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Locus of control, choice, and satisfaction with an assigned task
JOURNAL
OF RESEARCH
IN PERSONALITY
18,
342-351 (1984)
Locus of Control, Choice, and Satisfaction with an Assigned Task WAYNE HARRISON,GWEN LEWIS, AND University
of Nebraska
TIM
STRAKA
at Omaha
P. E. Spector’s (1982, Psychological Bulletin, 91, 482-497) hypothesis that under conditions of freedom of choice persons characterized by an internal locus of control will experience greater satisfaction with an undesirable task than persons characterized by an external locus of control is considered in light of distinctions between perceived control and perceived choice. Perceived choice is proposed as an intervening variable implicit in Spector’s argument. This reasoning was tested with 46 male and female college student participants in a 2 (Choice) x 2 (Locus of Control) factorial design experiment. An interaction of Choice x Locus of Control on task satisfaction was obtained such that internals tended to be more satisfied when given a choice while externals experienced greater satisfaction when not given a choice. The implications of this result for Spector’s hypothesis and for the manner in which undesirable work is assigned are discussed.
The concept of locus of control is grounded in Rotter’s (1954) social learning theory, in which expectations regarding the probability of reinforcement are hypothesized to be important determinants of behavior. Rotter (1966) subsequently proposed that differences in such expectations are due in part to an enduring personality trait, which has become known as locus of control. Persons believing that they have control over the likelihood of experiencing reinforcing outcomes are referred to as internals; persons who ascribe this control externally-to chance, fate, or powerful others-are termed externnals. Spector (1982) recently reviewed the role of locus of control in employ&es’ behavior in organizations. Among the variables cited by Spector as influenced by locus of control beliefs is job satisfaction. Four reasons for this relationship are proposed. Of these, three concern behavioral differences linked to an employee’s locus of control. For example, internals should experience greater job satisfaction because they are more likely to exert control by quitting undesirable jobs, moving on until a satisfactory position is found. Requests for reprints should be addressed to Dr. Wayne Harrison, Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68182. 342 0092-6566184 $3 .OO Copytiht AII rights
0 I!384 by Academic Press, Inc. of reproduction in my fom reserved.
CONTROL, CHOICE, AND SATISFACTION
343
Spector’s fourth hypothesis proposes a cognitive, rather than a behavioral, reason for expecting internals to be more satisfied than externals. He states that cognitive consistency theory provides a basis for predicting that persons in an unsatisfying position who have perceived personal control to leave, but choose not to, will tend to reevaluate the situation favorably to maintain attitude-behavior consistency. Internals are thought to perceive greater ability to leave relative to externals “who perceive no options” (p. 490). Spector cites no empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) is a cognitive consistency theory often applied to the situation Spector describes. The situation is one of forced compliance. The inconsistency between a negative attitude toward the job and the (positive) behavior of choosing to remain in it creates dissonance, which may be reduced by favorable attitude change toward the job. Considerable research has demonstrated that perceived volition or choice is a necessary condition for experiencing dissonance in the forced compliance situation (e.g., Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Linder, Cooper & Jones, 1967). The behavior of not quitting the job does not arouse dissonance if the actor perceives no choice in the matter. Thus, implicit in Spector’s (1982) hypothesis is an apparent equating of locus of control and perceived choice. The dissonance effect on attitude toward the job depends upon perceived choice while the difference between internals and externals lies with perceived control. Is perceived control equivalent to perceived choice? We think not. At its most fundamental, the perception of choice is a belief that two or more courses of action are possible. Although the relative outcomes of the possible actions probably influence the perception of choice,’ the critical feature is simply the salience of alternative courses of action. If there is only one gas station in town, a motorist experiences no choice of where to fill up; if there are two or more stations, the motorist must make a decision and will perceive a choice. Perceived control is a more complex construct. Locus of control is a belief regarding one’s ability to obtain reinforcements by virtue of one’s actions, i.e., a belief that outcomes are contingent on behaviors. Thompson’s (1981) definition of control is similar: “the belief that one has at one’s disposal a response that can influence the aversiveness of an event” (p. 89). In a recent book on the topic, Langer (1983) defines control as “the active belief that one has a choice among responses that are differentially effective in achieving the desired outcome,” assuming some uncertainty “that any one response will bring about the desired outcome” ‘Brehm and Cohen (1%2), for example, suggest that the more nearly equivalent the outcomes, the greater the perceived choice.
