commons and to contribute to the achievement of sustainable development. According to economic rationality, people are motivated to maximize their own personal self-interest when facing adverse climate change (Jager et al., 2000; Van Lange et al., 2018). On the other hand, research on social dilemmas has demonstrated that sacrificing personal interests for the benefit of society and ecosystems in such situations is pervasive (for a review, see Van Lange et al., 2013). Research has shown that people are willing to restrain themselves in order to maintain the development and sustainability of natural resources (Van der Linden et al., 2015). However, relying only on the voluntary restraint of individuals is insufficient to meet collective targets (Brick et al., 2016). In this paper, leadership is introduced as a possible solution to encourage people to behave in an environmentally responsible way. 1.2 Leadership According to Stogdill (1950), leadership is defined as the process of “influencing the activities of an organized group in its efforts toward goal setting and goal achievement” (p. 4). To understand the process of leadership, two other components are necessary: the person, and the general requirements of the job itself (Gini, 1997).
To be a leader, a person should possess some specific talents and traits. For example, a transformational leader is able to i) serve as role model for her/his followers, ii) motivate and inspire them, iii) stimulate the efforts of her/his followers to be innovative and creative, and iv) pay special attention to the needs of each individual follower (Bass and Riggio, 2006). In order to fulfill their job requirements, leaders need to set a direction, and spend effort and to influence other persons to follow it. Leaders need to coordinate the often diverse needs of group members as, in this way, they increase group cohesion and finally promote the achievement of group goals (Van Vugt and De Cremer, 2002). Leaders can make a costly commitment to their group (Komai et al., 2011), and are motivated to prioritize the interests of their organizations and their followers (Samuelson and Messick, 1995). Leaders usually hold power to apply sanctions in order to induce compliance with rules. Ideally, leaders are expected to use their power to promote group goals versus self-interest. In addition to this intentional process, leadership can also happen in an unintentional way. In fact, leaders can shape their followers’ beliefs and actions by creating role models. Evidence shows that leaders may provide a good example by voluntarily contributing to the public good before the others are expected to do so (Grabo and Van Vugt, 2016). Behavioral economic research has identified the leading by example as an important way to influence, motivate, and direct the efforts of group members toward the achievement of collective goals (Schwerhoff, 2016). Thus, when leaders’ actions serve as a good example for their followers, their pioneering actions
will work as a motivator. Consequently, the followers may reciprocate by behaving positively (Russell et al., 2017). 1.3 The present study The first aim of the present study is to examine the effects of ecological conditions on individuals’ ERB. Specifically, two ecological conditions were the focus of the present study: the state of resources, and climate condition. Research has indicated that individuals’ ERB depends on the state of resources. For instance, people react positively when faced with limited and deteriorating resources (Prediger et al., 2013). The state of limited and deteriorating resources may enhance people’s awareness of, and concern for their scarcity, and thereby increase their concerns for environment and sustainability. However, the extent to which climate change affects an individual’s ERB and, hence, sustainable resource use, is not clear. Evidence shows that awareness of climate change leads to individuals’ ERB (Han et al., 2016; Masud et al., 2016). When individuals become more aware of, and concerned about, climate change or its impacts, they are more likely to behave in an environmentally responsible way. It is assumed that diverse ecological conditions exert an effect on individuals’ ERB in a same way. Thus, in a similar way as for resource state, climate change may encourage people to increase their concerns for environment and sustainability. In this way, climate change may inspire people to behave in an environmentally responsible way. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: H1: A deteriorated climate condition will induce a higher level of individuals’
ERB than a neutral climate condition. The second aim of the present study is to explore the effects of leadership in promoting individuals’ ERB. Although current research on leadership has grown and flourished in the fields of psychology and management, leadership is one of the critical, yet largely unexplored concepts in resource management research (Minelgaite et al., 2018; Vinkhuyzen and Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2014). Leaders play an important role in achieving collective goals and in maintaining the harmony of a group and of society. Research has demonstrated that the presence of a leader can promote the group’s welfare and ERB (e.g., Bahbouhi and Moussa, 2019; De Cremer and Van Dijk, 2008; Gutiérrez et al., 2011; Kosfeld and Rustagi, 2015; Stouten et al., 2005). People meet what is expected of them, once they take on the role of leader (Van Vugt and De Cremer, 2002). This effect has been demonstrated when leaders are chosen either by their behavioral attributes (Kumru and Versterlund, 2010; Wolff and Keith, 2019), or collectively through a voting procedure (Levy et al., 2011; Levati et al., 2007), or even voluntarily (Arbak and Villeval, 2013; Cartwright et al., 2013; Rivas and Sutter, 2011). Recent evidence further suggests that the leader selection process plays a critical role in determining the success of groups facing collective action problems (Harrell, 2018). Interestingly, even if randomly assigned, leaders act in a different way compared to their followers (Gächter and Renner, 2014; Komai et al., 2011; Moxnes and Van der Heijden, 2003). Research has demonstrated that random role assignment can induce a difference in cooperation between leaders and followers (De Cremer and
Van Dijk, 2008; Arbak and Villeval, 2013). Even if randomly chosen, leaders can lead by example, if it is less costly to do so (Van der Heijden and Moxnes, 2013). Moreover, randomly-chosen leaders are not necessarily less influential than voluntary leaders. Thus, it seems that everyone in a group has the chance to take on the leadership role, and that the talents and traits of a leader can be learned once a person assumes the role of leader. Moreover, leadership often appears in critical situations, and sometimes automatically. Evidence shows that group members expect to select or appoint an appropriate leader to solve a collective tragedy, especially when a group fails in fostering the collective welfare (Messick et al., 1983), or when they are dissatisfied with the status quo (Messick and Brewer, 1983), or when resources distribution or use is viewed as being unfair (Naquin and Kurtzberg, 2018). When resources are overused, people tend to vote to stop the free access to these resources in favor of a leader (Messick et al., 1983). Therefore, the person who takes on the role of leader is expected to manage a critical situation once it arises. Under this situation, group members will hand over the management of the resources to their superior. In summary, it is expected that the effects of the random appointment of leadership in promoting individuals’ ERB will be observed under critical situations. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: H2: When the environment deteriorates and/or the regeneration capacity of a resource is low, the assumption of the leadership role will push individuals to act in an environmentally responsible way, more than the assumption of the follower role.
