- Email: [email protected]
No change in Uruguay: the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 20 (2001) 643–659
649
El Mercurio Electro´ nico. 2000, 6 January. Ercilla, 2000, 7–20 February, 130. Gideon, R., Sznajder, M., 1998. Electoral engineering in Chile: The electoral system and limited democracy. Electoral Studies 17 (4), 429–442. La Tercera, 2000. 12 January; http://www.latercera.cl Plumb, D., 1998. El Partido por la Democracia: The birth of Chile’s postmaterialist catch-all left. Party Politics 4 (1), 93–106. The Guardian, 2000, 18 January. 0261-3794/01/$ - see front matter 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 2 6 1 - 3 7 9 4 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 5 6 - 1
No change in Uruguay: the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections Roberto Espı´ndola
*
Department of European Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford BD7 1DP, UK
The first round of Uruguay’s presidential election on 31 October 1999 produced an unprecedented result. Tabare´ Va´ zquez, candidate of the centre–left coalition Encuentro Progresista–Frente Amplio (EP–FA), won a plurality of votes, but fell short of outright victory. Therefore, for the first time in a Uruguayan presidential contest, a second round was held, on 28 November 1999. This returned a no-change verdict, with the presidency remaining in the hands of the Partido Colorado (PC). Finally successful in his fifth attempt to become President, Jorge Batlle led a centre– right coalition to victory over Va´ zquez, by 54.1% to 45.9%. The elections were also characterised by a very high turnout: 91.8% of the electorate went to the polls. The success of EP–FA in the first round led to frantic negotiations between traditional rivals on the right, the PC and the Partido Nacional (PN).1 The dealing and discussion continued right up to the date of the second round; finally the coalition was able to block Va´ zquez’s path to the presidency. Despite their ultimate defeat, these were the best results for the centre–left since 1971. The EP–FA won 40 out of 99 seats in the lower house, the Chamber of Depu-
* Tel.: +44-1274-233823; fax:+44-1274-235550. E-mail address: [email protected] (R. Espı´ndola). 1 Those following the PN are also known as blancos (whites) as opposed to the PN’s colorados (Reds).
650
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ties. However, although the centre–left Nuevo Espacio (NE) won four seats and could arrive at an understanding with EP–FA, the right still controls the lower house with 33 PC and 22 PN deputies. The distribution of Senate seats is similar: the EP–FA is the largest party, with 12 seats, but can be outvoted if the PC (10 seats) and PN (7 seats) combine. The NE won the single remaining seat of the 30-member Senate.
1. The parties Since the end of military dictatorship in 1984, the main parties in Uruguay have been the PC, the PN, and the EP–FA. The ruling PC is largely a liberal and secular party, relying mainly on urban support, whilst their traditional PN rivals represent a more conservative option, closely associated with rural areas and the Catholic church. The EP–FA has its origins in the 1971 Frente Amplio (FA) electoral alliance of Christian democrats, socialists and communists. In 1984, the Christian democrats left the FA; ten years later, a broad centre–left coalition was re-established as EP– FA, choosing the mayor of Montevideo and FA leader, Tabare´ Va´ zquez, as their presidential candidate. The principal new party, the NE, is a centre–left group with a social democratic outlook. It is led and controlled by senator Rafael Michelini, the son of a victim of the military regime.
2. The new electoral system The elections took place under the new electoral system established by the constitutional reform of 1996.2 Until 1996, political parties were entitled to put forward several presidential candidates, under the system of ‘banners’ and ‘sub-banners’ (lemas and sublemas) known as double simultaneous voting (DSV). Factions (subbanners) within a party could present their own candidates under the party’s registered banner, and voters could then mark a preference both for a party and for a candidate. Under this plurality system, the party that achieved—from the sum of its candidates’ votes—the plurality at the national level would win the election, and the candidate from this party with the highest number of preferences would become President. Thus it was possible for a candidate with the largest personal vote not to win the presidency, if his or her party accumulates a total vote lower than that of another party.3 A PR version of the same system was applied at parliamentary and local government elections, which were held on the same day as the presidential ones. However, the system explicitly prevented ticket-splitting. The DSV system—which still applies to Senate and local government elections— still has its advocates. They argue that it produces a two-party system, thus facilitating competition between broad-based coalitions, such as the EP–FA, or umbrella
2 3
The ninth reform of the constitution that in 1830 established a presidential regime in Uruguay. See Blais and Massicote (1996, p. 53).
