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The status of the systems approach: Reply to Bryer
O ~ E G 4 The Int J[ of Mgmt S~cl.. ~ o l '~. N o 3. p~. 2-" to 2St) C Pergamon Pre,,, g~d 1,180 Pr~med ~n Great Britain
0305-0-183 80,0501-0277S02.00,0
FEEDBACK The Status of The Systems Approach: Reply to Bryer logical positions in terms of which he characterizes "the" systems approach. This is apparent, for example, when he identifies 'the philosophical approach" (in contrast to his own) with "science-positivism" [1. p. 220] (positivism and scientism are in fact the exact disavowal of a philosophical approach!), or when in his discussion of the measurement problem he himself falls into the positivist trap of not recognizing the unavoidable circularity of any measurement process (cf. 4 below). This last point is especially distressing because it reveals Bryer's failure to read the authors he criticizes. As early as 1948 Churchman published Theory of Experimental Inference [2], in which he attempted a precise formulation of philosophical positions on epistemology based primarily on the concept of 'presupposition'. These included the 'direct approaches" referred to earlier. What emerged as apparently the most viable approach is what EA Singer called 'experimentalism," in which the circular process of knowledge acquisition is revealed. Anyone who has attempted to calibrate measurements (in the physical, biological or social sciences) quickly becomes aware of the circularity of his presuppositions. And measurement is calibrated information. It is not merely the assignment of numbers to objects as SS Stevens suggests [3, p. 18ff]. Number assignment is only one feature of a measurement process. The assignment of objects to qualitative classes also requires a delicate calibration process, as, for example, the histories of astronomy and biology show over and over. Further explanation of these points especially with respect to the measurement of values appears in [4]. As one wag has pointed out, a philosopher has at most one idea in his life though he may have many books. Churchman's one idea is the logical structure of inquiry. The idea has certainly evolved over his lifetime, but it hasn't changed so much that one can safely ignore the earlier works. Even if you feel he's been gnawing at the idea far too long (over forty years), still, a little patience and study on the part of the younger inquirers seems called for) The inevitable result of the deficiencies of Bryer's article is much fuzziness and confusion in his argum e n t - c o n f u s i o n that certainly does not help the cause of making the systems approach (particularly, "systems science') more (self-)critical. Because our own concern is in overcoming the technocratic and positivist aspects of the systems-scientific approach to social inquiry and design, let us examine in more detail to what extent Bryer's paper misses the critical intent of the dialectical systems approach which we advocate. 2 These are some crucial points we shall examine briefly:
R A BRYER. in his paper on 'The Status of the Systems Approach" [1] claims to give a critical assessment of the philosophical basis of the work of Ackoff, Beer and Churchman. It is certainly true that what the systems movement today needs most if it is to keep growing and learning is a critical clarification of its underlying philosophy. However, in order to merit the title 'critical.' such as assessment must meet some minimum requirements, among them: {1) The object of criticism must be identified and explained so that one can judge whether or not the criticized position is adequately represented. (2) The critic's own position needs to be explained so that the methodological and normative presuppositions on which the critique depends are exposed. [3) Labels used to characterize positions ought to be used correctly or, if employed in other than usual fashion, must be introduced explicitly. Bryer's paper does not live up to any of these requirements. In regard to (l)` Bryer not only throws such entirely distinct approaches as Beer's 'managerial cybernetics' and Churchman's 'dialectical" systems approach into one and the same pot, but he also fails to notice the epistemological gap that separates the positions he claims to assess (especially Churchman's and Ackoff's) from the (un-)philosophical viewpoint that is typified by Operations Research, RAND-type systems analysis, General Systems Theory, etc. (For convenience, we shall in the following subsume these approaches under the label 'systems science'.) Rather simplistically, Bryer pretends to assess the status of 'the' systems approach, and thereby misses the critical intent of Churchman's and Ackoff's systems approach against the narrow scientistic or positivist employment of the systems idea in contemporary "systems science'. With respect to (2), Bryer fails to make explicit the normative and epistemological-methodological presuppositions on which he relies for his criticism, thereby giving himself a seemingly objective role above the situa t i o n - q u i t e in the fashion of an uncritical "systems scientist'. Rather than explaining his own philosophical standpoint in comparison to the one he criticizes ('positivism'? 'pragmatism'? 'conventionalism/idealism?), he characterizes his own position as a 'direct" approach that is allegedly free of philosophical assumptions and is presented as an "alternative to the philosophical approach" [1, p. 220]. The history of philosophical thought has shown over and over that the 'direct approach" never works; for one thing, it is not possible to define 'direct" in any direct fashion. As to (3). finally, Bryer himself reveals that he does not understand the basic epistemological--methodo-
i We hope Bryer will forgive this much pouting on the part of senex. 2 The reader will find more systematic recent expositions of our critical stance in [8, 12. 13].
