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Thomas Hobbes ou l'oeuvre de la raison
01914599/H9 S3.00+ 000 Prrgamon Press
plc
BOOK
REVIEWS
Thomas Hobbes ou I’oeuvre de la raison, Michel Malherbe, Bibliothtque
d’histoire de la
philosophie (Paris: J. Vrin 1984), 270 pp. Hobbes’ major works were written only between his fiftieth and his seventieth year, which was not oniy in his own time an extremely late age. This slow maturation accounts for a remarkable homogeneity of his thought. One cannot discern any significant breaks or reversals in it that would allow one to delimit markedly different phases of his development. On the other hand, we possess only a handful of documents informing us about the origin and growth of Hobbes’ ideas, so that they seem to arise out ofa void. It is rather difficult to connect them with the preoccupations of other authors living and working in his time. Whereas the fist feature lends compactness to his thought, the second one bestows upon it the mark of originahty. Correspondingly expositions of Hobbes’ philosophy often waver between two poles. Either they prefer the certain to the uncertain, offering condensed extracts from Hobbes’ texts that remain as difficultly accessible as is the original, and thus are of no real help to the reader. Or they try to translate Hobbes into a language that is more easily understandable to the modem reader, and then are in danger of betraying his authentic thought. Malherbe’s great mastery of Hobbesian thought is borne out by the fact that he avoids such pitfaIls. He remains faithful to his author, saving his reader none of the difficulties inherent in Hobbes’ ideas, and still succeeds in introducing this reader into Hobbes from a modern standpoint. This he achieves by presenting Hobbes’ philosophy as thought in action and in the process of its formation. He gives plausibility to specific Hobbesian tenets that at first sight appear strange by showing how they flow from Hobbes’ conception of reason as an activity or operation that works upon the materials presented to us by our senses. The six chapters of the book comprise most of Hobbes’ philosophy as contained in the Elementa philosophiae. Malherbe sets out with logic, First Philosophy and philosophy of nature (three of the four sections of De Corpore), studies more specifically human nature (cf. the second part of De Homine), and finally develops the nature of sovereignty and Hobbes’ peculiar political theoiogy (thus covering the main themes of De Cive). Only geometry and optics drop out. The former is briefly treated as an introduction to natural philosophy, whereas the latter is compietely neglected. Though this is in harmony with a more modern notion of philosophy, I doubt the usefulness of this procedure, since, in Hobbes’ view, the process of seeing is the paradigm of sensation, i.e. of the cognising subject’s relation to the world. A certain distortion of this relation, then, is to be feared. Malherbe gives a fascinating survey of the genesis of language, reason and science in Hobbes, correctly underlining the double aspect of the production of ideas in our mind. These are both the result of phantasms brought forth by things touching our senses, and of a feedback caused by the use of names. Yet the indissoluble link holding between names and phantasms should have prevented the author from introducing a distinction between mere ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ definitions-a distinction relevant for Aristotle and many authors after him, but lacking a fundament in Hobbes (who never used such language). The chapter on First Philosophy centers around De Corpore, chap. 8, i.e. around the notions of body and accident. Here M~herbe goes far more into detail than usually is done, and the results are rewarding. He manages to show how, by means of the notion of ‘real space’, Hobbes can affirm both that body underlies all accidents, and that nevertheless magnitude, as an accident, is essential for body. Yet the very fact that magnitude is an accident testifies against Malherbe’s affirmation that we would dispose of 59.5
596 something like a primordial certainty concerning the existence of bodies, a certainty brought about by what he calls an ‘ontic causation’ which he wants to distinguish from ‘mechanical causation’. This is to introduce one more unnecessary duality into Hobbes’ rigid monism. Hobbes’ philosophy of nature is generally treated in a stepmotherly fashion. Malherbe, however, gives a coherent reading of at least the opening chapter of this part of Hobbes’ system (= De Corpore, chap. XXV). He integrates the Hobbesian notion of conct~r into the process of sensation, showing Hobbes’ good reasons for making psychology the first part of natural philosophy. Also the nature of the passions is developed out of the mechanics of man’s physical