- Email: [email protected]
Whither Zambia? The Zambian presidential and parliamentary elections of November 1996
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as issues. Slovenia is also facing the demographic time bomb familiar in all mature westem societies. The cost of pensions and health care has become a serious political issue; LDS campaigned on pension reform. Indeed, these new social clouds on the horizon may have made the electorate cautious and prevented the more free market Slovene Spring alliance from gaining a clear majority. Another issue was the implementation of the compromise reached with Italy, brokered by the then Spanish Foreign Minister Solana, enabling the conclusion of the EU Association Agreement, opening the way, in due course, to full Slovenian EU membership. This compromise would require Slovenia to allow non-nationals to acquire property within 4 years and to allow non-nationals already resident in Slovenia for more than 3 years to acquire property immediately. A constitutional amendment, requiring a two-thirds majority in Parliament, would be required. The results saw a net gain of 16 seats for the Slovene Spring parties, jumping from 29 seats in 1992 to 45 now. Their fortunes were varied: SDS gained 12 seats, SLS gained 7 seats, while on the other hand SKD lost 5 seats. In the liberal bloc, ZLSD lost 5 seats, close to the 4 seats won by DESUS that had been part of the United List (ZL) in 1992. The SNS lost 8 seats, while the LDS easily remained the largest party, even gaining 3 seats. The old Democratic Party disappeared.
Whither Zambia? The Zambian Presidential and Parliamentary Elections of November 1996 Peter Burnell
Department of Politics and International Studies, The Universi~. of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
The 18th November 1996 witnessed Zambia's second multi-party elections since the restoration of political pluralism, following President Kaunda's signing of a constitutional amendment which introduced the Third Republic in December 1990. The first such elections, held in October 1991, saw Frederick Chiluba defeat Kenneth Kaunda, who was the country's only previous occupant of the presidency. Then, Chiluba, who had been Chairman-General of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions since 1974, secured over 75 per cent of the vote. His newly formed party, the Movement for Multi Party Democracy (MMD), won 125 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly, the remainder going to Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP)--the ruling party in the de jure one-party state of Zambia's Second Republic. The 1991 polls were widely perceived, including by a large contingent of international observers to have been largely free and fair, and the result was an accurate reflection of feeling in the country (Commonwealth Observer Group, 1992; Bjornlund et al., 1992; Bratton, 1992).
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Victory in the 1996 elections again went to Chiluba and MMD, but this time the elections themselves proved to be a far more controversial issue.
The Register
First, the elections were held on the basis of a new electoral register, which critics--including UNIP--say seriously understates the true size of the electorate, perhaps by around 50 per cent. The electoral roll of 2.267 million people compares with a total population of over 8 million. The register was prepared by an Israeli company, Nikuv, which secured the contract in the face of other bidders. The procedure for compiling the register was laborious, and some registered voters did not collect their voting cards. However, it seems weaknesses in the administration of the process rather than deliberate or organised political manipulation explain the shortcomings. Notwithstanding the concern expressed in the independent media and among non-governmental organisations--as well as UNIP--about the register, the government declined to revert to the register used in 1991. It knew that to do so would disenfranchise many new, young voters--voters who would probably not vote for UNIP or for Kaunda. Kaunda had returned to lead UNIP, despite seeming to take political retirement shortly after the 1991 elections defeat and handing over the party leadership to his chosen successor, Kebby Musokotwane. The 1991 register was itself defective at that time, and there has undoubtedly been considerable attrition over the intervening period, not least because of the growing problem of AIDS. At the time of writing, UNIP and some other losing political figures in 1996 continue to dispute the Nikuv register, and UNIP has a policy of trying to persuade voters to surrender their voting cards, so as to further compromise any parliamentary by-elections and local government elections. There have been thinly veiled threats that intimidation would be used if necessary to secure this objective, along with invocations to stage a more general campaign of civil disobedience.
Constitutional Changes
Secondly, and arousing no less controversy especially among the international community, were constitutional changes passed by parliament prior to the elections and effectively barring Kaunda from standing for the presidency. The changes restrict any holder from serving more than two terms, and require the holder and the holder's parents to be Zambian nationals (Kaunda's parents were born in what is now called Malawi). Chiluba, whose own birthplace and the identity of his father have been the subject of considerable press speculation in Zambia (origins in what is now Zaire are alleged), would also be bound by the changes. Chiluba's argument is that all four of the consultative exercises over the country's constitution that have been carried out with the Zambian people, beginning with the earliest days and embracing the most recent o n e - - a broadly-based commission of inquiry carried out in the Third Republic-show the Zambian people strongly favour a limit on presidential tenure. The Chona Commission inquiry that immediately preceded the Second Republic (which began in August 1973, when the one-party state was legislated, following Kaunda's issuing of a presidential proclamation on the matter in December 1972) revealed similar sentiments, but Kaunda chose to ignore them. Even so, in 1996 the plan to change the constitution generated widespread com-
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ment. A compromise proposal to legislate an interim solution that would allow Kaunda to stand again but without setting a precedent, came to nothing. It encountered strong opposition from MMD backbenchers and, owing to what Chiluba (1997) calls a 'misunderstanding' it failed to command the support in Parliament even of UNIP MPs, who left the chamber.
The Contest
Following the 1996 election a second five-year term for Chiluba seems assured, notwithstanding the problems surrounding the election register and allegations by some defeated politicians and donor-funded local observer NGO groups that the elections were not wholly free and fair. On the day, the elections were peaceful and orderly. Some instances of voting irregularities have been claimed, and these possibly affected the outcome in a small number of parliamentary constituencies. During the campaign the MMD was able to make favourable use of such government resources as official vehicles and government-controlled media including television, although the privately-owned paper The Post kept up its usual hostility to the government. More importantly, the constitutional changes triggered a decision by UNIP in the last week of October to withdraw from the parliamentary election, at Kaunda's insistence. Now, in the wake of the election there is growing disarray in the party over the wisdom of that decision. Not only did it deny some UNIP stalwarts the personal material and other benefits that come from being elected an MP, but it threatens to marginalise the party as a political force even more than before. Assuming Chiluba draws a line at the end of his second term (unlike government heads in some other democratising countries who have sought ways of trying to extend their incumbency in spite of constitutional obstacles), it will be difficult for UNIP to continue to advance Kaunda's claims (he will be 77 years old in 2001; Chiluba will be 58). Ultimately, a showdown between the old guard and younger elements in UNIP looks just as inevitable as it would have been if Kaunda had taken part in the presidential election and lost heavily.
The Results
The 1996 results, drawn from a report prepared by Nikuv Computers Ltd (1996) and certified by the Election Office, were as follows.
