Tracing the evolutionary path for space technologies

Space Policy 16 (2000) 171}183

Tracing the evolutionary path for space technologies Pamela L. Whitney* National Research Council, 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20418, USA

Abstract Proliferation and pace of advancing technologies warrant policy and strategic decision-making. Without thinking ahead, companies can loose marketshare and countries can yield comparative advantage. The rate at which burgeoning technologies progress, however, can make it di$cult for corporations and governments alike to discern or better anticipate critical junctures in technology developments. This paper presents a conceptual, multidimensional framework, the `evolutionary patha, for understanding the stages of technological development in the civil space area. The analysis draws from three case studies * communications satellites, computers, and launch vehicles * and shows how the implications and developments of new, breakthrough technologies di!er from the incremental technology upgrades or the later emergence of interconnected systems and infrastructures.  1998 Pamela L. Whitney. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction As new space assets become available, several conditions can limit their progression along an `evolutionary patha of development for space assets. The `evolutionary patha is characterized in three clear, but nondiscrete stages beginning with centralization, moving to decentralization, and continuing and evolving toward a distributed phase. Fig. 1 shows the conceptual framework of the evolutionary path. Those assets that originate from within a government program may have few private sector markets and limited commercial sector opportunities (e.g. the B-1 bomber). In other situations, the cost and technical expertise required for developing a particular asset may reside only in the largest of corporations, i.e. those that can a!ord substantial research and development investments. Still other conditions that may delay or slow the progression of a space asset along the path include an organization's commitment to an existing technical system and the resistance to or risk of adopting a new technology. This paper will use three examples * communications satellites, computers, and launch vehicles * to illuminate he entry and evolution of critical space assets along the * Tel.: 001-202-334-3477; fax: 001-202-334-3701. E-mail address: [email protected] (P.L. Whitney).  The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not, in any way, represent the views of the National Research Council.

evolutionary path. It will also examine the relationships of these assets among the corporate, policy, and government infrastructures they emerged. The "rst example highlights the emergence of communications satellites and their auspicious growth in the commercial domain. This case focuses on technology and institutional developments. The second example chronicles the evolution of computers. Although computers are not a space technology, developments in computing and computer technologies have signi"cantly in#uenced space technologies (e.g. subsystems and microelectronics). Today, computers permeate all facets of space assets and operations. This case emphasizes technological and management factors, and how they in#uenced movement along the path. The third example, launch vehicles, is the least evolved. Launch vehicle technologies, infrastructures, and market developments, however, are poised to make major strides. This case shows the emergence of launch vehicles to date and provides a test case for applying the `evolutionary patha framework illustrated in the satellite and computer examples. In addition, this example focuses on policy decisions and their impact on the evolution of launch vehicles along the path. These three examples also illustrate the relationship between the space asset and the end user. As a technology evolves, the number of users often increases, as does the users' control of the technology. Users may become sophisticated and discriminating in their technology selections. Competitors arise to lower prices, target niche

0265-9646/00/$ - see front matter  1998 Pamela L. Whitney. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 2 6 5 - 9 6 4 6 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 2 1 - 7

172

P.L. Whitney / Space Policy 16 (2000) 171}183 Table 1 Characteristics of stages along the evolutionary path Stage evolution

Characterisitics

Centralized

Government-oriented assets Core industry group Large, heavy technology Little or no commercial service Increasing number of systems Technology upgrades Smaller, lighter, cheaper systems Multiple competitors Fleets, constellations, networks Versatile systems (multiple tasks)

Decentralized

Distributed

Fig. 1. Conceptual Framework of the Evolutionary Path. A new space asset tends to have poor infrastructure, few customers and suppliers, and limited technological diversi"cation. Evolution along multidimensional space often changes the mix of these factors for the space asset.

customers, and provide new services and technological capabilities. Finally, each of the assets to be surveyed has had a critical impact on the development and advancement of the other. Space assets are individually multidimensional, and involve technical, infrastructure, market, and policy factors. Space assets are also collectively multidimensional, creating opportunities and interrelationships among several assets. Arthur C. Clarke noted, for example, that the early conception of a global satellite system was fed, in part, by the successful development of the long-range, V2 rocket [1].

2. De5nitions and assumptions (1) Centralization, in this context, means a technology or infrastructure largely under central control. Management, operations, or processing characteristics may indicate centralization. In some instances, centralization may exist because of the lack of competing technologies or market players. (2) Decentralization, in this context, occurs when there is more than one main technology type, when there are many systems or several technology providers, or when controls and functions are dispersed from central to regional or local control. (3) Distributed, in this context, means divided or spread out among several or many. Multiple control points; multiple operators, multiple technology types, or multiple providers fall within the distributed term. In addition, the distributed concept extends to many system types, interconnected infrastructures, and multiple, interrelated markets. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of each stage of evolution along the path. The evolutionary path described in this paper has been simpli"ed to reveal overarching themes and directions. The framework is based on an US perspective and the

examples do not take into account all the political and economic factors that in#uence space assets and their infrastructures. Finally, there is an inherent interrelationship among technologies, infrastructures, and industries/ markets; overlap is unavoidable.

