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Uniquely human: The evolution of speech, thought, and selfless behavior
128
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JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS
Integrating several experimental tests of the evolutionary theory of aging, Rose suggests that aging is distinct from the evolution of fitness. If this is true, it gives credence to the view that gerontologists should study the evolutionary biology of aging rather than the physiological process of aging. Supported is the association between early reproduction and longevity and genetic variation in aging that is separate from genetic variation of fitness; recognized, however, is the need for more evidence (p. 45). Much of Rose’s book is devoted to exploring, at the experimental level, the issues of (1) genetics and the evolution of aging, (2) comparative patterns of aging, and (3) evolutionary theory of aging compared with biological theories of aging; each issue is captured in at least one exclusive and table-filled chapter. The result is a thorough synthesis of the vast literature on aging, including aging theories from antagonistic pleiotrophy to lipofuscin accumulation (p. 160). Evolutionary biologists and scientists of aging will likely find the reading more stimulating than will social gerontologists. Despite the technical presentation, Rose’s book is a creative work. Clearly, much thought and consideration went into the writing of Evolutionary Biology of Aging. One has much to contemplate after reading this book. And despite his boisterous theoretical claim, Rose does offer, if not a new paradigm, a fundamentally new perspective on aging.
Uniquely Human: The Evolution of Speech, Thought, and Selfless Behavior, by Philip Lieberman.
Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University
Reviewed by David G. Hays, 25 Nagle Avenue,
Press, 1991, 210 pp. Apt. 3-G, New York, New York 10040
Books that refer to publications in primatology, paleontology, anthropology, psychology, neurology, and linguistics are not uncommon. Books that insist on a distinction between “animal altruism” ‘and a “‘higher’ human altruism” are not so common. I, for one, am pleased to see in print the assertion that “this ‘higher’ human altruism evolved from human cognitive and linguistic ability acting on a preadaptive ‘emotional’ base” (p. 166). The insertion of cognitive processes between emotion and altruism makes for a structure inimitable by the bees and the other proper subjects of sociobiology. Lieberman’s table of contents reflects his personal history: brain structure, behavior, and circuitry; human speech; a thoroughly modem human brain; the brain’s dictionary; learning to talk and think; culture and selfless behavior. The text tells more than you would expect about speech and language, and less than you would expect about cognition, if you were to rely on this list of chapters. But given Lieberman’s start in phonetics, and his early publications on the impossibility of a vocal tract capable of producing good vowels in any species other than our own, we can respect the breadth of vision to which he has risen. Anyone who likes simplicity will be disappointed by the facts of evolution and neurology. The brain, in particular, is full of parts that were once useful for some purpose which is now obsolete; so they are pressed into service for new purposes; a muddle (pp. 2, 6), quite unlike the elegant organ of language proposed by Chomsky (p. 15). Indeed, if the capacity for speech were carried in a tightly-integrated, logically compact, system, genetic variation would bring into the world too many individuals with garbled versions, who would speak oddly if at all (p. 131). For his discussion of the brain, Lieberman begins (pp. 16-17) with the “triune” model
Review ~
129
of Paul MacLean (1967). Part of our brains can be matched with the brains of reptiles; another part matches tissue added by old mammals; and a third part matches the added cortex of newer mammals. Our reptilian brains are large and heavily involved in speech; so are the old mammalian parts. We could not perform the new functions of language and cognition with the new parts of the brain; we need the combination of new and old (p. 15). Localization, the idea that began as phrenology and was made more realistic by Brodmann, Broca, Wemicke, and others, has to be understood in more subtle terms than were available to the early workers. “The neurophysiologist Jean-Pierre Changeux, for example, notes that ‘apparently simple operations of behavior, such as the movements of the eye or the killing of a mouse by a cat, in fact involve the recruitment of a large number of neurons (thousands, even millions) from many different areas of the brain . . . A given behavioral act may engage, simultaneously and necessarily, groups of neurons which appeared at different periods in the evolution of vertebrate’ (1980, p. 188)” (p. 29). In writing about behavioral modes, Benzon and I (1988, p. 297) put the matter this way: “The fundamental act is to commit the brain to a configuration of activity which interprets the external world as an arena for the satisfaction of particular inner needs . . . ,” and if we had known of Changeux’s statement, 1 am sure we would have quoted it then. What looks to be an integrated behavior is not localized in the brain, but scattered; what small parts of the brain do is not arbitrary, and the neurologist (I infer) will