Presidential
For the presidency, Chiluba (MMD) won 68.96 per cent of votes cast, equivalent to 72.59 per cent of votes received after discounting spoiled ballot papers. The four other candidates were: Dean Mung'omba, leader of Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC) who received 12.75 per cent of votes, spread fairly evenly around the country; Humphrey Mulemba, president of the National Party (NP), polling 6.66 per cent of the votes, over 40 per cent of which came from his home North Western Province; Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika of Agenda for Zambia (AZ) with 4.71 per cent of the vote, over half of which was in his home Western Province (the former Barotseland); and the elderly, some would say rather eccentric Chama Chakomboka of Movement for Democratic Process (MDP), with 3.29 per cent of the vote (not much improvement on his performance in the 1991 election). All but the last of these are former MMD members who briefly held government posts before leaving the party. Lewanika was a
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founder member of the NP, a splinter grouping that broke away from MMD in 1993, before moving on yet again. Chiluba's margin of victory ranged from a high in Copperbelt Province, with 86.35 per cent of votes received, down to lows of 52.20 per cent in North Western, where Mulemba polled 29.49 per cent, and 43.14 per cent in Western Province, where Lewanika polled 29.49 per cent. From the earliest days of Zambia's struggle for independence the regional pattern of political allegiances has been considered an important dimension of politics in the country (Tordoff, 1974; Gertzel, 1984). In particular Western Province and Southern Province (home base of Harry Nkumbula, a hero of the independence struggle, leader of Zambia's African National Congress and Kaunda's principal rival until the one-party state was introduced in the face of determined ANC resistance) have a past record of resisting the national embrace of UNIP and Kaunda. But most analysts agree that tribalism is far too crude a notion to adequately summarise Zambia's pattern of regional and local politics. Some, like Molteno (1974) have argued that sectionalism is a more appropriate lens. It is worth noting that in 1996 only a quarter of the total tally of votes recorded for Chiluba was sourced in Copperbelt Province, customarily seen as his and M M D ' s heartland together with Northern Province and the smaller Luapula Province. Only two of Zambia's nine provinces (Western and North Westem) contributed less than 7.5 per cent of Chiluba's vote. In short, the election demonstrated for the second time that Chiluba has national support, judged on the basis of an overall turnout that was 58.44 per cent of registered voters. That figure compares well with a tumout in 1991 of around 45 per cent--a figure regarded as disappointing then, and which was explained at the time by reference to (unwarranted) fears there would be violence at the polls, so causing voters to stay away, and also by the fact that for the first time for many years voters felt free to abstain. Parliamentary
Zambia has a unicameral legislature, and in the 1996 parliamentary elections MMD, the only party to contest all 150 constituencies, gained 131 seats with 60.88 per cent of votes received--a somewhat less impressive performance nationally than their leader achieved. The remaining seats went to Independents (10), NP (5), AZ (2) and ZDC (2)--the last being a very meagre return on ZDC's investment in contesting 141 seats, so providing the nearest thing to an alternative to MMD on a nation-wide basis. Six other parties apart from UNIP failed to win representation, ranging from the National Lima Party (83 candidates) to the Liberal Progressive Front's solitary candidate. The rest of Zambia's 30 or so registered 'parties' did not field candidates, for the most part because they are not parties in any meaningful sense. Like UNIP, the small Labour Party chose to boycott the election. Of the former ministers in the MMD government and senior party officers who contested parliamentary seats under different colours, notable successes were scored by Ludwig Sondashi (NP, for Solwezi Central in North Western Province) and Dipak Patel standing as Independent (in Lusaka Central), although his divorce from the party was not made apparent in the many election posters his supporters put up. Patel resigned from MMD after the robust handling of the nationality issue in the parliamentary debates on changes to the constitution. Disappointment went to Guy Scott (a white farmer and MMD's first Agriculture Minister, standing for the Lima Party), in a controversial recount, and Chilufya Kapwepwe, whose credentials as daughter of Simon Kapwepwe (another former hero of the early years of the Republic, until a serious rift developed with Kaunda) were not enough to win her a seat, contrary to when she stood as an MMD candidate in 1991.
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A few UNIP political figures left the party in order to stand as Independents. But if UNIP had contested the parliamentary election then MMD's share of the total vote could well have been less than half. Even so, the likelihood is that UNIP would not have been able to deny MMD an overall majority in parliament (local estimates are that UNIP would probably have won 40-50 seats), especially if UNIP contested only the parliamentary and not the presidential elections. In Eastern Province, which was UNIP's only stronghold in 1991 (then winning 68.17 per cent of the vote and all 19 seats there), people declined to vote in significant numbers for rival candidates to MMD. This allowed MMD to scoop all 19 seats, so adding to its clean sweep in Copperbelt, Luapula and Southern Provinces. At 37.03 per cent of registered voters the turnout in Eastern Province was easily the lowest of any province, and almost half that achieved on the Copperbelt. The proportion of spoiled papers was below average. The dispersed population of this rural province made the voter registration exercise and collection of voters' cards burdensome for many peasant farmers. Thus, MMD's result in the province is highly misleading, and loyalty to Kaunda and UNIP is probably still very strong in this part of Zambia. The MMD slate of candidates fared least well in Western Province--11 seats won but 6 lost, which were divided equally between Independents, AZ and ZDC. Of the minor parties, NP in North Western (where it amassed more than twice as many votes as in any other province) and AZ in Western Province showed their appeal was largely regionally based, almost exclusively so in AZ's case. Zambia inherited from Britain, the colonial power, the first-past-the-post electoral system, and as elsewhere this has enabled some quirky results. Thus five parliamentary candidates were elected with less than 40 per cent of the votes received and a further 27 were elected with under half of the votes. The most hotly contested clusters of seats, where the margin of victory was relatively modest, were in the provinces where MMD's competitors were also fielding presidential hopefulls who have a background in the province, especially North Western and Western Provinces. Aside from this coat-tails effect, Central and to a lesser degree Southern Province also contained more than the average proportion of well contested seats. The voters in Southern Province perhaps had good reason to display confusion. In 1991 its leading light Baldwin Nkumbula (a son of Harry Nkumbula) was appointed to a junior ministerial post in the new MMD government. He soon became dissatisfied, left the government and then left the party to help form the NP. He captured the NP presidency in circumstances in which several other, more 'heavyweight' contestants cancelled one another out. Proving to be an ineffectual leader, he was replaced by Mulemba in 1995; after that Nkumbula applied to rejoin MMD, only to be killed in a car accident shortly after. This kind of circulation from one party to another and then back again is, however, not an unusual feature of Zambian political life (Burnell, (1995a, b)). Of more than 200 women who registered an intention with the National Women's Lobby group to contest the parliamentary elections, a quarter were selected by parties to stand or stood as Independents. Thirteen were successful in winning seats, 11 of them from MMD, and one is now a cabinet minister--Edith Nawakwi, Agriculture Minister, who held similar ranking positions throughout the first MMD government. ZDC fielded the most women candidates (15), none of whom were successful.