3. Examples 3.1. Satellite Communications &&The development of satellite communications has not one uni"ed past, but rather re#ects the sometimes connected and sometimes separate relationships'' [2]. 3.1.1. Centralized Like other new space assets, communications satellites in their early stages were centralized. Technology development and expertise resided in the two superpowers, the United States and the former Soviet Union. Satellite manufacturing in the United States was centered within AT&T, which viewed satellite communications as an extension of its monopoly in terrestrial communications. AT&T invested heavily in research and development in satellites, thus maintaining a leading, central hold on communications technology among the companies that were beginning to develop the technology. The satellites themselves, placed in orbit above the Earth, acted as relays to transmit telephony to distant locations. As few as three satellites located in geostationary orbit can reach most points on Earth. As telephone relay systems, however, satellites at the time were inextricably linked to the terrestrial telecommunications infrastructure, a centralized system in its own right. The centralized nature of communication satellites extended internationally. Almost as soon as the technology became available in the early 1960s, several countries joined together to establish a single, global communication satellite system * the International Telecommunication and Satellite Organization (INTELSAT). Led by

P.L. Whitney / Space Policy 16 (2000) 171}183

the United States, INTELSAT invited all nations to bene"t from global satellite communications. INTELSAT embodied a centralized organization; there was a single system to provide global coverage, and the central headquarters and operations were based in the United States. Indeed, Article 14 of the INTELSAT Agreement, which precluded competition from another global satellite system, ensured INTELSAT's unique position. Despite the organization's international make-up, the United States, as the largest shareholder of INTELSAT, carried signi"cant in#uence. The Communications Satellite Company (COMSAT), a consortium of US common carriers including AT&T, RCA, Western Union, and others, was INTELSAT's management and executive body and thereby had responsibilities for proposing and implementing projects [3]. Thus, the leadership for the organization, the headquarters and operations, and the management body were all centered in the United States. Furthermore, the United States' central and dominant position in the INTELSAT framework cemented the US leadership role in satellite technology. This in#uential position bene"ted US satellite manufacturers such as RCA and Hughes, which had the advantage in competitive bidding for INTELSAT satellite manufacturing contracts, especially in the early years of INTELSAT operations [3]. 3.1.2. Decentralized As communications satellites evolved, and demand for services grew worldwide, the numbers and types of satellite systems in operation increased accordingly. In response to INTELSAT, the former Soviet Union established an eastern European international satellite system, INTERSPUTNIK, in 1968 National and regional systems emerged in several countries: Canada introduced the "rst domestic geostationary system, the Anik series in 1972; a consortium of European states formed the European Telecommunications Satellite organization (EUTELSAT) in 1979; and India launched the Indian National Satellite (INSAT) in 1982. Several other domestic systems were also underway. These systems both decentralized the #ow of satellite communications tra$c and broke the US hold on satellite technology, manufacturing, operations, and technical expertise. EUTELSAT's primary driver, for instance, was the creation of an independent European satellite manufacturing capability and space industry.

 Article XIV of the INTELSAT Agreement stated that competing satellite systems must be proven not to cause `signi"cant economic harm to Intelsata.  Unlike the INTELSAT and subsequent national and regional satellite systems, INTERSPUTNIK satellites were placed in Molniya orbit, which reached the more northern latitudes of the Soviet Union's territories.

173

The relationship between communication satellites and their ground segment (earth stations) was also important in decentralizing satellite communications. Technology developments in both the satellite and ground systems enabled cheaper access to satellite communication services, new applications for their use and thus a decentralization of the technology, service and markets. Several government technology programs were instrumental in moving the space and ground segments along the evolutionary path toward decentralization. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) program, active from 1967 to 1976, demonstrated the use of higherfrequency bands, increases in satellite power and stabilization, and the use of smaller ground-based antennas [4]. Another NASA program, the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), was deployed to relay communications from the space Shuttle and other orbital systems to Earth. TDRSS introduced advanced capabilities, such as intersatellite links, interorbit communications, and the use of both "xed and mobile communications. These technology improvements increased the capacity, lifetime, range of services, and performance of satellites. Among these technical advances, gains in power and performance were the most critical for decentralization. High-powered satellites required smaller, simpler, and less expensive earth stations, which subsequently rendered satellite access more a!ordable. Designs for smaller and cheaper earth stations, known as very small aperture terminals (VSATs), were introduced during the mid1980s. VSATs send and receive data and information via a hub satellite that services multiple terminals in a private network. The #exibility of VSAT networks made them very attractive to corporations and large organizations. By installing terminals at disparate branches or sites, large corporations could create private satellite networks that bypassed public network links [4]. VSAT networks also o!ered greater #exibility over terrestrial communications; by simply adding or removing terminals, networks could expand or contract to accommodate corporate needs. Moreover, VSATs were more e$cient for the `burstya or discontinuous transmissions characteristic of corporate communications. On balance, the entry of VSATs marked a critical point in the evolution toward decentralized satellite communications. The ability to create private networks began to decouple satellite communications from the terrestrial telephone network [5]. Moreover, small terminals extended satellite access to increased numbers and types of users. Perhaps most importantly, VSATS brought access to satellite communications closer to the individual user. Table 2 summarizes the key characteristics of satellite communications at each stage, including the decentralized phase.

174

P.L. Whitney / Space Policy 16 (2000) 171}183

Table 2 Characteristics of satellite communications at each stage along the path Centralized

Decentralized

Distributed

Infrastructure

Global Govt. consortium (Intelsat)

Customers/Providers Technology

Govt. & few large corps. (AT&T, ITT) Large heavy expensive

Linkages

Public telecom

Global; regional consortia; domestic (Eutelsat, Insat) Govt. US & European companies (Matra Macrconl) Lifetime power VSATS Public telecom VSAT networks

Multiple consortia; domestic; commercial Free market competition Niche markets GEO, MEO, LEO Systems Handheld units Telecom VSAT-VSAT-TV-Internet