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651
parties, such as the traditional PC and PN. It is also argued to serve the purpose of a primary election, since the electorate at the same time selects a party and one of the alternatives offered by faction of that party. Critics of the system counter that it lacks democratic transparency, since policy and ideological differences between factions may be very wide, and voters may end up aiding a candidate vastly different from the one that they actually supported. Another criticism is that the banner system promotes factionalism within parties, although arguably it simply reflects rather than causes such divisions. Under the new electoral system, a political party or coalition must now choose its presidential candidate via a primary, six months before the election. Candidates nominated can then choose their running mates for the vice-presidency. At the presidential election, any slate winning over 50% of the first-round vote is elected; otherwise, the two slates with the most votes in the first round fight a second round four weeks later. The 1996 reform was largely prompted by the growth of the EP–FA vote, which at the 1994 elections led to an almost exact three-way split between the main parties: the EP–FA (30.6%) and the PN (31.2%) were very close behind the victorious PC (32.7%). Those supporting the reform argued that a two-round system would allow the traditional right-wing parties to join forces if necessary in the second round, thus preventing a centre–left victory. Another argument pointed to the need to give the President greater parliamentary support, by promoting broad electoral coalitions. The pre-1996 system meant that the President could only count on the parliamentary support of his own faction, having constantly to negotiate for support from other factions from within his own party, or from the opposition benches. The reform has certainly forced parties to engage in internal negotiation over their programmes and prospective presidential candidates. By contrast, until 1996, a party could avoid such difficult decisions by allowing all factions to nominate candidates to stand under its banner, with all their votes counting towards the party’s total and voters’ preferences determining which of the candidates was to hold the seat.
3. Presidential primaries All the parties and coalitions held primary elections on 25 April 1999. Overall, the primary campaigns managed to mobilise 53.7% of the electorate. According to the 1996 electoral reform, in order to win a party’s presidential nomination a candidate must win either a majority in the primary, or at least 40% of the vote provided that the nearest challenger is at least 10 percentage points adrift. If neither condition is met, then the choice is left to the party’s national convention. Ideological divisions and personality clashes marked the PN primary, in which five prospective candidates competed: former President Luis Alberto Lacalle, former interior minister Juan Andre´ s Ramı´rez, former foreign secretary Alvaro Ramos, former PN president Alberto Volonte´ , and deputy Alan Garcı´a. In the end, the primary became a two-way contest between Lacalle and Ramı´rez. The former was identified with neo-liberal economic policies, but his policy stances continued to be over-
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shadowed by (unproven) accusations of corruption dating from his period in office (1989–94). Ramı´rez’s platform was based on decentralisation and social justice, and he had the support of provincial governors. In the primary poll, Lacalle won with 48.2% of the votes, comfortably ahead of the 32.2% polled by Ramı´rez. But the acrimony of the primaries’ campaign left the PN bitter and divided; Ramı´rez, backed up by his centrist supporters, turned down the offer to stand for the vice-presidency, and Lacalle had to settle for his former foreign secretary, Sergio Abreu, as a running mate. For the EP–FA, a key problem was the role and complex composition of the FA. Within the wider coalition, the FA is itself formed by eight different groups or organised tendencies, ranging from the moderate, centre–left Asamblea Uruguay led by Senator Danilo Astori, to the left where the Partido Socialista, Partido Comunista, and Corriente de Izquierda represent two-thirds of FA members. In late November 1998, the FA’s national convention had decided, by a vote of 96.2%, to nominate Tabare´ Va´ zquez as the FA candidate for the EP–FA primaries. However, after much wrangling, the FA decided to allow Astori to stand in the primaries. The other members of the EP–FA, two Christian democratic groups, were expected to support Astori, who claimed that this potential to attract moderate voters gave him the best chance of a second-round victory. Nonetheless, the EP–FA result was never in doubt and Va´ zquez had no difficulty in getting the nomination, winning 82.4% of the votes. Just as with the PN, the choice of vice-presidential candidate reflected the bitterness of the primary campaign. Va´ zquez refused to offer the post to Astori, giving it instead to Rodolfo Nin, the leader of the Christian democrats. Unlike the PN and EP–FA, the ruling PC used the primary to its advantage, despite being split into two major factions, both equally strong. The crucial difference was that the PC primary involved mainly a choice between candidates, rather than rival ideologies or policy stances. The confrontation was between the Foro Batllista, controlled by incumbent President Julio Marı´a Sanguinetti, and the Lista 15 group, led by Jorge Batlle. Although Batlle was at the time just a senator, he was nevertheless a very familiar figure, as the son, grand-nephew and great-grandson of former Presidents and PC leaders, and, of course, as a previous candidate for Uruguay’s presidency. Sanguinetti sought a candidate who would ensure the continuity of his administration and his policies, particularly the opening up of the economy to international trade. Accordingly, he chose his interior minister, Luis Hierro, who resigned his portfolio to fight the primary. Hierro ran a sophisticated campaign, with a message and symbols that appealed not only to PC voters but also to a much wider audience. Batlle’s campaign, in contrast, appealed mainly to the traditional PC voter. He abandoned the programmatic approach taken in 1994, preferring instead an emphasis on his family background and personal qualities. He avoided a confrontational tone and defended the achievements of the Sanguinetti administration. His campaign targeted floating voters, particularly those less informed about politics who were thought to be more influenced by the campaign. By mid-April 1999, a week before the primaries, opinion polls placed both Batlle and Hierro at about 48%, but anticipated a Hierro victory by a small margin. This
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653
predicted result did not materialise. Batlle won the nomination with 55.1% of the vote. Hierro polled 44.9%. As soon as the results were announced, Batlle offered Hierro the vice-presidential slot, which was accepted after some persuasion from President Sanguinetti. Opinion pollsters’ difficulties in anticipating the results of the primaries may have been due to a large proportion of the electorate—some one-fifth, according to the Factum national survey of May 1999—making up their mind within the last week of the campaign. The same survey suggested that, amongst last-minute PC voters, some 60% chose Batlle.