(1) What exactly is the object of Bryer's criticism? The dialectical systems approach vs 'systems science'?. 277
:78
Feedb~c 1,
t21 What is Bryer's ,:ore argument? The problem of holism vs incrementalism? (3) What is Bryer's main conclusion'? The problem of a philosophical vs an unphilosophical Cdirect'. "scientific') understanding of the s}stems idea" 14) Some remarks concerning the core problem of measurement,
The object of Bryer's criticism: dialectical systems approach or "systems science'? It is easy to show that the object of Bryer's criticism is not the one he proclaims, namely, 'the philosophical approach" to OR and systems design. Rather, his criticism unintentionally strikes at the very approach he himself advocates---the scientific, unphilosophical. 'direct' approach to planning that understands itself as 'systems science' and takes recourse to "the accumulated knowledge of the established sciences" [1, p. 220]. Three specific examples must suffice to illustrate the point. (al Bryer characterizes the position he wants to criticize as being positivistic, explaining the "questions about the 'nature" of phenomena or the 'nature" of theories are considered meaningless by positivists" [I, p. 220], that "positivists take the whole system for granted because they are unable and are forbidden to inquire into how phenomenal events are related" [1, p. 225], and that "for both the positivist and the pragmatist there are no underlying realities which play a direct part in the practice of science.'" rl, p. 225]. In distinction to this. Churchman has repeatedly argued that the social inquirer and planner cannot escape the difficult question of the reality and nature of the whole system for which he plans, and the nature of the inquiring system that he himself represents [5. Ch. 14, 7, Ch. 1.15, 16]. It is indeed one of the basic critical themes of the dialectical systems approach that all inquiry and design implies very questionable a priori judgments about the nature and the boundaries of the whole system in question; precisely for this reason the dialectical systems approach maintains that a systems approach that is not to become a source of objectivist illusion must be a self-critical and philosophical one. (b) Bryer also 'explains' that the systems approach at which his criticism aims can be characterized by a pragmatism with positivistic undertones. He correctly points out that pragmatism comes close to positivism when it assumes that methodology can "produce" reality, i.e. guarantee a continuous approximation toward truth. He overlooks, however, that it is the prevailing scientistic methodology of Karl Popper's 'Critical Rationalism" which really postulates just such an approximation toward truth (e.g. [11, p. 57ff'J), while the dialectical systems approach has always rejected this idea. It rejects it because any judgment about whether such an approximation has occurred would presuppose a whole systems judgment, i.e. a judgment about the nature of the totality that is to be approximated, and of course no judgment of this kind is objecti~,ely possible. Rather, the notion of a progress toward an ideal {the ideal of truth in science, the ideal of improvement in planning) must be understood as a critical idea that leads us to reflect on our inevitable lack of knowledge of the whole system, and hence, the selectivity and normative content of our knowledge (~f [5, p. 47]). (c) In the same context, Bryer also misapprehends the position that he claims to assess when he suggests, quite correctly, that
remaining entirely faithful to methodology creates insoluble problems. The most important of these is that without some knowledge of reality that is independent of our methodology [ . . . ] we cannot know if our methodology puts us in touch with "'reality". [ I, p. 224]. This is well observed. Only, Bryer does not seem to have read Churchman very well. for Churchman has for :,ears maintained that the systems approach must enter into a dialogue with the moral, political, religious and aesthetic perspectives on social reality that are outside its own scope of rationality, but are nevertheless indispensable sources of knov, ledge for keeping in touch with "reality' (of esp. [6] and [8]).
