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Housing improvement and popular participation in the Upper Volta
Ql97-3975~sz!Qm;?os~u6SIa300/0 ‘3“ 1982 Pergamon Press Ltd.
Housing Improvement and Popular Participation in the Upper Volta Fracture
PFXSTER
Uuagadougou,
Upper Volta
INTRODUCTION Efforts ta improve housing conditions in the rapidly-gro~ng cities of the Third World are frequently confronted by the striking contrast between the incapacity of the responsible authorities to cope with this problem and the remarkable ingenuity and energy displayed by individual families in developing some sort of shelter and organising their survival despite hopelessly scanty resources. It is now increasingly recognised that such efforts deserve and require official support. In fact, it is more than mere humanitarian logic to organise popular participation in urban mass housing operations; it is the only viable programme for housing improvement in both rural and urban areas.
However, there are many economic and socio-cultural implications to this approach which may provoke extremely complex and delicate problems with societies in the process of rapid transition. It is hoped that the experience gained from the promotion of a People’s Savings and Credit Association (Caisse Populaire d’Epargne et de Credit) as a self-managed voluntary association at Cissin-~uagadougou in Upper Volta, as described in this paper, will assist others in dealing with the complex problems which may arise in organising the participation of the urban poor in improving their own environment.
Ouagadougou, the capital of Upper Volta with 250,000 inhabitants, is surrounded by a wide belt of spontaneous settlements sheltering 60% of the population, These areas are still administered according to traditional social systems of land tenure under which the land occupants enjoy no legally recognised security of tenure. Basic infrastructural services, either social or technical, are virtually non-existent. The mode of living resembles village life rather than city life, without any of the respective advantages of both. Hardships are pressed upon the people by the ever-increasing burden of an urban monetary economy; this being the main cause of problematic constraints to the residents being integrated into an urban context. The project
The “Project for Improving Living and Housing Conditions for Low Income Popuiatio~” was launched in i973 by the Government with technical cooperation by the United Nations. The main objectives were to assist low-income inhabitants of the spontaneous settlements to develop adequate housing by self-help, as well as to promote their gradual integration into the new urban monetary economy. The physical achievements of the project have already been analysed in other papers’ and are only briefly summarised here: (a) The development of a 615 plot site-and-service scheme at Cissin, known as the “Pilot Zone” where plots were allocated to selected low-income candidates. Most of these
‘See Hunm
Sertlements, Vol. VIII, Nos.
1 and 2, March/June 1978.
209
210
were dispiaced victims of eviction from other parts of the city, which made it difficult, at the beginning, to establish a socially coherent community.
(b) Secondly.
the on-the-spot upgrading (restructuring) of a ZSO-family area within a nearbv spontaneous settlement. Access ways and basic services were provided, while demolition was limited to a practicable rnininlu~ll. Finally, the newly-demarcated plots were officially registered in the name of their original occupants in accordance with modern legal procedures.
This latter aspect, providing security of land tenure for the residents, was found to be the most important motivation for their participation in the self-help aspects of the project. The success of this effort has induced the Government to expand this type of operation with financial assistance from the World Bank. It is. however. worth noting that this success was f~~c~lit~~tcdby the fact that. in contrast to the adjacent Pilot Zone coItl~lunity, the totality of the upgraded settlement population originated from the same viltages of the South Mossi territorv. They had been living at C&sin for a relatively long time under their traditional authorities and customs. This gave their community strong social cohesion. facilitating their mobilisation for popular participation.