4. The campaign and results Once the candidates had been selected, the presidential campaign quickly became a two-horse race between Batlle and Va´ zquez. The primary campaign had already gone a long way towards establishing the image and approach of each candidate. Batlle’s highly personalised campaign contrasted with Va´ zquez’s emphasis on his reputation as an efficient and responsive mayor of Montevideo. Lacalle had difficulties in differentiating himself from the Sanguinetti administration that the PN had supported, while also defending the controversial record of his own period in office. Lacalle and Batlle, as members of the previous government, both claimed to represent policy continuity, particularly since Sanguinetti’s fiscal, exchange, and foreign policies met with general support amongst their (respective) natural constituencies. The key difference was that Batlle, without expressing any major disagreement with President Sanguinetti, centered the PC’s campaign around his own personality. Meanwhile, Lacalle could not shake off the image, generated by the primary, of a deeply and bitterly divided PN. Va´ zquez was the clear winner of the first round with 40.1% of the vote (see Table 1). Lacalle was the principal loser, with 22.3%, much lower than the 31.2% support for the PN in 1994. The campaign for the second round began as soon as the results of the first emerged, with both Batlle and Va´ zquez seeking out support and votes from unsuccessful candidates. Va´ zquez could confidently count on NE support, but Table 1 Distribution of votes in Uruguay’s presidential elections, 31 October and 28 November 1999
Tabare´ Va´ zquez (EP–FA) Jorge Batlle (PC) Luis Alberto Lacalle (PN) Rafael Michelini (NE) Luis Pieri (Unio´ n Cı´vica) Total
First round Votes (%)
Second round Votes (%)
40.1 32.8 22.3 4.6 0.2 100.0
45.9 54.1
Sources: Electoral Court, and La Repu´ blica (1999, 4 December).
100.0
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the key to second round victory was the PN vote. Batlle was able to negotiate the support of the PN leadership, but that was not necessarily enough to ensure that their voters would follow them and support their traditional rivals. A belligerent campaign ensued, with Batlle taking the offensive and seeking to scare PN voters away from the EP–FA candidate. He accused Va´ zquez of being a Marxist who would tax wage-earners, pensioners, the professional middle class, saving-account holders, and small entrepreneurs. Va´ zquez had campaigned very effectively in the first round, focusing on the crisis affecting the economy and the rising levels of unemployment. He promised not only change but ‘Uruguayan-style change’ (Cambio a la uruguaya), implying that it would take place gradually and in a context of moderation and tolerance. In the second round, he added an emphasis on inclusiveness, making much use of Uruguay’s flag. This was insufficient to counter Batlle’s negative campaigning, and Va´ zquez was forced onto the defensive, being obliged to deny plans for massive new taxes (Cardarello, 2000). The effectiveness of Batlle’s tactics is clearly illustrated by the fact that, in the second round, Va´ zquez received barely more than his first-round vote plus those from the EN. Both rounds were characterised by widespread participation: turnouts were high and surprisingly similar, with 91.78% of the registered electorate voting on the first round, and 91.76% on the second round.4 Spoilt and blank ballots accounted for just 3% of first round and 4.2% of second round votes.
5. Parliamentary results The parliamentary elections, held on the same date as the first round of the presidential poll, mirrored its results; because the system prevents ticket-splitting, the division of the votes in the parliamentary elections exactly matches the division in the presidential contest. The EP–FA became the largest political force in parliament, with a gain of nine seats in the lower chamber and three in the Senate. Again, these gains came principally at the PN’s expense: the latter lost nine seats in the Chamber of Deputies and three in the Senate (see Table 2). On the other hand, a coalition government with PN participation could in theory count on a parliamentary majority, except in making key appointments and special laws that require more than a simple majority. But that would ignore the fractionalised nature of Uruguayan party politics, shown in the greater identification of parliamentarians with the faction or sub-banner under which they were elected than with their party. Whilst there were just five presidential candidates, the five parties or alliances nominating them presented 32 different lists or sub-banners for the parliamentary elections, some as national lists, other at the departmental level: the EP–FA presented
4
The number of votes cast on the first round was of 2,204,662, as compared with 2,204,174 on the second, according to final figures issued by the Electoral Court on 4 December 1999; the total electorate was of 2,402,160 for both rounds.
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655
Table 2 Distribution of parliamentary seats following elections of 31 October 1999
Encuentro Progresista–Frente Amplio Partido Colorado Partido Nacional Nuevo Espacio Total
Chamber of Deputies Seats
Senate Seats
40 33 22 4 99
12 10 7 1 30
Source: La Repu´ blica (1999, 2 November).
