The Privileges of Past Communist Party Membership in Russia and Endogenous Switching Regression

Social Science Research 30, 641– 652 (2001) doi:10.1006/ssre.2001.0711, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on

COMMENTARY The Privileges of Past Communist Party Membership in Russia and Endogenous Switching Regression Akos Rona-Tas and Alya Guseva University of California, San Diego Published online September 6, 2001 By now a large literature testifies to the enduring advantages ex-members of the Communist Party enjoy in post-communist countries. Most researchers argue that formal or informal institutional mechanisms explain this persistence. Gerber’s (2000) alternative explanation contends that not institutions but certain durable personal characteristics give ex-party members a leg up. He uses endogenous switching regression (ESR) to test his theory. We argue that Gerber’s own model does not show that the ex-party members’ economic advantage is psychological rather than institutional. Then we demonstrate that Gerber’s model is incomplete and once we add missing variables in the selection equation the model reduces to simple Analysis of Covariance Regression suggesting no selection effect. Finally, we voice more general doubts about ESR. © 2001 Academic Press

In his article, “Membership Benefits or Selection Effects? Why Former Communist Party Members Do Better in Post-Soviet Russia,” Theodore Gerber offers an original explanation for the persistence of advantages of those who once were members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (Gerber, 2000). The literature on the post-communist market transition contends that with the collapse of socialist institutions and the communist party at its center, ex-party members keep their advantages because informal institutions survive and because they have converted their party-membership into more resilient resources (e.g., Staniszkis, 1990; Rona-Tas, 1994; Hanley, Yershova, and Anderson, 1995; Bian and Logan, 1996). Even those who entered this debate from the other side, disputing persistence of party advantages, argue from an institutionalist perspective (Nee, 1989, 1991; for one overview see Cao and Nee, 2000). Gerber offers an alternative explanation. It is not institutions, but certain durable personal characteristics, such as ambition, opportunism, and knack for Address correspondence and reprint requests to Akos Rona-Tas, University of California, Department of Sociology, 401 Social Science Building, Room SSB491, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92039-0533. Fax: (858) 534-4753. E-mail: [email protected]. 641 0049-089X/01 $35.00 Copyright © 2001 by Academic Press All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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organizational activities, that make party members more successful. It is the way people were before they were selected into the party—and not the institutional advantages members acquired after they joined the party—that explains the economic advantage of past membership in the now defunct CPSU. This is a fascinating and plausible story, but one that would require psychological data on personal characteristics of people from many years earlier. Since these data are unavailable, Gerber’s solution is to build an endogenous switching regression (ESR) model, which removes the effect of selection into CPSU. He finds that selection fully explains the advantage of ex-party members, who would even be at a slight disadvantage, had their fate depended solely on institutional factors. We believe that Gerber’s interpretation is flawed. First, we will argue that Gerber’s own model does not support his conclusion, there is nothing inherent in his model that shows that the party members’ economic advantage is psychological and not institutional. Then we will show that Gerber’s model is incomplete and once we have the proper variables in the selection equation the model reduces to simple analysis of covariance regression (ANACOVA) suggesting no selection effect. For this, we have reanalyzed the data Gerber used. 1 Finally, we will voice our doubts about ESR’s capacity to answer the otherwise important and interesting question Gerber has raised. Gerber’s claim that it is individual characteristics that matter rests on his interpretation of a statistically significant positive correlation between the error in the selection model and the error in the model predicting income for ex-party members (␳ 1,3). 2 The correlation shows that there are other factors, not captured by either of the equations that influenced both joining the party then and influence income earning now. Why are these unmeasured factors necessarily noninstitutional? There is nothing in the model itself that speaks to the psychological nature of the unmeasured variable. We reran Gerber’s model but replaced selection into the Communist Party (CP) with selection into top managerial positions.3 The results for top managers were similar to what Gerber found for party members but stronger. Managers were at an even greater net disadvantage than CP members once the selection effect was removed. Following Gerber’s interpretation this would imply that managers are paid more, simply because of their personal characteristics, and becoming a manager actually hurts them economically. A more likely explanation would point to unmeasured organizational and institutional factors that drive both promotions and set managerial salaries. There are two possible reasons for interpreting the selection effect Gerber found as psychological, neither of which is actually tested by his model. One we will call the “post-communist institutional big-bang” and the other, “institutional 1

The first author was one of the participants of the Social Stratification in Eastern Europe 1993 project that generated the data. 2 Gerber presents ESR well, and therefore, there is no need for us to reproduce here the ESR equations. 3 We kept all Gerber’s independent variables except for class, which became our selection criterion. The model is available upon request.