In connection with the housing upgrading operation. a Savings and Credit Association was formed by the population of the spontaneous settlements - including the Pilot Zone. Most of the 20.000 inhabitants (about 4.000 families), had no access to any form of bank credit facilities because of the paucity and irregularity of their incomes. Some 50”;, were still rural peasants maintaining strong links with neighbouring farms and villages and thus were dependent upon seasonal cycles of employment. The others belonged mostly to the “informal” sector of economic activities. i.~. smallartisans or traders. However, a survey conducted by the Project led to the conclusion that most residents in the area would be able to take advantage of a real, though small, saving capacity that the systems in use simply did not allow them to exploit. Hence, the decision was made to establish a people-owned. self-managed, savings and credit association appropriately structured to grant small loans at affordable terms to its members. This was set up at the beginning of 1976 and developed during three missions by consultant Roger &tan. After the first year of operations nearly 4 million FCFA’ (about US$l6,000) had been accumulated by about 1,600 members. In order to respect the traditional pattern of land authorities - eight sub-areas (soussubdivision as still administered by customary yuor-ticus). including the Pilot Zone. were identified as ‘satellites‘ of the central organisation. Their respective members then elected a bureau whose main function was to collect savings. These were then deposited fortnightly at the National Savings Bank (Caisse Nationale d’Epargne CNE). A management committee of eight members was then elected and the Association officially registered by the Minister of the Interior. After an adequate period of capital accumulation, withdrawals were authorised under an adopted system of loan procedures.’ The total savings fund is now also used to finance or guarantee the financing of other related development schemes aimed at benefiting the particular community. Three such operations have been undertaken with various degrees of success: ~f’.swe~r curtsjbr the distribution oj’wter from the only standpipe serving the (21) PimIme whole settlement (proposed in order to stop existing exploitation in the sale of water). This enterprise quickly ran into difficulty when it appeared that it interfered with the existing ‘informal’ distribution system to which it brought only unproductive competition. It was finally abandoned, since the municipality was about to connect the area to the city water supply network.
’ FCFA = Franc Communatit~ Financikre Afrrcainc. ’ For example, if a member needs 50,000 FCFA, to roof his house. but his savings share in the Association nmoums only to 10,000 FCFA, he can withdraw his 10,000 FCFA and then apply for a loan of 40,000 FCFA. provided other members will guarantee the latter amount. ‘I-hcse guarantors arcthen commltted not to withdraw the guaranteed amount before the borrower has reimbursed his loan to the Association.
(b) PurclTase and operation of a ~~~~e~grinding milt. This enterprise, made possible through a Project Loan from the National Development Bank, has functioned satisfactorily since July 1977 under direct management by the Association. At first it seemed that a general consensus had been reached to give the management of the mill to the chairman of the management committee under a contractual agreement. But when the mill was ready to operate some members reahsed that possible advantages might personally accrue to the elected manager. The resulting situation constituted a classic class conflict between, on the one hand, a group enjoying a relatively middleclass status (mostly in the Pilot Zone), and, on the other hand, the poorer, less literate and consequently more vulnerable mass of members living in the spontaneous settlement. As a result of the strife, the Pilot Zone group has withdrawn from the enterprise and the previously elected manager is an employee of the Association which pays him a salary assured by the income of the mill. (c) T/z ma&et qfcr’ssin. As a result of inquiries and discussions with the population as to their priorities for community needs, the responsibility of running and managing a new market at C&sin was given to the Association under a contract negotiated with the municipality. A first phase of seven shops and t04 stalls was built with a Project loan. Then an interesting phenomenon occurred: the Project, with its highly qualified staff, had spent 2 million FCFA to build the first phase in 4---5months. As some traders had contested the size of the erected stalls, they were allowed to complete the market through their own means under Prqject supervision. Then, in a period of three days, more than 400 stalls were built, all with iron-sheet-roofed wooden frame structures, entirely by their users and without one franc being spent by the community! Thus it can be stated that the low-income peopfe of Cissin have demonstrated their potential capacity to meet their own needs provided that adequate guidance is provided. A self-managed Savings and Credit Association may constitute a powerful lever for development and integration of poorer communities into the urban context in terms of housing, job promotion, and communal facilities as well as security of tenure. However, certain problems and difficulties may arise which can jeopardise such types of community ventures. In the case of the Ouagadougou project, a crisis was precipitated between the Credit Association and the traditional land tenure authority in the area. This conflict between the traditional and modern systems of land tenure is described below. Land tenure and speculation
In order to clarify the origins of the 1977 crisis, which nearly resulted in the collapse of the Association, it is necessary to briefly describe the customary land tenure system still in use in Ouagadougou and the extent to which this system may be affected by the new market economy. Land in the unregistered area of Cissin is traditionally under the authority of the ~u~~~di~-~~~~~ (chief of Samandinf. The chief, who ranks at the third or fourth level in the Mossi hierarchy, is thus empowered to distribute land, according to well-defined rules and procedures, to whoever applies for it and subsequently recognises his authority as a ruter of that Iand, Traditionally, iand has no monetary value and is allocated for specific uses, i.e. farming, housing, pastures, etc. Within this context, the structural upgrading of the whole area by the Government was introduced with World Bank assistance. A development operation of such magnitude can only bring drastic changes to the population and its customary modes of authority. As a result of the pro,ject two phenomena occurred - one legal, the other economic. In legal terms the whole area was transferred from the control of the Chiefs to that of the Municipality. The Chiefs then lost all their power over the allocation of land, although they were allowed to retain title to a few plots as compensation. Then each legitimate occupant was entitled to claim a plot in the newly-serviced area. In this respect it is worth noting that there was some confusion between the role of the Credit Association (envisaged as an attempt at assisting people in the rehabilitation of their new environment) and the entire settlement upgrading programme. As a result, some people believed that by being members of the Credit Association they were automatically entitled to a plot in the upgraded area.