2 Methods 2.1 Participants and research design A total of 86 undergraduate students participated in the study. About half of them were recruited through posted flyers on the campus; the rest were recruited via invitation, by those who had already participated in the experiment. The students had a variety of majors, and had not participated in any similar experiments beforehand. There were 19 male and 62 female in the sample with a mean age of 19.91 (SD=1.18). Two participants were suspicious that they had been processing the experiment with a computer, and three incorrectly recalled their role in the experiment. Thus, valid data included 81 participants. We used a 2 (climate: deteriorated vs. neutral) × 2 (role: captain vs. crew) × 2 (regeneration rate: high vs. low) mixed factorial design. The first two variables are between-subjects variables, and the last one is a within-subjects variable. The dependent variable is the cooperation indicator in the experimental tasks, namely the FISH (Gifford and Aranda, 2013). 2.2 Materials Climate scenario. To manipulate exposure to a deteriorated climate versus a neutral climate, two texts of similar length and style were developed to describe global climate. The first text (deteriorated climate) was intended to induce in the participants the perception of risk from global warming. It described the negative impact of global warming in recent years. The text was articulated into three paragraphs, for a total of 500 words. First, major facts pertaining to global warming
were introduced, followed by various disastrous consequences that could result from it. The text concluded providing information about how the world can contribute to dealing with climate change. Similarly, the second text (neutral climate) described the phenomenon of climate in neutral terms. The text was articulated into three paragraphs, for a total of 500 words. General information pertaining to climate was first introduced, followed by the presentation of various climatic phenomena in different areas, and, finally, by specific climatic characteristics in a particular area. FISH 4.0. The danger of overfishing is a well-known example of overexploitation of common-pool resources. We used an experimental task, called FISH, to simulate a commons dilemma (Gifford and Aranda, 2013). In practice, FISH is a real-time interactive microworld designed for the systematic investigation of individual decision-making in commons dilemmas. In the simulation, individuals serve as fishers, and are motivated to maximize individual profits by catching more fish (in terms of value) over the costs associated with catching those fish over multiple “seasons”. Fishers must independently decide how many fish to catch in each season. Once fishers stop fishing for a season, or when a season ends, the fish spawn, and thus fish supply recovers. However, fish supply after spawning does not exceed the level of the first season. Fishers earn money for each fish caught; no cost is incurred for fishing time or for leaving the port for each season. This situation poses a commons dilemma, as overfishing by individuals would deplete fish stocks for future use. In the current FISH task, each participant, as a fisher, shared an ocean with two
other simulated fishers. These three fishers formed a team, but they were free, and independent, to catch fish from the ocean across multiple seasons. The simulated fishers’ greed (i.e., a level of fish catch that hampers their regeneration to the original level) was set to .5, which meant that their behavior was cooperative. Each fish caught was worth 0.25 RMB (about 0.04 USD). The ocean had an initial abundance of 50 fishes. Fishing activities could last for 6 seasons maximum. Information about the number of fishes harvested, fish remaining in the ocean, and profits were displayed continuously on a screen, although without providing information about other fishers’ catches. Among the various FISH indicators, individual restraint (IR) is defined as the proportion of fish left in the fish stock per member (Gifford and Aranda, 2013). As IR represents the degree of cooperation, we used it as an index of individuals’ ERB. 2.3 Procedures In each experimental session, participants were ushered into the lab in groups of three to six. In case of a group with only two participants, one confederate was added to the group, and behaved throughout the experiment as a naïve participant. The participants were randomly placed in a small cubicle, and were told that they would perform a task with other two participants. In reality, their partners were fictitious, and programmed. To give an incentive, participants were told that they would win a payoff, depending on their performance in the FISH task. To allow participants to become familiar with the experimental task, the details of the FISH program and its operating procedure were then presented on screen via multiple frames. Thereafter, participants were given the chance to practice fishing. In this
simulation, only one fisherman was set to go to sea for fishing. After participants finished practicing, the manipulation on climate condition was introduced. Participants were told that they were invited to perform another task unrelated to the current study, before continuing with the experiment. One of the two materials related to climate condition was then presented on screen. After 20 seconds, participants could continue the experiment by pressing a button. Thereafter, two questions were presented, aimed at reinforcing the effects of climate manipulation. The first question asked participants to summarize the main idea of the presented material, while the second question asked them to provide their personal action in response to global warming (for deteriorated climate), or to describe the weather during the last week (for neutral climate). After the climate manipulation, the main fishing task was introduced. Before participants went to sea for fishing, information about team formation and role assignment was presented. Thereafter, participants were instructed that they would have to take on different roles before going to sea for fishing together. Among the three fishers, one took on the role of captain, and the other two the role of crew. The duties of each role were specified based on Katz and Kahn’s (1966) summary of the role requirements that a leader must meet (i.e., task requirement and maintenance requirement). In this way, the captain was described as being responsible for team management, and she/he had the right to redistribute the group’s final payoff. The crew, on the other hand, needed to obey the captain’s regulations and unconditionally accept any redistribution. Thereafter, participants were fictitiously informed of their
role in the current experiment. In fact, the role had already been assigned randomly, as soon as the experimental program begun. After ensuring that all participants in one experimental session understood the fishing task, the experimenter distributed a password to the participants, so that they could access the FISH website and simultaneously proceed with the experiment. Participants were asked to harvest fish twice serially. They first harvested fish with a high regeneration rate of 3.0, and then with a low rate of 1.5. To avoid excessive exploitation in the final season, participants were told that their first fishing operation lasted approximately six seasons, and their second lasted approximately ten seasons. In fact, the number of seasons was set as five. Post-hoc measures. After completing the fishing tasks, participants were asked to rate their risk perceptions on climate change in the fishing field and in general on a 7-point scale. The fishing risk perception of climate change was rated with two statements: (1) “Global warming leads to a low rate of fish regeneration,” and (2) “Global warming leads to the depletion of fish resources in the sea.” Similarly, the general risk perception of climate change was also assessed with another two statements: (1) “Currently, global climate change is happening,” and (2) “Detrimental global warming is occurring at present.” In addition, to check the effect of role manipulation, participants were asked to recall their role in the task. All participants except one answered correctly, confirming the role assigned to them. At the end of the experiment, participants provided their demographic information including gender and age. All participants were paid based on their
performance on their first FISH task; they earned 20 RMB (about 3 USD) per person on average within one week after the completion of the whole experiment. Thereafter, a debrief was also sent via email. 3 Results 3.1 Manipulation check The 2 (climate) × 2 (role) Univariate ANOVA on the fishing risk perception of climate change showed only the significant effect of climate change, F(1,77) = 18.37, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.193. Participants perceived a higher level of fishing risk under the deteriorated climate condition (M = 5.13, SD = 1.13) than under the neutral climate condition (M = 3.92, SD = 1.41). Additionally, another ANOVA on the general perception of climate change only showed only a marginally significant climate change effect, F(1,77) = 3.37, p = 0.070, ηp2 = 0.042. Participants perceived a slightly higher level of general risk under the deteriorated climate condition (M = 6.48, SD = 0.69) than under the neutral climate condition (M = 6.15, SD = 0.95). In general, the manipulation of climate condition was successful. 3.2 ERB Among the valid data, the FISH indicator IR had substantial skew, kurtosis, and outliers. We used ± 3 SD as a loose criterion for outliers. In this way, we were able to identify 12 outliers, leaving 69 valid data for parametric statistical analysis1. A 2 (climate) × 2 (role) × 2 (regeneration rate) repeated ANOVA on IR was then conducted. Table 1 presents the statistical analyses of the data illustrated in Figure 1. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of the regeneration rate, F(1, 65) =
