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Towards establishing an International Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents Database (HIAD)
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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 98–107 www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp
Towards establishing an International Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents Database (HIAD) C. Kirchsteigera,, A.L. Vetere Arellanoa, E. Funnemarkb a
European Commission, DG JRC, Institute for Energy, Westerduinweg 3, 1755 LE, Petten, Netherlands b DNV Consulting, Veritasveien, 1322 Høvik, Norway Received 19 June 2006; received in revised form 18 October 2006; accepted 18 October 2006
Abstract This paper describes the need for, and objectives of the European Hydrogen Incident and Accident Database (HIAD). This web-based Information System is currently being developed by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (Institute for Energy) and Det Norske Veritas (DNV). The background, design principles and operating regime are described. The result is a conceptually new and innovative event database approach. Instead of standard industrial accident database tool, HIAD is a collaborative and communicative process in the form of an open web-based Information System. This, to promote and communicate safety actions taken by industrial and other partners as a consequence of hydrogen-related incidents and accidents. r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Hydrogen; Risk; Communication; Participation; Governance; Lessons learning
1. Rationale Public awareness about hydrogen has increased again in the last couple of years, as an alternative source of energy. Contributions to this increased awareness have been a cocktail of issues (political, economical, environmental, etc.). First of all, from a political standpoint, on 25 June 2003 the European Union and the United States agreed to cooperate on building momentum towards the creation of the hydrogen economy.1 Fig. 1 shows a scheme of the Hydrogen Economy. This triggered, the launch of the campaign strongly promoted by Romano Prodi, the former President of the European Commission (European Commission, 2004). The search for alternative energy sources is also favoured by the world’s strong dependence on oil and gas, which are found mainly in difficult regions of the world (Middle East, Caucasus, Russia), where security of supply cannot be continuously guaranteed. This is also intricately linked to dynamic markets that are sensitive to recent geopolitical Corresponding author. 1
E-mail address: [email protected] (C. Kirchsteiger). http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030625-6.html.
0950-4230/$ - see front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2006.10.004
developments in these regions that resulted in the rising oil and gas prices, which in turn increased electricity prices. Such events, although far away, directly affect all publics and thus, raise their awareness on our gradually decreasing traditional energy resources. These publics demand solutions from governments to address them, who in turn look to experts for advice on new technologies. Another contribution to the increased awareness on alternative energy sources, such as hydrogen, is the world’s awareness on climate change and sustainable development, which increased momentum in the search and support for cleaner technologies. The European Union has committed itself to the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in order to contribute in reducing green house gas emissions.2 As hydrogen would be a clean energy source, coordinated research efforts have increased to support the development of hydrogen-related technologies. An example for this concerted effort in Europe is the Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Platform, which was established ‘‘to facilitate and accelerate the development and deployment of 2
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/kyoto.htm.
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Fig. 1. The Hydrogen economy [taken from RTD Info No. 42 (European Commission, 2004)].
cost-competitive, world class European hydrogen and fuel cell-based energy systems and component technologies for applications in transport, stationary and portable power’’.3 A further visible expression of increased awareness on hydrogen is the appearance of popular literature in bookshops (Hoffmann, 2002; Kunstler, 2005; Rifkin, 2002), where the first two books are quite favourable towards the realisation of this hydrogen economy. The third book by Kunstler claims ‘‘in the Long Emergency4 there will be no hoped-for hydrogen economy’’. Moreover, the petroleum industry, along with other industries, such as natural gas, nuclear and chemical, have processes that deal with hydrogen. In light of the abovementioned observations regarding reasons for increased awareness on hydrogen, there are also techno-economical discussions on the use of hydrogen derived from these industries. As a result of this, coupled with the publics’ environmental concerns, nowadays, it is also possible to observe the ‘‘greening’’ of petroleum companies, who are investing in renewable energies too, including hydrogen.5 In addition, also the transport industry has increased investments in hydrogen-powered vehicles, as a contribution to efforts in decreasing green house gas emissions.6 3