The second phenomenon was the tremendous speculation occasioned by the increase in land value due to the transfer from traditional to modern law. Very briefly, it has been observed that a plot of about 15 x 25 m whose market value was about 50,000 FCFA (LJS$220) in the spontaneous settlement increased up to 1 million FCFA once the area was officially registered, resulting in an increase of 24 times its original value. This means that, for some astute ~~pp~~rtunists occupying strategic positions. there is a point in the legal transition process when the land can easily be grabbed. This is made even easier by the fact that the legitimate beneficiaries of the programme are particularly vulnerable and defenceless. The crisis of the Cissin Credit Association may thus be viewed as an episode in the struggle for ownership of the land between the would-be speculators and the legitimate occupants. On one side there were the middle-class residents. in the registered neighbourhood adjacent to the spontaneous settlement, who attempted to use the dispute as an opportunity to evict part of the settlement populatioll. thus capturing some of the Iand for speculation purposes and taking controlling advantages in the Credit ,4ssociation. Their greater financial means gave them strong instruments of pressure which the poorer community could hardly resist. On the other hand. there was only the Association Management Committee to defend not only the interests of Association members. but those of the whole population of the spontaneous settlement. It is likely that the action of the Committee was resented by some traditional rulers as a circumvention of their authority. In fact, the confusion which prevailed at a certain moment of the crisis resulted from their impression that the Association seemed to have the aim of assuming control of the entire upgrading operation. If such had been the case it would have given the Association an abusive power which was obviously not acceptable to the customary authorities, and of course, was never intended by the leaders of the Project.
HISTORY
OF THE CRISIS
The crisis was triggered by the contesting, by the Slrrn~~fldin-Naha , of the rights of residents of one of the sub-areas, Gandhin. to settle on his territory. It seems that some of the latter had redistributed land without the approval of the area Chief. The dispute occurred immediately after the Project had started initial investigations and surveys in the area. Although al1 c~)mlllunities had lived in peace up to that Illornent, it was soon apparent that a group gravitating around the Chief was taking advantage of the situation. In May 1977 the conflict was submitted to the hforo-N&. Emperor of the Mossis and supreme authority in such traditional matters. The outcome was a decision without appeal in favour of Samandin. It was immediately obvious that the Gandhin people. who formed one third of the Credit Association, were not prepared to accept such a decision, particularly since the Samandin group was trying to take advantage of the situation to destroy the Association by splitting Gandhin into new sub-areas under its control. The controversy which followed assumed such proportions that all activities were suspended by the Government until a satisfactory solution could be found. After several months of negotiations, during which positions hardened on both sides. the Association Management Committee finally. on its own initiative, appealed to the Minister of Interior, the highest authority with jurisdiction in this matter, requesting him to settle the matter. During an all-day meeting, at which representatives ofall groups involved the Minister clearly defined the issues and made the following rulings:
were assembled,
(a) Traditional land law is applicable only in those cases where modern law does not provide any specific solution or procedure. In the event of a conflict between the two, modern law has absolute precedent. [b) A savings and credit association is a free association of free Voltaic citizens, subject to modern legislation and upon which traditional ~~utlloriti~s cannot exert any control whatsoever. On the other hand, credit association committees can never assume the powers of traditional authorities, particularly with regard to land allocation.