89.41, p <.001, ηp2 = 0.579. Participants restrained themselves more under a low regeneration rate (M = 0.40, SD = 0.23) than under a high regeneration rate (M = 0.18, SD = 0.23). The main effect of climate manipulation was significant, F(1, 65) = 4.10, p = .047, ηp2 = 0.059. However, the results show that participants restrained themselves more under the neutral climate condition (M = 0.35, SD = 0.20) than under the deteriorated climate condition (M = 0.25, SD = 0.20). Thus, H1 was rejected. There were no significant two-way interactions (role × rate: F(1, 65) = 0.017, p = .895, ηp2 = 0.000; role × climate: F(1, 65) = 0.786, p = .378, ηp2 = 0.012; climate × rate: F(1, 65) = 0.001, p = .971, ηp2= 0.000). However, the three-way interaction was significant, F(1, 65) = 4.04, p = .049, ηp2 = 0.059. A planned contrast was subsequently conducted to examine our research hypotheses. Results indicate that, when fish regenerated at the lower rate, the IR of the captains was higher than that of their crews under the deteriorated climate condition, F(1, 35) = 4.44, p = .042, ηp2 = 0.113,whereas there was no difference in the IR between captains and crews under the neutral climate condition. In addition, results show that, when fish regenerated at the lower rate, the IR of crews was higher under the neutral climate condition than under the deteriorated climate condition, F(1, 36) = 6.77, p = .013, ηp2 = 0.158, whereas there was no difference in the IR of captains between the two climate conditions. Thus, H2 was supported only under an extremely emergent condition, that is, the regeneration capacity of the fish resource became low, and environment deterioration posed a risk to its survival. --------------------------------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE -------------------------------------------------------------------4 Discussion The present study aimed at exploring the effects of ecological conditions on individuals’ harvesting behavior and their interactive effect with leadership. The results show a dissociation effect of the two ecological conditions: a low regeneration rate of fishery resources prevented people from exploiting the fish stocks, whereas a deteriorated climate condition encouraged overfishing. Moreover, the results indicate that assuming a leadership role can encourage people to protect common-pool resources, especially under critical situations. In line with previous studies (e.g., Brucks and Mosler, 2011; Hine et al., 2009), our research confirms that people react positively to the degradation of natural resources (Blanco et al., 2015; Brucks and Mosler, 2011; Hine et al., 2009). People harvest less, and exhibit a higher level of self-restraint when the regeneration rate becomes lower, than when the regeneration rate is higher (Feeny et al., 1990). When facing conflicts over the management of common-pool resources, people usually make an effort to maintain the sustainability of these resources. In general, as the commons deteriorates, and there is a shortage of resources, inequality may be adopted in the commons (Edney, 1980), and the motivation to consume efficiently increases (Brucks and Mosler, 2011). However, unexpectedly, the deteriorated climate condition seemed to have a negative effect on ERB. The results indicate that participants restrained themselves
less once they had knowledge of a deteriorated climate. We speculate that uncertainty characterizing most real-world commons may play an important role in influencing ERB. Evidence suggests that environmental and resource uncertainty tends to promote overuse and to reduce the level of cooperation (Gustafsson et al., 2000; Mantilla, 2018; Wit and Wilke, 1998). Indeed, increased resource uncertainty due to climate change hinders individuals’ cooperation (Döll, 2002). Evidence also shows that cooperation initially increases with uncertainty in the resource, and later decreases, leading to an inverse U-shaped relationship between cooperation and uncertainty (Dinar, 2009; Dinar et al., 2010). With uncertainty, individuals may overestimate the availability of the resource (Brucks and Mosler, 2011), are optimistic about the future, and underestimate the damage they are doing to the environment (Opotow and Weiss, 2000). Compared to the common resources that people are consuming, climatic and environmental conditions are less controllable and more uncertain. A disappointing fact is that actions taken by the public to mitigate climate change are achieved at a far lower level than what expected by the prescriptions of policy-makers (Whitmarsh, 2009). Research on climate change has widely found a gap between attitude/intention and action, whereas although people generally concern about global climate change, their action is often not in accordance with their concern (Moser and Dilling, 2011; Zabkar and Hosta, 2013). For instance, 30% of UK consumers report that they are very concerned about environmental issues, but they are struggling to translate this into green purchases (Young et al., 2010). The
social-cognitive approach provides an explanation of this attitude/intention-action gap. According to the construal level theory (Ledgerwood et al., 2010), distal events are perceived as more abstract than proximal events. This abstraction may increase uncertainty levels and arouse a sense of fear, which further leads to the public’s self-protection and their desire to survive. On the contrary, the deteriorated quality of resources signals a definite threat to survival. This evidence supports the idea that risk communications of the commons should have potential negative impacts on individuals’ personal concerns (Spence et al., 2012). The results of the present study do not show a significant effect of leadership on individuals’ ERB. However, this effect is confirmed by the finding that those taking on the role of leader restrained themselves more than those taking on the role of follower. Indeed, previous research verified the effect of leadership on ERB (e.g., De Cremer and Van Dijk, 2008; Gutiérrez et al., 2011; Kosfeld and Rustagi 2015). In the current study, leadership occurred in the simplest way, as the roles taken on by participants were randomly determined. In fact, participants taking on the role of leader did not use their power to punish or reward their followers. In order to sustain a collective resource, leaders need to use their power to reward cooperation, or to sanction non-cooperation (De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2019; Kosfeld, 2019). Thus, this nonsignificant finding may suggest that the assumption of the role of leader should be accompanied by her/his power to execute her/his will. Notably, other research shows that the effect of leadership on ERB seems to be negative. For instance, Stouten et al. (2005) have demonstrated that, compared to
followers, leaders are likely to harvest more resources, and this effect is especially evident when the variance between the harvests of group members is high. Those authors reason that leaders feel more entitled to higher harvests. The present study suggests certain situations where the assignment of the leadership role may lead to inefficiency in managing a common-pool resource. Since a position of leadership brings power to its occupant, a leader is motivated to maintain that power (Williams, 2014). Thus, a negative effect may occur when the leader is motivated to strengthen her/his social position, or when her/his social position is threatened. It was expected that leadership takes effect under critical situations. Since a critical situation calls for steadfastness or cohesion, leadership plays a great role in group development. In this case, the leader should behave in an environmentally responsible way, when the environment becomes deteriorated or the regeneration capacity of a resource is low. To our surprise, the results of the present study do not show any significant two-way interaction between role and regeneration rate, or between role and climate condition. Further analysis shows that social responsibility for all individuals increases when the conditions worsen. In line with our expectations, the significant three-way interaction shows that leadership happens under an extremely severe condition, that is, the combination of different deteriorated situations in this case. This indicates that a critical situation indeed induces those taking on the position of leader to self-restrain. This also suggests a possibility of self-governance of the commons, in that people facing an extremely serious threat can survive because they can voluntarily afford to take responsibility.