12 lists, the PC six, the PN six, NE three and even the minute Unio´ n Cı´vica presented five. Not all are represented in the new congress, but there is sufficient fragmentation to make coalition-building a complex task. The EP–FA success in the parliamentary elections also reflected their strongest ever showing in the provinces. The centre–left coalition won 51.8% of the votes cast in Montevideo, its traditional stronghold, but for the first time it won in the second most important department, Canelones, as well as in the departments of Paysandu´ and Maldonado. Until these elections, the PC and PN had controlled more than 80% of the provincial vote; now the EP–FA won 28.5% of that vote, compared to the PC’s 33.7% and the PN’s 30%. Within the EP–FA, the greatest success was enjoyed by the socialist Espacio 90 list: it won the plurality of EP–FA votes in 11 departments (including Montevideo), and doubled its parliamentary representation, winning fourteen of the forty EP–FA seats in the Chamber of Deputies (up from seven in 1994) and four of the twelve EP–FA senatorial benches (up from two in 1994). The moderate Asamblea Uruguay remained the second strongest force within the EP–FA, yet it lost seats, going from 17 deputies and four senators in 1994 to seven deputies and two senators in 1999. While Asamblea Uruguay may have paid a price for its leader’s insistence on competing with Va´ squez for the presidential nomination, the Christian democratic list Alianza Progresista benefited from Rodolfo Nin’s stand as Va´ squez’s running mate: Nin’s election gave the party their first ever senator, and they won five seats in the Chamber of Deputies, a gain of four on 1994. Five of the EP–FA lists failed to win any parliamentary representation. The main loser in the parliamentary election was the traditional PN, which saw its representation fall to 22 deputies and seven senators, compared with 31 and 10 respectively in 1994. The results showed the conservative Herrerista faction, led by presidential candidate Luis Alberto Lacalle, to be dominant: it supplied five of the PN’s seven senators and 18 of its 22 deputies. The centre–right Alianza Nacional list was left with a meagre representation of two senators and four deputies, despite having received almost a third of the PN’s votes. The unity shown within the PC in support of its presidential candidate, Jorge Batlle, was not in evidence in the parliamentary polls. The Foro Batllista faction, led by former President Julio Marı´a Sanguinetti, won in 11 departments, whilst Jorge
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Batlle’s faction, Lista 15, won in eight (including Montevideo). Although Lista 15 actually won slightly more votes than Foro, the territorial distribution of those votes was such that, of the 32 PC seats in the lower house, 18 went to Foro and only 15 to the new President’s Lista 15. Whilst there are no major ideological differences between the PC’s main factions, there are notable policy differences. Foro defends former President Sanguinetti’s relatively moderate economic policies and his support for the regional trading bloc Mercosur, whilst Lista 15 backs Jorge Batlle’s neoliberal policies, including the capping of public spending and the privatisation of some public services. The parliamentary election results demonstrate that the 1996 electoral reforms have served to weaken the presidency. The DSV system, for all its faults, did at least ensure that a President’s faction would have some degree of dominance within its own party, and that the President’s party would have the largest number of seats in parliament. Under the 1996 electoral reforms, the President’s party may not have a plurality in parliament, since a candidate with the most first-round votes (and hence obtaining a parliamentary plurality) may lose the presidency in the second round. The primaries, held six months ahead of the presidential and parliamentary election, also imply that the candidate nominated may not represent the faction that emerges as dominant at the parliamentary polls (Buquet, 2000). That is clearly what happened at the 1999 elections. Jorge Batlle won the nomination in April, but his faction accounts for a minority of the PC’s parliamentary seats. President Batlle can only count on fifteen deputies and four senators, and will have to negotiate for the other parliamentary votes that he needs. The PN supports him at present, and is likely to remain within a governing coalition. But, as the next elections approach, the PN will grow reluctant to remain the junior partner in government, and will seek to reassert its freedom of action and its separate identity, in order to avoid a repetition of the 1999 results. Furthermore, the PC–PN support for the government is unlikely to be monolithic. Centre–right factions such as the PC’s Foro Batllista or the PN’s Alianza Nacional will continue to oppose major privatisations, or any search for trading alliances outside Mercosur. Alianza Nacional’s support for social justice and decentralisation may even lead them to vote with the opposition, bringing the latter close to a majority in the Senate. Thus, expectations of stability in government may yet prove premature.
6. Conclusions The results show that the tendency to bipolarity continues to characterise Uruguayan politics, even when the principal actors swap roles. The centre–left has now become one of the main poles, and the traditional parties of the right and centre– right have had to form a coalition that could continue to erode their individual identities. This has already forced President Batlle into some concessions. Whilst he continues to advocate the legal enforcement of limits on public spending, and the privatisation of public services, he has moderated his proposal to seek a link with Nafta as a potential alternative to Mercosur.
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Although at first sight it might appear that President Batlle could easily govern with the parliamentary support of his party and the PN, the factional nature of Uruguay’s party politics means that he can only rely on the support of his own Lista 15 faction in parliament. Other sources of support cannot be counted on, and, like so much in Uruguayan politics, are subject to negotiations.