(c) Onty persons who physically reside in the area, which must be defined in the association by-laws, qualify as members of a credit association, whether or not they own the premises on which they live. In other words, to be a member it is not enough to own land in the area; one must also occupy it permanently with one’s family. The ~amu~din-Naba himself, who personally owns four plots at Cissin but who lives in the neighbouring area of Samandin, was publicly denied the right of association membership. After a six month dispute which had raised fears as to its ability to survive, the Cissin Credit Association was able to resume its activities and quickly proved to be more alive and dynamic than ever. It is very likely that the solution imposed by the Minister of Interior increased the confidence of members and their leaders in the potentialities of the Association. This brief analysis of events and phenomena relating to a specific experiment of organising public participation in upgrading low-income spontaneous settlements demonstrates the potentialities of the poorest population groups to defend this right within the framework of an enlightened government and a modern legal system. Probably for a long time to come, such population groups need effective and protective support, not so much in technical assistance which may be one of the easiest forms of assistance to be provided ~ but also in solving their legal and institutional problems. The Cissin Project is now operated by the Government and is being widely expanded through a World Bank/IDA loan. CONCLUDING
COMMENTS
The above events emphasise a number of issues:
The need for an official institution to deal with and protect the interests of poor members of Credit and Savings Associations seems to emerge as a first conclusion of the Cissin crisis. This could be linked with an emerging national cooperative movement, although special aspects concerning housing and settlement planning deserve particular consideration. In Upper Volta there are no less than four Ministries claiming jurisdiction in the matter, none of which fully appreciated the cooperative aspect so essential to this type of association, The crisis would probably not have been permitted to develop had the Credit Association been introduced into a clear and appropriate legal and institutional framework. The crisis itself has demonstrated the acute need for effective protection against covetousness from outside. However, any sort of protective institution should always be flexible enough never to interfere with the decision-making power which must rest in the hands of Association members.
The following should be emphasised: (a) The role of traditional rulers must be appreciated in the specific context of a transition towards a new type of society. Their power is no longer automatically recognised by an increasing segment of the population: which feels more attracted by the advantages it draws from its integration into the urban system. The structure of the Association must serve the needs of that population and assist in its survival within an urban setting rather than continuing its dependence on a rural systent destined to disappear with time. The wishes of the population have precedence over those of the Chiefs and new institutions should allow those wishes to be freely expressed in opposition to adverse external interference. (b) The Association itself should be decentralised, thus giving more autonomy to each respective sub-area. Disagreement may erupt between communities which can be better solved if each group is given the opportunity to defend its particular interests. Moreover, the crisis has shown that a management committee can easiIy lose contact with the mass of association members. For instance, it has been proposed that the eight sub-areas of Cissin be progressively transformed into eight autonomous associations supervised by a Coordinating Committee. Such a reorganisation should take place gradually, together with the setting up
of an adequate on-the-spot information and training programme for prospective committee officers. It has also been proposed that the management of community development operations he separated from the management of the Credit Association, in order to ease the burden of executives. This might take the form of several independent ventures, one for each operation, which would be financed through the credit societies. This may give the latter some legal assurance against unforeseen dif~culties resulting from mismanagement or other causes.
One of the causes of the crisis was the difficulty particularly to the lowest level of the sub-areas. confusion could not be completely avoided.
in disseminating Despite many
information efficiently, efforts, ambiguities and
Cominunication is, therefore, the most important problem, second only to and closely linked with that of having an appropriate institutional framework. For that reason it should be dealt with, at a national policy level. Related problems are two-sided. First, there is the need for relying on a permanent supporting staff for associations who should have an acute perception of all problems involved, including the importance of traditions, an understanding of land problems as well as basic knowledge of housing and environment. A second aspect, even more important and difficutt to resolve, concerns the training and education of the mass of partly illiterate association members from which executive officers must be elected. A savings and credit association promotion programme should therefore be closelv coordinated with some form of adult education programme which exists in most court&es today based on teaching in indigenous languages.
It is self-evident that any call for popular partj~ipation must be supported by strong nlotivation on the part of the people involved. At Cissin it was found that the main motivation to participate in the community organisation was the promise of land tenure security for the majority of unregistered settlement dwellers. However, investigations of priority needs in selecting community development operations revealed a wide variety of motivations among the different groups involved. Reactions were quite different to proposals made at men’s as opposed to women’s meetings. This supports the idea of decentralisation, thus giving each identifiable group the opportunity to establish its own priorities. As a final comment, one can say that just as war is too important a matter to be left to generals, so this matter is too important and complex to be solved only by social scientists and other technicians. Only direct and open discussions with the communities on the field can develop the best solutions. The people, poor and illiterate as they may be, know what they want. They only need to be asked in an appropriate way and advised as to how to develop the means to fulfil their aspirations.