4.1 Strengths The present research has several strengths. First, we have studied ERB in a social dilemma situation. This situation involves a conflict between the interests of individuals and of the collectivity at large (Van Lange et al., 2018). In this way, it is easy to understand individuals’ motivation behind their actions. Our findings clearly demonstrate that leadership assumption induces people to balance their private interests and their social responsibility. Thus, this indicates that people are not always rational, and that they can be motivated to behave in an environmentally responsible way and preserve the common-pool resource from being depleted. Second, we have used the simplest way to assign roles to the players. In fact, participants were randomly assigned one role, either leader or follower. In line with previous research (Arbak and Villeval, 2013; Van der Heijden and Moxnes, 2013), the present study demonstrates that random role assignment induces a greater level of ERB in leaders than in followers. One implication of this finding is that individual group members can be stimulated to take responsibility by being endowed with an appropriate social position. In this way, they can restrain their own self-interests when confronting severe environmental issues. Third, we have manipulated the climate variable using different scenarios. To our knowledge, very few existing works on climate change investigate the unconscious influence of the climate factor on individuals’ ERB. In the social psychological literature, it is widely demonstrated that subtly activating (“priming”) a form of social representation in a prior context can influence what comes next,
without the person’s awareness of this influence (Bargh, 2006). In the current study, the exposure of the experimental participants to a scenario related to climate change causes them to subsequently restrain themselves less, compared to the neutral climate condition. This result is consistent with the widely reported finding of the attitude/intention-action gap in climate change research (e.g., Moser and Dilling, 2011; Zabkar and Hosta, 2013). Thus, the climate scenario used in the current study serves as a priming stimulus, which arouses people’s memory of different climate states. 4.2 Limitations The present study also suffers from some limitations, which should be addressed in future work. First, role manipulation may underestimate the effect of leadership on ERB. In the present study, participants taking on the role of leader had no power to motivate their members. Evidence indicates that the higher power that leaders experience is associated with a greater perception on their part of a greater responsibility (Scholl et al., 2017). Therefore, the observed effect of leadership on ERB would be more salient if, for example, participants taking on the leader role are endowed with the power to punish or reward their followers. However, it should also be noted that the endowment of power may cause some of those assuming the leader position to prioritize their own interests versus the goals of the group (Maner and Mead, 2010). Second, communication among participants was not allowed in the current experimental setting. Evidence supports a group discussion effect, in that individuals are more likely to act cooperatively if they are given the chance to discuss their
tragedy with others (Meleady et al., 2013). In group situations, many decisions need to be made collectively. When a group faces an external threat, its leader especially needs to coordinate their followers. Once followers realize that their own interest is bonded with the collective interest, they may act substantially in the same way as their leader and, thus, restrain their selfishness. Finally, the sample size of this study is limited. The sample size was low, and further decreased due to outliers and exclusions. A small sample size might not fulfill the assumption of normal approximation, and might not lead to a proper statistical test. Moreover, the highly unequal number of female and male participants did not allow us to examine gender difference in ERB. In addition, the extent to which the findings can be generalized to the wider population also needs further investigation. 4.3 Conclusions The awareness of climate deterioration causes individuals to over-exploit resources, whereas a reduced resource capacity leads them to resource preservation. Thus, these two ecological conditions exert an opposite influence on individuals’ ERB in commons dilemmas. Compared to individuals taking on the follower role, those taking on the leader role can demonstrate self-restraint under conditions of resource depletion, even if information on climate deterioration is implicitly present. In summary, the current study provides evidence that, in small groups, self-governance of deteriorated common-pool resources can be achieved simply by encouraging people to assume a position of responsibility for the group and for the environment.
Footnote. 1. Nonparametric Manne-Whitney U tests for all 81 valid data were used to examine whether the difference in IR between captains and crews was related to the regeneration rate under each of the two possible climate conditions. We did not find any significant difference. However, the trend was worthy of notice: when fish were regenerating at a low rate, the IR of captains was clearly higher than that of crews under the deteriorated climate condition, U=159.0, Z=-1.536, p=.124.
Acknowledgements and funding
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Table 1. Parametric ANOVA analyses on individual restraint. Climate
Regeneration
Captain
Crew F
ηp2
condition
rate
M(SD)
n
M(SD)
n
Deteriorated
High
0.17(0.24)
16
0.11(0.26)
21
.489
.014
Low
0.44(0.20)
16
0.28(0.24)
21
4.443*
.113
High
0.27(0.20)
15
0.20(0.21)
17
.816
.026
Low
0.45(0.22)
15
0.47(0.20)
17
.097
.003
Neutral
Note. *p<.05.
Figure 1. Individual restraint as a function of role and regeneration rate (a) for the deteriorated climate condition and (b) for the neutral climate condition. 0.6
Captain Crew
individual restraint
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 High Rate
Low Rate
(a)
0.6
Captain Crew
individual restraint
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 High Rate
Low Rate
(b)
Highlights (1) The attitude-action gap in climate change was demonstrated. (2) Climate condition and resource states had an opposite influence. (3) Leadership prevented people from being selfish under critical situations.
S0959-6526(20)30220-1
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.120173
Reference:
JCLP 120173
To appear in:
Journal of Cleaner Production
Received Date: 28 March 2019 Revised Date:
26 November 2019
Accepted Date: 15 January 2020
Please cite this article as: Liu C-J, Hao F, The impact of social and ecological factors on environmentally responsible behavior, Journal of Cleaner Production (2020), doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.jclepro.2020.120173. This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the addition of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is not yet the definitive version of record. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that, during the production process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. © 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
The impact of social and ecological factors on environmentally responsible behavior Chang-Jiang Liu 1, 2 1 2
Fang Hao 1
School of Psychology, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, China
Research Institute of Moral Education, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, China
Running Head: Leadership takes effect in critical situations
Address for correspondence: Chang-Jiang Liu, School of Psychology, Nanjing Normal University, 122 Ninghai Road, Gulou District, Nanjing, 210097, China. Phone number: (86)18120187004. Email: [email protected].
Conflict of Interest: I declare that I have no conflict of interest.
Informed consent: Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.
Funding This work was supported by the grant from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant No. 71690242], the grant from the National Social Science Fund of China [Grant No. 18BSH113], and the grant from Jiangsu Provincial Department of Education, China [Grant No. 2018SJZDI205].
Acknowledgements Data collection was assisted by graduate students Yan Wu and Jingjing Shao. I appreciate those students’ effort on this work. I also thank Professor Robert Gifford for his permission to use the FISH 4.0.
The impact of social and ecological factors on environmentally responsible behavior
Abstract Exploring the possibility of self-governance of common-pool resources has received increasing attention in the literature. In echoing to this issue, the current study attempts to investigate the effects of ecological conditions on individuals’ environmentally responsible behavior, and to examine the role of leadership in managing resource deterioration in a small group. An ocean fishing experimental task, with different climate conditions and resource regeneration rates, was used to simulate a commons dilemma. Moreover, the role that participants played was manipulated. The results show a dissociation effect of the two ecological conditions: A low regeneration rate of fishery resources prevented participants from exploiting the fish stocks, whereas a deteriorated climate condition encouraged participants to overfish. Moreover, the results show that, when the regeneration rate of fishery resources was lower, the deteriorated climate condition led the crews to restrain themselves less than the neutral climate condition. The deteriorated climate condition led the captains to maintain the same high level of self-restraint as the neutral climate condition. In summary, the findings of the present study suggest that the assumption of a leadership position encourages people to protect common-pool resources, especially under critical situations. This study contributes to our understanding of the feasibility of self-governance of common-pool resources in small groups. Keywords: environmentally responsible behavior; leadership; climate change; the commons.