Some Observations Personal popularity and political clientelism continue to be important factors in public life in Zambia today, in inter-party and intra-party relations. But clearly, in the absence of MMD
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backing it is not always sufficient to ensure political success. That sharp disagreements over policy substance should have played little role in the election campaign is unsurprising, given that most of the leading candidates have at one time or another since 1990 belonged to MMD (and in some cases, to UNIP before 1991). Moreover, the scope for advancing feasible alternative economic strategies for the nation is extremely limited by the country's high external indebtedness (still over $6 billion, despite some relief arrangements being secured since 1991) and the undeniable potential for influence given to the foreign donors and Bretton Woods institutions especially. Party Differentiation
ZDC's campaign made promises of cleaner and more democratic government, seeking to portray MMD as having departed from the democratising promise that first brought it to power. The Lima Party sought to represent farmers' interests, and hence its largest single tranche of votes was delivered in the fertile Southern Province. By association NP and AZ came to be construed as tribally-oriented parties. UNIP's late decision to boycott the elections did not stop MMD resorting to the argument that only by returning MMD safely to power could the country be kept safe from the many negative features displayed by UNIP's rule in the past. These are still recent enough to figure in many voters' consciousness. The MMD manifesto, a glossily produced 30-page affair, highlighted the MMD government's economic achievements and offered a surprisingly large menu of promises. In contrast, the party's 1991 manifesto had indicated painful sacrifices would be necessary as a result of bringing in sound economic policies; and Chiluba has always maintained this platform in 1991 is what gave the MMD government the political space in which to implement such policies, notwithstanding the considerable social costs. Now, the party seems to believe the country is poised to reap the economic rewards, and the 1996 manifesto contains both general statements of intent and concrete measures, stretching as far as the creation of a National Sports Academy by 1998! There was bound to be only limited distribution of the manifesto around the country, and in parts its contents seem designed to impress the international (donor) community, pushing the right buttons in respect of language (such as the aim to create a 'stakeholder economy') and priorities like prosecuting the war against drugs trafficking, making military expenditure subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and praising the local government reforms (Britain's assistance to the Local Government Support Programme throughout all 61 District Councils being singled out for special mention). For their part UNIP and Kaunda with their familiar slogan of 'One Zambia One Nation' continue to preach the message that tribal-based divisions and the disintegration of the country are proceeding apace under MMD rule. They point to the self-enrichment of prominent government politicians and the persistence of mass poverty, and the selling of the nation's patrimony to foreigners as a result of the privatisation exercise and dismemberment of insolvent state 'assets'. Evolution of the Parties
So far, MMD has confounded those sceptics who believed the unlikely coalition of interest groups and individuals who came together to form the organisation in 1990 would not survive long, even if it gained access to the many advantages of incumbency in office. This seemed born out by the rapid emergence of factional-type strains in the senior hierarchy (forseen early
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on in the perceptive analysis of the post-1991 elections situation by Baylies and Szeftel, 1992), the steady loss of senior members (some of whom chose to leave the party and others who were forced out), and a growing disaffection with aspects of the party's performance and public policies by students, trade unionists and even church leaders, all of whom welcomed the MMD challenge to UNIP in 1991. In fact, the MMD now seems rather more cohesive than before, having shed some of the mavericks. According to Chiluba (1997), an appreciation that their political prospects are best served by remaining within the party has gained ground among party cadres, for over the period 1992-95 they have seen some high profile figures leave the party and fail to make a political mark outside the MMD. In other words, by comparison with earlier days, the MMD now looks less like a coalition of interests and more like a single unified party, even though there are still some significant differences remaining within the cabinet. An illustration concerns acceptable solutions to the need to bring private foreign corporate capital into the copper mining industry--an industry that has great symbolic as well as economic importance to Zambia as an independent country. MMD backbenchers continue to rebel over legislative initiatives they disagree with, especially when not given the opportunity to vent their opinions first in party caucus meetings. Backbench opposition is not unknown from among the eight members of the National Assembly who are nominated by the government, even now. But much more questionable than MMD's prospects of survival is whether ZDC, denied power and with substantial financial debts from the election campaign, will remain and build as a party to anything like the extent MMD seems to have done. One possibility is that it will go the way of some small parties who won seats in local government elections, and contested some parliamentary by-elections, during the period of the first MMD government. They did not last. In some notable instances their leaders surrendered their independence and crossed over to MMD, like Enoch Kavindele (now a cabinet minister) who abandoned his creation, the United Democratic Party in 1994. Political Trends
Among Zambians there is a view that the simmering personal rivalry between Kaunda and Chiluba has not been entirely helpful to the development of a healthy political culture. But, if the current legal challenges to Chiluba's nomination in the 1996 presidential election (grounded on the nationality issue) and to the holding of the election on the Nikuv register prove unsuccessful, as seems likely, then the relevance of that rivalry should recede, especially if UNIP becomes preoccupied with reforming itself and with leadership succession. Of course, at a different level, another factor in the equation is the attitude of the donor community, which has taken a close interest in Zambian developments ever since regarding the country as a pacesetter in Africa's new 'wind of change', at the start of the 1990s. Idle speculation might ask who gave encouragement to President Mandela when, immediately prior to the elections he said (to the South African Broadcasting Corporation) that the elections would 'lack legitimacy' if they went ahead. Of course Mandela was aware of Kaunda's and Zambia's practical support to South Africa's African National Congress in the past and the country's notable participation as a 'front-line' state in the struggle against apartheid. Also, he received advice from Kaunda that Zambia would descend into chaos if he was not allowed to contest the presidency. Events subsequently showed Chiluba's response to Mandela--that the imposition of a state of emergency (which would make it possible to cancel the election) was not justified--to have been the more valid. Neither did the Electoral Commission accept Mandela's advice and use its independent authority to suspend the electoral process.
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Major donors to Zambia have expressed very clearly their disappointment in certain matters, for example the US government with the changes to the constitution and the British over perceived levels of corruption. Some donors have suspended or stopped elements of their aid, for example the British decided to cancel programme (i.e. balance of payments) aid well before the elections timetable began. The MMD government has criticised donors for appearing to side with those Zambian non-governmental organisations who, like the Zambia Independent Monitoring Team, either called for the elections to be suspended because they believed UNIP's campaign to persuade people not to vote would be successful, or went on to declare the elections were not free and fair. Some of the losing politicians also allege the election must have been fraudulent. But the donors have no interest in destabilising a government that has demonstrated it has substantial popular support (the outcome of the presidential election in particular being regarded as a fairly accurate reflection of the people's choice). Moreover, since 1991 the MMD government has persevered with liberalising trade and economic policy reforms including a rolling programme of privatisation. By February 1997, 159 companies had been privatised, many falling to international investors; according to the MMD manifesto the programme will be completed by 1999, so ending the delay in dealing with the mines. Also, the government's 1997 budget proposes to address the challenge of pruning the over-sized civil service, setting aside Kwacha 20 billion (£1 = around Kwacha 2050 in February 1997) for retiring and retrenching employees (downsizing has been another major demand of the donors). This initiative together with continuation of the country's recent good record for the region of attracting inwards investment depend crucially on the maintenance of political stability and a predictable economic policy framework, avoiding the more populist appeals redolent of the Second Republic.