344
HARRISON,
LEWIS,
AND
STRAKA
(p. 20). The common characteristic of these definitions is a belief that one’s actions matter, that one’s outcomes are affected by one’s decisions. Thus, even when given a choice, our hypothetical motorist will perceive little control if all the gas stations in town charge the same price. Although the expectation of control (internal locus of control) presumes having a choice, the lack of this expectation (external locus of control) does not imply a denial that one has a choice. Externals may well perceive options, but fail to perceive any connection between these alternatives and their outcomes. With regard to Spector’s hypothesis and example, we thus see no basis for stating that externals believe themselves to have “no options” (1982, p. 490). This misidentifies their difference from internals. Although choice and control are not synonymous, the possibility remains that the expectation of control may influence the perception of choice. Expectations are well known to influence perception under conditions of ambiguity (e.g., Allport & Postman, 1947; Bruner & Postman, 1949; Bugelski & Alampay, 1961). The extent to which one has a choice in the forced compliance situation is phenomenologically ambiguous. Kelley’s (1967) analysis of the forced compliance situation is suggestive. Subjects in the “high choice” condition of forced compliance studies are typically presented with a choice between two alternatives and then asked, for some external reason, to choose the counterattitudinal (less preferred) alternative. This procedure is highly effective in that few subjects decline the experimenter’s request. However, few also recognize the request as a powerful external cause of their compliance. Objectively, these subjects’ behavior is under situational control; subjectively, subjects perceive some degree of choice. Under such circumstances, expectations of control, and therefore, to some extent, expectations of choice, may affect perceived choice. Internals, expecting control (and a choice), may deny that the external pressure (the experimenter’s request) served to limit their freedom of choice. Externals, expecting their outcomes to be determined by powerful others, may more veridically recognize the press and perceive less choice. If internals and externals do differ in their perception of external forces, they should experience different degrees of dissonance and of satisfaction. The purposes of this study are twofold. First, Spector’s hypothesis that under conditions of freedom of choice internals will experience more satisfaction with an undesirable task than will externals is tested. Second, the reasoning above is evaluated by examining the mediating role of perceived choice on the satisfaction of internals and externals. In addition to perceived choice, two other potential intervening variables (perceived control and perceived responsibility) are assessed. This permits a discriminant test of the role of perceived choice.
CONTROL,
CHOICE,
AND
SATISFACTION
345
METHOD Subjects Forty-six students enrolled in introductory psychology classes participated as volunteers in a 2 (Choice) x 2 (Locus of Control) factorial design. Subjects were selected from the upper and lower quartiles of 172 student respondents to Rotter’s I-E Scale (1966). The mean I-E score of the 26 internal subjects (15 males, 11 females; 13 assigned to each Choice condition) was 5 *, the mean of the 20 external subjects (12 males, 8 females; 10 assigned to each Choice condition) was 15.2. Four additional subjects (1 internal, 3 externals) assigned to the High Choice condition were dropped for failure to comply with the experimenter’s request (see below).
Procedure Subjects participated in this experiment individually. Upon arrival at the experiment, subjects were met by the experimenter (one male and one female experimenter each conducted half of the sessions; the experimenter was blind to the subject’s I-E score) and seated at a table upon which a microcomputer was prominent. The computer monitor was on, reading “COMPUTER-ASSISTED PROOFREADING TASK; please wait for the experimenter’s instructions before proceeding.” The experimenter introduced the experiment as a study comparing manual and computeraided methods of proofreading. The manual method was described as the traditional, paperand-pencil technique, somewhat lengthy and routine. The comparative method was described as a new, computer-assisted approach to proofreading, designed for people without previous computer experience and incorporating some features of video games to make it more enjoyable. At this point, the Choice variable was manipulated. Low-Choice subjects were instructed that they had been assigned to use the manual method. High-Choice subjects were told that the choice of methods to use was up to them. However, the experimenter explained, as the majority of prior subjects had chosen the computer-assisted method and an equal number of subjects were needed for each method, it would be appreciated if the subject would select the manual method. Subjects were reminded that the decision was theirs and then asked which method they wished to choose. Of 27 subjects, 23 complied with the request to choose the manual method. For the 4 subjects choosing the computer-assisted method, the experiment was stopped and the rationale of the study explained. Subjects in both Choice conditions were then instructed in the manual method of proofreading and proceeding to work on this task for 15 min. The task, which was designed to be tedious, consisted of crossing out words containing a specified letter. The task booklet contained a sufficient number of pages of 400 words each so that no subject could finish in the allotted time. Following the task, subjects responded to a post-test questionnaire containing several dependent measures. The experimenter concluded the session by explaining the purpose of the study and thanking subjects for their participation.
Post-test
Questionnaire
The post-test questionnaire contained measures of task satisfaction, three potential mediating variables, and a manipulation check. Four Ppoint semantic differentials were employed as indicators of task satisfaction: “interesting/uninteresting,” “unsatisfying/satisfying,” The three potential mediating variables “enjoyable/unenjoyable,” and “boring/exciting.” of perceived control, perceived responsibility, and perceived choice were each assessed by two items. The perceived control measure consisted of responses on 7-point scales to the questions: “How much conrrol did you have in determining which proofreading task
346
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LEWIS,
AND
STRAKA
(paper-and-pencil or computer-assisted) you worked on?” and “To what extent did the task assignment (paper-and-pencil or computer-assisted) happen to you rather than being determined by you?” Perceived responsibility was measured by the items “Who was responsible for you doing one task rather than the other?” and “To what extent was the experimenter the cause of you proofreading by one method rather than the other?” The latter item employed a 7-point scale; the former a S-point scale ranging from “completely me” to “completely the experimenter.” Perceived choice was assessed by two questions with 7-point response scales: “How much freedom did you have in choosing between the two tasks?” and “How much choice did you have in which task you worked on?” Finally, as a check that the computer-assisted method was more appealing, subjects were asked on a Spoint scale how relatively interesting the two tasks sounded prior to working on either one. Although posing this question after working on the task made it subject to rationalization, it was considered necessary in order to avoid contaminating the assessment of the major dependent variable.