3.1.3. Distributed A NASA program called the Advanced Communications Satellite (ACTS) was a major catalyst in moving satellite communications toward the distributed stage. Politically troubled and in danger of cancellation during the 1980s, ACTS survived and was "nally launched in 1993 [4, p. 10, 6]. The ACTS system incorporated a host of sophisticated technologies, including interconnected spot beams, high-frequency (Ka 20}30 GHz) bands, and on-orbit, intelligent switching [6,7]. Further, NASA designed the program to encourage industry to experiment with applications thought to be commercially viable. Direct broadcast satellite (DBS) service, narrowband mobile service, interactive VSAT-to-VSAT capability, and satellite-based cellular network service could all be demonstrated on ACTS [6,7]. The ACTS program enabled the interconnection of multiple types of networks * broadcast, cellular, VSAT, mobile * and the ability to create a widely distributed system of networks of di!erent media. ACTS proved to be a success; the technologies demonstrated have been incorporated into the next generation of advanced communication satellite systems. For example, the Iridium constellation of low-earth-orbit (LEO) satellites employs on-orbit switching to provide global, mobile data and voice communications. Such LEO systems bring satellite access directly to the individual user via a small pocketsized antenna/phone. Other LEO and middle-earth-orbit (MEO) satellite constellations will provide high bandwidth communica Satellite-based cellular service provided cellular service to remote regions that did not have a terrestrial cellular system. Narrowband mobile is the use of high band frequencies directed at small, transportable terminals. Interactive VSAT-to-VSAT is the ability for a spacebased hub that can link several VSAT networks. This would eliminate ground-based hubs and the need to make two hops to reach a terminal in another VSAT network.  Other constellation systems include Orbcomm (orbital systems) a network of 35 LEO satellites that provide global wireless and data messaging communications, and Globalstar, a consortium of international telecommunication companies that provide "xed and mobile telephony services from a constellation of 48 LEO satellites.

tions. These systems marry the convenience of advanced, mobile satellite connections to the power of the Internet and World Wide Web. The Teledesic concept exempli"es the evolution of satellite communications to a distributed stage in which individual users have direct access to satellites from any point on Earth for interactive broadband communications services. Moreover, Teledesic will enable inter-network links, essentially creating a network of networks. The trend toward distributed satellite communications is also appearing in future plans for space science networks. NASA is exploring the use of commercial LEO systems as possible relays for communications between deep space probes and planetary landers. `As part of the conceptual Interplanetary Internet, the Deep Space Network, now used for ground-based tracking and communications with spacecraft, would extend into space and relay data to and from Earth via communications satellites placed near Mars or another planet'' [8]. `The goal of the Interplanetary Internet is to make these remote systems more accessible to the public and essentially make Mars a node on the Internet'' [8]. Other projects at both the US Air Force and NASA are incorporating even greater degrees of distribution into and among satellite networks. Researchers are working on #eets of tiny satellites that would share portions of di$cult tasks. `The objective is to demonstrate that the functions of large and complex spacecraft can be broken up among several smaller, collaborating spacecrafta [9]. The movement of satellite communications could not have occurred without concomitant developments in policy, marketing, and manufacturing practices. As satellite technology, services, and networks have evolved, so too has the need for complementary management and policy structures. For instance, in the United States, private

 The Teledesic system, to be built by Motorola, is a Ka-band, LEO system with global coverage. Some 288 satellites will comprise the network. Services may include voice, data, video, imaging, interactive video, TV broadcast, multimedia, global Internet, messaging and trunking.

P.L. Whitney / Space Policy 16 (2000) 171}183

175

among these distributed parts, computer networks have proliferated at an amazing speed'' [12].

Fig. 2. Evolution of satellite communications along the evolutionary path.

companies such as PanAmsat and Orion recently won access to compete against INTELSAT for global satellite communications services. In Europe, deregulation and privatization of national telecommunications networks have allowed competition and commercial telecommunications corporations into the region. Commercial telecommunications providers are o!ering the advanced services so critical for businesses in a competitive global marketplace. In the international domain, the INTELSAT case exempli"es the management changes needed to keep an organization functioning as key player in an increasingly competitive commercial environment. INTELSAT is moving from a centralized, internationally cooperative entity to a privately owned and decentralized management structure. The "rst move was the creation of a private spin-o! company, New Skies [10]. Fig. 2 depicts a scenario of communications satellites along the path. Other changes such as manufacturing practices indicate further decentralization and distribution. Companies such as Motorola and Lockheed Martin are adopting mass-market production styles that are changing the direction of satellite manufacturing [11]. 3.2. Computing &&Computing technology is becoming increasingly decentralized; the personal computers on o$ce desks are an example of this trend 2 centralized corporate control is passing down the hierarchy, and in many cases, the hierarchy itself is #attening. To provide connectivity

3.2.1. Centralized The centralized nature of early computing technology is self-evident. The earliest computing machines were built with government funding for government applications ranging from ballistics calculations to census computations. The Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC) had more than 17,000 vacuum tubes. With one tube needing replacement about every 10 minutes, these machines required numerous technicians to keep the computers functioning [13]. Electronic computers o!ered little improvement. The cost, complexity, size and sheer weight of the machines prohibited their di!usion to all but the most data-laboring entities * banks, universities, government and military organizations. At the same time, the computer was well suited to these traditionally large, centralized institutions. Centralization in early computing extended to the manufacturing sphere where Remington Rand's UNIVAC (UNIversal Automatic Computer) inspired IBM to wage a "erce competition for the commercial computer market. By 1955, IBM had taken the lead. A cluster of follower companies * Remington Rand, GE, Burroughs, NCR, Control Data, Honeywell, and DEC * known as `the seven dwarfsa [13, p. 135] also saw the promise of electronic computers for the corporate world. Table 3 summarizes the computer asset at each stage of the evolutionary path. 3.2.2. Decentralized &&Independent-minded users were beginning to reject the centralized mainframe in favor of a decentralized small computer in their own department'' [13, p. 221]. The move toward decentralization in computing emerged, at one level, from growth in the numbers of computers. From 1950 to 1960, just a decade into the commercial computing age, the US computer industry had installed some 5000 computers [15, p. 30]. The 1959 invention of the integrated circuit or `chipa, a set of several transistors embedded into a single wafer of semiconducting material, was the true catalyst in the decentralization of the computer. With the use of the `chipa, the computer's size and cost shrank while speed

Table 3 Characteristics of computing at each stage along the evolutionary path Centralized

Decentralized

Distributed

Infrastructure Customers/suppliers

Mainframe IBM mainframe companies

Mainframe mini PCS Peripheral companies; innovative start-ups

Technology Linkages

Large, heavy, expensive

Chip, `SFCa, speed & power Timesharing, LAN, WAN, internet

Multiple technologies; networks Computer, communications, network, content Distributed tasking and programming Multimedia, global, mobile; computercommunications-content