nature. This leads the author to the threshold of political philosophy: the state of nature. Malherbe develops in a cogent way what he calls ‘the calculus of reason’ by which man comes to overcome the particularism of his desires in favor of following up the dictates of reason, i.e. the natural law. The dualism prevailing in earlier Hobbes research between an egoistic Hobbesian psychology and universally obliging moral laws becomes obsolete in Malherbe’s fine unifying interpretation which develops the character of these laws as obliging only in a conditional way, namely insofar as peace among men is obtainable. Moral reasoning, Malherbe says, is and remains formal, for the very reason that it is reasoning. All content depends on what in fact is given to us. This opens, by the way, an inlet for history into Hobbes’ rigid system. There exists, Malherbe remarks, a kind of ‘delay’ between the moral obligation and the execution of corresponding actions. Morality, that is, can neither be founded exclusively on factual conventions among men nor on human nature or the authority of God alone. The ‘scandal’ of Hobbes’ moral thought consists, as Malherbe correctly points out, in his view that God’s commands, in order to become effective, must be supplemented by human commands. Morality, that is, can come to life only in the state. Hobbes’ political philosophy is dealt with under the pretty yet apposite title ‘The Sovereign Effect’. Maybe there is not that much innovation in this chapter as is in the other ones. This part of Hobbes’ thought, one knows, has been dealt with in Hobbes research rather frequently, if not too exclusively. Yet as the very title of this chapter shows, Malherbe is perfectly aware both of the dependent character of political philosophy in Hobbes-it is an effect-as well as of the importance that must be ascribed to it, not only in view of the impact it made on contemporaries and on thinkers of later generations, but also in Hobbes’ own view. I should mention especially the adequateness of Malherbe’s treatment of the covenant and of the absolute nature of sovereignty. He correctly underlines the decisive nature of authorisation mediating between these two extremes. Moreover the way in which civil society and the citizen’s liberty are treated, gives a wellbalanced picture of Hobbes’ political philosophy. The last chapter contains a masterly discussion of the role and nature of Hobbesian theology. At least since Pacchi’s trailblazing work theology must be recognised as an integral and genuine part of Hobbes’ thought. The way Malherbe treats God’s natural and prophetic kingdoms shows how closely this very perfectly demythologised theology is connected with political philosophy. The obedience to God cannot be divorced from our obedience to the sovereign; rather, the first is performed by performing the latter. In doing one thing, man in fact does two things at once. Thus Hobbes’ principles undergo no change or attenuation in the transition from politics to theology. Sovereignty cannot be divided, be it by means of a division of powers or of a split between civil and ecclesiastical law. One must, Malherbe says, ‘admit the beautiful rigor of this civil philosophy*. One must admit, too, the beauty and the rigor of the way in which Hobbes’ philosophy is expounded in Malherbe’s book. He offers a useful and reliable guide to a difficult system of thought. And he has written one of the most helpful and recommendable introductions to Hobbes
that have been produced in recent years. As such it would without doubt merit a translation into English. The scientitic quality of the work is underlined also by its bibliography. Though at times somewhat imbalanced (why mention a review article oftwo pages?) it shows an international orientation that is up to date. Malherbe’s book is part of historical scholarship in the field of philosophy, and it overtly presents itself as such. Yet the author is lively aware of the fact that our time, too, still struggles with the same problem Wobbes was faced with: the problem of securing lasting peace by means of man’s own powers. Maybe the modernity of Hobbes, and therefore also a major ruison d’Prre of Malherbe’s book, lies precisely in this situation. Karl Schuhmann University of Ulrechr
Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Jean Hampton (Cambridge University Press, 1986), xi + 299 pp. Some of the most interesting new ideas in recent Hobbesian literature have come from the attempt to understand Hobbes’ moral and political philosophy in the light of contemporary rational choice theory and game theory. The assumptions underlying these attempts are that the logical structure of Hobbes’ theory is relevantly and sufficiently similar to our views of rational behaviour, and that it is at the same time strong enough to bear the burden of (some degree of) formalisation. I think that both the interpretive ideas and the assumptions are sound, and that Hampton’s book is the most interestingfand the most disputable) product of this new wave in Hobbes interpretation. Hampton develops a convincin& atgument about the affinity between Hobbes’ conception of rationality and value in relation to modern utility theory, and she affirms that Hobbes’ views on this subject bear sufficient resemblance to the principle of maximisation of expected utility to warrant an interpretation of his theory in terms of rational choice (16,35-36). An obvious problem for any subjectivist reading of Hobbes is the philosopher’s repeated contention that there is at least one end which is intrinsically or objectively rational, that is, self-preservation. From a subjectivist standpoint, an answer may be found by distinguishing between real desires and desires which would not pass rhe test of ideal deliberation under full information, or which are caused by ill functioning physiological processes (41). This distinction does not require reason to assign goals to behaviour, and yet explains the role given by Hobbes to self-preservation. Another possible solution is to see Hobbes as working with two (or possibly more) criteria of rational action, and to interpret his affirmations about the dominant end of selfpreservation as inspired by a sort of maximum criterion. Anyway, the idea that there is a shared preference for self-preservation, and that peace is the best way to satisfy that preference, leads very easily to Hobbes’ doctrine of the laws of nature, which are seen as asserting causal connections between certain forms of individual behaviour and peace and self-preservation (47). Given the aim of self-preservation, moral science can give information about the world, that is, about the causal factors which can explain and lead to the achievement of that aim. Among these factors, Hobbes reserves a very important place to the interdependence of the behaviour of the various agents, to the circumstance that the result of their actions depends not only on their choices but, also, on those of the other agents involved in the same situation (48). Hampton is surely correct in characterising Hobbes’ laws of nature as hypothetical imperatives, and in stressing their crucial strategical dimension. What is more disputable is her treatement of the concept of obligation. Hobbes, according to Hampton, defines two conditions for a contractual
plc
BOOK
REVIEWS
Thomas Hobbes ou I’oeuvre de la raison, Michel Malherbe, Bibliothtque
d’histoire de la
philosophie (Paris: J. Vrin 1984), 270 pp. Hobbes’ major works were written only between his fiftieth and his seventieth year, which was not oniy in his own time an extremely late age. This slow maturation accounts for a remarkable homogeneity of his thought. One cannot discern any significant breaks or reversals in it that would allow one to delimit markedly different phases of his development. On the other hand, we possess only a handful of documents informing us about the origin and growth of Hobbes’ ideas, so that they seem to arise out ofa void. It is rather difficult to connect them with the preoccupations of other authors living and working in his time. Whereas the fist feature lends compactness to his thought, the second one bestows upon it the mark of originahty. Correspondingly expositions of Hobbes’ philosophy often waver between two poles. Either they prefer the certain to the uncertain, offering condensed extracts from Hobbes’ texts that remain as difficultly accessible as is the original, and thus are of no real help to the reader. Or they try to translate Hobbes into a language that is more easily understandable to the modem reader, and then are in danger of betraying his authentic thought. Malherbe’s great mastery of Hobbesian thought is borne out by the fact that he avoids such pitfaIls. He remains faithful to his author, saving his reader none of the difficulties inherent in Hobbes’ ideas, and still succeeds in introducing this reader into Hobbes from a modern standpoint. This he achieves by presenting Hobbes’ philosophy as thought in action and in the process of its formation. He gives plausibility to specific Hobbesian tenets that at first sight appear strange by showing how they flow from Hobbes’ conception of reason as an activity or operation that works upon the materials presented to us by our senses. The six chapters of the book comprise most of Hobbes’ philosophy as contained in the Elementa philosophiae. Malherbe sets out with logic, First Philosophy and philosophy of nature (three of the four sections of De Corpore), studies more specifically human nature (cf. the second part of De Homine), and finally develops the nature of sovereignty and Hobbes’ peculiar political theoiogy (thus covering the main