need some new verbs to name the elementary neural acts. Lieberman believes in progress, even moral progress (p. 10): The torture of human and beast is now denied and hidden, “destruction of forests is now ‘justified’ . . . . Moral progress . . . follows from our cognitive ability, which, in turn, derives from our linguistic ability.” Nevertheless, he writes that “we have no inherent cognitive advantages with respect to first-century Romans and Gauls even though the TGV high-speed train traveling between Paris and Nice at 200 kilometers per hour makes for a smoother ride than a chariot” (p. 161) The clue must be in the word “inherent”; brains have not changed in 2000 years, but Lieberman’s belief in moral progress suggests change in the way brains are used (see Benzon & Hays, 1990, for my own views). To have a strong explanation of higher human altruism would be good. The passage that seems to strike at this point is: “Cognitive altruism increases an individual’s cognitive fitness. For a person who holds a belief with a cognitive basis, such as the attainment of Nirvana or heaven, altruism increases the likelihood of attaining that goal. Without this cognitive basis, neither belief in or enhancement of one’s chances of attaining heaven or Nirvana is possible” (p. 171). I cannot understand this text as written, although I might well understand some paraphrase of it. Does “attaining heaven” imply life of the spirit after death of the body? If not, what does it imply? Nevertheless, I believe that Lieberman is on the path that will lead someone, someday, to a solution of the problem of selfless behavior. And I agree with his closing statement: “The remnants of the primitive brains within ourselves still generate the rage, anger, and violence that dominate human affairs. If these behavioral attributes-altruism, empathy, and moral sense-are markers of fully modem human beings, then it is apparent that this aspect of our potential is still incomplete” (p. 172). References Beazon, W. L. & Hays, D. G. (1988) ‘Rinciples and Development of Natural Intelligence.” Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 11, 293-322.
130
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JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS
Benzon, W. L. & Hays, D. G. (1990) “The Evolution of Cognition.”Journal of Social and Biological structures, 13, 291-320. Changeux, J.-P. (1980) “Properties of the Neuronal Network,” in Piatelli-Palmarini, M., ed. Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 184-202. MacLean, P. D. (1967) “The Brain in Relation to Empathy and Medical Education.” Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders, 144, 374-382.
Understunding Behuvior: What Primate Studies Tell Us About Human Behavior, edited by James D. Lay and Calvin B. Peters. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, xiii + 264 pp., $49.95 (cloth). Reviewed by David G. Hays, 25 Nagle Avenue, New York, NY 10040
Plot a trend line through cultural evolution and a second line through primate evolution; where they cross, we will discover human nature. Such, at least, seems to be the hope of many observers of alloprimates (all primates but us), and of readers of their reports. Sir Solly Zuckerman believed in 1932, and still in 1981, that we could not learn about ourselves by studying them (pp. 5-6); but others have tried, nevertheless, and the authors of the nine survey chapters in this volume are mostly optimists. The authors are mostly in anthropology-primatology seems not to be a subdivision of mammalogy. The editors call their introductory chapter “Mortifying Reflections,” presumably because of “pithecophobia” and “the apparent mismatch between primatological data and the lines of inquiry in contemporary social science” (p. 13). Nevertheless, their final word is, “Some answers wait ahead” in the book. The content of their chapter is mostly historical. Mothering (Nancy A. Nicolson) is a heavy responsibility for all primates; experience counts (first-born are less likely to survive, p. 25). “There is, in short, no single formula for ideal mothering; the best strategy will depend on the risks and opportunities provided by the particular social and ecological context” (p. 39). Nevertheless, the chemistry of human milk entails frequent feeding, and we are probably evolved for “higher levels of contact and nursing frequency than are currently observed in Western cultures” (p. 41) Hormones are involved, but so are prior social experience and concurrent support. Fathering (David Taub and Patrick Mehlman) varies greatly across the primates, but we are the only species to build a “home base” (p. 72), to which adults bring home the bacon, or the harvest. Comparison between them and us must be subtle: “there are simply too many unique aspects of human paternalistic investment even to rank human males on the same scale with other primate males” (p. 75). Alloprimates of some species care for infants; some bring food to a nursing mother; some protect the young and the females from predators. There is much variation in the data, and not enough relevant data yet. Individual development (Janice Chism) includes learning to perceive and move, to choose foods and make friends, to live a life. The story of Harlow’s surrogate monkey mothers and Bowlby’s theory of attachment is a major success for primate research. One is also struck by the tendency of the young to draw away from the mother, seemingly out of eagerness to grow up.