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innocence.” Both arguments hinge on institutional discontinuity. The first posits a radical break between communist and post-communist institutional context, the second between the institutional context of joining the CP and one’s career. Either way, the same institutions are not present both at the time of selection and at the point we observe wages. The institutional big-bang implies, as Gerber claims, a complete break with past Communist institutions. None of the institutions that existed at the time people joined the party existed by 1993, or as he put it “along with the Soviet system disappeared any possible institution-based advantage for CPSU members” (p. 31). This is clearly a gross exaggeration. While the CP as an organization lost its formal right to provide material advantages to its members, the successor of the CPSU, the CP of Russia, remained a formidable political force as a party. But more importantly, the economic system the CPSU had created was, by and large, still in place less than 2 years after the Soviet Union collapsed. Industrial restructuring did not begin, companies were still operating under soft budget constraint, and large employers were still providers of local welfare (see e.g., Commander, Liberman, and Yemtsov, 1993a, 1993b; Commander, Lee, and Tolstopiatenko, 1996). During that short time, the distribution of people across jobs changed very little. The average tenure in a job actually increased. According to our survey, the one Gerber used, in January 1988 people had been in their jobs on the average for 100 months and by April–July 1993 it was 115 months. The median also grew from 55 to 65 months. Administrative restrictions on labor mobility were still in place and the housing market was (and is) still rigid (Dadashev, 1995). By 1993, the wage structure changed only slightly, and inequalities increased only to a small extent (Commander, McHale, and Yemtsov, 1995). This is not to say that by 1993 nothing had changed, but the literature is unequivocal that the changes were slow in coming. The same people were in the same jobs receiving similar wages relative to others. Even in the small private sector things were not dramatically different. A large number of people in the private sector worked for privatized companies. Since privatization in Russia, for the most part, turned over firms to management, workers, and a large number of voucher holders, privatization made very little difference, at least in the short run. Advantages enjoyed by the party members during the Soviet period were reproduced not just through informal mechanisms, such as social networks, inherited from the past, but also through economic and structural inertia. Surprisingly, Gerber himself acknowledges this in a footnote (p. 36, footnote 11). To explain how people were able to factor in their post-communist wages in their communist era decision to join the CP, something that ESR implies, he writes: “[The] equation [. . .] is appropriate even though neither individuals nor Party officials could anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union and the potential income returns to Party membership in the post-Soviet context. So long as relative earnings in the Soviet context are highly correlated with relative earnings in the post-Soviet context, we can take the actual returns to Party membership in the post-Soviet period as a reasonable proxy for the returns in the Soviet context.” (Emphasis added.) From this it follows that if CP members were advantaged only because of their personal characteristics in

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the post-Soviet era, their advantage in the Soviet era was similarly due to their own psychological traits and not to institutions. The second possible reason why the unmeasured variables are noninstitutional is “institutional innocence” of the people who apply to the Party, i.e., their being untouched by the relevant institutions. If people join the party before they start their working life and therefore before they come into contact with institutions that are primarily responsible for allocating economic rewards, the institutional context of their choice of joining and of their income earning are largely disjunct. Once education is controlled, there is little institutional overlap left. The problem is, however, that almost everyone who joined the CPSU did so after they began their careers. In fact, while the average age of starting to work is 19.7 years, the average age of joining is 27.5 (see Appendix 1.). In the sample, less than 4% of those who joined were accepted into the party before starting their first job. Most of these exceptional cases were recruited while still in college and the rest while serving as draftees in the military. Neither the institutional big bang nor the institutional innocence assumption can be sustained, and there is nothing further in Gerber’s models or argument that would suggest that the unmeasured variables influencing both CP membership and incomes in 1993 are not institutional. In some trivial way, of course, all institutional arguments can be retold as a story of personal choice. One simply adds the element of (partial) foresight and the consequences of one’s actions become their causes. Then one could argue that the fact that CEOs make more money than short-order cooks has nothing to do with supply and demand on the job market, with organizational power, or with social networks and credentialing. It is only that some people choose to be CEOs while others do not have the ambition. But then one must ask the question: why do ambitious people want to run Fortune 500 companies and choose not to flip burgers instead? This takes us back to institutions, supply and demand on the job market, organizational power, and the rest. Once Gerber tries to explain the mechanism through which party members could have foreseen the wisdom of their choice, he too must fall back on an institutional story. Whatever the meaning of the selection effect may be (institutions or psychological variables) even Gerber’s model finds that selection does not fully explain the advantages of people in what he calls “elite categories.” But can we trust Gerber’s model? ESR, as any selection model, is only as good as its assumptions about the way the selection occurs (Winship and Mare, 1992; Stolzenberg and Relles, 1997). Gerber’s analysis is exemplary in its clarity of presentation and cleanness of execution and we could easily recreate his model (Appendix 2). Gerber’s selection equation explains only a small fraction of joining the CPSU. This should already be a cause for concern. Gerber’s model suggests that joining the CPSU is only a matter of education and family background. But this scarcely does justice to the actual selection process. We can do better even within the limitations of the available data. We know that at least some people joined the party out of ideological conviction. Unfortunately, we do not have direct measures of past ideological beliefs, but we do know who were