1 Introduction Human activities have increasingly deteriorated the environment. Anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere intensify climate change and global warming, while overfishing is increasingly leading to the depletion of fish resources. The overexploitation of the common resources is a classic case of tragedy of the commons, which has been widely studied through the commons dilemma paradigm (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 2008). This paradigm presents people with a conflict between individual short-term gains and collective long-term good. Rational individuals will choose to harvest a resource unrestrictedly, inevitably leading to the deterioration and possible depletion of the resource base. Thus, rational individuals behave in an environmentally irresponsible way. Various governance and management approaches of common-pool resources, such as governmental regulations, market mechanisms, and institutional design, have been proposed to avoid the tragedy of the commons (see Murase and Baek, 2018). However, a controversy exists on whether self-governance can be achieved without external intervention (Boyd et al., 2018). The present study attempts to explore in what way people in a small group can directly manage resources deterioration. When groups are small, there may exist some individual action in favor of the achievement of common goals (Morano et al., 2018). Specifically, this study examines a leadership solution for the self-governance of common-pool resources. The idea behind this solution is that a person would have a sense of responsibility once she/he takes on a position of leadership. Moreover, leadership should take effect in critical situations.
Consequently, this study tests whether the effects of leadership on individuals’ environmentally responsible behavior (ERB) are dependent on deteriorated ecological conditions (i.e., climate change and resource depletion). 1.1 Climate change, its consequences, and public concern Scientific evidence shows that climate is changing, and that public concern about climate change and the environment is growing (Cook et al., 2016; Weber and Stern, 2011). Most people think that climate change and sustainability are important problems (Gifford, 2011). However, technological solutions alone are insufficient to address climate change. Thus, it is proposed that actors at all levels are required to reduce carbon emissions and to adapt to climate risks. Individual citizens have been recognized to play a key role in any potential shift towards a low-carbon society (Whitmarsh and Lorenzoni, 2010). Moreover, different actions, albeit quite variable, have been taken to improve resource systems (Newell et al., 2014; Nilsson and Grelsson, 1995). For example, people can spare gas or electricity, buy energy efficient products, or join an environmental group. The governments of the world have devoted themselves to facilitate individual behavior change, primarily through economic and informational approaches (Whitmarsh et al., 2011). Changes in ecological conditions, such as global warming, have further accelerated resources deterioration (Feeny et al., 1990). Climate science has demonstrated that greenhouse gases concentrations, and their effects on global warming, put increasing pressures on humans and on resource systems (Schlüter et al., 2016; Whitmarsh, 2009). Resources deterioration may arouse people’s willingness to
restrain their consumption. Evidence showed that, although individuals’ consumption usually tends to increase over time, there is little or no increase in consumption when the resource is being overused (e.g., Blanco et al., 2015; Hine et al., 2009; Messick et al., 1983). Optimistic and encouraging approaches in social sciences research persistently indicate that human beings have the ability to cope with the tragedy of the commons and to contribute to the achievement of sustainable development. According to economic rationality, people are motivated to maximize their own personal self-interest when facing adverse climate change (Jager et al., 2000; Van Lange et al., 2018). On the other hand, research on social dilemmas has demonstrated that sacrificing personal interests for the benefit of society and ecosystems in such situations is pervasive (for a review, see Van Lange et al., 2013). Research has shown that people are willing to restrain themselves in order to maintain the development and sustainability of natural resources (Van der Linden et al., 2015). However, relying only on the voluntary restraint of individuals is insufficient to meet collective targets (Brick et al., 2016). In this paper, leadership is introduced as a possible solution to encourage people to behave in an environmentally responsible way. 1.2 Leadership According to Stogdill (1950), leadership is defined as the process of “influencing the activities of an organized group in its efforts toward goal setting and goal achievement” (p. 4). To understand the process of leadership, two other components are necessary: the person, and the general requirements of the job itself (Gini, 1997).
To be a leader, a person should possess some specific talents and traits. For example, a transformational leader is able to i) serve as role model for her/his followers, ii) motivate and inspire them, iii) stimulate the efforts of her/his followers to be innovative and creative, and iv) pay special attention to the needs of each individual follower (Bass and Riggio, 2006). In order to fulfill their job requirements, leaders need to set a direction, and spend effort and to influence other persons to follow it. Leaders need to coordinate the often diverse needs of group members as, in this way, they increase group cohesion and finally promote the achievement of group goals (Van Vugt and De Cremer, 2002). Leaders can make a costly commitment to their group (Komai et al., 2011), and are motivated to prioritize the interests of their organizations and their followers (Samuelson and Messick, 1995). Leaders usually hold power to apply sanctions in order to induce compliance with rules. Ideally, leaders are expected to use their power to promote group goals versus self-interest. In addition to this intentional process, leadership can also happen in an unintentional way. In fact, leaders can shape their followers’ beliefs and actions by creating role models. Evidence shows that leaders may provide a good example by voluntarily contributing to the public good before the others are expected to do so (Grabo and Van Vugt, 2016). Behavioral economic research has identified the leading by example as an important way to influence, motivate, and direct the efforts of group members toward the achievement of collective goals (Schwerhoff, 2016). Thus, when leaders’ actions serve as a good example for their followers, their pioneering actions
will work as a motivator. Consequently, the followers may reciprocate by behaving positively (Russell et al., 2017). 1.3 The present study The first aim of the present study is to examine the effects of ecological conditions on individuals’ ERB. Specifically, two ecological conditions were the focus of the present study: the state of resources, and climate condition. Research has indicated that individuals’ ERB depends on the state of resources. For instance, people react positively when faced with limited and deteriorating resources (Prediger et al., 2013). The state of limited and deteriorating resources may enhance people’s awareness of, and concern for their scarcity, and thereby increase their concerns for environment and sustainability. However, the extent to which climate change affects an individual’s ERB and, hence, sustainable resource use, is not clear. Evidence shows that awareness of climate change leads to individuals’ ERB (Han et al., 2016; Masud et al., 2016). When individuals become more aware of, and concerned about, climate change or its impacts, they are more likely to behave in an environmentally responsible way. It is assumed that diverse ecological conditions exert an effect on individuals’ ERB in a same way. Thus, in a similar way as for resource state, climate change may encourage people to increase their concerns for environment and sustainability. In this way, climate change may inspire people to behave in an environmentally responsible way. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: H1: A deteriorated climate condition will induce a higher level of individuals’
ERB than a neutral climate condition. The second aim of the present study is to explore the effects of leadership in promoting individuals’ ERB. Although current research on leadership has grown and flourished in the fields of psychology and management, leadership is one of the critical, yet largely unexplored concepts in resource management research (Minelgaite et al., 2018; Vinkhuyzen and Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2014). Leaders play an important role in achieving collective goals and in maintaining the harmony of a group and of society. Research has demonstrated that the presence of a leader can promote the group’s welfare and ERB (e.g., Bahbouhi and Moussa, 2019; De Cremer and Van Dijk, 2008; Gutiérrez et al., 2011; Kosfeld and Rustagi, 2015; Stouten et al., 2005). People meet what is expected of them, once they take on the role of leader (Van Vugt and De Cremer, 2002). This effect has been demonstrated when leaders are chosen either by their behavioral attributes (Kumru and Versterlund, 2010; Wolff and Keith, 2019), or collectively through a voting procedure (Levy et al., 2011; Levati et al., 2007), or even voluntarily (Arbak and Villeval, 2013; Cartwright et al., 2013; Rivas and Sutter, 2011). Recent evidence further suggests that the leader selection process plays a critical role in determining the success of groups facing collective action problems (Harrell, 2018). Interestingly, even if randomly assigned, leaders act in a different way compared to their followers (Gächter and Renner, 2014; Komai et al., 2011; Moxnes and Van der Heijden, 2003). Research has demonstrated that random role assignment can induce a difference in cooperation between leaders and followers (De Cremer and
Van Dijk, 2008; Arbak and Villeval, 2013). Even if randomly chosen, leaders can lead by example, if it is less costly to do so (Van der Heijden and Moxnes, 2013). Moreover, randomly-chosen leaders are not necessarily less influential than voluntary leaders. Thus, it seems that everyone in a group has the chance to take on the leadership role, and that the talents and traits of a leader can be learned once a person assumes the role of leader. Moreover, leadership often appears in critical situations, and sometimes automatically. Evidence shows that group members expect to select or appoint an appropriate leader to solve a collective tragedy, especially when a group fails in fostering the collective welfare (Messick et al., 1983), or when they are dissatisfied with the status quo (Messick and Brewer, 1983), or when resources distribution or use is viewed as being unfair (Naquin and Kurtzberg, 2018). When resources are overused, people tend to vote to stop the free access to these resources in favor of a leader (Messick et al., 1983). Therefore, the person who takes on the role of leader is expected to manage a critical situation once it arises. Under this situation, group members will hand over the management of the resources to their superior. In summary, it is expected that the effects of the random appointment of leadership in promoting individuals’ ERB will be observed under critical situations. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: H2: When the environment deteriorates and/or the regeneration capacity of a resource is low, the assumption of the leadership role will push individuals to act in an environmentally responsible way, more than the assumption of the follower role.