References Blais, A., Massicote, L., 1996. Electoral systems. In: LeDuc, L., Niemi, R., Norris, P. (Eds.), Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Globl Perspective. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Buquet, D. 2000. Uruguay: la novedad de seguir igual. Nueva Sociedad 166. Cardarello, S., 2000. Efectos de las nuevas reglas sobre las estrategias electorales: Uruguay 1999–2000 una campan˜ a de cuatro estaciones. Paper presented at the 18th World Congress of IPSA, Quebec. La Repu´ blica, 1999. 2, 29 November, 2 December. 0261-3794/01/$ - see front matter 2001 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. PII: S 0 2 6 1 - 3 7 9 4 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 5 7 - 3
649
El Mercurio Electro´ nico. 2000, 6 January. Ercilla, 2000, 7–20 February, 130. Gideon, R., Sznajder, M., 1998. Electoral engineering in Chile: The electoral system and limited democracy. Electoral Studies 17 (4), 429–442. La Tercera, 2000. 12 January; http://www.latercera.cl Plumb, D., 1998. El Partido por la Democracia: The birth of Chile’s postmaterialist catch-all left. Party Politics 4 (1), 93–106. The Guardian, 2000, 18 January. 0261-3794/01/$ - see front matter 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 2 6 1 - 3 7 9 4 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 5 6 - 1
No change in Uruguay: the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections Roberto Espı´ndola
*
Department of European Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford BD7 1DP, UK
The first round of Uruguay’s presidential election on 31 October 1999 produced an unprecedented result. Tabare´ Va´ zquez, candidate of the centre–left coalition Encuentro Progresista–Frente Amplio (EP–FA), won a plurality of votes, but fell short of outright victory. Therefore, for the first time in a Uruguayan presidential contest, a second round was held, on 28 November 1999. This returned a no-change verdict, with the presidency remaining in the hands of the Partido Colorado (PC). Finally successful in his fifth attempt to become President, Jorge Batlle led a centre– right coalition to victory over Va´ zquez, by 54.1% to 45.9%. The elections were also characterised by a very high turnout: 91.8% of the electorate went to the polls. The success of EP–FA in the first round led to frantic negotiations between traditional rivals on the right, the PC and the Partido Nacional (PN).1 The dealing and discussion continued right up to the date of the second round; finally the coalition was able to block Va´ zquez’s path to the presidency. Despite their ultimate defeat, these were the best results for the centre–left since 1971. The EP–FA won 40 out of 99 seats in the lower house, the Chamber of Depu-
* Tel.: +44-1274-233823; fax:+44-1274-235550. E-mail address: [email protected] (R. Espı´ndola). 1 Those following the PN are also known as blancos (whites) as opposed to the PN’s colorados (Reds).
650
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 20 (2001) 643–659
ties. However, although the centre–left Nuevo Espacio (NE) won four seats and could arrive at an understanding with EP–FA, the right still controls the lower house with 33 PC and 22 PN deputies. The distribution of Senate seats is similar: the EP–FA is the largest party, with 12 seats, but can be outvoted if the PC (10 seats) and PN (7 seats) combine. The NE won the single remaining seat of the 30-member Senate.
1. The parties Since the end of military dictatorship in 1984, the main parties in Uruguay have been the PC, the PN, and the EP–FA. The ruling PC is largely a liberal and secular party, relying mainly on urban support, whilst their traditional PN rivals represent a more conservative option, closely associated with rural areas and the Catholic church. The EP–FA has its origins in the 1971 Frente Amplio (FA) electoral alliance of Christian democrats, socialists and communists. In 1984, the Christian democrats left the FA; ten years later, a broad centre–left coalition was re-established as EP– FA, choosing the mayor of Montevideo and FA leader, Tabare´ Va´ zquez, as their presidential candidate. The principal new party, the NE, is a centre–left group with a social democratic outlook. It is led and controlled by senator Rafael Michelini, the son of a victim of the military regime.
2. The new electoral system The elections took place under the new electoral system established by the constitutional reform of 1996.2 Until 1996, political parties were entitled to put forward several presidential candidates, under the system of ‘banners’ and ‘sub-banners’ (lemas and sublemas) known as double simultaneous voting (DSV). Factions (subbanners) within a party could present their own candidates under the party’s registered banner, and voters could then mark a preference both for a party and for a candidate. Under this plurality system, the party that achieved—from the sum of its candidates’ votes—the plurality at the national level would win the election, and the candidate from this party with the highest number of preferences would become President. Thus it was possible for a candidate with the largest personal vote not to win the presidency, if his or her party accumulates a total vote lower than that of another party.3 A PR version of the same system was applied at parliamentary and local government elections, which were held on the same day as the presidential ones. However, the system explicitly prevented ticket-splitting. The DSV system—which still applies to Senate and local government elections— still has its advocates. They argue that it produces a two-party system, thus facilitating competition between broad-based coalitions, such as the EP–FA, or umbrella
2 3
The ninth reform of the constitution that in 1830 established a presidential regime in Uruguay. See Blais and Massicote (1996, p. 53).
Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 20 (2001) 643–659
651
parties, such as the traditional PC and PN. It is also argued to serve the purpose of a primary election, since the electorate at the same time selects a party and one of the alternatives offered by faction of that party. Critics of the system counter that it lacks democratic transparency, since policy and ideological differences between factions may be very wide, and voters may end up aiding a candidate vastly different from the one that they actually supported. Another criticism is that the banner system promotes factionalism within parties, although arguably it simply reflects rather than causes such divisions. Under the new electoral system, a political party or coalition must now choose its presidential candidate via a primary, six months before the election. Candidates nominated can then choose their running mates for the vice-presidency. At the presidential election, any slate winning over 50% of the first-round vote is elected; otherwise, the two slates with the most votes in the first round fight a second round four weeks later. The 1996 reform was largely prompted by the growth of the EP–FA vote, which at the 1994 elections led to an almost exact three-way split between the main parties: the EP–FA (30.6%) and the PN (31.2%) were very close behind the victorious PC (32.7%). Those supporting the reform argued that a two-round system would allow the traditional right-wing parties to join forces if necessary in the second round, thus preventing a centre–left victory. Another argument pointed to the need to give the President greater parliamentary support, by promoting broad electoral coalitions. The pre-1996 system meant that the President could only count on the parliamentary support of his own faction, having constantly to negotiate for support from other factions from within his own party, or from the opposition benches. The reform has certainly forced parties to engage in internal negotiation over their programmes and prospective presidential candidates. By contrast, until 1996, a party could avoid such difficult decisions by allowing all factions to nominate candidates to stand under its banner, with all their votes counting towards the party’s total and voters’ preferences determining which of the candidates was to hold the seat.