Housing Improvement and Popular Participation in the Upper Volta Fracture
PFXSTER
Uuagadougou,
Upper Volta
INTRODUCTION Efforts ta improve housing conditions in the rapidly-gro~ng cities of the Third World are frequently confronted by the striking contrast between the incapacity of the responsible authorities to cope with this problem and the remarkable ingenuity and energy displayed by individual families in developing some sort of shelter and organising their survival despite hopelessly scanty resources. It is now increasingly recognised that such efforts deserve and require official support. In fact, it is more than mere humanitarian logic to organise popular participation in urban mass housing operations; it is the only viable programme for housing improvement in both rural and urban areas.
However, there are many economic and socio-cultural implications to this approach which may provoke extremely complex and delicate problems with societies in the process of rapid transition. It is hoped that the experience gained from the promotion of a People’s Savings and Credit Association (Caisse Populaire d’Epargne et de Credit) as a self-managed voluntary association at Cissin-~uagadougou in Upper Volta, as described in this paper, will assist others in dealing with the complex problems which may arise in organising the participation of the urban poor in improving their own environment.
Ouagadougou, the capital of Upper Volta with 250,000 inhabitants, is surrounded by a wide belt of spontaneous settlements sheltering 60% of the population, These areas are still administered according to traditional social systems of land tenure under which the land occupants enjoy no legally recognised security of tenure. Basic infrastructural services, either social or technical, are virtually non-existent. The mode of living resembles village life rather than city life, without any of the respective advantages of both. Hardships are pressed upon the people by the ever-increasing burden of an urban monetary economy; this being the main cause of problematic constraints to the residents being integrated into an urban context. The project
The “Project for Improving Living and Housing Conditions for Low Income Popuiatio~” was launched in i973 by the Government with technical cooperation by the United Nations. The main objectives were to assist low-income inhabitants of the spontaneous settlements to develop adequate housing by self-help, as well as to promote their gradual integration into the new urban monetary economy. The physical achievements of the project have already been analysed in other papers’ and are only briefly summarised here: (a) The development of a 615 plot site-and-service scheme at Cissin, known as the “Pilot Zone” where plots were allocated to selected low-income candidates. Most of these
‘See Hunm
Sertlements, Vol. VIII, Nos.
1 and 2, March/June 1978.
209
210
were dispiaced victims of eviction from other parts of the city, which made it difficult, at the beginning, to establish a socially coherent community.
(b) Secondly.
the on-the-spot upgrading (restructuring) of a ZSO-family area within a nearbv spontaneous settlement. Access ways and basic services were provided, while demolition was limited to a practicable rnininlu~ll. Finally, the newly-demarcated plots were officially registered in the name of their original occupants in accordance with modern legal procedures.
This latter aspect, providing security of land tenure for the residents, was found to be the most important motivation for their participation in the self-help aspects of the project. The success of this effort has induced the Government to expand this type of operation with financial assistance from the World Bank. It is. however. worth noting that this success was f~~c~lit~~tcdby the fact that. in contrast to the adjacent Pilot Zone coItl~lunity, the totality of the upgraded settlement population originated from the same viltages of the South Mossi territorv. They had been living at C&sin for a relatively long time under their traditional authorities and customs. This gave their community strong social cohesion. facilitating their mobilisation for popular participation.