RESULTS Manipulation Check The Spoint scale of relative interest of the two proofreading methods was scored 2 to - 2 were 2 represented a rating of the computer-assisted method as “much more interesting” than the paper-and-pencil method and - 2 represented the reverse. The mean rating of 1.2 differed from the neutral point of zero (F(1, 42) = 85.98, p < .OOl), indicating the desired difference in appeal of the two tasks. A Choice x Locus of Control nonorthogonal analysis of variance revealed that this rating did not differ by experimental condition (the two main effect and the interaction p’s > .lO). Performance No performance differences were anticipated and none were found. The mean number of words completed was 1541 (all three ANOVA effect F’s < 1); the mean number of errors was 24.3 (all F’s < 1). Thus, any differences in task satisfaction presumably are not due to differential senses of accomplishment. Task Satisfaction Ratings on the four semantic differentials measuring task satisfaction were averaged and found to form an internally consistent scale (coefficient (Y = .90). Mean task satisfaction ratings for each experimental condition as measured by this 4-item scale are displayed in Fig. 1. The analysis of variance of these ratings revealed only a significant interaction of Choice x Locus of Control (F(1, 42) = 4.19, p < .05). Spector’s (1982) hypothesis that cognitive consistency pressures are greater for internals than externals under conditions of freedom of choice does not receive strong support from these data. Although the degree of task satisfaction reported by High-Choice Internals is somewhat greater than that expe-
CONTROL, CHOICE, AND SATISFACTION
341
0 Internals o I Low Choice
Externals I High Choice
FIG. 1. Mean task satisfaction as a function of choice and locus of control.
rienced by High-Choice Externals, this difference is not significant (simple effect F(1, 42) = 1.23, ns). The obtained interaction of Choice x Locus of Control is perhaps more fruitfully viewed as the impact of Choice on task satisfaction within each personality type. There is a nonsignificant tendency for internals to find the task more satisfying when they choose it than when they are simply assigned the task (simple effect F(1, 42) = 1.19, ns). There is a marginal, mirror-image tendency for externals to be more satisfied when they are nor permitted to choose (simple effect F(1, 42) = 3.12, p < . 10). These nonsignificant simple effects complicate the interpretation of the significant Choice x Locus of Control interaction. We may nonetheless conclude that internals and externals respond differently to choice, noting that this difference (the Choice x Locus of Control interaction) accounts for 6.7% (w’) of the variance in their satisfaction with the task. Mediating
Variables
The role of perceived control, responsibility, and choice in determining task satisfaction was examined through several subsidiary analyses. First, the discriminant validity of these three constructs was assessedby factor analyzing the intercorrelations of the six relevant questionnaire items after partialing out the shared variance due to the treatment variables. Two factors unambiguously emerged from this analysis (the first three eigenvalues were 1.90, 1.25, and 0.16, respectively). Communality estimates and the rotated factor pattern are presented in Table 1. Factor 1primarily reflects perceived choice while Factor 2 most strongly reflects perceived responsibility. The communality estimates of the two perceived control items are low, indicating inadequate (nonconvergent) measures of this construct. For this reason, these items were dropped from further consideration. The indicators of perceived choice and of perceived responsibility do converge; in addition, these constructs are relatively orthogonal.
348
HARRISON, LEWIS, AND STRAKA TABLE COMMUNALITY
Measure Control 1 Control 2 Responsibility Responsibility Choice 1 Choice 2
1
ESTIMATES AND ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN OF PERCEIVED CONTROL, RESPONSIBILITY, AND CHOICE MEASURES
Factor loading
Communality estimate
Factor 1
Factor 2
.14 .18 .72 .50 .82 .78
.17 .22 .ll -.I5 .90 38
.34 .37 .84 .69 .11 .09
1 2
We conclude that the two constructs of perceived choice and responsibility are adequately measured and are discriminable. Single measures of perceived choice and responsibility were constructed by averaging the two questionnaire items relevant to each variable (transforming the one Spoint response scale to match the other items). Table 2 reports the mean levels of perceived choice and responsibility for the four experimental conditions. The analysis of variance of perceived choice revealed a large effect of the Choice manipulation (F( 1, 42) = 247.22, p < .OOl). The Locus of Control main effect on perceived choice was also significant (F(1, 42) = 6.62, p < .05), as was the interaction of Choice x Locus of Control (F(1, 42) = 4.84, p < .OS>.Low-Choice subjects, regardless of locus of control orientation, reported (correctly) no choice of tasks; High-Choice subjects did admit to a choice, HighTABLE MEAN
PERCEIVED FUNCTION
2
CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF CHOICE AND Locus OF CONTROL
AS
A
Choice Locus of control
Low
High
Internal External
Perceived choice 1.31 1.20
6.38 5.00
Internal External
Perceived responsibility 1.40 1.83
4.35 3.60
No&. The higher the value, the greater the perceived choice or responsibility (scale: l-7).