3. Presidential primaries All the parties and coalitions held primary elections on 25 April 1999. Overall, the primary campaigns managed to mobilise 53.7% of the electorate. According to the 1996 electoral reform, in order to win a party’s presidential nomination a candidate must win either a majority in the primary, or at least 40% of the vote provided that the nearest challenger is at least 10 percentage points adrift. If neither condition is met, then the choice is left to the party’s national convention. Ideological divisions and personality clashes marked the PN primary, in which five prospective candidates competed: former President Luis Alberto Lacalle, former interior minister Juan Andre´ s Ramı´rez, former foreign secretary Alvaro Ramos, former PN president Alberto Volonte´ , and deputy Alan Garcı´a. In the end, the primary became a two-way contest between Lacalle and Ramı´rez. The former was identified with neo-liberal economic policies, but his policy stances continued to be over-
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shadowed by (unproven) accusations of corruption dating from his period in office (1989–94). Ramı´rez’s platform was based on decentralisation and social justice, and he had the support of provincial governors. In the primary poll, Lacalle won with 48.2% of the votes, comfortably ahead of the 32.2% polled by Ramı´rez. But the acrimony of the primaries’ campaign left the PN bitter and divided; Ramı´rez, backed up by his centrist supporters, turned down the offer to stand for the vice-presidency, and Lacalle had to settle for his former foreign secretary, Sergio Abreu, as a running mate. For the EP–FA, a key problem was the role and complex composition of the FA. Within the wider coalition, the FA is itself formed by eight different groups or organised tendencies, ranging from the moderate, centre–left Asamblea Uruguay led by Senator Danilo Astori, to the left where the Partido Socialista, Partido Comunista, and Corriente de Izquierda represent two-thirds of FA members. In late November 1998, the FA’s national convention had decided, by a vote of 96.2%, to nominate Tabare´ Va´ zquez as the FA candidate for the EP–FA primaries. However, after much wrangling, the FA decided to allow Astori to stand in the primaries. The other members of the EP–FA, two Christian democratic groups, were expected to support Astori, who claimed that this potential to attract moderate voters gave him the best chance of a second-round victory. Nonetheless, the EP–FA result was never in doubt and Va´ zquez had no difficulty in getting the nomination, winning 82.4% of the votes. Just as with the PN, the choice of vice-presidential candidate reflected the bitterness of the primary campaign. Va´ zquez refused to offer the post to Astori, giving it instead to Rodolfo Nin, the leader of the Christian democrats. Unlike the PN and EP–FA, the ruling PC used the primary to its advantage, despite being split into two major factions, both equally strong. The crucial difference was that the PC primary involved mainly a choice between candidates, rather than rival ideologies or policy stances. The confrontation was between the Foro Batllista, controlled by incumbent President Julio Marı´a Sanguinetti, and the Lista 15 group, led by Jorge Batlle. Although Batlle was at the time just a senator, he was nevertheless a very familiar figure, as the son, grand-nephew and great-grandson of former Presidents and PC leaders, and, of course, as a previous candidate for Uruguay’s presidency. Sanguinetti sought a candidate who would ensure the continuity of his administration and his policies, particularly the opening up of the economy to international trade. Accordingly, he chose his interior minister, Luis Hierro, who resigned his portfolio to fight the primary. Hierro ran a sophisticated campaign, with a message and symbols that appealed not only to PC voters but also to a much wider audience. Batlle’s campaign, in contrast, appealed mainly to the traditional PC voter. He abandoned the programmatic approach taken in 1994, preferring instead an emphasis on his family background and personal qualities. He avoided a confrontational tone and defended the achievements of the Sanguinetti administration. His campaign targeted floating voters, particularly those less informed about politics who were thought to be more influenced by the campaign. By mid-April 1999, a week before the primaries, opinion polls placed both Batlle and Hierro at about 48%, but anticipated a Hierro victory by a small margin. This
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predicted result did not materialise. Batlle won the nomination with 55.1% of the vote. Hierro polled 44.9%. As soon as the results were announced, Batlle offered Hierro the vice-presidential slot, which was accepted after some persuasion from President Sanguinetti. Opinion pollsters’ difficulties in anticipating the results of the primaries may have been due to a large proportion of the electorate—some one-fifth, according to the Factum national survey of May 1999—making up their mind within the last week of the campaign. The same survey suggested that, amongst last-minute PC voters, some 60% chose Batlle.