Br)'er'5 core aryument: holism or incrementalism? Bryer's chief criticism turns out to rely on the old and tired standard argument of positivists (logical empiricists and critical rationalists included) against 'holism'. Knowing the whole system, so goes the argument, is impossible: "hence" the whole-systems ideal is practically irrelevant and must be avoided. In its stead, the incrementalist approach is advocated as a 'practically attainable" strategy [1. p. 221]. lncrementaiism assumes that comprehensive understanding of whole systems is not only impossible but also unnecessary. Breaking up complex problems into small segments will make it possible, so goes the argument, to define clear criteria of progress for small ('incremental') but satisfactory steps forward. The argument is rather uncritical, and rather childlike: here we have a difficulty that we cannot resolve, so let us close our eyes before that difficulty and let us be sure that our approach, on the surface of it, looks neat and scientific. It is indeed an old positivistic device to neutralize genuine epistemological difficulties by relegating them to a methodologically irrelevant staus. Bryer here reveals that he has not at all understood the critical methodological significance of the systems idea. Over two hundred years ago, in the Critique of Pure Reason [10], Immanuel Kant demonstrated that the systems idea, or the idea of a totality of conditions, is an unavoidable idea flowing into all our knowledge. Ignoring it does not make our knowledge any more "objective" or "practical,' but only deceptive. From a non-positivist, critical, point of view, the fact that we never know the whole system--the totality of relevant conditions--does not imply that we should keep the scope of inquiry within arbitrary boundaries and treat the environment as a "given" (as incrementalism concludes) but rather that we cannot know anything unless we critically reflect upon our ignorance of the totality of relevant conditions, and the normative content of the boundary judgments by which we separate the problem-relevant system from the whole (the 'environment'). Bryer's conclusion c,'m only be attributed to his uncritical standpoint: If we take the whole systems ideal seriously it appears that we must have full knowledge before we can provide guidelines for inquiry. However. if we had this knowledge inquiry would be unnecessary! [1, p. 222]. The critical conclusion is quite the opposite: if we take the whole systems ideal seriously for what it is, namely, an unavoidable critical idea. we must conclude that we can know 'reality" only to the extent we critically reflect
Omega. Vol. ?L No. 3 on the potential deceptiveness of the v, hole s)stems judgments that inevitably flow into our conception of reality. An incrementalist approach to planning is bound to end up as an uncritically technocratic approach, as is sufficiently demonstrated by "general" systems theory, Rand-systems analysis, artificial intelligence and heuristic programming, much of current OR pracice, and all other incrementalist planning methodologies: they all suffer from a common inability to deal critically with the very social reality which they ought to improve
[13]. It is of no avail for the incrementalist to argue, as Bryer does, that he does not "in principle' deny the desirability of the systems idea but merely adopts the incremental approach as "a practical guide for action"; for in methodological issues the 'normal" (practical, feasible) becomes the norm, without investigators being aware of it. Thus the 'normal" becomes the standard against which the scientific character of inquiry is judged (e.g. "peer review" in judging the quality of a research proposal).
Bryer's conclusion: philosophical or unphilosoph&'al (scientific) understanding of the systems approach? After having blurred the above-mentioned critical distinctions, Bryer can hardly be expected to arrive at a helpful conclusion. A ~helpful' conclusion would merit its title by critically examining its own philosophical and ideological presuppositions in each application, and would not hide its uncritical character behind the cover of "science'. That Bryer's conclusion lacks this quality of being helpful is apparent from the following: The general lesson to be learned from the failure of the philosophies of science to define adequately the nature of OR as a science--adequate to its whole systems objective--is that philosophical analyses of ideal methods should be abandoned in favor of attempts to define and measure real knowledge interests and the knowledge which is necessary for their pursuit. If we follow the classification [of knowledge interests] provided by Habermas [9, p. 191if, 309f] there is clearly a much greater role for the social sciences in this ['direct,' scientific] model of the practice of OR than would be apparent from the works of the prominent theoreticians of OR. [I, p. 230,/'eference added], (Similarly, in the abstract, he says that the paper is to illustrate the conclusion "'that philosophy confuses rather than clarifies the nature of OR as a science.") Quite apart from Bryer's misreading of Habermas' intent--which is a critical one against scientism--his conclusion finally reveals the defensive character of his argument. Instead of arguing for a truly critical reconstruction of systems science, he wants us to abandon altogether the attempt to reflect philosophically upon the deceptiveness of the existing model. Everything stands on its head here. 'The' philosophical approach is identified with positivism and scientism (cf, [1, p. 220]); positivism becomes "a contender as a method of inquiry with which OR could pursue the whole systems ideal" [I, p. 223]; and more scientism is
279
implied to be the medicine for the already prevalent scientism. All this comes neatly packaged in a "direct approach," an approach that prides itself on its resisting "'the striking degradation of the rote of a knowledgeable grasp of particular subject-matters in the practice of science" [1. p. 223]. The unspoken assumption is that "the established knowledge of the social sciences" on which Bryer wants us to rely [1, p. 227] exists, is objective, and can replace critical reflection on the epistemological difficulties and the value content of "scientific' systems design. Let us not fool ourselves: the genuine philosophical ditficulties raised by the systems idea cannot be passed over simply by disavowing their critical relevance, and by ignoring the need that they imply for a philosophically self-critical systems approach. "Systems science' will only be scientific in so far as it becomes self-reflective with regard to these genuine dit~culties, and no 'direct' approach should make us believe that the cure for the ailing systems science is "more of the same."