-
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS
Integrating several experimental tests of the evolutionary theory of aging, Rose suggests that aging is distinct from the evolution of fitness. If this is true, it gives credence to the view that gerontologists should study the evolutionary biology of aging rather than the physiological process of aging. Supported is the association between early reproduction and longevity and genetic variation in aging that is separate from genetic variation of fitness; recognized, however, is the need for more evidence (p. 45). Much of Rose’s book is devoted to exploring, at the experimental level, the issues of (1) genetics and the evolution of aging, (2) comparative patterns of aging, and (3) evolutionary theory of aging compared with biological theories of aging; each issue is captured in at least one exclusive and table-filled chapter. The result is a thorough synthesis of the vast literature on aging, including aging theories from antagonistic pleiotrophy to lipofuscin accumulation (p. 160). Evolutionary biologists and scientists of aging will likely find the reading more stimulating than will social gerontologists. Despite the technical presentation, Rose’s book is a creative work. Clearly, much thought and consideration went into the writing of Evolutionary Biology of Aging. One has much to contemplate after reading this book. And despite his boisterous theoretical claim, Rose does offer, if not a new paradigm, a fundamentally new perspective on aging.
Uniquely Human: The Evolution of Speech, Thought, and Selfless Behavior, by Philip Lieberman.
Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University
Reviewed by David G. Hays, 25 Nagle Avenue,
Press, 1991, 210 pp. Apt. 3-G, New York, New York 10040
Books that refer to publications in primatology, paleontology, anthropology, psychology, neurology, and linguistics are not uncommon. Books that insist on a distinction between “animal altruism” ‘and a “‘higher’ human altruism” are not so common. I, for one, am pleased to see in print the assertion that “this ‘higher’ human altruism evolved from human cognitive and linguistic ability acting on a preadaptive ‘emotional’ base” (p. 166). The insertion of cognitive processes between emotion and altruism makes for a structure inimitable by the bees and the other proper subjects of sociobiology. Lieberman’s table of contents reflects his personal history: brain structure, behavior, and circuitry; human speech; a thoroughly modem human brain; the brain’s dictionary; learning to talk and think; culture and selfless behavior. The text tells more than you would expect about speech and language, and less than you would expect about cognition, if you were to rely on this list of chapters. But given Lieberman’s start in phonetics, and his early publications on the impossibility of a vocal tract capable of producing good vowels in any species other than our own, we can respect the breadth of vision to which he has risen. Anyone who likes simplicity will be disappointed by the facts of evolution and neurology. The brain, in particular, is full of parts that were once useful for some purpose which is now obsolete; so they are pressed into service for new purposes; a muddle (pp. 2, 6), quite unlike the elegant organ of language proposed by Chomsky (p. 15). Indeed, if the capacity for speech were carried in a tightly-integrated, logically compact, system, genetic variation would bring into the world too many individuals with garbled versions, who would speak oddly if at all (p. 131). For his discussion of the brain, Lieberman begins (pp. 16-17) with the “triune” model
Review ~
129
of Paul MacLean (1967). Part of our brains can be matched with the brains of reptiles; another part matches tissue added by old mammals; and a third part matches the added cortex of newer mammals. Our reptilian brains are large and heavily involved in speech; so are the old mammalian parts. We could not perform the new functions of language and cognition with the new parts of the brain; we need the combination of new and old (p. 15). Localization, the idea that began as phrenology and was made more realistic by Brodmann, Broca, Wemicke, and others, has to be understood in more subtle terms than were available to the early workers. “The neurophysiologist Jean-Pierre Changeux, for example, notes that ‘apparently simple operations of behavior, such as the movements of the eye or the killing of a mouse by a cat, in fact involve the recruitment of a large number of neurons (thousands, even millions) from many different areas of the brain . . . A given behavioral act may engage, simultaneously and necessarily, groups of neurons which appeared at different periods in the evolution of vertebrate’ (1980, p. 188)” (p. 29). In writing about behavioral modes, Benzon and I (1988, p. 297) put the matter this way: “The fundamental act is to commit the brain to a configuration of activity which interprets the external world as an arena for the satisfaction of particular inner needs . . . ,” and if we had known of Changeux’s statement, 1 am sure we would have quoted it then. What looks to be an integrated behavior is not localized in the brain, but scattered; what small parts of the brain do is not arbitrary, and the neurologist (I infer) will need some new verbs to name the elementary neural acts. Lieberman