176

P.L. Whitney / Space Policy 16 (2000) 171}183

and power increased dramatically [14]. Several changes in computer con"gurations and technology types followed: the minicomputer (1960s) and eventually the `personal computera (1970s}1980s). Steadily falling costs coupled with smaller, more powerful, and less expensive computers enabled one of the more radical aspects of the computer's move along the evolutionary path: the machine's relationship to the user. Unlike satellites and the case of launch vehicles to follow, the computer systematically evolved closer and closer to the individual user. The personal computer (PC) put the control, operation, and knowledge of the machine in the hands of the user, a critical aspect of the computer's decentralization. Visions of a PC on every desk and in every home captivated an already aggressive industry that was stirring with its own profound evolution toward decentralization. Although advances in computer technology showed great promise for users and industry, industrial management approaches played a signi"cant role in the evolution of computers along the path. The cluster of traditional, centralized industry players led by IBM lacked the #exibility, speed, and innovation of the very technology they established. `The rapid decentralization of computing in the 1970s and 1980s called for fundamentally new approaches; but IBM stuck with the tried and truea [14, p. 92]. IBM's auspicious entry into the personal computer world with the IBM PC * a true feat of creation in just 12 months * was important in establishing a near-standard PC architecture, but the corporation lacked the managerial support and vision to sustain the new business. While IBM, DEC and others clung to older managerial practices and existing technology lines, new entrepreneurial computer "rms sprouted in the Northeast and Northwestern corners of the country. The newer companies departed from the practice of creating `turnkey systemsa whereby each company developed inhouse the hardware and software for its computer product and also handled the sales and operations services for its product lines. In turn, the newer companies began developing computers as a series of individual, modular components that were borrowed from multiple vendors and integrated into a product line that was sold and serviced by distributors as well as the computer company. Components, software operating systems, applications, and peripheral devices were developed separately (often by di!erent vendors), each spawning specialized markets, sales and operations. And while IBM was sluggish within this changing environment, companies such as Apple, and Compaq became known for their lean  The proliferation of computer companies, IBM-PC clones, and niche markets was largely permitted by an `open-architecturea policy started early in the PC generation. The open publication of component speci"cations allowed companies to create add-ons and to write compatible software.

Fig. 3. Scenario of IBM's movement along the path. IBM clung to its mainframe products and practices, and overlooked opportunities to market its research developments like relational databases and reduced instruction chips. Forays into decentralized lines like the IBM PC were not sustained in the trend toward smaller, faster, cheaper PCs and networks.

operations and low-cost planning, `strategies 2 much more closely aligned to the realities of technology in the 1990sa [14, p. 114]. Fig. 3 shows the scenario of IBM along the evolutionary path. 3.2.3. Decentralization to distributed `In contrast to the dumb terminals, which could talk only to the mainframe, modern networks are inherently decentralized; all the workstations can talk to each othera [14, p. 116]. As individual computers became faster and more powerful, so did the prospects for linking them together. The computer's evolution along the path from a decentralized to distributed stage of development is best illustrated through the development of networking. Computer networks not only linked several machines together, they distributed the actual process of storing and sharing information. One of the "rst organizations to experiment during the 1960s with computer networking was the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) under the Department of Defense. The vision to connect ARPA's 17 computers was based on the development of a telecommunications routing concept called `packet switchinga [12, p. 183}5; 13, p. 288}94]. Packet switching would enable ARPA to use computers as nodes and switches, thereby linking several machines into a network without having to create connections between each and every machine. The network, called APARNET, also included an interface allowing di!erent types of host computers to connect to the network.  Packet switching is the ability to break a message into several `packetsa each with an address. The computer routes individual packets through the most e$cient route in the network. Computers acting as switches or nodes receive and route the packets through the nodes. The "nal receiving node reassembles the packets and routes the message into the end-network or "nal link to the end-user. (See TimeLife Books, Understanding Computers, Communications (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, Inc., 1986).

P.L. Whitney / Space Policy 16 (2000) 171}183

Computer networking advanced in parallel with related developments. For example, the proliferation of personal computers and peripheral devices warranted networks suited to di!ering computing environments. The local area network (LAN), established for the o$ce and campus environments, allowed access from one computer to a more powerful, remotely located computer, or designated one computer to store and distribute information amongst the others in the network. Although networks enabled resource sharing, the advent of electronic mail or `e-maila was the impetus for widespread and rapid growth in computer networking and enabled distributed computing [13, p. 294]. The rapid growth of the Internet * a network connecting multiple networks * arose from the in#ux of home and personal computers and the immediate popularity of e-mail. The beginning of the distributed system had all the characteristics of a decentralized industry. The increasing use of computer networks such as the Internet in turn spawned a suite of value-added, on-line services (e.g. e-mail, news, entertainment, information, and education). A networking industry emerged, and much like the process it served, was decentralized. Companies were formed to provide hardware and software to serve local and wide-area networks, for access to the Internet, and for posting information onto the Internet. The value of networks, including the Internet, lay in accessibility and information content. Perhaps one of the most revolutionary contributions of the Internet is the power it gives to the individual user to be an information creator, provider, and publisher. Moreover, the distributed nature of the system gives the individual the mechanism by which to have his or her information reach a signi"cant population. 3.2.4. Distributed [15] &&Distributed computing holds out the promise of increasing the power of a standard laptop exponentially'' [16]. Computer networking and the integration of computer and communication technologies created the framework for distributed computing. Within the networking area there is another facet of distributed computing emerging. Distributed computing enables an individual to access these capabilities as situations and tasks demand. In this way, distributed computing is both autonomous and interdependent. One o$cial from a research and development agency characterized the concept, `the network is the computera [17]. Despite its potential, distributed computing is still evolving along the path. Currently, di!erent networks * television, LAN, Internet, cable, wireless systems*use di!erent protocols for communicating amongst network computers and components. This heterogeneous mix makes it di$cult for networks to `talka to one another. Thus, the key to distributed computing is the capability