REFERENCES 1. BRYER R (1979)The status of the systems approach. Omega, 7(3), 219-231. 2. CHURCHMAN CW (1948) Theory of Experimental Inference. Basic Books, New York, USA. 3. CHURCHMAN CW & RATOOSH P (Eds) (1959) Measurement: Definitions and Theories. John Wiley, New York, USA. 4. CHURCHMAN CW (1963) Prediction and Optimal Decision. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, USA. 5. CHURCHMAN CW (19681 Challenye to Reason. McGraw-Hill, New York, USA. 6. CHURCHMAN CW (1968) The Systems Approach. 2rid ed. to be publ. Dell, New York, USA. 7. CHURCHMAN CW [1971) The Design of lnquiriny Systems. Basic Books, New York, USA. 8. CHURCHMANCW (1979) The Systems Approach and its Enemies. Basic Books, New York, USA. 9. [-[ABERMASJ (1971) Knowledge and Human Interests. Beacon, Boston, Massachusetts, USA. 10. KANT I (1781/1787) Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by SMITH NK (1965), St Martin's Press, New York, USA. I1. POPPER KR {1972) Objective Knowledge, an Evolutionary Approach. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK. 12. ULRICH W (1979) A critique of pure cybernetic reason, part I: Theory, and part II: Practice, the case of Stafford Beer's work in Chile, 1971-1973. M~jmt Sci., to be published. 13. ULRICH W 11980) The metaphysics of design: a Simon-Churchman 'debate'. Interfaces, 10(l)--to be published.
Centerfor Research in Management C WESTCHURCHMAN Science WERNER ULRICH University of California 26 Barrows Hall Berkeley California 94720 USA
0305-0-183 80,0501-0277S02.00,0
FEEDBACK The Status of The Systems Approach: Reply to Bryer logical positions in terms of which he characterizes "the" systems approach. This is apparent, for example, when he identifies 'the philosophical approach" (in contrast to his own) with "science-positivism" [1. p. 220] (positivism and scientism are in fact the exact disavowal of a philosophical approach!), or when in his discussion of the measurement problem he himself falls into the positivist trap of not recognizing the unavoidable circularity of any measurement process (cf. 4 below). This last point is especially distressing because it reveals Bryer's failure to read the authors he criticizes. As early as 1948 Churchman published Theory of Experimental Inference [2], in which he attempted a precise formulation of philosophical positions on epistemology based primarily on the concept of 'presupposition'. These included the 'direct approaches" referred to earlier. What emerged as apparently the most viable approach is what EA Singer called 'experimentalism," in which the circular process of knowledge acquisition is revealed. Anyone who has attempted to calibrate measurements (in the physical, biological or social sciences) quickly becomes aware of the circularity of his presuppositions. And measurement is calibrated information. It is not merely the assignment of numbers to objects as SS Stevens suggests [3, p. 18ff]. Number assignment is only one feature of a measurement process. The assignment of objects to qualitative classes also requires a delicate calibration process, as, for example, the histories of astronomy and biology show over and over. Further explanation of these points especially with respect to the measurement of values appears in [4]. As one wag has pointed out, a philosopher has at most one idea in his life though he may have many books. Churchman's one idea is the logical structure of inquiry. The idea has certainly evolved over his lifetime, but it hasn't changed so much that one can safely ignore the earlier works. Even if you feel he's been gnawing at the idea far too long (over forty years), still, a little patience and study on the part of the younger inquirers seems called for) The inevitable result of the deficiencies of Bryer's article is much fuzziness and confusion in his argum e n t - c o n f u s i o n that certainly does not help the cause of making the systems approach (particularly, "systems science') more (self-)critical. Because our own concern is in overcoming the technocratic and positivist aspects of the systems-scientific approach to social inquiry and design, let us examine in more detail to what extent Bryer's paper misses the critical intent of the dialectical systems approach which we advocate. 2 These are some crucial points we shall examine briefly:
R A BRYER. in his paper on 'The Status of the Systems Approach" [1] claims to give a critical assessment of the philosophical basis of the work of Ackoff, Beer and Churchman. It is certainly true that what the systems movement today needs most if it is to keep growing and learning is a critical clarification of its underlying philosophy. However, in order to merit the title 'critical.' such as assessment must meet some minimum requirements, among them: {1) The object of criticism must be identified and explained so that one can judge whether or not the criticized position is adequately represented. (2) The critic's own position needs to be explained so that the methodological and normative presuppositions on which the critique depends are exposed. [3) Labels used to characterize positions ought to be used correctly or, if employed in other than usual fashion, must be introduced explicitly. Bryer's paper does not live up to any of these requirements. In regard to (l)` Bryer not only throws such entirely distinct approaches as Beer's 'managerial cybernetics' and Churchman's 'dialectical" systems approach into one and the same pot, but he also fails to notice the epistemological gap that separates the positions he claims to assess (especially Churchman's and Ackoff's) from the (un-)philosophical viewpoint that is typified by Operations Research, RAND-type systems analysis, General Systems Theory, etc. (For convenience, we shall in the following subsume these approaches under the label 'systems science'.) Rather simplistically, Bryer pretends to assess the status of 'the' systems approach, and thereby misses the critical intent of Churchman's and Ackoff's systems approach against the narrow scientistic or positivist employment of the systems idea in contemporary "systems science'. With respect to (2), Bryer fails to make explicit the normative and epistemological-methodological presuppositions on which he relies for his criticism, thereby giving himself a seemingly objective role above the situa t i o n - q u i t e in the fashion of an uncritical "systems scientist'. Rather than explaining his own philosophical standpoint in comparison to the one he criticizes ('positivism'? 'pragmatism'? 'conventionalism/idealism?), he characterizes his own position as a 'direct" approach that is allegedly free of philosophical assumptions and is presented as an "alternative to the philosophical approach" [1, p. 220]. The history of philosophical thought has shown over and over that the 'direct approach" never works; for one thing, it is not possible to define 'direct" in any direct fashion. As to (3). finally, Bryer himself reveals that he does not understand the basic epistemological--methodo-
i We hope Bryer will forgive this much pouting on the part of senex. 2 The reader will find more systematic recent expositions of our critical stance in [8, 12. 13].
(1) What exactly is the object of Bryer's criticism? The dialectical systems approach vs 'systems science'?. 277
:78
Feedb~c 1,
t21 What is Bryer's ,:ore argument? The problem of holism vs incrementalism? (3) What is Bryer's main conclusion'? The problem of a philosophical vs an unphilosophical Cdirect'. "scientific') understanding of the s}stems idea" 14) Some remarks concerning the core problem of measurement,
The object of Bryer's criticism: dialectical systems approach or "systems science'? It is easy to show that the object of Bryer's criticism is not the one he proclaims, namely, 'the philosophical approach" to OR and systems design. Rather, his criticism unintentionally strikes at the very approach he himself advocates---the scientific, unphilosophical. 'direct' approach to planning that understands itself as 'systems science' and takes recourse to "the accumulated knowledge of the established sciences" [1, p. 220]. Three specific examples must suffice to illustrate the point. (al Bryer characterizes the position he wants to criticize as being positivistic, explaining the "questions about the 'nature" of phenomena or the 'nature" of theories are considered meaningless by positivists" [I, p. 220], that "positivists take the whole system for granted because they are unable and are forbidden to inquire into how phenomenal events are related" [1, p. 225], and that "for both the positivist and the pragmatist there are no underlying realities which play a direct part in the practice of science.'" rl, p. 225]. In distinction to this. Churchman has repeatedly argued that the social inquirer and planner cannot escape the difficult question of the reality and nature of the whole system for which he plans, and the nature of the inquiring system that he himself represents [5. Ch. 14, 7, Ch. 1.15, 16]. It is indeed one of the basic critical themes of the dialectical systems approach that all inquiry and design implies very questionable a priori judgments about the nature and the boundaries of the whole system in question; precisely for this reason the dialectical systems approach maintains that a systems approach that is not to become a source of objectivist illusion must be a self-critical and philosophical one. (b) Bryer also 'explains' that the systems approach at which his criticism aims can be characterized by a pragmatism with positivistic undertones. He correctly points out that pragmatism comes close to positivism when it assumes that methodology can "produce" reality, i.e. guarantee a continuous approximation toward truth. He overlooks, however, that it is the prevailing scientistic methodology of Karl Popper's 'Critical Rationalism" which really postulates just such an approximation toward truth (e.g. [11, p. 57ff'J), while the dialectical systems approach has always rejected this idea. It rejects it because any judgment about whether such an approximation has occurred would presuppose a whole systems judgment, i.e. a judgment about the nature of the totality that is to be approximated, and of course no judgment of this kind is objecti~,ely possible. Rather, the notion of a progress toward an ideal {the ideal of truth in science, the ideal of improvement in planning) must be understood as a critical idea that leads us to reflect on our inevitable lack of knowledge of the whole system, and hence, the selectivity and normative content of our knowledge (~f [5, p. 47]). (c) In the same context, Bryer also misapprehends the position that he claims to assess when he suggests, quite correctly, that