2 Methods 2.1 Participants and research design A total of 86 undergraduate students participated in the study. About half of them were recruited through posted flyers on the campus; the rest were recruited via invitation, by those who had already participated in the experiment. The students had a variety of majors, and had not participated in any similar experiments beforehand. There were 19 male and 62 female in the sample with a mean age of 19.91 (SD=1.18). Two participants were suspicious that they had been processing the experiment with a computer, and three incorrectly recalled their role in the experiment. Thus, valid data included 81 participants. We used a 2 (climate: deteriorated vs. neutral) × 2 (role: captain vs. crew) × 2 (regeneration rate: high vs. low) mixed factorial design. The first two variables are between-subjects variables, and the last one is a within-subjects variable. The dependent variable is the cooperation indicator in the experimental tasks, namely the FISH (Gifford and Aranda, 2013). 2.2 Materials Climate scenario. To manipulate exposure to a deteriorated climate versus a neutral climate, two texts of similar length and style were developed to describe global climate. The first text (deteriorated climate) was intended to induce in the participants the perception of risk from global warming. It described the negative impact of global warming in recent years. The text was articulated into three paragraphs, for a total of 500 words. First, major facts pertaining to global warming
were introduced, followed by various disastrous consequences that could result from it. The text concluded providing information about how the world can contribute to dealing with climate change. Similarly, the second text (neutral climate) described the phenomenon of climate in neutral terms. The text was articulated into three paragraphs, for a total of 500 words. General information pertaining to climate was first introduced, followed by the presentation of various climatic phenomena in different areas, and, finally, by specific climatic characteristics in a particular area. FISH 4.0. The danger of overfishing is a well-known example of overexploitation of common-pool resources. We used an experimental task, called FISH, to simulate a commons dilemma (Gifford and Aranda, 2013). In practice, FISH is a real-time interactive microworld designed for the systematic investigation of individual decision-making in commons dilemmas. In the simulation, individuals serve as fishers, and are motivated to maximize individual profits by catching more fish (in terms of value) over the costs associated with catching those fish over multiple “seasons”. Fishers must independently decide how many fish to catch in each season. Once fishers stop fishing for a season, or when a season ends, the fish spawn, and thus fish supply recovers. However, fish supply after spawning does not exceed the level of the first season. Fishers earn money for each fish caught; no cost is incurred for fishing time or for leaving the port for each season. This situation poses a commons dilemma, as overfishing by individuals would deplete fish stocks for future use. In the current FISH task, each participant, as a fisher, shared an ocean with two
other simulated fishers. These three fishers formed a team, but they were free, and independent, to catch fish from the ocean across multiple seasons. The simulated fishers’ greed (i.e., a level of fish catch that hampers their regeneration to the original level) was set to .5, which meant that their behavior was cooperative. Each fish caught was worth 0.25 RMB (about 0.04 USD). The ocean had an initial abundance of 50 fishes. Fishing activities could last for 6 seasons maximum. Information about the number of fishes harvested, fish remaining in the ocean, and profits were displayed continuously on a screen, although without providing information about other fishers’ catches. Among the various FISH indicators, individual restraint (IR) is defined as the proportion of fish left in the fish stock per member (Gifford and Aranda, 2013). As IR represents the degree of cooperation, we used it as an index of individuals’ ERB. 2.3 Procedures In each experimental session, participants were ushered into the lab in groups of three to six. In case of a group with only two participants, one confederate was added to the group, and behaved throughout the experiment as a naïve participant. The participants were randomly placed in a small cubicle, and were told that they would perform a task with other two participants. In reality, their partners were fictitious, and programmed. To give an incentive, participants were told that they would win a payoff, depending on their performance in the FISH task. To allow participants to become familiar with the experimental task, the details of the FISH program and its operating procedure were then presented on screen via multiple frames. Thereafter, participants were given the chance to practice fishing. In this
simulation, only one fisherman was set to go to sea for fishing. After participants finished practicing, the manipulation on climate condition was introduced. Participants were told that they were invited to perform another task unrelated to the current study, before continuing with the experiment. One of the two materials related to climate condition was then presented on screen. After 20 seconds, participants could continue the experiment by pressing a button. Thereafter, two questions were presented, aimed at reinforcing the effects of climate manipulation. The first question asked participants to summarize the main idea of the presented material, while the second question asked them to provide their personal action in response to global warming (for deteriorated climate), or to describe the weather during the last week (for neutral climate). After the climate manipulation, the main fishing task was introduced. Before participants went to sea for fishing, information about team formation and role assignment was presented. Thereafter, participants were instructed that they would have to take on different roles before going to sea for fishing together. Among the three fishers, one took on the role of captain, and the other two the role of crew. The duties of each role were specified based on Katz and Kahn’s (1966) summary of the role requirements that a leader must meet (i.e., task requirement and maintenance requirement). In this way, the captain was described as being responsible for team management, and she/he had the right to redistribute the group’s final payoff. The crew, on the other hand, needed to obey the captain’s regulations and unconditionally accept any redistribution. Thereafter, participants were fictitiously informed of their
role in the current experiment. In fact, the role had already been assigned randomly, as soon as the experimental program begun. After ensuring that all participants in one experimental session understood the fishing task, the experimenter distributed a password to the participants, so that they could access the FISH website and simultaneously proceed with the experiment. Participants were asked to harvest fish twice serially. They first harvested fish with a high regeneration rate of 3.0, and then with a low rate of 1.5. To avoid excessive exploitation in the final season, participants were told that their first fishing operation lasted approximately six seasons, and their second lasted approximately ten seasons. In fact, the number of seasons was set as five. Post-hoc measures. After completing the fishing tasks, participants were asked to rate their risk perceptions on climate change in the fishing field and in general on a 7-point scale. The fishing risk perception of climate change was rated with two statements: (1) “Global warming leads to a low rate of fish regeneration,” and (2) “Global warming leads to the depletion of fish resources in the sea.” Similarly, the general risk perception of climate change was also assessed with another two statements: (1) “Currently, global climate change is happening,” and (2) “Detrimental global warming is occurring at present.” In addition, to check the effect of role manipulation, participants were asked to recall their role in the task. All participants except one answered correctly, confirming the role assigned to them. At the end of the experiment, participants provided their demographic information including gender and age. All participants were paid based on their
performance on their first FISH task; they earned 20 RMB (about 3 USD) per person on average within one week after the completion of the whole experiment. Thereafter, a debrief was also sent via email. 3 Results 3.1 Manipulation check The 2 (climate) × 2 (role) Univariate ANOVA on the fishing risk perception of climate change showed only the significant effect of climate change, F(1,77) = 18.37, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.193. Participants perceived a higher level of fishing risk under the deteriorated climate condition (M = 5.13, SD = 1.13) than under the neutral climate condition (M = 3.92, SD = 1.41). Additionally, another ANOVA on the general perception of climate change only showed only a marginally significant climate change effect, F(1,77) = 3.37, p = 0.070, ηp2 = 0.042. Participants perceived a slightly higher level of general risk under the deteriorated climate condition (M = 6.48, SD = 0.69) than under the neutral climate condition (M = 6.15, SD = 0.95). In general, the manipulation of climate condition was successful. 3.2 ERB Among the valid data, the FISH indicator IR had substantial skew, kurtosis, and outliers. We used ± 3 SD as a loose criterion for outliers. In this way, we were able to identify 12 outliers, leaving 69 valid data for parametric statistical analysis1. A 2 (climate) × 2 (role) × 2 (regeneration rate) repeated ANOVA on IR was then conducted. Table 1 presents the statistical analyses of the data illustrated in Figure 1. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of the regeneration rate, F(1, 65) =