Significance for Democratisation Briefly, what is the significance of the 1996 elections for democratisation in Zambia? Do they signal the consolidation of democratic transition? Do they denote a step forward on the long road to democratic consolidation and sustainability? Or do they indicate evidence of what Diamond (1996) calls the hollowing out of democracy--a process that is consistent with the institutionalisation of elective democracy, and genuine multi-party competition together with some uncertainty over outcomes, but absent of significant progress towards a much richer portfolio of characteristics defining liberal democracy, a free state? Different again would be some intermediate condition or, even less desirable, 'pseudodemocracy', where the existence of independent opposition parties is tolerated, but there does not exist a fair arena of contestation that would allow the ruling party to be removed from office (Diamond, 1996, p. 25). However, while the M M D ' s repeat success in 1996 means Huntington's (Huntington, 1991, pp. 237 and 266-267) double turnover test of democracy has yet to be fulfilled, Zambia's exact position on the scale of democratic political development is not obvious at the present time. There are several reasons for this. For one thing, to even start to address such questions would require a much more extended discussion covering what has been happening in society, economy and polity at large. For another, as the situation continues to evolve we should be prepared to modify our judgements, almost month by month. After all, many analysts would share Chiluba's view that Zambia's experience, like that of other countries, teaches us democratisation is a fragile process which can easily be undermined or reversed. Caution is the watchword; and the surest way of preventing difficulties is said to be to consult the people over important changes, like the ones
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affecting the constitution (Chiluba, 1997). Also, the importance of economic development in particular is stressed (Chiluba, 1995, Chapter 8). Indeed, Chiluba (1997) rates as the most encouraging achievement of the 1990s the change that is taking place in people's attitudes-away from looking to the state and an expectation that they will be handed welfare, towards a determination to become more reliant on their own efforts: that is to say, "from consumption to production". Thirdly, further work needs to be done to refine the conceptual schemas offered by the 'transitology' and 'consolidology' literature, which have yet to gain universal endorsement (see for example the debate between Gunther et al., 1996 and O'Donnell, 1996). Finally, the evaluation of individual cases must remain sensitive to their historical traditions, and also perhaps should make allowance for regional comparisons. But one thing that can be said of Zambia, however, is that critical discussion of its democratic performance is now accepted as a legitimate part of public inquiry and debate. That is a different state of affairs from most of the period of the Second Republic. For while political dissent has never been entirely absent from the country, the press was less robust then than it has since become, the so called participatory democracy of the one-party state was a sham, and no serious challenge to Kaunda's leadership was allowed to emerge. In the US it is sometimes said that a president who is elected for a second term is virtually a lame-duck almost from the time of reelection. The management of relations with Congress becomes more difficult. In contrast to the situation that usually prevails in the US, the Zambian president's party currently has an unambiguous majority in the legislature. But even if the domestic political 'turbulence' experienced in 1996 is now largely at an end, as Chiluba believes, there is no reason why the next 5 years should be any less interesting. Already, political commentators are turning to the question who will succeed Chiluba in 2001? After all, "competition and rivalry have been the hallmark of the MMD. And the next three years should underline that fact" (Chirambo, 1997).
References Baylies, C. and Szeftel, M. (1992) The fall and rise of multi-party politics in Zambia. Review of African Political Economy 54, 75-91. Bjornlund, E., Bratton, M. and Gibson, C. (1992) Observing multi-party elections in Africa: lessons from Zambia. African Affairs 91, 405-431. Bratton, M. (1992) Zambia starts over. Journal of Democracy 3, 81-94. Burnell, P. (1995a) Building on the past? Party politics in Zambia's Third Republic. Par~_ Politics 1, 397-405. Burnell, P. (1995b) The politics of poverty and the poverty of politics in Zambia's Third Republic. Third World Quarterly 16, 675-690. Chiluba, F. J. T. (1995) Democracy. The Challenge of Change. Multimedia Publications, Lusaka. Chiluba, F. J. T. (1997) Conversations with the author, 8-15 February 1997. Chirambo, K. (1997) Towards 2000--groping for new blood. Sunday Times of Zambia, 9 February 1997. Commonwealth Observer Group, (1992) Presidential and National Assembly Elections in Zambia. The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group. Commonwealth Secretariat, London. Diamond, L. (1996) Is the third wave over? Journal of Democracy 7, 20-37. Gertzel, C. (Ed.) (1984) The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia. Manchester University Press, Manchester. Gunther, R., Diamandouros, P. N. and Puhle, H. (1996) O'Donnell's "Illusions": a rejoinder. Journal of Democracy 7, 151-159. Huntington, S. (1991) The Third Wave. Democratization in the late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman and London.
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Molteno, R. (1974) Cleavage and conflict in Zambian politics: a study in sectionalism. In Politics in Zambia, ed. W. Tordoff, pp. 63-106. Manchester University Press, Manchester. Nikuv Computers Ltd (1996) Republic of Zambia General Elections 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary. Analysis of the Elections Results.
O'Donnell, G. (1996) Illusions and conceptual flaws. Journal of Democracy 7, 160-168. Tordoff, W. (Ed) (1974) Politics in Zambia. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
The December 1996 General Elections in Ghana Joseph R A Ayee Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana
Introduction Ghana is one of the few countries in Africa that has had significant experiences with democratic political life. It operated as a democracy during the pre-independence internal self-rule period, 1951-1957, during the early post independence period, 1957-1960, before succumbing to oneparty dictatorship, and during two brief renewals of civilian, constitutional government, October 1969-January 1972 and September 1979-December 1981. Ghana has also experienced prolonged periods of military dictatorship in the last few decades, under the National Liberation Council (NLC) from February 1966-October 1969; National Redemption/Supreme Military Council (NRC/SMC) from January 1972-June 1979; the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) from June 1979-September 1979 and under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government from 31 December 198 l-6 January 1993. Despite the prolonged periods of military rule, there are important social and political forces embedded in the fabric of Ghanaian society that support democratic government. In November 1992, the PNDC government held multi-party presidential elections to return the country to constitutional rule. It was won by Flt. Lt. J. J. Rawlings' National Democratic Congress (NDC). Although international observers, like the Commonwealth Observer Group (COG), declared the elections as 'free and fair', the outcome of the democratic transition was highly disputed by four opposition parties, namely, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), People's National Convention (PNC), National Independence Party (NIP) and People's Heritage Party (PHP). Consequently, the legitimacy and moral authority of the whole democratic transition and the new democratic institutions were cast in doubt. Indeed, the opposition parties were so enraged at what they considered the unfair electoral environment, PNDC control over the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) and voter registration and manipulation of the presidential elections themselves that they decided to boycott the parliamentary elections in December 1992. As a consequence, during Ghana's first 4 years of its fourth attempt to establish constitutional government, the government party, the NDC virtually controlled all (189 out of the 200) seats in parliament.