177

for networks to interact with one another; a concept called `interoperabilitya. Distributed computing will also rely on the ability to parcel a program or task amongst several computers in a network. Sun Microsystems' Jini, a Java-based product, for example, Is designed to move chunks of computer code from machine to machine 2 [it] uses this ability in ways that allow computers and other devices to cooperate, sometimes by sharing instructions or information, [and] sometimes by actually dividing a program into parts and spreading the computation work across several computers [16, p. 1, 10]. In short, laptops could harness the power of a supercomputer on demand [16, p. 1, 10]. The essence of distributed computing captures well the #avor of the computer industry. First, the computer infrastructure is becoming inextricably linked to the communications and the content infrastructures [12, p. 45}6]. This `digital convergencea [15, p. 1] of computing, communications, and content is becoming evident in the changing industry landscape. Large computer and communications providers are o!ering computer network services (e.g. AT&T Worldnet, MCInet, Microsoft Network). Second, the Internet continues to spawn on-line businesses and business services. Companies provide network security, accounting, encryption, digital compression, Internet Web page design, and network management to accommodate Internet-based commerce. These emerging on-line businesses mirror the haphazard emergence of the Internet: The Internet grew with a very decentralized model of control. There is no central point of oversight or administration. This model was part of the early success of the Internet; it allowed it to grow in a very autonomous manner [18]. Although some argue for more control, others favor the Internet model over the more rigid network control exercised in the telecommunications regime. Despite the many types of companies involved in digital convergence, Silicon Valley computer "rms continue to play a critical role in in#uencing the future direction of convergence. The talent, #exibility, and rapid pace of Silicon Valley companies are important in responding to the components, operating systems, and software needed for an increasingly distributed computing environment [18]. 3.3. Launch systems 3.3.1. Centralized Launch vehicle technology emerged, primarily, from the centralized military domain. Vehicles were government developed, owned, and operated. To date, the

178

P.L. Whitney / Space Policy 16 (2000) 171}183

Table 4 Characteristics of launch vehicles at each stage along the evolutionary path Centralized

Decentralized

Distributed

Infrastructure

Govt-owned, operated ELVS

Customers/suppliers

Core aerospace & Govt. labs (Boeing, MCD, GD) ICBM-based ELVS (Atlas, Delta) None?

ELVs; Shuttle Commercial spaceports Commerical; International partners; New start-ups (Kelly, Kistler) Upgraded ELVS (e.g. Ariane, Pegasus) Docking (e.g. Shuttle-MIR; Satellites)

Multiple vechicle types Multiple launch sites Specialized services? Niche markets ELVS; crewed & uncrewed RLVS, SSTOS, TSTOS Interorbital, interlinking, multifunctional

Technology Linkages

government remains the largest consumer of launch services. The impetus for developing launch vehicles was to deploy reconnaissance payloads for the Department of Defense. Early launchers such as the ThorDelta, the Atlas, and the Titan were modeled on intercontinental ballistic missile designs of the 1950s [19]. The US Air Force (USAF) was assigned oversight of space vehicles, a heritage that continues today. The USAF maintains and operates the two main US launch sites located at Vandenberg Air Force Base and Cape Canaveral. NASA's entry into launch vehicle development began in 1959 when the agency took on the Saturn launcher, a vehicle originally conceived at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency and designed to send humans to the Moon. A year later, in 1960, NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center became a key player in establishing the US launch infrastructure when it contracted with Douglas Aircraft Corporation (now Boeing/McDonnell Douglas) to build the Delta vehicle. The Delta, which was developed primarily for scienti"c, weather, and communications payloads, combined aspects of the Thor and Vanguard launchers. As NASA's mission expanded, so did its involvement in launch vehicle development. During the same year, NASA developed the Scout vehicle, the "rst launcher to rely on solid fuel. Centralization also extended to the industry sector. The launch vehicle manufacturing capability centered on core US aerospace and defense contractors: Martin Marietta, McDonnell Douglas, Boeing, and General Dynamics. Strict technology transfer controls severely limited technology sharing with other nations. Consequently, launch vehicle technology di!used very slowly. Table 4 summarizes the key characteristics of the launch vehicle asset at stages of the evolutionary path.  1997 World government expenditure on space transportation (launch and research), China excluded"6.08 billion. Commercial expenditure same year"2.52 billion. Note-total commercial space expenditure in 1997"42 billion, total government (China excluded)"38 billion. See Futron Corporation and Satellite Industry Association, Satellite Industry Indicators Survey: Selected 1998 Survey Results.

3.3.2. Centralized to decentralized US space technology policy in#uenced how the technology, infrastructure, and industry moved along the evolutionary path. Following the success of the Apollo program, the United States decided to maintain its human space program through the development of a reusable space transportation vehicle [20]. The Space Transportation System, or Shuttle, was designed as a versatile, human-rated vehicle capable of deploying military, scienti"c, and foreign satellite payloads. NASA, in concert with the DOD and the Reagan Administration, declared the Shuttle the &national launch capability' [20, p. 1, 5]. As a result of this policy, NASA terminated procurement of Delta and Atlas vehicles; a year later the DOD decided to cease production of additional Titan III vehicles [21]. Instead of enriching and expanding the US launch capability, US policy decisions served to hinder growth and maintain a centralized, government-oriented launch infrastructure. In this way, the United States was ill-equipped for commercial innovation in launch vehicle technology. While the Reagan Administration granted industry the rights to produce and operate the expendable launch vehicle (ELV) infrastructure in 1983, this gesture did little to encourage private competition. Given the government's endorsement of the national launch capability, `the major US aerospace companies declined the opportunity to enter the commercial marketplacea [21]. The decision to focus on a single launch vehicle was as important for pushing decentralization abroad as it was for maintaining centralization in the United States. During the early 1970s, deliberations between the United States and Europe over Europe's participation in the post-Apollo/Shuttle program swayed Europe toward launch autonomy [22]. Thus, while the European Space Agency (ESA) began developing the commercial and applications-oriented Ariane vehicle, NASA was concentrating on meeting the extensive and expensive requirements speci"ed for carrying humans and military payloads aboard the Shuttle. The move toward decentralization occurred in the early 1980s when launch vehicle technology and