remaining entirely faithful to methodology creates insoluble problems. The most important of these is that without some knowledge of reality that is independent of our methodology [ . . . ] we cannot know if our methodology puts us in touch with "'reality". [ I, p. 224]. This is well observed. Only, Bryer does not seem to have read Churchman very well. for Churchman has for :,ears maintained that the systems approach must enter into a dialogue with the moral, political, religious and aesthetic perspectives on social reality that are outside its own scope of rationality, but are nevertheless indispensable sources of knov, ledge for keeping in touch with "reality' (of esp. [6] and [8]).
Br)'er'5 core aryument: holism or incrementalism? Bryer's chief criticism turns out to rely on the old and tired standard argument of positivists (logical empiricists and critical rationalists included) against 'holism'. Knowing the whole system, so goes the argument, is impossible: "hence" the whole-systems ideal is practically irrelevant and must be avoided. In its stead, the incrementalist approach is advocated as a 'practically attainable" strategy [1. p. 221]. lncrementaiism assumes that comprehensive understanding of whole systems is not only impossible but also unnecessary. Breaking up complex problems into small segments will make it possible, so goes the argument, to define clear criteria of progress for small ('incremental') but satisfactory steps forward. The argument is rather uncritical, and rather childlike: here we have a difficulty that we cannot resolve, so let us close our eyes before that difficulty and let us be sure that our approach, on the surface of it, looks neat and scientific. It is indeed an old positivistic device to neutralize genuine epistemological difficulties by relegating them to a methodologically irrelevant staus. Bryer here reveals that he has not at all understood the critical methodological significance of the systems idea. Over two hundred years ago, in the Critique of Pure Reason [10], Immanuel Kant demonstrated that the systems idea, or the idea of a totality of conditions, is an unavoidable idea flowing into all our knowledge. Ignoring it does not make our knowledge any more "objective" or "practical,' but only deceptive. From a non-positivist, critical, point of view, the fact that we never know the whole system--the totality of relevant conditions--does not imply that we should keep the scope of inquiry within arbitrary boundaries and treat the environment as a "given" (as incrementalism concludes) but rather that we cannot know anything unless we critically reflect upon our ignorance of the totality of relevant conditions, and the normative content of the boundary judgments by which we separate the problem-relevant system from the whole (the 'environment'). Bryer's conclusion c,'m only be attributed to his uncritical standpoint: If we take the whole systems ideal seriously it appears that we must have full knowledge before we can provide guidelines for inquiry. However. if we had this knowledge inquiry would be unnecessary! [1, p. 222]. The critical conclusion is quite the opposite: if we take the whole systems ideal seriously for what it is, namely, an unavoidable critical idea. we must conclude that we can know 'reality" only to the extent we critically reflect
Omega. Vol. ?L No. 3 on the potential deceptiveness of the v, hole s)stems judgments that inevitably flow into our conception of reality. An incrementalist approach to planning is bound to end up as an uncritically technocratic approach, as is sufficiently demonstrated by "general" systems theory, Rand-systems analysis, artificial intelligence and heuristic programming, much of current OR pracice, and all other incrementalist planning methodologies: they all suffer from a common inability to deal critically with the very social reality which they ought to improve
[13]. It is of no avail for the incrementalist to argue, as Bryer does, that he does not "in principle' deny the desirability of the systems idea but merely adopts the incremental approach as "a practical guide for action"; for in methodological issues the 'normal" (practical, feasible) becomes the norm, without investigators being aware of it. Thus the 'normal" becomes the standard against which the scientific character of inquiry is judged (e.g. "peer review" in judging the quality of a research proposal).