believes in progress, even moral progress (p. 10): The torture of human and beast is now denied and hidden, “destruction of forests is now ‘justified’ . . . . Moral progress . . . follows from our cognitive ability, which, in turn, derives from our linguistic ability.” Nevertheless, he writes that “we have no inherent cognitive advantages with respect to first-century Romans and Gauls even though the TGV high-speed train traveling between Paris and Nice at 200 kilometers per hour makes for a smoother ride than a chariot” (p. 161) The clue must be in the word “inherent”; brains have not changed in 2000 years, but Lieberman’s belief in moral progress suggests change in the way brains are used (see Benzon & Hays, 1990, for my own views). To have a strong explanation of higher human altruism would be good. The passage that seems to strike at this point is: “Cognitive altruism increases an individual’s cognitive fitness. For a person who holds a belief with a cognitive basis, such as the attainment of Nirvana or heaven, altruism increases the likelihood of attaining that goal. Without this cognitive basis, neither belief in or enhancement of one’s chances of attaining heaven or Nirvana is possible” (p. 171). I cannot understand this text as written, although I might well understand some paraphrase of it. Does “attaining heaven” imply life of the spirit after death of the body? If not, what does it imply? Nevertheless, I believe that Lieberman is on the path that will lead someone, someday, to a solution of the problem of selfless behavior. And I agree with his closing statement: “The remnants of the primitive brains within ourselves still generate the rage, anger, and violence that dominate human affairs. If these behavioral attributes-altruism, empathy, and moral sense-are markers of fully modem human beings, then it is apparent that this aspect of our potential is still incomplete” (p. 172). References Beazon, W. L. & Hays, D. G. (1988) ‘Rinciples and Development of Natural Intelligence.” Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 11, 293-322.
130
-
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS
Benzon, W. L. & Hays, D. G. (1990) “The Evolution of Cognition.”Journal of Social and Biological structures, 13, 291-320. Changeux, J.-P. (1980) “Properties of the Neuronal Network,” in Piatelli-Palmarini, M., ed. Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 184-202. MacLean, P. D. (1967) “The Brain in Relation to Empathy and Medical Education.” Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders, 144, 374-382.
Understunding Behuvior: What Primate Studies Tell Us About Human Behavior, edited by James D. Lay and Calvin B. Peters. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, xiii + 264 pp., $49.95 (cloth). Reviewed by David G. Hays, 25 Nagle Avenue, New York, NY 10040
Plot a trend line through cultural evolution and a second line through primate evolution; where they cross, we will discover human nature. Such, at least, seems to be the hope of many observers of alloprimates (all primates but us), and of readers of their reports. Sir Solly Zuckerman believed in 1932, and still in 1981, that we could not learn about ourselves by studying them (pp. 5-6); but others have tried, nevertheless, and the authors of the nine survey chapters in this volume are mostly optimists. The authors are mostly in anthropology-primatology seems not to be a subdivision of mammalogy. The editors call their introductory chapter “Mortifying Reflections,” presumably because of “pithecophobia” and “the apparent mismatch between primatological data and the lines of inquiry in contemporary social science” (p. 13). Nevertheless, their final word is, “Some answers wait ahead” in the book. The content of their chapter is mostly historical. Mothering (Nancy A. Nicolson) is a heavy responsibility for all primates; experience counts (first-born are less likely to survive, p. 25). “There is, in short, no single formula for ideal mothering; the best strategy will depend on the risks and opportunities provided by the particular social and ecological context” (p. 39). Nevertheless, the chemistry of human milk entails frequent feeding, and we are probably evolved for “higher levels of contact and nursing frequency than are currently observed in Western cultures” (p. 41) Hormones are involved, but so are prior social experience and concurrent support. Fathering (David Taub and Patrick Mehlman) varies greatly across the primates, but we are the only species to build a “home base” (p. 72), to which adults bring home the bacon, or the harvest. Comparison between them and us must be subtle: “there are simply too many unique aspects of human paternalistic investment even to rank human males on the same scale with other primate males” (p. 75). Alloprimates of some species care for infants; some bring food to a nursing mother; some protect the young and the females from predators. There is much variation in the data, and not enough relevant data yet. Individual development (Janice Chism) includes learning to perceive and move, to choose foods and make friends, to live a life. The story of Harlow’s surrogate monkey mothers and Bowlby’s theory of attachment is a major success for primate research. One is also struck by the tendency of the young to draw away from the mother, seemingly out of eagerness to grow up.