In connection with the housing upgrading operation. a Savings and Credit Association was formed by the population of the spontaneous settlements - including the Pilot Zone. Most of the 20.000 inhabitants (about 4.000 families), had no access to any form of bank credit facilities because of the paucity and irregularity of their incomes. Some 50”;, were still rural peasants maintaining strong links with neighbouring farms and villages and thus were dependent upon seasonal cycles of employment. The others belonged mostly to the “informal” sector of economic activities. i.~. smallartisans or traders. However, a survey conducted by the Project led to the conclusion that most residents in the area would be able to take advantage of a real, though small, saving capacity that the systems in use simply did not allow them to exploit. Hence, the decision was made to establish a people-owned. self-managed, savings and credit association appropriately structured to grant small loans at affordable terms to its members. This was set up at the beginning of 1976 and developed during three missions by consultant Roger &tan. After the first year of operations nearly 4 million FCFA’ (about US$l6,000) had been accumulated by about 1,600 members. In order to respect the traditional pattern of land authorities - eight sub-areas (soussubdivision as still administered by customary yuor-ticus). including the Pilot Zone. were identified as ‘satellites‘ of the central organisation. Their respective members then elected a bureau whose main function was to collect savings. These were then deposited fortnightly at the National Savings Bank (Caisse Nationale d’Epargne CNE). A management committee of eight members was then elected and the Association officially registered by the Minister of the Interior. After an adequate period of capital accumulation, withdrawals were authorised under an adopted system of loan procedures.’ The total savings fund is now also used to finance or guarantee the financing of other related development schemes aimed at benefiting the particular community. Three such operations have been undertaken with various degrees of success: ~f’.swe~r curtsjbr the distribution oj’wter from the only standpipe serving the (21) PimIme whole settlement (proposed in order to stop existing exploitation in the sale of water). This enterprise quickly ran into difficulty when it appeared that it interfered with the existing ‘informal’ distribution system to which it brought only unproductive competition. It was finally abandoned, since the municipality was about to connect the area to the city water supply network.
’ FCFA = Franc Communatit~ Financikre Afrrcainc. ’ For example, if a member needs 50,000 FCFA, to roof his house. but his savings share in the Association nmoums only to 10,000 FCFA, he can withdraw his 10,000 FCFA and then apply for a loan of 40,000 FCFA. provided other members will guarantee the latter amount. ‘I-hcse guarantors arcthen commltted not to withdraw the guaranteed amount before the borrower has reimbursed his loan to the Association.
(b) PurclTase and operation of a ~~~~e~grinding milt. This enterprise, made possible through a Project Loan from the National Development Bank, has functioned satisfactorily since July 1977 under direct management by the Association. At first it seemed that a general consensus had been reached to give the management of the mill to the chairman of the management committee under a contractual agreement. But when the mill was ready to operate some members reahsed that possible advantages might personally accrue to the elected manager. The resulting situation constituted a classic class conflict between, on the one hand, a group enjoying a relatively middleclass status (mostly in the Pilot Zone), and, on the other hand, the poorer, less literate and consequently more vulnerable mass of members living in the spontaneous settlement. As a result of the strife, the Pilot Zone group has withdrawn from the enterprise and the previously elected manager is an employee of the Association which pays him a salary assured by the income of the mill. (c) T/z ma&et qfcr’ssin. As a result of inquiries and discussions with the population as to their priorities for community needs, the responsibility of running and managing a new market at C&sin was given to the Association under a contract negotiated with the municipality. A first phase of seven shops and t04 stalls was built with a Project loan. Then an interesting phenomenon occurred: the Project, with its highly qualified staff, had spent 2 million FCFA to build the first phase in 4---5months. As some traders had contested the size of the erected stalls, they were allowed to complete the market through their own means under Prqject supervision. Then, in a period of three days, more than 400 stalls were built, all with iron-sheet-roofed wooden frame structures, entirely by their users and without one franc being spent by the community! Thus it can be stated that the low-income peopfe of Cissin have demonstrated their potential capacity to meet their own needs provided that adequate guidance is provided. A self-managed Savings and Credit Association may constitute a powerful lever for development and integration of poorer communities into the urban context in terms of housing, job promotion, and communal facilities as well as security of tenure. However, certain problems and difficulties may arise which can jeopardise such types of community ventures. In the case of the Ouagadougou project, a crisis was precipitated between the Credit Association and the traditional land tenure authority in the area. This conflict between the traditional and modern systems of land tenure is described below. Land tenure and speculation
In order to clarify the origins of the 1977 crisis, which nearly resulted in the collapse of the Association, it is necessary to briefly describe the customary land tenure system still in use in Ouagadougou and the extent to which this system may be affected by the new market economy. Land in the unregistered area of Cissin is traditionally under the authority of the ~u~~~di~-~~~~~ (chief of Samandinf. The chief, who ranks at the third or fourth level in the Mossi hierarchy, is thus empowered to distribute land, according to well-defined rules and procedures, to whoever applies for it and subsequently recognises his authority as a ruter of that Iand, Traditionally, iand has no monetary value and is allocated for specific uses, i.e. farming, housing, pastures, etc. Within this context, the structural upgrading of the whole area by the Government was introduced with World Bank assistance. A development operation of such magnitude can only bring drastic changes to the population and its customary modes of authority. As a result of the pro,ject two phenomena occurred - one legal, the other economic. In legal terms the whole area was transferred from the control of the Chiefs to that of the Municipality. The Chiefs then lost all their power over the allocation of land, although they were allowed to retain title to a few plots as compensation. Then each legitimate occupant was entitled to claim a plot in the newly-serviced area. In this respect it is worth noting that there was some confusion between the role of the Credit Association (envisaged as an attempt at assisting people in the rehabilitation of their new environment) and the entire settlement upgrading programme. As a result, some people believed that by being members of the Credit Association they were automatically entitled to a plot in the upgraded area.