Bryer's conclusion: philosophical or unphilosoph&'al (scientific) understanding of the systems approach? After having blurred the above-mentioned critical distinctions, Bryer can hardly be expected to arrive at a helpful conclusion. A ~helpful' conclusion would merit its title by critically examining its own philosophical and ideological presuppositions in each application, and would not hide its uncritical character behind the cover of "science'. That Bryer's conclusion lacks this quality of being helpful is apparent from the following: The general lesson to be learned from the failure of the philosophies of science to define adequately the nature of OR as a science--adequate to its whole systems objective--is that philosophical analyses of ideal methods should be abandoned in favor of attempts to define and measure real knowledge interests and the knowledge which is necessary for their pursuit. If we follow the classification [of knowledge interests] provided by Habermas [9, p. 191if, 309f] there is clearly a much greater role for the social sciences in this ['direct,' scientific] model of the practice of OR than would be apparent from the works of the prominent theoreticians of OR. [I, p. 230,/'eference added], (Similarly, in the abstract, he says that the paper is to illustrate the conclusion "'that philosophy confuses rather than clarifies the nature of OR as a science.") Quite apart from Bryer's misreading of Habermas' intent--which is a critical one against scientism--his conclusion finally reveals the defensive character of his argument. Instead of arguing for a truly critical reconstruction of systems science, he wants us to abandon altogether the attempt to reflect philosophically upon the deceptiveness of the existing model. Everything stands on its head here. 'The' philosophical approach is identified with positivism and scientism (cf, [1, p. 220]); positivism becomes "a contender as a method of inquiry with which OR could pursue the whole systems ideal" [I, p. 223]; and more scientism is
279
implied to be the medicine for the already prevalent scientism. All this comes neatly packaged in a "direct approach," an approach that prides itself on its resisting "'the striking degradation of the rote of a knowledgeable grasp of particular subject-matters in the practice of science" [1. p. 223]. The unspoken assumption is that "the established knowledge of the social sciences" on which Bryer wants us to rely [1, p. 227] exists, is objective, and can replace critical reflection on the epistemological difficulties and the value content of "scientific' systems design. Let us not fool ourselves: the genuine philosophical ditficulties raised by the systems idea cannot be passed over simply by disavowing their critical relevance, and by ignoring the need that they imply for a philosophically self-critical systems approach. "Systems science' will only be scientific in so far as it becomes self-reflective with regard to these genuine dit~culties, and no 'direct' approach should make us believe that the cure for the ailing systems science is "more of the same."
REFERENCES 1. BRYER R (1979)The status of the systems approach. Omega, 7(3), 219-231. 2. CHURCHMAN CW (1948) Theory of Experimental Inference. Basic Books, New York, USA. 3. CHURCHMAN CW & RATOOSH P (Eds) (1959) Measurement: Definitions and Theories. John Wiley, New York, USA. 4. CHURCHMAN CW (1963) Prediction and Optimal Decision. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, USA. 5. CHURCHMAN CW (19681 Challenye to Reason. McGraw-Hill, New York, USA. 6. CHURCHMAN CW (1968) The Systems Approach. 2rid ed. to be publ. Dell, New York, USA. 7. CHURCHMAN CW [1971) The Design of lnquiriny Systems. Basic Books, New York, USA. 8. CHURCHMANCW (1979) The Systems Approach and its Enemies. Basic Books, New York, USA. 9. [-[ABERMASJ (1971) Knowledge and Human Interests. Beacon, Boston, Massachusetts, USA. 10. KANT I (1781/1787) Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by SMITH NK (1965), St Martin's Press, New York, USA. I1. POPPER KR {1972) Objective Knowledge, an Evolutionary Approach. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK. 12. ULRICH W (1979) A critique of pure cybernetic reason, part I: Theory, and part II: Practice, the case of Stafford Beer's work in Chile, 1971-1973. M~jmt Sci., to be published. 13. ULRICH W 11980) The metaphysics of design: a Simon-Churchman 'debate'. Interfaces, 10(l)--to be published.
Centerfor Research in Management C WESTCHURCHMAN Science WERNER ULRICH University of California 26 Barrows Hall Berkeley California 94720 USA