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as issues. Slovenia is also facing the demographic time bomb familiar in all mature westem societies. The cost of pensions and health care has become a serious political issue; LDS campaigned on pension reform. Indeed, these new social clouds on the horizon may have made the electorate cautious and prevented the more free market Slovene Spring alliance from gaining a clear majority. Another issue was the implementation of the compromise reached with Italy, brokered by the then Spanish Foreign Minister Solana, enabling the conclusion of the EU Association Agreement, opening the way, in due course, to full Slovenian EU membership. This compromise would require Slovenia to allow non-nationals to acquire property within 4 years and to allow non-nationals already resident in Slovenia for more than 3 years to acquire property immediately. A constitutional amendment, requiring a two-thirds majority in Parliament, would be required. The results saw a net gain of 16 seats for the Slovene Spring parties, jumping from 29 seats in 1992 to 45 now. Their fortunes were varied: SDS gained 12 seats, SLS gained 7 seats, while on the other hand SKD lost 5 seats. In the liberal bloc, ZLSD lost 5 seats, close to the 4 seats won by DESUS that had been part of the United List (ZL) in 1992. The SNS lost 8 seats, while the LDS easily remained the largest party, even gaining 3 seats. The old Democratic Party disappeared.
Whither Zambia? The Zambian Presidential and Parliamentary Elections of November 1996 Peter Burnell
Department of Politics and International Studies, The Universi~. of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
The 18th November 1996 witnessed Zambia's second multi-party elections since the restoration of political pluralism, following President Kaunda's signing of a constitutional amendment which introduced the Third Republic in December 1990. The first such elections, held in October 1991, saw Frederick Chiluba defeat Kenneth Kaunda, who was the country's only previous occupant of the presidency. Then, Chiluba, who had been Chairman-General of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions since 1974, secured over 75 per cent of the vote. His newly formed party, the Movement for Multi Party Democracy (MMD), won 125 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly, the remainder going to Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP)--the ruling party in the de jure one-party state of Zambia's Second Republic. The 1991 polls were widely perceived, including by a large contingent of international observers to have been largely free and fair, and the result was an accurate reflection of feeling in the country (Commonwealth Observer Group, 1992; Bjornlund et al., 1992; Bratton, 1992).
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Notes on Recent Elections The Issue of the 1996 Elections
Victory in the 1996 elections again went to Chiluba and MMD, but this time the elections themselves proved to be a far more controversial issue.
The Register
First, the elections were held on the basis of a new electoral register, which critics--including UNIP--say seriously understates the true size of the electorate, perhaps by around 50 per cent. The electoral roll of 2.267 million people compares with a total population of over 8 million. The register was prepared by an Israeli company, Nikuv, which secured the contract in the face of other bidders. The procedure for compiling the register was laborious, and some registered voters did not collect their voting cards. However, it seems weaknesses in the administration of the process rather than deliberate or organised political manipulation explain the shortcomings. Notwithstanding the concern expressed in the independent media and among non-governmental organisations--as well as UNIP--about the register, the government declined to revert to the register used in 1991. It knew that to do so would disenfranchise many new, young voters--voters who would probably not vote for UNIP or for Kaunda. Kaunda had returned to lead UNIP, despite seeming to take political retirement shortly after the 1991 elections defeat and handing over the party leadership to his chosen successor, Kebby Musokotwane. The 1991 register was itself defective at that time, and there has undoubtedly been considerable attrition over the intervening period, not least because of the growing problem of AIDS. At the time of writing, UNIP and some other losing political figures in 1996 continue to dispute the Nikuv register, and UNIP has a policy of trying to persuade voters to surrender their voting cards, so as to further compromise any parliamentary by-elections and local government elections. There have been thinly veiled threats that intimidation would be used if necessary to secure this objective, along with invocations to stage a more general campaign of civil disobedience.
Constitutional Changes
Secondly, and arousing no less controversy especially among the international community, were constitutional changes passed by parliament prior to the elections and effectively barring Kaunda from standing for the presidency. The changes restrict any holder from serving more than two terms, and require the holder and the holder's parents to be Zambian nationals (Kaunda's parents were born in what is now called Malawi). Chiluba, whose own birthplace and the identity of his father have been the subject of considerable press speculation in Zambia (origins in what is now Zaire are alleged), would also be bound by the changes. Chiluba's argument is that all four of the consultative exercises over the country's constitution that have been carried out with the Zambian people, beginning with the earliest days and embracing the most recent o n e - - a broadly-based commission of inquiry carried out in the Third Republic-show the Zambian people strongly favour a limit on presidential tenure. The Chona Commission inquiry that immediately preceded the Second Republic (which began in August 1973, when the one-party state was legislated, following Kaunda's issuing of a presidential proclamation on the matter in December 1972) revealed similar sentiments, but Kaunda chose to ignore them. Even so, in 1996 the plan to change the constitution generated widespread com-
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ment. A compromise proposal to legislate an interim solution that would allow Kaunda to stand again but without setting a precedent, came to nothing. It encountered strong opposition from MMD backbenchers and, owing to what Chiluba (1997) calls a 'misunderstanding' it failed to command the support in Parliament even of UNIP MPs, who left the chamber.
The Contest
Following the 1996 election a second five-year term for Chiluba seems assured, notwithstanding the problems surrounding the election register and allegations by some defeated politicians and donor-funded local observer NGO groups that the elections were not wholly free and fair. On the day, the elections were peaceful and orderly. Some instances of voting irregularities have been claimed, and these possibly affected the outcome in a small number of parliamentary constituencies. During the campaign the MMD was able to make favourable use of such government resources as official vehicles and government-controlled media including television, although the privately-owned paper The Post kept up its usual hostility to the government. More importantly, the constitutional changes triggered a decision by UNIP in the last week of October to withdraw from the parliamentary election, at Kaunda's insistence. Now, in the wake of the election there is growing disarray in the party over the wisdom of that decision. Not only did it deny some UNIP stalwarts the personal material and other benefits that come from being elected an MP, but it threatens to marginalise the party as a political force even more than before. Assuming Chiluba draws a line at the end of his second term (unlike government heads in some other democratising countries who have sought ways of trying to extend their incumbency in spite of constitutional obstacles), it will be difficult for UNIP to continue to advance Kaunda's claims (he will be 77 years old in 2001; Chiluba will be 58). Ultimately, a showdown between the old guard and younger elements in UNIP looks just as inevitable as it would have been if Kaunda had taken part in the presidential election and lost heavily.
The Results
The 1996 results, drawn from a report prepared by Nikuv Computers Ltd (1996) and certified by the Election Office, were as follows.