89.41, p <.001, ηp2 = 0.579. Participants restrained themselves more under a low regeneration rate (M = 0.40, SD = 0.23) than under a high regeneration rate (M = 0.18, SD = 0.23). The main effect of climate manipulation was significant, F(1, 65) = 4.10, p = .047, ηp2 = 0.059. However, the results show that participants restrained themselves more under the neutral climate condition (M = 0.35, SD = 0.20) than under the deteriorated climate condition (M = 0.25, SD = 0.20). Thus, H1 was rejected. There were no significant two-way interactions (role × rate: F(1, 65) = 0.017, p = .895, ηp2 = 0.000; role × climate: F(1, 65) = 0.786, p = .378, ηp2 = 0.012; climate × rate: F(1, 65) = 0.001, p = .971, ηp2= 0.000). However, the three-way interaction was significant, F(1, 65) = 4.04, p = .049, ηp2 = 0.059. A planned contrast was subsequently conducted to examine our research hypotheses. Results indicate that, when fish regenerated at the lower rate, the IR of the captains was higher than that of their crews under the deteriorated climate condition, F(1, 35) = 4.44, p = .042, ηp2 = 0.113,whereas there was no difference in the IR between captains and crews under the neutral climate condition. In addition, results show that, when fish regenerated at the lower rate, the IR of crews was higher under the neutral climate condition than under the deteriorated climate condition, F(1, 36) = 6.77, p = .013, ηp2 = 0.158, whereas there was no difference in the IR of captains between the two climate conditions. Thus, H2 was supported only under an extremely emergent condition, that is, the regeneration capacity of the fish resource became low, and environment deterioration posed a risk to its survival. --------------------------------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE -------------------------------------------------------------------4 Discussion The present study aimed at exploring the effects of ecological conditions on individuals’ harvesting behavior and their interactive effect with leadership. The results show a dissociation effect of the two ecological conditions: a low regeneration rate of fishery resources prevented people from exploiting the fish stocks, whereas a deteriorated climate condition encouraged overfishing. Moreover, the results indicate that assuming a leadership role can encourage people to protect common-pool resources, especially under critical situations. In line with previous studies (e.g., Brucks and Mosler, 2011; Hine et al., 2009), our research confirms that people react positively to the degradation of natural resources (Blanco et al., 2015; Brucks and Mosler, 2011; Hine et al., 2009). People harvest less, and exhibit a higher level of self-restraint when the regeneration rate becomes lower, than when the regeneration rate is higher (Feeny et al., 1990). When facing conflicts over the management of common-pool resources, people usually make an effort to maintain the sustainability of these resources. In general, as the commons deteriorates, and there is a shortage of resources, inequality may be adopted in the commons (Edney, 1980), and the motivation to consume efficiently increases (Brucks and Mosler, 2011). However, unexpectedly, the deteriorated climate condition seemed to have a negative effect on ERB. The results indicate that participants restrained themselves
less once they had knowledge of a deteriorated climate. We speculate that uncertainty characterizing most real-world commons may play an important role in influencing ERB. Evidence suggests that environmental and resource uncertainty tends to promote overuse and to reduce the level of cooperation (Gustafsson et al., 2000; Mantilla, 2018; Wit and Wilke, 1998). Indeed, increased resource uncertainty due to climate change hinders individuals’ cooperation (Döll, 2002). Evidence also shows that cooperation initially increases with uncertainty in the resource, and later decreases, leading to an inverse U-shaped relationship between cooperation and uncertainty (Dinar, 2009; Dinar et al., 2010). With uncertainty, individuals may overestimate the availability of the resource (Brucks and Mosler, 2011), are optimistic about the future, and underestimate the damage they are doing to the environment (Opotow and Weiss, 2000). Compared to the common resources that people are consuming, climatic and environmental conditions are less controllable and more uncertain. A disappointing fact is that actions taken by the public to mitigate climate change are achieved at a far lower level than what expected by the prescriptions of policy-makers (Whitmarsh, 2009). Research on climate change has widely found a gap between attitude/intention and action, whereas although people generally concern about global climate change, their action is often not in accordance with their concern (Moser and Dilling, 2011; Zabkar and Hosta, 2013). For instance, 30% of UK consumers report that they are very concerned about environmental issues, but they are struggling to translate this into green purchases (Young et al., 2010). The
social-cognitive approach provides an explanation of this attitude/intention-action gap. According to the construal level theory (Ledgerwood et al., 2010), distal events are perceived as more abstract than proximal events. This abstraction may increase uncertainty levels and arouse a sense of fear, which further leads to the public’s self-protection and their desire to survive. On the contrary, the deteriorated quality of resources signals a definite threat to survival. This evidence supports the idea that risk communications of the commons should have potential negative impacts on individuals’ personal concerns (Spence et al., 2012). The results of the present study do not show a significant effect of leadership on individuals’ ERB. However, this effect is confirmed by the finding that those taking on the role of leader restrained themselves more than those taking on the role of follower. Indeed, previous research verified the effect of leadership on ERB (e.g., De Cremer and Van Dijk, 2008; Gutiérrez et al., 2011; Kosfeld and Rustagi 2015). In the current study, leadership occurred in the simplest way, as the roles taken on by participants were randomly determined. In fact, participants taking on the role of leader did not use their power to punish or reward their followers. In order to sustain a collective resource, leaders need to use their power to reward cooperation, or to sanction non-cooperation (De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2019; Kosfeld, 2019). Thus, this nonsignificant finding may suggest that the assumption of the role of leader should be accompanied by her/his power to execute her/his will. Notably, other research shows that the effect of leadership on ERB seems to be negative. For instance, Stouten et al. (2005) have demonstrated that, compared to
followers, leaders are likely to harvest more resources, and this effect is especially evident when the variance between the harvests of group members is high. Those authors reason that leaders feel more entitled to higher harvests. The present study suggests certain situations where the assignment of the leadership role may lead to inefficiency in managing a common-pool resource. Since a position of leadership brings power to its occupant, a leader is motivated to maintain that power (Williams, 2014). Thus, a negative effect may occur when the leader is motivated to strengthen her/his social position, or when her/his social position is threatened. It was expected that leadership takes effect under critical situations. Since a critical situation calls for steadfastness or cohesion, leadership plays a great role in group development. In this case, the leader should behave in an environmentally responsible way, when the environment becomes deteriorated or the regeneration capacity of a resource is low. To our surprise, the results of the present study do not show any significant two-way interaction between role and regeneration rate, or between role and climate condition. Further analysis shows that social responsibility for all individuals increases when the conditions worsen. In line with our expectations, the significant three-way interaction shows that leadership happens under an extremely severe condition, that is, the combination of different deteriorated situations in this case. This indicates that a critical situation indeed induces those taking on the position of leader to self-restrain. This also suggests a possibility of self-governance of the commons, in that people facing an extremely serious threat can survive because they can voluntarily afford to take responsibility.