P.L. Whitney / Space Policy 16 (2000) 171}183

infrastructure expanded across national borders. Programs such as Europe's Ariane, Japan's H-I, and China's Long March began to decentralize launch capabilities away from the United States and establish indigenous technologies and means to build launch vehicles. In the case of the H-I, the "rst stage relied on US-based hardware and the requisite technology transfer agreements with the United States [23]. The loss of the Shuttle Challenger in January 1986 led the United States to alter its launch policy and precipitated an `about-facea toward reliance on and demand for a decentralized launch infrastructure. NASA shifted all commercial and many government payloads to expendable vehicles. But given the long lead-times in producing ELVs (a minimum of 30 months before the Challenger accident) and the need to implement commercial launch operations, it took until 1989 for the "rst US commercially operated launch to take place on a McDonnell Douglas Delta vehicle [19, p. 1]. Although the commercial launch industry made several improvements to the US ELV infrastructure, many analysts continued to raise concerns about the poor and out-moded condition of the ELV #eet. In 1992, the National Research Council reported, Current US Earth-to-orbit launch vehicles are based on 25}40-year-old technology. The infrastructure to support the vehicles is deteriorating, ine$cient, highly specialized, and expensive to operate. Even the Shuttle launch complex, which is the most modern, was adapted from facilities built for the Apollo program [24]. It would be di$cult to argue convincingly that technological development was a signi"cant factor in the evolution toward a decentralized launch infrastructure. Launch vehicle technology has improved incrementally. There are, however, some advancements that demonstrate increased decentralization. Developments in the US ELV #eet have been restricted to upgrades * more e$cient, uprated engines, modern avionics, lightweight materials, and increased ranges of lift capability. The Shuttle program, however, demonstrated more signi"cant technologies: launch vehicle reusability, cross-range maneuverability, increased payload capacity, and increased engine capability. In fact, the Shuttle orbiter main engines represent perhaps the highest e$ciency rate achievable with chemical rocket engines. Without ties to older, outdated launch concepts, Europe and Japan introduced more modern and cost-e!ective components in their ELVs. The use of modular designs and automated manufacturing, ground handling and checkout, for instance, decentralized certain development processes. For instance, the Ariane 5 vehicle, a European launcher, is the "rst ELV designed with computer-con-

179

trolled operations. These technical and service improvements simpli"ed payload integration and increased launch turnaround times. Other incremental technical progressions addressed the spectrum of sizes and capacity ranges of US vehicles, another factor in decentralizing the infrastructure. The Pegasus launcher, developed by Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) to carry small payloads, incorporated an innovative air-launch concept. OSC also introduced the small to medium range Taurus, a transportable vehicle, while Lockheed Martin introduced the Athena, also aimed at the small satellite class. Overall, launch technology developments during the 1980s and 1990s emphasized an increased number of vehicle con"gurations, a wider range of vehicle sizes (aimed at the heavy geosats and the smaller, lighter leosats) cost reductions, performance gains, and greater #exibility. Like Europe's Ariane approach, the newer, more modern US ELVs have been able to incorporate lower-cost, modular designs. In addition, they have included standard avionics, structures and launch support equipment for multiple con"gurations, o!-the-shelf components, and increased automation [25]. Cross-national alliances in the launch vehicle industry illustrate another level of decentralization. Companies are choosing to leverage the talents of international "rms to expand their product suite and simultaneously to extend their market presence. For example, Boeing has aligned with Norwegian, Russian, Ukranian and American companies on its Sea Launch venture, which uses a sea-based site to launch modi"ed Russian Zenit rockets. Lockheed Martin, RKK Khrunichev and RKK Energia have joined to form International Launch Systems, a commercial concern to market Proton vehicles. And Pratt and Whitney, a leading rocket engine manufacturer, partnered with Russia's Energomash to market and co-develop Russian engines [26]. This cross-national level of decentralization in the launch infrastructure is signi"cant in light of US limitations on foreign-launched American payloads. It is unclear how US export control and stringent technology transfer policies will a!ect these partnerships in the future. However, signi"cant advances in technology and launch infrastructure warrant a next generation vehicle: a single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) or a two-stage-to-orbit vehicle (TSTO), or an advanced, reusable, launch vehicle (RLV). 3.3.3. Toward a distributed launch industry and infrastructure &&We decided that if you ever wanted to make a di!erence, you weren't going to do it in a big company environment'' [27]. The evolution of launch vehicle technology and infrastructure is beginning to accelerate. The launch industry is

180

P.L. Whitney / Space Policy 16 (2000) 171}183

shifting to a largely commercial rather than government-oriented consumer environment. In the United States, prospects for high-resolution remote-sensing satellite systems, communication satellite constellations, and small scienti"c satellites are increasing the demand for smaller, cheaper and more e$cient launch services. Moreover, #attening and declining space budgets are forcing space agencies to seek marked reductions in costly launch operations. Despite these trends, many space analysts have long contested that signi"cant growth in commercial space markets can only be achieved through a drastic reduction (an order of magnitude) in the cost of access to space. Drastic cost reductions warrant revolutionary launch concepts, namely reusable launch vehicles. At this juncture, consumers and space enthusiasts can only envision the possibility of a distributed launch industry and infrastructure that would include several different launch vehicle types, infrastructures, and markets. It is the `visiona, however, that will propel major advances in launch-related technologies. The launch vehicle industry stands to gain the most from the satellite communications and computer industries as it evolves toward a distributed technology and infrastructure. The catalyst for notable movement along the evolutionary path will stem from innovative technologies, designs, "nancing, and business-oriented concepts in RLVs. At least "ve entrepreneurial companies have been formed to develop reusable or partially reusable launch vehicles and to provide commercial services. Unlike previous launch development programs, these start-up ventures would rely, largely, on private investments and "nancing rather than government support. This step alone breaks the legacy of US government-funded programs and marks a signi"cant step toward a distributed launch infrastructure. Fig. 4 presents a scenario of launch vehicles along the path. Myriad technology and design concepts are creating a fertile ground for distributed launch systems. Kistler Aerospace, founded in 1993, has designed a #eet of twostage reusable vehicles aimed at the LEO satellite market. Propulsion is based on "rst-stage liquid oxygen/ kerosene NK-33 engines, and the second stage, a single NK-43 GenCorp Aerojet. If the vehicle is successfully developed, launches will take place from new, modern facilities in Australia and Nevada. Reentry of the stages will rely on a parachute and airbag system. Using a tow-launch concept, Kelly Space and Technology, founded in 1993, plans a family of winged design spaceplanes. Towed to high altitude by a 747 airplane,