The second phenomenon was the tremendous speculation occasioned by the increase in land value due to the transfer from traditional to modern law. Very briefly, it has been observed that a plot of about 15 x 25 m whose market value was about 50,000 FCFA (LJS$220) in the spontaneous settlement increased up to 1 million FCFA once the area was officially registered, resulting in an increase of 24 times its original value. This means that, for some astute ~~pp~~rtunists occupying strategic positions. there is a point in the legal transition process when the land can easily be grabbed. This is made even easier by the fact that the legitimate beneficiaries of the programme are particularly vulnerable and defenceless. The crisis of the Cissin Credit Association may thus be viewed as an episode in the struggle for ownership of the land between the would-be speculators and the legitimate occupants. On one side there were the middle-class residents. in the registered neighbourhood adjacent to the spontaneous settlement, who attempted to use the dispute as an opportunity to evict part of the settlement populatioll. thus capturing some of the Iand for speculation purposes and taking controlling advantages in the Credit ,4ssociation. Their greater financial means gave them strong instruments of pressure which the poorer community could hardly resist. On the other hand. there was only the Association Management Committee to defend not only the interests of Association members. but those of the whole population of the spontaneous settlement. It is likely that the action of the Committee was resented by some traditional rulers as a circumvention of their authority. In fact, the confusion which prevailed at a certain moment of the crisis resulted from their impression that the Association seemed to have the aim of assuming control of the entire upgrading operation. If such had been the case it would have given the Association an abusive power which was obviously not acceptable to the customary authorities, and of course, was never intended by the leaders of the Project.
HISTORY
OF THE CRISIS
The crisis was triggered by the contesting, by the Slrrn~~fldin-Naha , of the rights of residents of one of the sub-areas, Gandhin. to settle on his territory. It seems that some of the latter had redistributed land without the approval of the area Chief. The dispute occurred immediately after the Project had started initial investigations and surveys in the area. Although al1 c~)mlllunities had lived in peace up to that Illornent, it was soon apparent that a group gravitating around the Chief was taking advantage of the situation. In May 1977 the conflict was submitted to the hforo-N&. Emperor of the Mossis and supreme authority in such traditional matters. The outcome was a decision without appeal in favour of Samandin. It was immediately obvious that the Gandhin people. who formed one third of the Credit Association, were not prepared to accept such a decision, particularly since the Samandin group was trying to take advantage of the situation to destroy the Association by splitting Gandhin into new sub-areas under its control. The controversy which followed assumed such proportions that all activities were suspended by the Government until a satisfactory solution could be found. After several months of negotiations, during which positions hardened on both sides. the Association Management Committee finally. on its own initiative, appealed to the Minister of Interior, the highest authority with jurisdiction in this matter, requesting him to settle the matter. During an all-day meeting, at which representatives ofall groups involved the Minister clearly defined the issues and made the following rulings:
were assembled,
(a) Traditional land law is applicable only in those cases where modern law does not provide any specific solution or procedure. In the event of a conflict between the two, modern law has absolute precedent. [b) A savings and credit association is a free association of free Voltaic citizens, subject to modern legislation and upon which traditional ~~utlloriti~s cannot exert any control whatsoever. On the other hand, credit association committees can never assume the powers of traditional authorities, particularly with regard to land allocation.