4. The campaign and results Once the candidates had been selected, the presidential campaign quickly became a two-horse race between Batlle and Va´ zquez. The primary campaign had already gone a long way towards establishing the image and approach of each candidate. Batlle’s highly personalised campaign contrasted with Va´ zquez’s emphasis on his reputation as an efficient and responsive mayor of Montevideo. Lacalle had difficulties in differentiating himself from the Sanguinetti administration that the PN had supported, while also defending the controversial record of his own period in office. Lacalle and Batlle, as members of the previous government, both claimed to represent policy continuity, particularly since Sanguinetti’s fiscal, exchange, and foreign policies met with general support amongst their (respective) natural constituencies. The key difference was that Batlle, without expressing any major disagreement with President Sanguinetti, centered the PC’s campaign around his own personality. Meanwhile, Lacalle could not shake off the image, generated by the primary, of a deeply and bitterly divided PN. Va´ zquez was the clear winner of the first round with 40.1% of the vote (see Table 1). Lacalle was the principal loser, with 22.3%, much lower than the 31.2% support for the PN in 1994. The campaign for the second round began as soon as the results of the first emerged, with both Batlle and Va´ zquez seeking out support and votes from unsuccessful candidates. Va´ zquez could confidently count on NE support, but Table 1 Distribution of votes in Uruguay’s presidential elections, 31 October and 28 November 1999
Tabare´ Va´ zquez (EP–FA) Jorge Batlle (PC) Luis Alberto Lacalle (PN) Rafael Michelini (NE) Luis Pieri (Unio´ n Cı´vica) Total
First round Votes (%)
Second round Votes (%)
40.1 32.8 22.3 4.6 0.2 100.0
45.9 54.1
Sources: Electoral Court, and La Repu´ blica (1999, 4 December).
100.0
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the key to second round victory was the PN vote. Batlle was able to negotiate the support of the PN leadership, but that was not necessarily enough to ensure that their voters would follow them and support their traditional rivals. A belligerent campaign ensued, with Batlle taking the offensive and seeking to scare PN voters away from the EP–FA candidate. He accused Va´ zquez of being a Marxist who would tax wage-earners, pensioners, the professional middle class, saving-account holders, and small entrepreneurs. Va´ zquez had campaigned very effectively in the first round, focusing on the crisis affecting the economy and the rising levels of unemployment. He promised not only change but ‘Uruguayan-style change’ (Cambio a la uruguaya), implying that it would take place gradually and in a context of moderation and tolerance. In the second round, he added an emphasis on inclusiveness, making much use of Uruguay’s flag. This was insufficient to counter Batlle’s negative campaigning, and Va´ zquez was forced onto the defensive, being obliged to deny plans for massive new taxes (Cardarello, 2000). The effectiveness of Batlle’s tactics is clearly illustrated by the fact that, in the second round, Va´ zquez received barely more than his first-round vote plus those from the EN. Both rounds were characterised by widespread participation: turnouts were high and surprisingly similar, with 91.78% of the registered electorate voting on the first round, and 91.76% on the second round.4 Spoilt and blank ballots accounted for just 3% of first round and 4.2% of second round votes.
5. Parliamentary results The parliamentary elections, held on the same date as the first round of the presidential poll, mirrored its results; because the system prevents ticket-splitting, the division of the votes in the parliamentary elections exactly matches the division in the presidential contest. The EP–FA became the largest political force in parliament, with a gain of nine seats in the lower chamber and three in the Senate. Again, these gains came principally at the PN’s expense: the latter lost nine seats in the Chamber of Deputies and three in the Senate (see Table 2). On the other hand, a coalition government with PN participation could in theory count on a parliamentary majority, except in making key appointments and special laws that require more than a simple majority. But that would ignore the fractionalised nature of Uruguayan party politics, shown in the greater identification of parliamentarians with the faction or sub-banner under which they were elected than with their party. Whilst there were just five presidential candidates, the five parties or alliances nominating them presented 32 different lists or sub-banners for the parliamentary elections, some as national lists, other at the departmental level: the EP–FA presented
4
The number of votes cast on the first round was of 2,204,662, as compared with 2,204,174 on the second, according to final figures issued by the Electoral Court on 4 December 1999; the total electorate was of 2,402,160 for both rounds.
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Table 2 Distribution of parliamentary seats following elections of 31 October 1999
Encuentro Progresista–Frente Amplio Partido Colorado Partido Nacional Nuevo Espacio Total
Chamber of Deputies Seats
Senate Seats
40 33 22 4 99
12 10 7 1 30
Source: La Repu´ blica (1999, 2 November).