 The shift to more commercial launch vehicle consumers is driven by increasing commercial investments in space, including the development of several communication satellite constellations, high-resolution remote-sensing spacecraft, and other commercial space developments.

Fig. 4. Scenario of launch vehicle evolution along the path. US launch policy shifted launch vehicles back to the centralized stage.

the spaceplane will use rocket engines to reach 120 km and an expendable second stage to reach orbit. The concept also includes a crew that will pilot the plane through re-entry; jet engines will provide additional power reentry and landing. Pioneer Rocketplane's Path"nder vehicle employs another spaceplane design. Founded in 1996, Pioneer Rocketplane would use airbreathing jet engines and LOX/kerosene rocket engines. The system design relies on an air-to-air concept for fueling the LOX tanks. In addition, the Path"nder is designed as a piloted vehicle that re-enters the Earth's atmosphere using jet-engine power. The Path"nder, which is targeted to small and medium class LEO payloads and sounding missions, would bene"t from airport launches and enable passenger or cargo delivery to any point on the globe within a few hours. Still other RLV, SSTO and TSTO designs feature vertical takeo! and landing (Rotary Rocket Company); a winged plane design using airbreathing ramjet and two rocket-powered stages to deploy satellites into orbit (Space Access LLC) [27, p. 34}7; 28]. These entrepreneurial concepts are innovative in their design and approaches for developing a reusable rocket. Many of the companies are also nimble, new start-ups with lean management and administrative operations. Their aim is to rapidly achieve commercial operability rather than to take on the risk of developing new, unproven technologies. They are market and design-driven companies that will take advantage of o!-the-shelf technologies, well-established propulsion technology, and other existing launch concepts. Contrasting with the commercially funded and market-driven approach is NASA's X-33 program, a government}industry partnership to develop enabling technologies for a heavy-lift, single-stage-toorbit, reusable launch vehicle. Lockheed Martin, the winner of the X-33 development contract, has designed a vertical takeo!-horizontal landing vehicle. The X-33 vehicle will demonstrate hypersonic speeds, aerospike

P.L. Whitney / Space Policy 16 (2000) 171}183

engines and autonomous operations. NASA is funding more than 75% of the program. Like the X-33, the X-34 program is a technology testbed for developing a smaller RLV for lighter payloads. Orbital Sciences, the X-34 contractor, is developing composite primary and secondary airframe structures; cryogenic insulation and propulsion system elements; advanced thermal protection systems and materials; and low-cost avionics. Orbital's X-34 is a winged design with a cylindrical body and will be launched from the air similar to the Pegasus ELV approach [28, p. 21}4]. Given the high barriers to entry in the commercial launch industry and the "nancial and technological risks of developing a successful RLV operation, it is likely that some of the companies will merge with others or, at worst, fail. Examples of "nancing di$culties are already apparent. However, the rich array of approaches to both vehicle designs and commercial operations is a positive step toward a distributed stage of evolution in launch vehicles. The role of government policy, commitment to technological development, and "nancing options will be important mechanisms required to move these "rms and systems further along the path. Looking beyond the current array of possible RLV developments one might envision the future distributed launch system to incorporate multi-functional space transportation vehicles that provide on-orbit reloading, refueling, payload deployment and retrieval, cargo ferrying, crew drop-o! and return, and interorbital transfer services. Docking capabilities would provide on-orbit linkage between di!erent vehicle types to expand launch tasks and services. Such vehicles might be operated from space stations, from automated ground-based control stations, or from individual desktop computers. These multiple vehicle and technology types would both create and demand specialized skills, services and niche markets. While the possibilities may seem limitless, the launch vehicle industry and infrastructure can look to the communications satellite and computer examples for a prospective glimpse at how the future of the launch infrastructure will evolve.

4. Summary Having reviewed the progression of three space assets along the evolutionary path from centralized to decentralized to distributed, key characteristics of each stage become clear. The analysis suggests a framework for strategic and long-term planning for space assets. The centralized phase bene"ts from the technical expertise and research and development resources of

 Berger, Brian, `RLV Firms Struggle to Lure Investorsa, Space News (May, 1999).

181

Table 5 Detailed characteristics of each stage the evolutionary path Stage of evolution

Characteristics

Centralized

Government-oriented Core industry group Limited technology options Expensive Few, if any, commercial suppliers Increasing number of systems Incremental technology improvements Expanding technology options Increased production e$ciency Expanding markets, services, niche providers Established commercial sector Smaller, lighter, and cheaper Modular systems Networking and linkages Innovative, startup "rms O! the shelf components Multiple competitors Fleets, constellations, networks Versatile systems (multiple functions) Industry convergence New manufacturing and production methods

Decentralized

Distributed

government and large corporations. These factors are critical to amassing the necessary talent and infrastructure to initiate and complete large technology programs (e.g. NASA with Shuttle; IBM with commercial mainframes; ARPA with networking; AT&T and ITT with communication satellites). One might consider Lockheed Martin's position in the X-33 program similar to this role. The introduction and operation of a new technology often inspires companies or organizations to replicate the technology, improve upon it, and compete for pro"t. Increasing numbers of systems, technology upgrades and advancements in e$ciency, performance, size, and power often characterize this decentralized stage. Di!erent types of systems may emerge and the manufacturing industry begins to expand. Specialized technologies and niche markets may also appear during this phase of evolution. More importantly, the interaction among systems becomes critical for expanding the infrastructure. Table 5 presents the salient characteristics of each stage of the evolutionary path. The distributed phase of technology evolution may involve a mature technology that has progressed through signi"cant `generationsa, a highly developed industry, and a competitive environment. Technology development tends to focus on value-added services; innovation; and the use of o!-the-shelf components where possible. In addition, the distributed stage often involves multiple, integrated systems and tasks. The division between the technology and the environment in which it operates becomes blurred.