CONTROL,
CHOICE,
AND
SATISFACTION
349
Choice Internals more so than High-Choice Externals (simple effect F( 1, 42) = 11.39, p < .Ol). This latter result, that under freedom of choice internals perceive greater choice than do externals, is consistent with our process interpretation of Spector’s (1982) hypothesis, although this difference is not paralleled (significantly) by the task satisfaction ratings. Overall, the large main effect of Choice on perceived choice, qualified to some extent by the interaction, would predict a different pattern of task satisfaction ratings than that obtained. In particular, it is evidently not perceived choice which mediates the task satisfaction of externals. The analysis of variance of perceived responsibility (see Table 2) revealed only a main effect of Choice F(1, 42) = 49.87, p < .OOl). Low-Choice subjects accepted virtually no responsibility for the task assignment. High-Choice subjects rated their responsibility at approximately the scale midpoint, indicating equal responsibility with the experimenter. As with perceived choice, there is no indication of a mediation of the task satisfaction of externals by this variable. These analyses suggest that the objective degree of choice of task assignment is fairly veridically perceived by both internals and externals. The Choice manipulation had a strong impact on perceived choice and perceived responsibility within both personality types. We are unable to reject either perceived choice or responsibility as a mediator of the effect of situational choice on the task satisfaction of internals; however, neither is tenable as a mediator of the Choice effect for externals. Our external subjects perceived the degree of choice accurately, but their experienced task satisfaction was at variance with a dissonance effect. DISCUSSION This study was successful in creating conditions suitable for testing the hypotheses. The requirements of dissonance theory were realized in that choice was successfully manipulated and the behavior enacted was perceived as less desirable than the alternative. In addition, a discriminably valid measure of perceived choice was obtained, permitting examination of the mediational role of this construct. Our results provide at best mixed reviews of Spector’s (1982) hypothesized relationship between locus of control and job satisfaction under conditions of freedom of choice. In our elaboration of his hypothesis, we proposed that locus of control would influence the perception of choice which would in turn determine task satisfaction through the dissonance reduction process. The first step in this model was confirmed: internals perceived greater choice than did externals. However, the second step in the model was not confirmed, in that task satisfaction was not a function of perceived choice. The form of the interaction of choice and locus of control is accounted
350
HARRISON,
LEWIS,
AND
STRAKA
for neither by Spector’s hypothesis nor by our elaboration of it. The nonsignificant increase in satisfaction of internals with increasing choice would, if significant, be adequately accounted for by consistency theory. However, the unanticipated finding that the task satisfaction of externals is a negative function of choice is clearly at variance with a dissonance effect. Externals perceived the degree of choice available in the situation accurately, but did not respond in a dissonance-reduction manner. Apparently some process other than dissonance is more important in determining the satisfaction of externals in these conditions. Two possible explanations of the obtained interaction of choice and locus of control occur to us. First, encountering a situation which confIrms one’s world view (for internals, having control; for externals, having no control) may be comfortable and reinforcing. This positive feeling may generalize to ratings of the task. Rotter and Mulry (1965) report a “congruence” effect such that internals valued successmore in skill situations while externals valued success more in chance situations. Their dependent measure was decision time, which is not a measure of satisfaction;however, the notion of congruence is the same and perhaps it also applies to satisfaction. A second possible explanation is that decision making is aversive for externals but not for internals. If one’s decisions are not perceived as affecting one’s outcomes, there is little payoff in having to make a decision. This may be the view of externals. The opportunity to choose is of course desirable to internals. It is interesting to note that either of these explanations provides a sufficient account of the obtained results without invoking dissonance theory at all. Admittedly, these subjects were extreme on the locus of control dimension. Perhaps for them the major determinant of satisfaction has to do with the matching of the situational requirements to their expectations. Traditional dissonance reduction may be a more important determinant of satisfaction for persons less extreme with regard to locus of control. Although caution should be employed in generalizing these results to actualjob settings,a tentative applied conclusion may beproffered regardless of the underlying psychological process. Supervisors can influence employees’ satisfaction and performance (Locke, 1970). We suggest that when assigning an undesirable task to a worker, the supervisor take into account the worker’s locus of control beliefs. Externals will experience greater satisfaction if simply told what to do. Internals will be more satisfied if given the illusion of choice. While this determinant of satisfaction is undoubtedly not as important as the task itself, it amounted to approximately 7% of the variance in task satisfaction in this study. Additional research is needed to assess the validity of the two post
CONTROL, CHOICE, AND SATISFACTION
351
hoc explanations provided. Is decision making more costly for externals than for internals? How important is situational “congruence”? In addition, the limited role of dissonance-reduction processes in the satisfaction of externals needs confirmation. We feel that we have contributed to the understanding of the impact of locus of control on satisfaction by distinguishing logically and empirically between perceived control and perceived choice. Further research on these constructs and their respective influence on satisfaction should prove illuminating. More generally, the issue of how stable individual differences in beliefs about the world affect the perception of, and response to, situations relevant to those beliefs needs to be systematically studied. REFERENCES Allport, G. W., & Postman, L. J. (1947). The psychology of rumor. New York: Holt. Brehm, J. W., & Cohen, A. R. (1962). Explorations in cogniiive dissonance. New York: Wiley. Bruner, J. S., & Postman, L. (1949). On the perception of incongruity: A paradigm. Journal of Personality,
18, 206-223.
Bugelski, B. R., & Alampay, D. A. (l%l). The role of frequency in developing perceptual sets. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 15, 205-211. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press. Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, IS, 192-238. Langer, E. J. (1983). The psychology of control. Beverly Hills: Sage. Linder, D. E., Cooper, J., & Jones, E. E. (1967). Decision freedom as a determinant of the role of incentive magnitude in attitude change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
6, 245-254.
Locke, E. A. (1970). The supervisor as “motivator”: His intluence on employee performance and satisfaction. In B. M. Bass, R. Cooper, & J. A. Haas (Eds.), Managing for accomplishment. Lexington, MA: Heath. Rotter, J. B. (1954). Social learning and clinical psychology. New York: Prentice-Hall. Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80,(1, Whole No. 609). Rotter, J. B., & Muhy, R. C. (1%5). Internal versus external control of reinforcement and decision time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2, 598-604. Spector, P. E. (1982). Behavior in organizations as a function of employee’s locus of control. Psychological Bulletin, 91, 482-497. Thompson, S. C. (1981). Will it hurt less if I can control it? A complex answer to a simple question. Psychological Bulletin, 90, 89-101.