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the ones who studied Marxism–Leninism before they applied for membership. Furthermore, the CPSU was not a voluntary organization. While one had a choice to join, the CPSU had the right to refuse and revoke membership. Moreover, it had a set of personnel policies that spelled out who were the more and less desirable applicants. Some people were invited to join, an offer no one could refuse. The party had recruitment plans and party leaders were anxiously monitoring the composition of their organization. Positions the party thought as key in maintaining its power were both more heavily recruited and received higher financial compensation. Joining the CPSU was not self-selection, but a selection where individual preferences had to meet the institutional preferences of the party. For instance, the Party was keen on having a strong presence in the security and military apparatus. If one worked in that area, the pressure for CP membership was considerable. Our variable is a dummy, indicating if the person was employed in the armed forces or the police or had a related occupation. Moreover, the Party also wanted to be able to influence authority relationships at the workplace. People who supervised others were more likely to be nudged to join. We tap this with an ordinal variable that captures the number of people supervised by the respondent in his first job (1 ⫽ none, 2 ⫽ 1–9, 3 ⫽ 10 or more). Finally, while the Party had a preference for educated people and bosses, it was always uneasy about becoming a party of white-collar professionals. After all, it was supposed to be the party of the working class. As a result, all else being equal, the CPSU preferred industrial workers. We measured this by using the four-digit ISCO88 occupational code and the economic branch codes from which we created a dummy variable if the person was a worker in their first job (Table 1). 4 These last three variables are institutional. The improved selection model predicting party membership is still weak, but better than Gerber’s, and all variables have significant marginal effects in the expected direction. But more importantly, now both correlations among the error terms are nonsignificant. The selection effect vanished. In fact, with this improved selection model, the ANACOVA and ESR produces similar results (Mare and Winship, 1988, pp. 142, 143). 5 Since in the case of low-to-moderate selection bias the step estimator used by ESR can actually worsen estimates (Stolzenberg and Relles, 1997, p. 503), we are better off with ANACOVA. When we calculate expected incomes for Party members and nonmembers using ANACOVA the pattern is clear (Table 2) and is not that different from what ESR implies (Appendix 3). In 1993, there was a party advantage overall, which increased as we go up in the hierarchy. For the sample average there was 4

We chose to keep parents’ education in the selection equation simply to make the comparison with Gerber’s model simpler. Since there is little theoretical justification for its inclusion and it comes up statistically not significant in all models, this variable should be dropped from the best model. Its exclusion changes nothing of consequence. We reran the model without the 11 early joiners, not shown here, and received the same results. 5 The only discrepancy between ANACOVA and ESR is that for party members rural residence is insignificant in ANACOVA, but significant in ESR, while age-squared is significant in ANACOVA, but not in ESR.

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TABLE 1 Improved Model Including Ideology and First Job Characteristics (Authority, Working Class Status and Job in the State Security Sector) in the Selection Equation Predicting Party Membership Dependent variable 6

Constant Parent CP member Parent’s education (years) Parent’s status Woman Age (minus 27) AGE (minus 27) squared* Education (less than secondary) VUZ degree Secondary/vocational Marxism–Leninism First job Armed forces/police/ security Authority Worker Residence (Moscow) Other city Town Rural village Economic branch Agriculture Education, health, science, culture Private sector ISEI (minus 43)* EG classes Professional Upper routine nonmanual Lower routine nonmanual Proprietor Skilled manual