(c) Onty persons who physically reside in the area, which must be defined in the association by-laws, qualify as members of a credit association, whether or not they own the premises on which they live. In other words, to be a member it is not enough to own land in the area; one must also occupy it permanently with one’s family. The ~amu~din-Naba himself, who personally owns four plots at Cissin but who lives in the neighbouring area of Samandin, was publicly denied the right of association membership. After a six month dispute which had raised fears as to its ability to survive, the Cissin Credit Association was able to resume its activities and quickly proved to be more alive and dynamic than ever. It is very likely that the solution imposed by the Minister of Interior increased the confidence of members and their leaders in the potentialities of the Association. This brief analysis of events and phenomena relating to a specific experiment of organising public participation in upgrading low-income spontaneous settlements demonstrates the potentialities of the poorest population groups to defend this right within the framework of an enlightened government and a modern legal system. Probably for a long time to come, such population groups need effective and protective support, not so much in technical assistance which may be one of the easiest forms of assistance to be provided ~ but also in solving their legal and institutional problems. The Cissin Project is now operated by the Government and is being widely expanded through a World Bank/IDA loan. CONCLUDING
COMMENTS
The above events emphasise a number of issues:
The need for an official institution to deal with and protect the interests of poor members of Credit and Savings Associations seems to emerge as a first conclusion of the Cissin crisis. This could be linked with an emerging national cooperative movement, although special aspects concerning housing and settlement planning deserve particular consideration. In Upper Volta there are no less than four Ministries claiming jurisdiction in the matter, none of which fully appreciated the cooperative aspect so essential to this type of association, The crisis would probably not have been permitted to develop had the Credit Association been introduced into a clear and appropriate legal and institutional framework. The crisis itself has demonstrated the acute need for effective protection against covetousness from outside. However, any sort of protective institution should always be flexible enough never to interfere with the decision-making power which must rest in the hands of Association members.
The following should be emphasised: (a) The role of traditional rulers must be appreciated in the specific context of a transition towards a new type of society. Their power is no longer automatically recognised by an increasing segment of the population: which feels more attracted by the advantages it draws from its integration into the urban system. The structure of the Association must serve the needs of that population and assist in its survival within an urban setting rather than continuing its dependence on a rural systent destined to disappear with time. The wishes of the population have precedence over those of the Chiefs and new institutions should allow those wishes to be freely expressed in opposition to adverse external interference. (b) The Association itself should be decentralised, thus giving more autonomy to each respective sub-area. Disagreement may erupt between communities which can be better solved if each group is given the opportunity to defend its particular interests. Moreover, the crisis has shown that a management committee can easiIy lose contact with the mass of association members. For instance, it has been proposed that the eight sub-areas of Cissin be progressively transformed into eight autonomous associations supervised by a Coordinating Committee. Such a reorganisation should take place gradually, together with the setting up
of an adequate on-the-spot information and training programme for prospective committee officers. It has also been proposed that the management of community development operations he separated from the management of the Credit Association, in order to ease the burden of executives. This might take the form of several independent ventures, one for each operation, which would be financed through the credit societies. This may give the latter some legal assurance against unforeseen dif~culties resulting from mismanagement or other causes.
One of the causes of the crisis was the difficulty particularly to the lowest level of the sub-areas. confusion could not be completely avoided.
in disseminating Despite many
information efficiently, efforts, ambiguities and
Cominunication is, therefore, the most important problem, second only to and closely linked with that of having an appropriate institutional framework. For that reason it should be dealt with, at a national policy level. Related problems are two-sided. First, there is the need for relying on a permanent supporting staff for associations who should have an acute perception of all problems involved, including the importance of traditions, an understanding of land problems as well as basic knowledge of housing and environment. A second aspect, even more important and difficutt to resolve, concerns the training and education of the mass of partly illiterate association members from which executive officers must be elected. A savings and credit association promotion programme should therefore be closelv coordinated with some form of adult education programme which exists in most court&es today based on teaching in indigenous languages.
It is self-evident that any call for popular partj~ipation must be supported by strong nlotivation on the part of the people involved. At Cissin it was found that the main motivation to participate in the community organisation was the promise of land tenure security for the majority of unregistered settlement dwellers. However, investigations of priority needs in selecting community development operations revealed a wide variety of motivations among the different groups involved. Reactions were quite different to proposals made at men’s as opposed to women’s meetings. This supports the idea of decentralisation, thus giving each identifiable group the opportunity to establish its own priorities. As a final comment, one can say that just as war is too important a matter to be left to generals, so this matter is too important and complex to be solved only by social scientists and other technicians. Only direct and open discussions with the communities on the field can develop the best solutions. The people, poor and illiterate as they may be, know what they want. They only need to be asked in an appropriate way and advised as to how to develop the means to fulfil their aspirations.