OF RESEARCH
IN PERSONALITY
18,
342-351 (1984)
Locus of Control, Choice, and Satisfaction with an Assigned Task WAYNE HARRISON,GWEN LEWIS, AND University
of Nebraska
TIM
STRAKA
at Omaha
P. E. Spector’s (1982, Psychological Bulletin, 91, 482-497) hypothesis that under conditions of freedom of choice persons characterized by an internal locus of control will experience greater satisfaction with an undesirable task than persons characterized by an external locus of control is considered in light of distinctions between perceived control and perceived choice. Perceived choice is proposed as an intervening variable implicit in Spector’s argument. This reasoning was tested with 46 male and female college student participants in a 2 (Choice) x 2 (Locus of Control) factorial design experiment. An interaction of Choice x Locus of Control on task satisfaction was obtained such that internals tended to be more satisfied when given a choice while externals experienced greater satisfaction when not given a choice. The implications of this result for Spector’s hypothesis and for the manner in which undesirable work is assigned are discussed.
The concept of locus of control is grounded in Rotter’s (1954) social learning theory, in which expectations regarding the probability of reinforcement are hypothesized to be important determinants of behavior. Rotter (1966) subsequently proposed that differences in such expectations are due in part to an enduring personality trait, which has become known as locus of control. Persons believing that they have control over the likelihood of experiencing reinforcing outcomes are referred to as internals; persons who ascribe this control externally-to chance, fate, or powerful others-are termed externnals. Spector (1982) recently reviewed the role of locus of control in employ&es’ behavior in organizations. Among the variables cited by Spector as influenced by locus of control beliefs is job satisfaction. Four reasons for this relationship are proposed. Of these, three concern behavioral differences linked to an employee’s locus of control. For example, internals should experience greater job satisfaction because they are more likely to exert control by quitting undesirable jobs, moving on until a satisfactory position is found. Requests for reprints should be addressed to Dr. Wayne Harrison, Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68182. 342 0092-6566184 $3 .OO Copytiht AII rights
0 I!384 by Academic Press, Inc. of reproduction in my fom reserved.
CONTROL, CHOICE, AND SATISFACTION
343
Spector’s fourth hypothesis proposes a cognitive, rather than a behavioral, reason for expecting internals to be more satisfied than externals. He states that cognitive consistency theory provides a basis for predicting that persons in an unsatisfying position who have perceived personal control to leave, but choose not to, will tend to reevaluate the situation favorably to maintain attitude-behavior consistency. Internals are thought to perceive greater ability to leave relative to externals “who perceive no options” (p. 490). Spector cites no empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) is a cognitive consistency theory often applied to the situation Spector describes. The situation is one of forced compliance. The inconsistency between a negative attitude toward the job and the (positive) behavior of choosing to remain in it creates dissonance, which may be reduced by favorable attitude change toward the job. Considerable research has demonstrated that perceived volition or choice is a necessary condition for experiencing dissonance in the forced compliance situation (e.g., Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Linder, Cooper & Jones, 1967). The behavior of not quitting the job does not arouse dissonance if the actor perceives no choice in the matter. Thus, implicit in Spector’s (1982) hypothesis is an apparent equating of locus of control and perceived choice. The dissonance effect on attitude toward the job depends upon perceived choice while the difference between internals and externals lies with perceived control. Is perceived control equivalent to perceived choice? We think not. At its most fundamental, the perception of choice is a belief that two or more courses of action are possible. Although the relative outcomes of the possible actions probably influence the perception of choice,’ the critical feature is simply the salience of alternative courses of action. If there is only one gas station in town, a motorist experiences no choice of where to fill up; if there are two or more stations, the motorist must make a decision and will perceive a choice. Perceived control is a more complex construct. Locus of control is a belief regarding one’s ability to obtain reinforcements by virtue of one’s actions, i.e., a belief that outcomes are contingent on behaviors. Thompson’s (1981) definition of control is similar: “the belief that one has at one’s disposal a response that can influence the aversiveness of an event” (p. 89). In a recent book on the topic, Langer (1983) defines control as “the active belief that one has a choice among responses that are differentially effective in achieving the desired outcome,” assuming some uncertainty “that any one response will bring about the desired outcome” ‘Brehm and Cohen (1%2), for example, suggest that the more nearly equivalent the outcomes, the greater the perceived choice.