Presidential
For the presidency, Chiluba (MMD) won 68.96 per cent of votes cast, equivalent to 72.59 per cent of votes received after discounting spoiled ballot papers. The four other candidates were: Dean Mung'omba, leader of Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC) who received 12.75 per cent of votes, spread fairly evenly around the country; Humphrey Mulemba, president of the National Party (NP), polling 6.66 per cent of the votes, over 40 per cent of which came from his home North Western Province; Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika of Agenda for Zambia (AZ) with 4.71 per cent of the vote, over half of which was in his home Western Province (the former Barotseland); and the elderly, some would say rather eccentric Chama Chakomboka of Movement for Democratic Process (MDP), with 3.29 per cent of the vote (not much improvement on his performance in the 1991 election). All but the last of these are former MMD members who briefly held government posts before leaving the party. Lewanika was a
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founder member of the NP, a splinter grouping that broke away from MMD in 1993, before moving on yet again. Chiluba's margin of victory ranged from a high in Copperbelt Province, with 86.35 per cent of votes received, down to lows of 52.20 per cent in North Western, where Mulemba polled 29.49 per cent, and 43.14 per cent in Western Province, where Lewanika polled 29.49 per cent. From the earliest days of Zambia's struggle for independence the regional pattern of political allegiances has been considered an important dimension of politics in the country (Tordoff, 1974; Gertzel, 1984). In particular Western Province and Southern Province (home base of Harry Nkumbula, a hero of the independence struggle, leader of Zambia's African National Congress and Kaunda's principal rival until the one-party state was introduced in the face of determined ANC resistance) have a past record of resisting the national embrace of UNIP and Kaunda. But most analysts agree that tribalism is far too crude a notion to adequately summarise Zambia's pattern of regional and local politics. Some, like Molteno (1974) have argued that sectionalism is a more appropriate lens. It is worth noting that in 1996 only a quarter of the total tally of votes recorded for Chiluba was sourced in Copperbelt Province, customarily seen as his and M M D ' s heartland together with Northern Province and the smaller Luapula Province. Only two of Zambia's nine provinces (Western and North Westem) contributed less than 7.5 per cent of Chiluba's vote. In short, the election demonstrated for the second time that Chiluba has national support, judged on the basis of an overall turnout that was 58.44 per cent of registered voters. That figure compares well with a tumout in 1991 of around 45 per cent--a figure regarded as disappointing then, and which was explained at the time by reference to (unwarranted) fears there would be violence at the polls, so causing voters to stay away, and also by the fact that for the first time for many years voters felt free to abstain. Parliamentary
Zambia has a unicameral legislature, and in the 1996 parliamentary elections MMD, the only party to contest all 150 constituencies, gained 131 seats with 60.88 per cent of votes received--a somewhat less impressive performance nationally than their leader achieved. The remaining seats went to Independents (10), NP (5), AZ (2) and ZDC (2)--the last being a very meagre return on ZDC's investment in contesting 141 seats, so providing the nearest thing to an alternative to MMD on a nation-wide basis. Six other parties apart from UNIP failed to win representation, ranging from the National Lima Party (83 candidates) to the Liberal Progressive Front's solitary candidate. The rest of Zambia's 30 or so registered 'parties' did not field candidates, for the most part because they are not parties in any meaningful sense. Like UNIP, the small Labour Party chose to boycott the election. Of the former ministers in the MMD government and senior party officers who contested parliamentary seats under different colours, notable successes were scored by Ludwig Sondashi (NP, for Solwezi Central in North Western Province) and Dipak Patel standing as Independent (in Lusaka Central), although his divorce from the party was not made apparent in the many election posters his supporters put up. Patel resigned from MMD after the robust handling of the nationality issue in the parliamentary debates on changes to the constitution. Disappointment went to Guy Scott (a white farmer and MMD's first Agriculture Minister, standing for the Lima Party), in a controversial recount, and Chilufya Kapwepwe, whose credentials as daughter of Simon Kapwepwe (another former hero of the early years of the Republic, until a serious rift developed with Kaunda) were not enough to win her a seat, contrary to when she stood as an MMD candidate in 1991.
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A few UNIP political figures left the party in order to stand as Independents. But if UNIP had contested the parliamentary election then MMD's share of the total vote could well have been less than half. Even so, the likelihood is that UNIP would not have been able to deny MMD an overall majority in parliament (local estimates are that UNIP would probably have won 40-50 seats), especially if UNIP contested only the parliamentary and not the presidential elections. In Eastern Province, which was UNIP's only stronghold in 1991 (then winning 68.17 per cent of the vote and all 19 seats there), people declined to vote in significant numbers for rival candidates to MMD. This allowed MMD to scoop all 19 seats, so adding to its clean sweep in Copperbelt, Luapula and Southern Provinces. At 37.03 per cent of registered voters the turnout in Eastern Province was easily the lowest of any province, and almost half that achieved on the Copperbelt. The proportion of spoiled papers was below average. The dispersed population of this rural province made the voter registration exercise and collection of voters' cards burdensome for many peasant farmers. Thus, MMD's result in the province is highly misleading, and loyalty to Kaunda and UNIP is probably still very strong in this part of Zambia. The MMD slate of candidates fared least well in Western Province--11 seats won but 6 lost, which were divided equally between Independents, AZ and ZDC. Of the minor parties, NP in North Western (where it amassed more than twice as many votes as in any other province) and AZ in Western Province showed their appeal was largely regionally based, almost exclusively so in AZ's case. Zambia inherited from Britain, the colonial power, the first-past-the-post electoral system, and as elsewhere this has enabled some quirky results. Thus five parliamentary candidates were elected with less than 40 per cent of the votes received and a further 27 were elected with under half of the votes. The most hotly contested clusters of seats, where the margin of victory was relatively modest, were in the provinces where MMD's competitors were also fielding presidential hopefulls who have a background in the province, especially North Western and Western Provinces. Aside from this coat-tails effect, Central and to a lesser degree Southern Province also contained more than the average proportion of well contested seats. The voters in Southern Province perhaps had good reason to display confusion. In 1991 its leading light Baldwin Nkumbula (a son of Harry Nkumbula) was appointed to a junior ministerial post in the new MMD government. He soon became dissatisfied, left the government and then left the party to help form the NP. He captured the NP presidency in circumstances in which several other, more 'heavyweight' contestants cancelled one another out. Proving to be an ineffectual leader, he was replaced by Mulemba in 1995; after that Nkumbula applied to rejoin MMD, only to be killed in a car accident shortly after. This kind of circulation from one party to another and then back again is, however, not an unusual feature of Zambian political life (Burnell, (1995a, b)). Of more than 200 women who registered an intention with the National Women's Lobby group to contest the parliamentary elections, a quarter were selected by parties to stand or stood as Independents. Thirteen were successful in winning seats, 11 of them from MMD, and one is now a cabinet minister--Edith Nawakwi, Agriculture Minister, who held similar ranking positions throughout the first MMD government. ZDC fielded the most women candidates (15), none of whom were successful.