Whether joined Cp entire sample

Log of income, 1993 party members

Log of income, 1993 non-party members

Coeff. ␲k

z

Coeff. ␤ 1k

z

Coeff. ␤ 2k

⫺1.761 0.442 ⫺0.021 ⫺0.006 ⫺0.388 0.019

⫺8.441 4.734 ⫺1.613 ⫺2.074 ⫺4.893 4.504

10.492

24.636

9.805

130.801

⫺0.291 0.009 ⫺0.072

⫺2.659 0.573 ⫺1.770

⫺0.288 0.026 ⫺0.000

⫺8.153 5.226 ⫺6.826

1.055 0.314 0.632

7.425 2.663 2.955

0.198 0.051

0.960 0.357

0.218 0.058

2.849 1.414

0.198 1.360 0.198

2.548 3.003 2.415 ⫺0.130 ⫺0.152 ⫺0.506

⫺1.052 ⫺1.130 ⫺3.244

0.252 0.229 0.217

4.564 3.760 3.605

⫺0.129

⫺0.822

⫺0.177

⫺3.881

0.038 0.133 0.767

0.357 1.290 2.160

⫺0.131 0.128 1.184

⫺3.217 3.287 8.308

⫺0.224 0.098 ⫺0.016 ⫺0.307 ⫺0.116

⫺1.672 0.606 ⫺0.114 0.000 ⫺0.893

⫺0.306 0.162 ⫺0.171 0.358 0.006

⫺4.800 2.129 ⫺3.412 3.291 0.187

0.593 0.064

22.729 0.232 0.629 0.064

64.558 0.262

␴1 ␳ 1,3 ␴2 ␳ 2,3

Z

McFadden’s pseudo R-square for uncorrected selection probit: .189 N

2438 6

342

2096

The asterisk indicates that we, as Gerber, multiplied the coefficient by 100 to show significant digits.

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TABLE 2 Income Advantage of Past CPSU Membership Calculated for Various Social Groups Using ANACOVA Estimates ANACOVA model 6 dependent variable log of income in 1993 Party members

Constant Woman Age (minus 27) Age (minus 27) squared* Education (less than secondary) VUZ degree Secondary/vocational Residence (Moscow) Other city Town Rural village Economic branch Agriculture Education, health, science, culture Private sector ISEI (minus 43)* EG classes Professional Upper routine nonmanual Lower routine nonmanual Proprietor Skilled manual

Non-Party members

Coeff.

t

Coeff.

t

10.573 ⫺0.277 0.009 ⫺0.073

51.494 ⫺3.468 0.611 ⫺1.925

9.809 ⫺0.294 0.026 ⫺0.099

128.821 ⫺9.379 5.326 ⫺7.079

0.168 0.042

1.241 0.346

0.232 0.061

3.843 1.656

⫺0.132 ⫺0.152 ⫺0.505

⫺0.976 ⫺1.0481 ⫺3.209

0.253 0.229 0.217

4.491 3.732 3.553

⫺0.131 0.040 0.133 0.765

⫺1.069 0.389 1.297 2.370

⫺0.177 ⫺0.132 0.128 1.187

⫺3.867 ⫺3.234 2.927 7.690

⫺0.226 0.095 ⫺0.019 ⫺0.300 ⫺0.117

⫺1.952 0.658 ⫺0.152 ⫺0.826 ⫺1.142

⫺0.309 0.163 ⫺0.172 0.357 0.007

⫺4.380 2.137 ⫺3.457 2.992 0.186

Adjusted R 2 N

.24962 342

.16597 2096 Predictions 7

1. Predicted log-income for ExCPSU member 2. Predicted log-income for never CPSU member Percentage difference in income

Sample average

Party member

Non-Party member

Elite status

Low status

10.0761

10.3438

10.0448

11.1064

9.2410

9.9325 15.4

10.2269 12.4

10.0000 4.6

10.5726 70.5

9.2446 ⫺0.4

7 Following Gerber, we defined the groups as follows: “Party Member”: 46-year-old man, with college degree in a city that is not Moscow, professional, in state industry, ISEI ⫽ 51; “Non-Party Member”: 42-year-old woman, secondary degree, in a city that is not Moscow, skilled worker in state industry, ISEI ⫽ 42; “Elite Status”: Muscovite, 30-year-old man, with college degree, manager in private services, ISEI ⫽ 71; “Low Status”: 55-year-old woman, with less than secondary education, in a village, working in a lower nonmanual job in state agriculture, ISEI ⫽ 34.