344
HARRISON,
LEWIS,
AND
STRAKA
(p. 20). The common characteristic of these definitions is a belief that one’s actions matter, that one’s outcomes are affected by one’s decisions. Thus, even when given a choice, our hypothetical motorist will perceive little control if all the gas stations in town charge the same price. Although the expectation of control (internal locus of control) presumes having a choice, the lack of this expectation (external locus of control) does not imply a denial that one has a choice. Externals may well perceive options, but fail to perceive any connection between these alternatives and their outcomes. With regard to Spector’s hypothesis and example, we thus see no basis for stating that externals believe themselves to have “no options” (1982, p. 490). This misidentifies their difference from internals. Although choice and control are not synonymous, the possibility remains that the expectation of control may influence the perception of choice. Expectations are well known to influence perception under conditions of ambiguity (e.g., Allport & Postman, 1947; Bruner & Postman, 1949; Bugelski & Alampay, 1961). The extent to which one has a choice in the forced compliance situation is phenomenologically ambiguous. Kelley’s (1967) analysis of the forced compliance situation is suggestive. Subjects in the “high choice” condition of forced compliance studies are typically presented with a choice between two alternatives and then asked, for some external reason, to choose the counterattitudinal (less preferred) alternative. This procedure is highly effective in that few subjects decline the experimenter’s request. However, few also recognize the request as a powerful external cause of their compliance. Objectively, these subjects’ behavior is under situational control; subjectively, subjects perceive some degree of choice. Under such circumstances, expectations of control, and therefore, to some extent, expectations of choice, may affect perceived choice. Internals, expecting control (and a choice), may deny that the external pressure (the experimenter’s request) served to limit their freedom of choice. Externals, expecting their outcomes to be determined by powerful others, may more veridically recognize the press and perceive less choice. If internals and externals do differ in their perception of external forces, they should experience different degrees of dissonance and of satisfaction. The purposes of this study are twofold. First, Spector’s hypothesis that under conditions of freedom of choice internals will experience more satisfaction with an undesirable task than will externals is tested. Second, the reasoning above is evaluated by examining the mediating role of perceived choice on the satisfaction of internals and externals. In addition to perceived choice, two other potential intervening variables (perceived control and perceived responsibility) are assessed. This permits a discriminant test of the role of perceived choice.
CONTROL,
CHOICE,
AND
SATISFACTION
345
METHOD Subjects Forty-six students enrolled in introductory psychology classes participated as volunteers in a 2 (Choice) x 2 (Locus of Control) factorial design. Subjects were selected from the upper and lower quartiles of 172 student respondents to Rotter’s I-E Scale (1966). The mean I-E score of the 26 internal subjects (15 males, 11 females; 13 assigned to each Choice condition) was 5 *, the mean of the 20 external subjects (12 males, 8 females; 10 assigned to each Choice condition) was 15.2. Four additional subjects (1 internal, 3 externals) assigned to the High Choice condition were dropped for failure to comply with the experimenter’s request (see below).
Procedure Subjects participated in this experiment individually. Upon arrival at the experiment, subjects were met by the experimenter (one male and one female experimenter each conducted half of the sessions; the experimenter was blind to the subject’s I-E score) and seated at a table upon which a microcomputer was prominent. The computer monitor was on, reading “COMPUTER-ASSISTED PROOFREADING TASK; please wait for the experimenter’s instructions before proceeding.” The experimenter introduced the experiment as a study comparing manual and computeraided methods of proofreading. The manual method was described as the traditional, paperand-pencil technique, somewhat lengthy and routine. The comparative method was described as a new, computer-assisted approach to proofreading, designed for people without previous computer experience and incorporating some features of video games to make it more enjoyable. At this point, the Choice variable was manipulated. Low-Choice subjects were instructed that they had been assigned to use the manual method. High-Choice subjects were told that the choice of methods to use was up to them. However, the experimenter explained, as the majority of prior subjects had chosen the computer-assisted method and an equal number of subjects were needed for each method, it would be appreciated if the subject would select the manual method. Subjects were reminded that the decision was theirs and then asked which method they wished to choose. Of 27 subjects, 23 complied with the request to choose the manual method. For the 4 subjects choosing the computer-assisted method, the experiment was stopped and the rationale of the study explained. Subjects in both Choice conditions were then instructed in the manual method of proofreading and proceeding to work on this task for 15 min. The task, which was designed to be tedious, consisted of crossing out words containing a specified letter. The task booklet contained a sufficient number of pages of 400 words each so that no subject could finish in the allotted time. Following the task, subjects responded to a post-test questionnaire containing several dependent measures. The experimenter concluded the session by explaining the purpose of the study and thanking subjects for their participation.
Post-test
Questionnaire
The post-test questionnaire contained measures of task satisfaction, three potential mediating variables, and a manipulation check. Four Ppoint semantic differentials were employed as indicators of task satisfaction: “interesting/uninteresting,” “unsatisfying/satisfying,” The three potential mediating variables “enjoyable/unenjoyable,” and “boring/exciting.” of perceived control, perceived responsibility, and perceived choice were each assessed by two items. The perceived control measure consisted of responses on 7-point scales to the questions: “How much conrrol did you have in determining which proofreading task
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(paper-and-pencil or computer-assisted) you worked on?” and “To what extent did the task assignment (paper-and-pencil or computer-assisted) happen to you rather than being determined by you?” Perceived responsibility was measured by the items “Who was responsible for you doing one task rather than the other?” and “To what extent was the experimenter the cause of you proofreading by one method rather than the other?” The latter item employed a 7-point scale; the former a S-point scale ranging from “completely me” to “completely the experimenter.” Perceived choice was assessed by two questions with 7-point response scales: “How much freedom did you have in choosing between the two tasks?” and “How much choice did you have in which task you worked on?” Finally, as a check that the computer-assisted method was more appealing, subjects were asked on a Spoint scale how relatively interesting the two tasks sounded prior to working on either one. Although posing this question after working on the task made it subject to rationalization, it was considered necessary in order to avoid contaminating the assessment of the major dependent variable.