themes of De Cive). Only geometry and optics drop out. The former is briefly treated as an introduction to natural philosophy, whereas the latter is compietely neglected. Though this is in harmony with a more modern notion of philosophy, I doubt the usefulness of this procedure, since, in Hobbes’ view, the process of seeing is the paradigm of sensation, i.e. of the cognising subject’s relation to the world. A certain distortion of this relation, then, is to be feared. Malherbe gives a fascinating survey of the genesis of language, reason and science in Hobbes, correctly underlining the double aspect of the production of ideas in our mind. These are both the result of phantasms brought forth by things touching our senses, and of a feedback caused by the use of names. Yet the indissoluble link holding between names and phantasms should have prevented the author from introducing a distinction between mere ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ definitions-a distinction relevant for Aristotle and many authors after him, but lacking a fundament in Hobbes (who never used such language). The chapter on First Philosophy centers around De Corpore, chap. 8, i.e. around the notions of body and accident. Here M~herbe goes far more into detail than usually is done, and the results are rewarding. He manages to show how, by means of the notion of ‘real space’, Hobbes can affirm both that body underlies all accidents, and that nevertheless magnitude, as an accident, is essential for body. Yet the very fact that magnitude is an accident testifies against Malherbe’s affirmation that we would dispose of 59.5
596 something like a primordial certainty concerning the existence of bodies, a certainty brought about by what he calls an ‘ontic causation’ which he wants to distinguish from ‘mechanical causation’. This is to introduce one more unnecessary duality into Hobbes’ rigid monism. Hobbes’ philosophy of nature is generally treated in a stepmotherly fashion. Malherbe, however, gives a coherent reading of at least the opening chapter of this part of Hobbes’ system (= De Corpore, chap. XXV). He integrates the Hobbesian notion of conct~r into the process of sensation, showing Hobbes’ good reasons for making psychology the first part of natural philosophy. Also the nature of the passions is developed out of the mechanics of man’s physical nature. This leads the author to the threshold of political philosophy: the state of nature. Malherbe develops in a cogent way what he calls ‘the calculus of reason’ by which man comes to overcome the particularism of his desires in favor of following up the dictates of reason, i.e. the natural law. The dualism prevailing in earlier Hobbes research between an egoistic Hobbesian psychology and universally obliging moral laws becomes obsolete in Malherbe’s fine unifying interpretation which develops the character of these laws as obliging only in a conditional way, namely insofar as peace among men is obtainable. Moral reasoning, Malherbe says, is and remains formal, for the very reason that it is reasoning. All content depends on what in fact is given to us. This opens, by the way, an inlet for history into Hobbes’ rigid system. There exists, Malherbe remarks, a kind of ‘delay’ between the moral obligation and the execution of corresponding actions. Morality, that is, can neither be founded exclusively on factual conventions among men nor on human nature or the authority of God alone. The ‘scandal’ of Hobbes’ moral thought consists, as Malherbe correctly points out, in his view that God’s commands, in order to become effective, must be supplemented by human commands. Morality, that is, can come to life only in the state. Hobbes’ political philosophy is dealt with under the pretty yet apposite title ‘The Sovereign Effect’. Maybe there is not that much innovation in this chapter as is in the other ones. This part of Hobbes’ thought, one knows, has been dealt with in Hobbes research rather frequently, if not too exclusively. Yet as the very title of this chapter shows, Malherbe is perfectly aware both of the dependent character of political philosophy in Hobbes-it is an effect-as well as of the importance that must be ascribed to it, not only in view of the impact it made on contemporaries and on thinkers of later generations, but also in Hobbes’ own view. I should mention especially the adequateness of Malherbe’s treatment of the covenant and of the absolute nature of sovereignty. He correctly underlines the decisive nature of authorisation mediating between these two extremes. Moreover the way in which civil society and the citizen’s liberty are treated, gives a wellbalanced picture of Hobbes’ political philosophy. The last chapter contains a masterly discussion of the role and nature of Hobbesian theology. At least since Pacchi’s trailblazing work