4.1 Strengths The present research has several strengths. First, we have studied ERB in a social dilemma situation. This situation involves a conflict between the interests of individuals and of the collectivity at large (Van Lange et al., 2018). In this way, it is easy to understand individuals’ motivation behind their actions. Our findings clearly demonstrate that leadership assumption induces people to balance their private interests and their social responsibility. Thus, this indicates that people are not always rational, and that they can be motivated to behave in an environmentally responsible way and preserve the common-pool resource from being depleted. Second, we have used the simplest way to assign roles to the players. In fact, participants were randomly assigned one role, either leader or follower. In line with previous research (Arbak and Villeval, 2013; Van der Heijden and Moxnes, 2013), the present study demonstrates that random role assignment induces a greater level of ERB in leaders than in followers. One implication of this finding is that individual group members can be stimulated to take responsibility by being endowed with an appropriate social position. In this way, they can restrain their own self-interests when confronting severe environmental issues. Third, we have manipulated the climate variable using different scenarios. To our knowledge, very few existing works on climate change investigate the unconscious influence of the climate factor on individuals’ ERB. In the social psychological literature, it is widely demonstrated that subtly activating (“priming”) a form of social representation in a prior context can influence what comes next,
without the person’s awareness of this influence (Bargh, 2006). In the current study, the exposure of the experimental participants to a scenario related to climate change causes them to subsequently restrain themselves less, compared to the neutral climate condition. This result is consistent with the widely reported finding of the attitude/intention-action gap in climate change research (e.g., Moser and Dilling, 2011; Zabkar and Hosta, 2013). Thus, the climate scenario used in the current study serves as a priming stimulus, which arouses people’s memory of different climate states. 4.2 Limitations The present study also suffers from some limitations, which should be addressed in future work. First, role manipulation may underestimate the effect of leadership on ERB. In the present study, participants taking on the role of leader had no power to motivate their members. Evidence indicates that the higher power that leaders experience is associated with a greater perception on their part of a greater responsibility (Scholl et al., 2017). Therefore, the observed effect of leadership on ERB would be more salient if, for example, participants taking on the leader role are endowed with the power to punish or reward their followers. However, it should also be noted that the endowment of power may cause some of those assuming the leader position to prioritize their own interests versus the goals of the group (Maner and Mead, 2010). Second, communication among participants was not allowed in the current experimental setting. Evidence supports a group discussion effect, in that individuals are more likely to act cooperatively if they are given the chance to discuss their
tragedy with others (Meleady et al., 2013). In group situations, many decisions need to be made collectively. When a group faces an external threat, its leader especially needs to coordinate their followers. Once followers realize that their own interest is bonded with the collective interest, they may act substantially in the same way as their leader and, thus, restrain their selfishness. Finally, the sample size of this study is limited. The sample size was low, and further decreased due to outliers and exclusions. A small sample size might not fulfill the assumption of normal approximation, and might not lead to a proper statistical test. Moreover, the highly unequal number of female and male participants did not allow us to examine gender difference in ERB. In addition, the extent to which the findings can be generalized to the wider population also needs further investigation. 4.3 Conclusions The awareness of climate deterioration causes individuals to over-exploit resources, whereas a reduced resource capacity leads them to resource preservation. Thus, these two ecological conditions exert an opposite influence on individuals’ ERB in commons dilemmas. Compared to individuals taking on the follower role, those taking on the leader role can demonstrate self-restraint under conditions of resource depletion, even if information on climate deterioration is implicitly present. In summary, the current study provides evidence that, in small groups, self-governance of deteriorated common-pool resources can be achieved simply by encouraging people to assume a position of responsibility for the group and for the environment.
Footnote. 1. Nonparametric Manne-Whitney U tests for all 81 valid data were used to examine whether the difference in IR between captains and crews was related to the regeneration rate under each of the two possible climate conditions. We did not find any significant difference. However, the trend was worthy of notice: when fish were regenerating at a low rate, the IR of captains was clearly higher than that of crews under the deteriorated climate condition, U=159.0, Z=-1.536, p=.124.
Acknowledgements and funding
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Table 1. Parametric ANOVA analyses on individual restraint. Climate
Regeneration
Captain
Crew F
ηp2
condition
rate
M(SD)
n
M(SD)
n
Deteriorated
High
0.17(0.24)
16
0.11(0.26)
21
.489
.014
Low
0.44(0.20)
16
0.28(0.24)
21
4.443*
.113
High
0.27(0.20)
15
0.20(0.21)
17
.816
.026
Low
0.45(0.22)
15
0.47(0.20)
17
.097
.003
Neutral
Note. *p<.05.
Figure 1. Individual restraint as a function of role and regeneration rate (a) for the deteriorated climate condition and (b) for the neutral climate condition. 0.6
Captain Crew
individual restraint
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 High Rate
Low Rate
(a)
0.6
Captain Crew
individual restraint
0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 High Rate
Low Rate
(b)
Highlights (1) The attitude-action gap in climate change was demonstrated. (2) Climate condition and resource states had an opposite influence. (3) Leadership prevented people from being selfish under critical situations.