RESULTS Manipulation Check The Spoint scale of relative interest of the two proofreading methods was scored 2 to - 2 were 2 represented a rating of the computer-assisted method as “much more interesting” than the paper-and-pencil method and - 2 represented the reverse. The mean rating of 1.2 differed from the neutral point of zero (F(1, 42) = 85.98, p < .OOl), indicating the desired difference in appeal of the two tasks. A Choice x Locus of Control nonorthogonal analysis of variance revealed that this rating did not differ by experimental condition (the two main effect and the interaction p’s > .lO). Performance No performance differences were anticipated and none were found. The mean number of words completed was 1541 (all three ANOVA effect F’s < 1); the mean number of errors was 24.3 (all F’s < 1). Thus, any differences in task satisfaction presumably are not due to differential senses of accomplishment. Task Satisfaction Ratings on the four semantic differentials measuring task satisfaction were averaged and found to form an internally consistent scale (coefficient (Y = .90). Mean task satisfaction ratings for each experimental condition as measured by this 4-item scale are displayed in Fig. 1. The analysis of variance of these ratings revealed only a significant interaction of Choice x Locus of Control (F(1, 42) = 4.19, p < .05). Spector’s (1982) hypothesis that cognitive consistency pressures are greater for internals than externals under conditions of freedom of choice does not receive strong support from these data. Although the degree of task satisfaction reported by High-Choice Internals is somewhat greater than that expe-
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0 Internals o I Low Choice
Externals I High Choice
FIG. 1. Mean task satisfaction as a function of choice and locus of control.
rienced by High-Choice Externals, this difference is not significant (simple effect F(1, 42) = 1.23, ns). The obtained interaction of Choice x Locus of Control is perhaps more fruitfully viewed as the impact of Choice on task satisfaction within each personality type. There is a nonsignificant tendency for internals to find the task more satisfying when they choose it than when they are simply assigned the task (simple effect F(1, 42) = 1.19, ns). There is a marginal, mirror-image tendency for externals to be more satisfied when they are nor permitted to choose (simple effect F(1, 42) = 3.12, p < . 10). These nonsignificant simple effects complicate the interpretation of the significant Choice x Locus of Control interaction. We may nonetheless conclude that internals and externals respond differently to choice, noting that this difference (the Choice x Locus of Control interaction) accounts for 6.7% (w’) of the variance in their satisfaction with the task. Mediating
Variables
The role of perceived control, responsibility, and choice in determining task satisfaction was examined through several subsidiary analyses. First, the discriminant validity of these three constructs was assessedby factor analyzing the intercorrelations of the six relevant questionnaire items after partialing out the shared variance due to the treatment variables. Two factors unambiguously emerged from this analysis (the first three eigenvalues were 1.90, 1.25, and 0.16, respectively). Communality estimates and the rotated factor pattern are presented in Table 1. Factor 1primarily reflects perceived choice while Factor 2 most strongly reflects perceived responsibility. The communality estimates of the two perceived control items are low, indicating inadequate (nonconvergent) measures of this construct. For this reason, these items were dropped from further consideration. The indicators of perceived choice and of perceived responsibility do converge; in addition, these constructs are relatively orthogonal.
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Measure Control 1 Control 2 Responsibility Responsibility Choice 1 Choice 2
1
ESTIMATES AND ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN OF PERCEIVED CONTROL, RESPONSIBILITY, AND CHOICE MEASURES
Factor loading
Communality estimate
Factor 1
Factor 2
.14 .18 .72 .50 .82 .78
.17 .22 .ll -.I5 .90 38
.34 .37 .84 .69 .11 .09
1 2
We conclude that the two constructs of perceived choice and responsibility are adequately measured and are discriminable. Single measures of perceived choice and responsibility were constructed by averaging the two questionnaire items relevant to each variable (transforming the one Spoint response scale to match the other items). Table 2 reports the mean levels of perceived choice and responsibility for the four experimental conditions. The analysis of variance of perceived choice revealed a large effect of the Choice manipulation (F( 1, 42) = 247.22, p < .OOl). The Locus of Control main effect on perceived choice was also significant (F(1, 42) = 6.62, p < .05), as was the interaction of Choice x Locus of Control (F(1, 42) = 4.84, p < .OS>.Low-Choice subjects, regardless of locus of control orientation, reported (correctly) no choice of tasks; High-Choice subjects did admit to a choice, HighTABLE MEAN
PERCEIVED FUNCTION
2
CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF CHOICE AND Locus OF CONTROL
AS
A
Choice Locus of control
Low
High
Internal External
Perceived choice 1.31 1.20
6.38 5.00
Internal External
Perceived responsibility 1.40 1.83
4.35 3.60
No&. The higher the value, the greater the perceived choice or responsibility (scale: l-7).