theology must be recognised as an integral and genuine part of Hobbes’ thought. The way Malherbe treats God’s natural and prophetic kingdoms shows how closely this very perfectly demythologised theology is connected with political philosophy. The obedience to God cannot be divorced from our obedience to the sovereign; rather, the first is performed by performing the latter. In doing one thing, man in fact does two things at once. Thus Hobbes’ principles undergo no change or attenuation in the transition from politics to theology. Sovereignty cannot be divided, be it by means of a division of powers or of a split between civil and ecclesiastical law. One must, Malherbe says, ‘admit the beautiful rigor of this civil philosophy*. One must admit, too, the beauty and the rigor of the way in which Hobbes’ philosophy is expounded in Malherbe’s book. He offers a useful and reliable guide to a difficult system of thought. And he has written one of the most helpful and recommendable introductions to Hobbes
that have been produced in recent years. As such it would without doubt merit a translation into English. The scientitic quality of the work is underlined also by its bibliography. Though at times somewhat imbalanced (why mention a review article oftwo pages?) it shows an international orientation that is up to date. Malherbe’s book is part of historical scholarship in the field of philosophy, and it overtly presents itself as such. Yet the author is lively aware of the fact that our time, too, still struggles with the same problem Wobbes was faced with: the problem of securing lasting peace by means of man’s own powers. Maybe the modernity of Hobbes, and therefore also a major ruison d’Prre of Malherbe’s book, lies precisely in this situation. Karl Schuhmann University of Ulrechr
Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Jean Hampton (Cambridge University Press, 1986), xi + 299 pp. Some of the most interesting new ideas in recent Hobbesian literature have come from the attempt to understand Hobbes’ moral and political philosophy in the light of contemporary rational choice theory and game theory. The assumptions underlying these attempts are that the logical structure of Hobbes’ theory is relevantly and sufficiently similar to our views of rational behaviour, and that it is at the same time strong enough to bear the burden of (some degree of) formalisation. I think that both the interpretive ideas and the assumptions are sound, and that Hampton’s book is the most interestingfand the most disputable) product of this new wave in Hobbes interpretation. Hampton develops a convincin& atgument about the affinity between Hobbes’ conception of rationality and value in relation to modern utility theory, and she affirms that Hobbes’ views on this subject bear sufficient resemblance to the principle of maximisation of expected utility to warrant an interpretation of his theory in terms of rational choice (16,35-36). An obvious problem for any subjectivist reading of Hobbes is the philosopher’s repeated contention that there is at least one end which is intrinsically or objectively rational, that is, self-preservation. From a subjectivist standpoint, an answer may be found by distinguishing between real desires and desires which would not pass rhe test of ideal deliberation under full information, or which are caused by ill functioning physiological processes (41). This distinction does not require reason to assign goals to behaviour, and yet explains the role given by Hobbes to self-preservation. Another possible solution is to see Hobbes as working with two (or possibly more) criteria of rational action, and to interpret his affirmations about the dominant end of selfpreservation as inspired by a sort of maximum criterion. Anyway, the idea that there is a shared preference for self-preservation, and that peace is the best way to satisfy that preference, leads very easily to Hobbes’ doctrine of the laws of nature, which are seen as asserting causal connections between certain forms of individual behaviour and peace and self-preservation (47). Given the aim of self-preservation, moral science can give information about the world, that is, about the causal factors which can explain and lead to the achievement of that aim. Among these factors, Hobbes reserves a very important place to the interdependence of the behaviour of the various agents, to the circumstance that the result of their actions depends not only on their choices but, also, on those of the other agents involved in the same situation (48). Hampton is surely correct in characterising Hobbes’ laws of nature as hypothetical imperatives, and in stressing their crucial strategical dimension. What is more disputable is her treatement of the concept of obligation. Hobbes, according to Hampton, defines two conditions for a contractual