182

P.L. Whitney / Space Policy 16 (2000) 171}183

5. Conclusions The evolutionary path of space technology, infrastructure, and industry described in this article can be used strategically for public organizations and corporations. Preparation, #exibility and an understanding of future trends can help organizations position themselves both internally and externally for the infrastructure and industry responses to rapidly changing technologies. The following points highlight some of the issues that space industries and organizations should consider: E The launch infrastructure/industry is emerging from the `mainframea stage. Flexibility, accelerated change, increased system modularity, niche markets and innovation will be important for a new generations of technology and growth. Firms should be mindful not to stick to one line of technology (e.g. IBM), but stay apace of technology developments and maintain #exibility for change. E Systems integration and engineering will continue to be a critical technical asset for organizations and "rms. This process will be important for integrating multiple components and modules and for integrating multiple system types * communication, computer, launch * that interact with each other. E As new technologies and space assets are introduced, "rms, cooperative entities, and government agencies should consider how the space asset will move along the evolutionary path. Anticipating key aspects of stages such as decentralization (e.g. upgrades, the importance of linkages/networks, and size and modular designs) can be addressed proactively rather than responsively. E Firms, agencies and organizations should not be myopic, but keep abreast of the trends in non-space technology areas and use `lessons learneda from a broad array of technology industries, organizations and infrastructures.

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5] [6]

[7] [8] [9] [10]

[11]

[12]

[13] [14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

Acknowledgements [18]

I gratefully acknowledge Dr. David Smith, National Research Council, for his generosity in providing comments and assistance. I would also like to acknowledge Ms. Stephanie Roy, Futron Corporation, Mr. Matthew Bille, ANSER Corporation, and Mr. Jerry Sheehan, National Research Council, for providing comments on this paper.

References [1] Clarke AC. Extra-terrestrial relays: can rocket stations give world-wide radio coverage? In: Logsdon JM, Launius RD, Onkst

[19] [20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

DH, Garber SJ, editors. Exploring the unknown. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1998. p. 16. Butrica AJ, edtior. Beyond the ionosphere: "fty years of satellite communications. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Of"ce, 1997. p. xxv. Whalen DJ. Billion dollar technology: a short historical overview of the origins of communications satellite technology, 1945}1965. In: Butrica AJ, editor. Beyond the ionosphere. Washington, DC: US Government Printing O$ce, 1997. p. 95}114. Pelton JN. The history of satellite communications. In: Logsdon JM, Launius RD, Onkst DH, Garber S, editors. Exploring the unknown. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1998. p. 8}9. Maral G. VSAT networks. New York: Wiley, 1995. Glover DR. NASA experimental communications satellites 1958}1995. Butrica AJ, edtior. Beyond the ionosphere: "fty years of satellite communications. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing O$ce, 1997. p. 62}3. Marek S. ACTS: the bridge to commercial applications. Satellite Communications, August 1991:25}8. Shaki P. Team proposes deep space internet connections. Space News 17}25 August 1998. Ferster W. Tiny satellite #eet may function as one craft. Space News 17}25 August 1998. IINTELSAT press relase. INTELSAT assembly of parties unanimously approves creation of spin-o! company, new skies satellities, N.V. 31 March 1998. InternationalTechnology Research Institute, World Technology (WETC) Division. Global Satellite communications technology and systems. Baltimore, MD: International Technology Research Institute, 1998. p. 8}9. National Research Council. Computing the future, a broader agenda for computer science and engineering. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992. p. 183. Campbell-Kelly M, Aspray W. Computer: a history of the information machine. New York: Basic Books, 1996. p. 87}8. Ferguson CH, Morris CR. Computer wars: how the west can win in a post-ibm world. New York: Times Books, 1993. p. 5}6. National Research Council. Keeping the US computer and communications industry competitive: convergence of computing, communications, and entertainment. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995. p. 22. Marko! J. &Science "ction' power for the PC, Technology promises to harness networks. International Herald Tribune 16 July 1998;1. National Research Council. Computing and communications in the extreme: research for crisis management and other applications. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996. p. 69. National Research Council, The unpredictable certainty: information infrastructure through 2000. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996. p. 155}6. Chow, BG. An evolutionary approach to space launch commercialization. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1993. p. 16. National Research Council. Assessment of candidate expendable launch vehicles for large payloads. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1984. p. 5. Obermann RA, Williamson RA. Implications of previous space commercialization experiences for the reusable launch vehicle. Space Policy 1998;14:20. National Research Council, European Science Foundation. US}European collaboration in space science. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1998. p. 18. Logsdon JM. Learning from the leader: the early years of US}Japanese cooperation in space. Washington, DC, Space

P.L. Whitney / Space Policy 16 (2000) 171}183 Policy Institute, Elliott School of International A!airs, The George Washington University. [24] National Research Council. From earth to orbit: an assessment of transportation options. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992. p. 15. [25] McMillan J, Karol J, Holmes B-J. A historical look at united states launch vehicles: 1967-present, 4th ed. Arlington, VA: ANSER, 199. p. D-1.

183

[26] Aldrin A. Technology control regimes and the globalization of space industry. Space Policy 1998;14:115}22. [27] Iannotta B. Small start-ups vie for big business. Aerospace America August 1998:34. [28] Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration. Reusable launch vehicle programs and concepts. January 1998.