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Choice Internals more so than High-Choice Externals (simple effect F( 1, 42) = 11.39, p < .Ol). This latter result, that under freedom of choice internals perceive greater choice than do externals, is consistent with our process interpretation of Spector’s (1982) hypothesis, although this difference is not paralleled (significantly) by the task satisfaction ratings. Overall, the large main effect of Choice on perceived choice, qualified to some extent by the interaction, would predict a different pattern of task satisfaction ratings than that obtained. In particular, it is evidently not perceived choice which mediates the task satisfaction of externals. The analysis of variance of perceived responsibility (see Table 2) revealed only a main effect of Choice F(1, 42) = 49.87, p < .OOl). Low-Choice subjects accepted virtually no responsibility for the task assignment. High-Choice subjects rated their responsibility at approximately the scale midpoint, indicating equal responsibility with the experimenter. As with perceived choice, there is no indication of a mediation of the task satisfaction of externals by this variable. These analyses suggest that the objective degree of choice of task assignment is fairly veridically perceived by both internals and externals. The Choice manipulation had a strong impact on perceived choice and perceived responsibility within both personality types. We are unable to reject either perceived choice or responsibility as a mediator of the effect of situational choice on the task satisfaction of internals; however, neither is tenable as a mediator of the Choice effect for externals. Our external subjects perceived the degree of choice accurately, but their experienced task satisfaction was at variance with a dissonance effect. DISCUSSION This study was successful in creating conditions suitable for testing the hypotheses. The requirements of dissonance theory were realized in that choice was successfully manipulated and the behavior enacted was perceived as less desirable than the alternative. In addition, a discriminably valid measure of perceived choice was obtained, permitting examination of the mediational role of this construct. Our results provide at best mixed reviews of Spector’s (1982) hypothesized relationship between locus of control and job satisfaction under conditions of freedom of choice. In our elaboration of his hypothesis, we proposed that locus of control would influence the perception of choice which would in turn determine task satisfaction through the dissonance reduction process. The first step in this model was confirmed: internals perceived greater choice than did externals. However, the second step in the model was not confirmed, in that task satisfaction was not a function of perceived choice. The form of the interaction of choice and locus of control is accounted
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for neither by Spector’s hypothesis nor by our elaboration of it. The nonsignificant increase in satisfaction of internals with increasing choice would, if significant, be adequately accounted for by consistency theory. However, the unanticipated finding that the task satisfaction of externals is a negative function of choice is clearly at variance with a dissonance effect. Externals perceived the degree of choice available in the situation accurately, but did not respond in a dissonance-reduction manner. Apparently some process other than dissonance is more important in determining the satisfaction of externals in these conditions. Two possible explanations of the obtained interaction of choice and locus of control occur to us. First, encountering a situation which confIrms one’s world view (for internals, having control; for externals, having no control) may be comfortable and reinforcing. This positive feeling may generalize to ratings of the task. Rotter and Mulry (1965) report a “congruence” effect such that internals valued successmore in skill situations while externals valued success more in chance situations. Their dependent measure was decision time, which is not a measure of satisfaction;however, the notion of congruence is the same and perhaps it also applies to satisfaction. A second possible explanation is that decision making is aversive for externals but not for internals. If one’s decisions are not perceived as affecting one’s outcomes, there is little payoff in having to make a decision. This may be the view of externals. The opportunity to choose is of course desirable to internals. It is interesting to note that either of these explanations provides a sufficient account of the obtained results without invoking dissonance theory at all. Admittedly, these subjects were extreme on the locus of control dimension. Perhaps for them the major determinant of satisfaction has to do with the matching of the situational requirements to their expectations. Traditional dissonance reduction may be a more important determinant of satisfaction for persons less extreme with regard to locus of control. Although caution should be employed in generalizing these results to actualjob settings,a tentative applied conclusion may beproffered regardless of the underlying psychological process. Supervisors can influence employees’ satisfaction and performance (Locke, 1970). We suggest that when assigning an undesirable task to a worker, the supervisor take into account the worker’s locus of control beliefs. Externals will experience greater satisfaction if simply told what to do. Internals will be more satisfied if given the illusion of choice. While this determinant of satisfaction is undoubtedly not as important as the task itself, it amounted to approximately 7% of the variance in task satisfaction in this study. Additional research is needed to assess the validity of the two post
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hoc explanations provided. Is decision making more costly for externals than for internals? How important is situational “congruence”? In addition, the limited role of dissonance-reduction processes in the satisfaction of externals needs confirmation. We feel that we have contributed to the understanding of the impact of locus of control on satisfaction by distinguishing logically and empirically between perceived control and perceived choice. Further research on these constructs and their respective influence on satisfaction should prove illuminating. More generally, the issue of how stable individual differences in beliefs about the world affect the perception of, and response to, situations relevant to those beliefs needs to be systematically studied. REFERENCES Allport, G. W., & Postman, L. J. (1947). The psychology of rumor. New York: Holt. Brehm, J. W., & Cohen, A. R. (1962). Explorations in cogniiive dissonance. New York: Wiley. Bruner, J. S., & Postman, L. (1949). On the perception of incongruity: A paradigm. Journal of Personality,
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Bugelski, B. R., & Alampay, D. A. (l%l). The role of frequency in developing perceptual sets. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 15, 205-211. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press. Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, IS, 192-238. Langer, E. J. (1983). The psychology of control. Beverly Hills: Sage. Linder, D. E., Cooper, J., & Jones, E. E. (1967). Decision freedom as a determinant of the role of incentive magnitude in attitude change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
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Locke, E. A. (1970). The supervisor as “motivator”: His intluence on employee performance and satisfaction. In B. M. Bass, R. Cooper, & J. A. Haas (Eds.), Managing for accomplishment. Lexington, MA: Heath. Rotter, J. B. (1954). Social learning and clinical psychology. New York: Prentice-Hall. Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80,(1, Whole No. 609). Rotter, J. B., & Muhy, R. C. (1%5). Internal versus external control of reinforcement and decision time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2, 598-604. Spector, P. E. (1982). Behavior in organizations as a function of employee’s locus of control. Psychological Bulletin, 91, 482-497. Thompson, S. C. (1981). Will it hurt less if I can control it? A complex answer to a simple question. Psychological Bulletin, 90, 89-101.