Some Observations Personal popularity and political clientelism continue to be important factors in public life in Zambia today, in inter-party and intra-party relations. But clearly, in the absence of MMD
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backing it is not always sufficient to ensure political success. That sharp disagreements over policy substance should have played little role in the election campaign is unsurprising, given that most of the leading candidates have at one time or another since 1990 belonged to MMD (and in some cases, to UNIP before 1991). Moreover, the scope for advancing feasible alternative economic strategies for the nation is extremely limited by the country's high external indebtedness (still over $6 billion, despite some relief arrangements being secured since 1991) and the undeniable potential for influence given to the foreign donors and Bretton Woods institutions especially. Party Differentiation
ZDC's campaign made promises of cleaner and more democratic government, seeking to portray MMD as having departed from the democratising promise that first brought it to power. The Lima Party sought to represent farmers' interests, and hence its largest single tranche of votes was delivered in the fertile Southern Province. By association NP and AZ came to be construed as tribally-oriented parties. UNIP's late decision to boycott the elections did not stop MMD resorting to the argument that only by returning MMD safely to power could the country be kept safe from the many negative features displayed by UNIP's rule in the past. These are still recent enough to figure in many voters' consciousness. The MMD manifesto, a glossily produced 30-page affair, highlighted the MMD government's economic achievements and offered a surprisingly large menu of promises. In contrast, the party's 1991 manifesto had indicated painful sacrifices would be necessary as a result of bringing in sound economic policies; and Chiluba has always maintained this platform in 1991 is what gave the MMD government the political space in which to implement such policies, notwithstanding the considerable social costs. Now, the party seems to believe the country is poised to reap the economic rewards, and the 1996 manifesto contains both general statements of intent and concrete measures, stretching as far as the creation of a National Sports Academy by 1998! There was bound to be only limited distribution of the manifesto around the country, and in parts its contents seem designed to impress the international (donor) community, pushing the right buttons in respect of language (such as the aim to create a 'stakeholder economy') and priorities like prosecuting the war against drugs trafficking, making military expenditure subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and praising the local government reforms (Britain's assistance to the Local Government Support Programme throughout all 61 District Councils being singled out for special mention). For their part UNIP and Kaunda with their familiar slogan of 'One Zambia One Nation' continue to preach the message that tribal-based divisions and the disintegration of the country are proceeding apace under MMD rule. They point to the self-enrichment of prominent government politicians and the persistence of mass poverty, and the selling of the nation's patrimony to foreigners as a result of the privatisation exercise and dismemberment of insolvent state 'assets'. Evolution of the Parties
So far, MMD has confounded those sceptics who believed the unlikely coalition of interest groups and individuals who came together to form the organisation in 1990 would not survive long, even if it gained access to the many advantages of incumbency in office. This seemed born out by the rapid emergence of factional-type strains in the senior hierarchy (forseen early
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on in the perceptive analysis of the post-1991 elections situation by Baylies and Szeftel, 1992), the steady loss of senior members (some of whom chose to leave the party and others who were forced out), and a growing disaffection with aspects of the party's performance and public policies by students, trade unionists and even church leaders, all of whom welcomed the MMD challenge to UNIP in 1991. In fact, the MMD now seems rather more cohesive than before, having shed some of the mavericks. According to Chiluba (1997), an appreciation that their political prospects are best served by remaining within the party has gained ground among party cadres, for over the period 1992-95 they have seen some high profile figures leave the party and fail to make a political mark outside the MMD. In other words, by comparison with earlier days, the MMD now looks less like a coalition of interests and more like a single unified party, even though there are still some significant differences remaining within the cabinet. An illustration concerns acceptable solutions to the need to bring private foreign corporate capital into the copper mining industry--an industry that has great symbolic as well as economic importance to Zambia as an independent country. MMD backbenchers continue to rebel over legislative initiatives they disagree with, especially when not given the opportunity to vent their opinions first in party caucus meetings. Backbench opposition is not unknown from among the eight members of the National Assembly who are nominated by the government, even now. But much more questionable than MMD's prospects of survival is whether ZDC, denied power and with substantial financial debts from the election campaign, will remain and build as a party to anything like the extent MMD seems to have done. One possibility is that it will go the way of some small parties who won seats in local government elections, and contested some parliamentary by-elections, during the period of the first MMD government. They did not last. In some notable instances their leaders surrendered their independence and crossed over to MMD, like Enoch Kavindele (now a cabinet minister) who abandoned his creation, the United Democratic Party in 1994. Political Trends
Among Zambians there is a view that the simmering personal rivalry between Kaunda and Chiluba has not been entirely helpful to the development of a healthy political culture. But, if the current legal challenges to Chiluba's nomination in the 1996 presidential election (grounded on the nationality issue) and to the holding of the election on the Nikuv register prove unsuccessful, as seems likely, then the relevance of that rivalry should recede, especially if UNIP becomes preoccupied with reforming itself and with leadership succession. Of course, at a different level, another factor in the equation is the attitude of the donor community, which has taken a close interest in Zambian developments ever since regarding the country as a pacesetter in Africa's new 'wind of change', at the start of the 1990s. Idle speculation might ask who gave encouragement to President Mandela when, immediately prior to the elections he said (to the South African Broadcasting Corporation) that the elections would 'lack legitimacy' if they went ahead. Of course Mandela was aware of Kaunda's and Zambia's practical support to South Africa's African National Congress in the past and the country's notable participation as a 'front-line' state in the struggle against apartheid. Also, he received advice from Kaunda that Zambia would descend into chaos if he was not allowed to contest the presidency. Events subsequently showed Chiluba's response to Mandela--that the imposition of a state of emergency (which would make it possible to cancel the election) was not justified--to have been the more valid. Neither did the Electoral Commission accept Mandela's advice and use its independent authority to suspend the electoral process.
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Major donors to Zambia have expressed very clearly their disappointment in certain matters, for example the US government with the changes to the constitution and the British over perceived levels of corruption. Some donors have suspended or stopped elements of their aid, for example the British decided to cancel programme (i.e. balance of payments) aid well before the elections timetable began. The MMD government has criticised donors for appearing to side with those Zambian non-governmental organisations who, like the Zambia Independent Monitoring Team, either called for the elections to be suspended because they believed UNIP's campaign to persuade people not to vote would be successful, or went on to declare the elections were not free and fair. Some of the losing politicians also allege the election must have been fraudulent. But the donors have no interest in destabilising a government that has demonstrated it has substantial popular support (the outcome of the presidential election in particular being regarded as a fairly accurate reflection of the people's choice). Moreover, since 1991 the MMD government has persevered with liberalising trade and economic policy reforms including a rolling programme of privatisation. By February 1997, 159 companies had been privatised, many falling to international investors; according to the MMD manifesto the programme will be completed by 1999, so ending the delay in dealing with the mines. Also, the government's 1997 budget proposes to address the challenge of pruning the over-sized civil service, setting aside Kwacha 20 billion (£1 = around Kwacha 2050 in February 1997) for retiring and retrenching employees (downsizing has been another major demand of the donors). This initiative together with continuation of the country's recent good record for the region of attracting inwards investment depend crucially on the maintenance of political stability and a predictable economic policy framework, avoiding the more populist appeals redolent of the Second Republic.