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a 15% advantage. This is twice what Xie and Hannum (1996) reported for urban China. For people at the top of the social hierarchy, in “elite status,” there was a sizeable 70.5% advantage. For low-status people we find that party-membership made no difference. People who had not been able to reach a certain status despite the push they had received from party membership under communism were not doing better at the time of the survey, everything else being equal. It comes as no surprise that only a year and a half after the fall off Soviet Communism, and under the conditions of slowly moving economic reforms, party membership was still an asset for most people and especially for those on the higher rungs of the social ladder. For the average person, the advantage is not large, but we must keep in mind that by 1993, Russia was in a deep depression, with an inflation of over 200%. Its economy was becoming quickly demonetized; people were not receiving salaries for months and were getting in-kind compensation for barter (Rose and McAllister, 1993; Woodruff, 2000). At the same time, the unregistered economy was flourishing. Under these conditions, wage from one’s main job was at best a crude indicator of people’s economic success. Do we finally have the proper model? Maybe. A weakness of ESR is that it has no measure of the properness of the selection model. Our selection model is superior to Gerber’s, but that does not necessarily mean we have a less biased estimate of the selection effect. Moreover, further developing the income equation is likely to lead to the usual plague of selection models, multicollinearity, because eventually, the same variables will show up in the selection and the income equation. This, in turn, will make models highly unstable. To use the characteristics of the first job in the selection equation and variables describing the current job in the income equation somewhat alleviates this problem. But the biggest problem with ESR is hermeneutic. The interpretation of the bias depends on the meaning we give to unmeasured and essentially indicatorless variables (error terms) that are likely to be combinations of several such variables. And finally, ESR raises more questions than it can answer. Gerber carefully explains that the reason we need ESR is the endogeneity problem we face when estimating the effect of party membership. But that opens a Pandora’s box. Is CP membership the only variable in Gerber’s model where endogeneity is a potential problem? Are there not other variables where endogeneity should stir much more trouble? Take being in the private sector. Under conditions of little unemployment is it not true that people join the new (i.e., nonprivatized) private sector in anticipation of higher incomes? And how about the choice of industrial sector, place of residence, education, or occupation? In fact, with the exception of age and gender, all variables in Gerber’s model should have a more serious endogeneity problem than CP membership. Worse yet, these choices are interdependent. But suppose we could build all into the ESR model, would our findings about CP membership hold up? Gerber’s article should be commended for raising these issues and opening a new, microlevel perspective on the post-communist transition debate. But as far as the evidence is concerned, it still looks like it is formal and informal

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institutions and not personal characteristics that give ex-party members a leg up. In 1993, the party was—well—still on. APPENDIX 1 The Age of Joining the Party and Starting One’s Career in the Work Force Party members

Highest education

Entire population average age when started first job

Average age when started first job

Average age when joined CP

Percentage early joiners

Primary incomplete Primary complete Vocational Secondary incomplete Secondary vocational Secondary academic Higher incomplete Tertiary Postgraduate

16.07 17.46 17.47 17.53 18.50 19.13 19.64 20.92 23.09

16.85 17.32 17.1 18.0 17.85 19.67 18.43 21.09 23.48

29.14 29.83 26.37 26.00 27.40 23.98 23.21 28.02 29.59

0 0 0 0 2.1 5.2 0 5.8 12.5 a

Total

18.59

19.27

26.95

3.7

a

Represents a single case.

APPENDIX 2 Gerber’s Model Reproduced 8 Entire sample Constant

Parent CP member Parent’s status Parent’s education (years) Woman Age (minus 27) Age (minus 27) squared* Education (less than secondary) VUZ degree Secondary/vocational Residence (Moscow) Other city Town Rural village Economic branch Agriculture

Coeff. ␲ k

z

⫺1.380 0.454 ⫺0.007 ⫺0.016 ⫺0.463 0.017

⫺7.707 5.110 ⫺2.472 ⫺1.266 ⫺6.159 4.042

1.084 0.311

8.073 2.702

Party members

␤ 1k

z

Non-Party members Coeff. ␤ 2k

z

9.807

132.454

9.807

132.454

⫺0.411 0.013 ⫺0.068

⫺4.397 0.941 ⫺1.705

⫺0.301 0.027 ⫺0.099

⫺7.791 5.339 ⫺6.870

0.452 0.125

3.393 0.990

0.254 0.068

2.896 1.599

⫺0.129 ⫺0.155 ⫺0.518

⫺1.124 ⫺1.206 ⫺3.478

0.256 0.232 0.221

4.632 3.819 3.662

⫺0.086

⫺0.552

⫺0.176

⫺3.872

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Entire sample Coeff. ␲ k

Constant

z

Education, health, science, culture Private sector ISEI (minus 43)* EG class Professional Upper routine non-manual Lower routine non-manual Proprietor Skilled manual