12 lists, the PC six, the PN six, NE three and even the minute Unio´ n Cı´vica presented five. Not all are represented in the new congress, but there is sufficient fragmentation to make coalition-building a complex task. The EP–FA success in the parliamentary elections also reflected their strongest ever showing in the provinces. The centre–left coalition won 51.8% of the votes cast in Montevideo, its traditional stronghold, but for the first time it won in the second most important department, Canelones, as well as in the departments of Paysandu´ and Maldonado. Until these elections, the PC and PN had controlled more than 80% of the provincial vote; now the EP–FA won 28.5% of that vote, compared to the PC’s 33.7% and the PN’s 30%. Within the EP–FA, the greatest success was enjoyed by the socialist Espacio 90 list: it won the plurality of EP–FA votes in 11 departments (including Montevideo), and doubled its parliamentary representation, winning fourteen of the forty EP–FA seats in the Chamber of Deputies (up from seven in 1994) and four of the twelve EP–FA senatorial benches (up from two in 1994). The moderate Asamblea Uruguay remained the second strongest force within the EP–FA, yet it lost seats, going from 17 deputies and four senators in 1994 to seven deputies and two senators in 1999. While Asamblea Uruguay may have paid a price for its leader’s insistence on competing with Va´ squez for the presidential nomination, the Christian democratic list Alianza Progresista benefited from Rodolfo Nin’s stand as Va´ squez’s running mate: Nin’s election gave the party their first ever senator, and they won five seats in the Chamber of Deputies, a gain of four on 1994. Five of the EP–FA lists failed to win any parliamentary representation. The main loser in the parliamentary election was the traditional PN, which saw its representation fall to 22 deputies and seven senators, compared with 31 and 10 respectively in 1994. The results showed the conservative Herrerista faction, led by presidential candidate Luis Alberto Lacalle, to be dominant: it supplied five of the PN’s seven senators and 18 of its 22 deputies. The centre–right Alianza Nacional list was left with a meagre representation of two senators and four deputies, despite having received almost a third of the PN’s votes. The unity shown within the PC in support of its presidential candidate, Jorge Batlle, was not in evidence in the parliamentary polls. The Foro Batllista faction, led by former President Julio Marı´a Sanguinetti, won in 11 departments, whilst Jorge
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Batlle’s faction, Lista 15, won in eight (including Montevideo). Although Lista 15 actually won slightly more votes than Foro, the territorial distribution of those votes was such that, of the 32 PC seats in the lower house, 18 went to Foro and only 15 to the new President’s Lista 15. Whilst there are no major ideological differences between the PC’s main factions, there are notable policy differences. Foro defends former President Sanguinetti’s relatively moderate economic policies and his support for the regional trading bloc Mercosur, whilst Lista 15 backs Jorge Batlle’s neoliberal policies, including the capping of public spending and the privatisation of some public services. The parliamentary election results demonstrate that the 1996 electoral reforms have served to weaken the presidency. The DSV system, for all its faults, did at least ensure that a President’s faction would have some degree of dominance within its own party, and that the President’s party would have the largest number of seats in parliament. Under the 1996 electoral reforms, the President’s party may not have a plurality in parliament, since a candidate with the most first-round votes (and hence obtaining a parliamentary plurality) may lose the presidency in the second round. The primaries, held six months ahead of the presidential and parliamentary election, also imply that the candidate nominated may not represent the faction that emerges as dominant at the parliamentary polls (Buquet, 2000). That is clearly what happened at the 1999 elections. Jorge Batlle won the nomination in April, but his faction accounts for a minority of the PC’s parliamentary seats. President Batlle can only count on fifteen deputies and four senators, and will have to negotiate for the other parliamentary votes that he needs. The PN supports him at present, and is likely to remain within a governing coalition. But, as the next elections approach, the PN will grow reluctant to remain the junior partner in government, and will seek to reassert its freedom of action and its separate identity, in order to avoid a repetition of the 1999 results. Furthermore, the PC–PN support for the government is unlikely to be monolithic. Centre–right factions such as the PC’s Foro Batllista or the PN’s Alianza Nacional will continue to oppose major privatisations, or any search for trading alliances outside Mercosur. Alianza Nacional’s support for social justice and decentralisation may even lead them to vote with the opposition, bringing the latter close to a majority in the Senate. Thus, expectations of stability in government may yet prove premature.
6. Conclusions The results show that the tendency to bipolarity continues to characterise Uruguayan politics, even when the principal actors swap roles. The centre–left has now become one of the main poles, and the traditional parties of the right and centre– right have had to form a coalition that could continue to erode their individual identities. This has already forced President Batlle into some concessions. Whilst he continues to advocate the legal enforcement of limits on public spending, and the privatisation of public services, he has moderated his proposal to seek a link with Nafta as a potential alternative to Mercosur.
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Although at first sight it might appear that President Batlle could easily govern with the parliamentary support of his party and the PN, the factional nature of Uruguay’s party politics means that he can only rely on the support of his own Lista 15 faction in parliament. Other sources of support cannot be counted on, and, like so much in Uruguayan politics, are subject to negotiations.
References Blais, A., Massicote, L., 1996. Electoral systems. In: LeDuc, L., Niemi, R., Norris, P. (Eds.), Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Globl Perspective. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. Buquet, D. 2000. Uruguay: la novedad de seguir igual. Nueva Sociedad 166. Cardarello, S., 2000. Efectos de las nuevas reglas sobre las estrategias electorales: Uruguay 1999–2000 una campan˜ a de cuatro estaciones. Paper presented at the 18th World Congress of IPSA, Quebec. La Repu´ blica, 1999. 2, 29 November, 2 December. 0261-3794/01/$ - see front matter 2001 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. PII: S 0 2 6 1 - 3 7 9 4 ( 0 0 ) 0 0 0 5 7 - 3