Significance for Democratisation Briefly, what is the significance of the 1996 elections for democratisation in Zambia? Do they signal the consolidation of democratic transition? Do they denote a step forward on the long road to democratic consolidation and sustainability? Or do they indicate evidence of what Diamond (1996) calls the hollowing out of democracy--a process that is consistent with the institutionalisation of elective democracy, and genuine multi-party competition together with some uncertainty over outcomes, but absent of significant progress towards a much richer portfolio of characteristics defining liberal democracy, a free state? Different again would be some intermediate condition or, even less desirable, 'pseudodemocracy', where the existence of independent opposition parties is tolerated, but there does not exist a fair arena of contestation that would allow the ruling party to be removed from office (Diamond, 1996, p. 25). However, while the M M D ' s repeat success in 1996 means Huntington's (Huntington, 1991, pp. 237 and 266-267) double turnover test of democracy has yet to be fulfilled, Zambia's exact position on the scale of democratic political development is not obvious at the present time. There are several reasons for this. For one thing, to even start to address such questions would require a much more extended discussion covering what has been happening in society, economy and polity at large. For another, as the situation continues to evolve we should be prepared to modify our judgements, almost month by month. After all, many analysts would share Chiluba's view that Zambia's experience, like that of other countries, teaches us democratisation is a fragile process which can easily be undermined or reversed. Caution is the watchword; and the surest way of preventing difficulties is said to be to consult the people over important changes, like the ones
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affecting the constitution (Chiluba, 1997). Also, the importance of economic development in particular is stressed (Chiluba, 1995, Chapter 8). Indeed, Chiluba (1997) rates as the most encouraging achievement of the 1990s the change that is taking place in people's attitudes-away from looking to the state and an expectation that they will be handed welfare, towards a determination to become more reliant on their own efforts: that is to say, "from consumption to production". Thirdly, further work needs to be done to refine the conceptual schemas offered by the 'transitology' and 'consolidology' literature, which have yet to gain universal endorsement (see for example the debate between Gunther et al., 1996 and O'Donnell, 1996). Finally, the evaluation of individual cases must remain sensitive to their historical traditions, and also perhaps should make allowance for regional comparisons. But one thing that can be said of Zambia, however, is that critical discussion of its democratic performance is now accepted as a legitimate part of public inquiry and debate. That is a different state of affairs from most of the period of the Second Republic. For while political dissent has never been entirely absent from the country, the press was less robust then than it has since become, the so called participatory democracy of the one-party state was a sham, and no serious challenge to Kaunda's leadership was allowed to emerge. In the US it is sometimes said that a president who is elected for a second term is virtually a lame-duck almost from the time of reelection. The management of relations with Congress becomes more difficult. In contrast to the situation that usually prevails in the US, the Zambian president's party currently has an unambiguous majority in the legislature. But even if the domestic political 'turbulence' experienced in 1996 is now largely at an end, as Chiluba believes, there is no reason why the next 5 years should be any less interesting. Already, political commentators are turning to the question who will succeed Chiluba in 2001? After all, "competition and rivalry have been the hallmark of the MMD. And the next three years should underline that fact" (Chirambo, 1997).
References Baylies, C. and Szeftel, M. (1992) The fall and rise of multi-party politics in Zambia. Review of African Political Economy 54, 75-91. Bjornlund, E., Bratton, M. and Gibson, C. (1992) Observing multi-party elections in Africa: lessons from Zambia. African Affairs 91, 405-431. Bratton, M. (1992) Zambia starts over. Journal of Democracy 3, 81-94. Burnell, P. (1995a) Building on the past? Party politics in Zambia's Third Republic. Par~_ Politics 1, 397-405. Burnell, P. (1995b) The politics of poverty and the poverty of politics in Zambia's Third Republic. Third World Quarterly 16, 675-690. Chiluba, F. J. T. (1995) Democracy. The Challenge of Change. Multimedia Publications, Lusaka. Chiluba, F. J. T. (1997) Conversations with the author, 8-15 February 1997. Chirambo, K. (1997) Towards 2000--groping for new blood. Sunday Times of Zambia, 9 February 1997. Commonwealth Observer Group, (1992) Presidential and National Assembly Elections in Zambia. The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group. Commonwealth Secretariat, London. Diamond, L. (1996) Is the third wave over? Journal of Democracy 7, 20-37. Gertzel, C. (Ed.) (1984) The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia. Manchester University Press, Manchester. Gunther, R., Diamandouros, P. N. and Puhle, H. (1996) O'Donnell's "Illusions": a rejoinder. Journal of Democracy 7, 151-159. Huntington, S. (1991) The Third Wave. Democratization in the late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman and London.
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Molteno, R. (1974) Cleavage and conflict in Zambian politics: a study in sectionalism. In Politics in Zambia, ed. W. Tordoff, pp. 63-106. Manchester University Press, Manchester. Nikuv Computers Ltd (1996) Republic of Zambia General Elections 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary. Analysis of the Elections Results.
O'Donnell, G. (1996) Illusions and conceptual flaws. Journal of Democracy 7, 160-168. Tordoff, W. (Ed) (1974) Politics in Zambia. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
The December 1996 General Elections in Ghana Joseph R A Ayee Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana
Introduction Ghana is one of the few countries in Africa that has had significant experiences with democratic political life. It operated as a democracy during the pre-independence internal self-rule period, 1951-1957, during the early post independence period, 1957-1960, before succumbing to oneparty dictatorship, and during two brief renewals of civilian, constitutional government, October 1969-January 1972 and September 1979-December 1981. Ghana has also experienced prolonged periods of military dictatorship in the last few decades, under the National Liberation Council (NLC) from February 1966-October 1969; National Redemption/Supreme Military Council (NRC/SMC) from January 1972-June 1979; the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) from June 1979-September 1979 and under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government from 31 December 198 l-6 January 1993. Despite the prolonged periods of military rule, there are important social and political forces embedded in the fabric of Ghanaian society that support democratic government. In November 1992, the PNDC government held multi-party presidential elections to return the country to constitutional rule. It was won by Flt. Lt. J. J. Rawlings' National Democratic Congress (NDC). Although international observers, like the Commonwealth Observer Group (COG), declared the elections as 'free and fair', the outcome of the democratic transition was highly disputed by four opposition parties, namely, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), People's National Convention (PNC), National Independence Party (NIP) and People's Heritage Party (PHP). Consequently, the legitimacy and moral authority of the whole democratic transition and the new democratic institutions were cast in doubt. Indeed, the opposition parties were so enraged at what they considered the unfair electoral environment, PNDC control over the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) and voter registration and manipulation of the presidential elections themselves that they decided to boycott the parliamentary elections in December 1992. As a consequence, during Ghana's first 4 years of its fourth attempt to establish constitutional government, the government party, the NDC virtually controlled all (189 out of the 200) seats in parliament.