␴1 ␳ 1,3 ␴2 ␳ 2,3

Party members

␤ 1k

Non-Party members

z

Coeff. ␤ 2k

z

0.040 0.138 0.816

0.386 1.340 2.325

⫺0.132 0.128 0.011

⫺3.267 3.294 8.316

⫺0.230 0.096 0.011 ⫺0.325 ⫺0.095

⫺1.717 0.593 0.085 0.000 ⫺0.756

⫺0.309 0.162 ⫺0.171 0.357 0.007

⫺4.820 2.134 ⫺3.415 3.278 0.198

0.672 0.550

13.881 5.131 0.630 ⫺0.098

55.756 ⫺0.327

McFadden’s pseudo R 2 for uncorrected selection probit: .175 N ⫽

2438

342

2096

8

The coefficients are very similar to Gerber’s. The asterisk indicates that we, as Gerber, multiplied the coefficient by 100 to show significant digits.

APPENDIX 3 Decomposition of Predicted Log-income from Improved Model 9 Sample 1. Party member observed in CP 2. Non-Party member not observed in CP 3. Non-Party member observed in CP 4. Party member not observed in CP Z(hat) ⫽ E(Z*) ␭1 ␭2 ␴ 13 ⫽ ␳ 1,3 *␴ 1 ␴ 23 ⫽ ␳ 2,3 *␴ 2 Selection effect 1 ␭ 1 *␴ 13 2 ⫺␭ 2 *␴ 23 䡠 3 ⫺␭ 2 *␴ 13 䡠

Party member

Non-Party member

Elite

Low

10.0118

10.3093

9.9726

11.0603

9.1689

9.9236

10.2067

9.9936

10.5542

9.2397

10.0118

10.3093

9.9726

11.0603

9.1689

9.9236 ⫺1.2820 1.7553 .1948 .0382 ⫽ .5936*.0644 .0408 ⫽ .6295*.0648

10.2067 ⫺.2158 .9401 .6657

9.9936 ⫺1.5663 1.9952 .1242

10.5542 ⫺.6508 1.2532 .4347

9.2397 ⫺1.6109 2.0334 .1151

.0382

.0382

.0382

.0382

.0408

.0408

.0408

.0408

1.7553*.0382 ⫽ .0670 ⫺.1948*.0408 ⫽ ⴚ.0079 ⫺.1948*.0382 ⫽ ⴚ.0074

.9401*.0382 ⫽ .0359 ⫺.6657*.0408 ⫽ ⴚ.0271 ⫺.6657*.0382 ⫽ ⴚ.0254

1.9952*.0382 ⫽ .0762 ⫺.1242*.0408 ⫽ ⴚ.0050 ⫺.1242*.0382 ⫽ ⴚ.0047

1.2532*.0382 ⫽ .0478 ⫺.4347*.0408 ⫽ ⴚ.0177 ⫺.4347*.0382 ⫽ ⴚ.0166

2.0334*.0382 ⫽ .0776 ⫺.1151*.0408 ⫽ ⴚ.0046 .1151*.0382 ⫽ ⴚ.0043

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Sample 4 ␭ 1 *␴ 23 Total effect 1 2 3 4

1.7553*.0408 ⫽ .0716 10.0788 9.9157 10.0044 9.9952

Party member .9401*.0408 ⫽ .0383 10.3452 10.1796 10.2839 10.2450

Non-Party member

Elite

Low

1.9952*.0408 ⫽ .0814

1.2532*.0408 ⫽ .0511

2.0334*.0408 ⫽ .0829

10.0488 9.9886 9.9679 10.0750

11.1081 10.5365 11.0437 10.6053

9.2465 9.2351 9.1646 9.3226

9 In calculating the expected logged incomes, we used Gerber’s definition of elite and low-status (see Table 2). Although it is inconsequential, we calculated Z(hat) for each group separately using the sample means for the variables for which no value was specified by Gerber.

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