https://www.hfpeurope.org/hfp/about_hfp. According to Kunstler the Long Emergency implies the ‘‘abyss of economic and political disorder on a scale that no one has ever seen before’’, i.e. his vision of the future, if no action is taken. 5 Shell: http://www.shell.com/home/Framework?siteId=hydrogen-en; BP: http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9007644& contentId=7014506; ExxonMobil: http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/ Campaign/Campaign_energysaving_fuels.asp; Total: http://www.total.com/en/ corporate-social-responsibility/Challenges_actions/Future-Energy/new-energyvectors_9066.htm; Agip/Eni: http://www.eni.it/eniit/eni/internal.do?cate goryId=-1073754689&RID=@252A4|0?xoidcmWopk&fromSearch=true &menu=true&lang=en&sessionId=3753433. 6 BMW: http://www.bmwworld.com/hydrogen; Toyota: http:// www.toyota.com/about/environment/technology/fuelcell_hybrid.html; 4
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Against this background, it is inevitable that improved hydrogen risk governance will be required to address safety and security issues, as hydrogen technologies develop and interface more and more with the publics. An important tool that can contribute towards improved risk governance is the incident and accident repository system. Any effective industrial risk management is aimed at preventing major accidents and limiting their consequences. In order to reduce or eliminate accidents, incidents and hazardous conditions, it is acknowledged in most industries that it is of utmost importance to learn from past incidents and accidents to prevent them from happening in the future and to mitigate their consequences. In other words, an important part of the work towards achieving effective risk control is by learning from past events. This must also be complemented with risk communication and public participation processes. Based on the above-portrayed rationale, this paper will first describe some possible risks of hydrogen and other fuels, followed by a section on learning from accidents. The next section is dedicated to a description of hydrogen risks, along with some comparisons to other fuels. A section follows this on the importance of communication and participation in risk governance. Finally, the objectives and establishment of a European Hydrogen Incident and Accident Database (HIAD), which is currently being developed by the European Commission Joint Research Centre’s Institute for Energy (EC-JRC), in partnership with Det Norske Veritas (DNV) are illustrated.
2. Risks of hydrogen and other fuels Hydrogen.gov, which is the United States government’s central source of information on hydrogen-related research, explains that ‘‘hydrogen has been handled safely in large quantities for many years. It is used in spacecraft, in the foods and electronics industries, and in industrial applications such as petrochemical production’’ (2006). Although statistics on hydrogen events are not easily accessible, there is a significant amount of hydrogen hazard information accessible on the Internet and in literature. Zalosh and Short (1978a, 1978b) carried out a comparative analysis in the industrial sector and discovered that the three main types hydrogen-related incidents are undetected leaks, hydrogen–oxygen off-gassing explosions and piping and pressure vessel ruptures. The results of their work were also used in NASA’s Safety Standard of 1997.7 Hydrogen incidents in ammonia plants were related to oil leaks, equipment flanges and piping flanges (Williams, 1978), whilst in the aerospace industry, a quarter of the incidents occurred in closed spaces (Ordin, 1974). (footnote continued) Volvo: http://www.greencar.com/index.cfm?content=news&ArticleID= 152. 7 Although this report was cancelled on 25 July 2005, the information on hydrogen-related hazards is still valid.
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According to Wilson (2003), in closed or poorly ventilated areas, hydrogen ‘‘is not inherently safe because it rapidly disperses up and away from its source’’. Installing ‘‘hydrogen and fire detection sensors’’, which are strategically placed above hydrogen-related equipment, can circumvent this. Ogden (2006) explains that ‘‘although hydrogen is flammable, it has a higher ignition temperature than gasoline and disperses in the air much more quickly, reducing the risk of fire’’. Notwithstanding, she also admits that hydrogen offers a wider range of concentrations for which it is flammable, compared to other fuels (see Table 1). Moreover, flames from large-scale hydrogen fires can be scorching hot on contact and can rapidly cause significant damage of anything in its vicinity. According to Lovins (2003), a hydrogen ‘‘explosion requires at least twice as rich a mixture y as of natural gas, though yitsy explosive potential continues to a fourfold higher upper limit’’. But Table 1 shows slightly different values, i.e., that hydrogen has an upper explosive limit that is almost five times higher than methane, the main component of natural gas. It also compares the lower and upper limits of explosion of four types of fuels hydrogen, methane, diesel and gasoline (Wikipedia, 2006 [with data from Lide, 1991; KOSHA, 2006; MSDS, 2006]). In addition, the table confirms Lovins’ statement ‘‘ignition also requires a fourfold higher minimum concentration of hydrogen than of gasoline vapour’’. Thus, it has been observed in many cases of hydrogen leaks that led to ignition, there had been no explosions but only burning (Lovins, 2003). Additionally, hydrogen can ignite and explode quite easily in enclosures, as it needs 14 times less energy than natural gas. However, as its explosive power per unit volume of gas is 22 times weaker than that of gasoline vapour, whilst in the open air, where it is unconfined and quickly dilutes itself (being lighter than air), the risk of ignition and explosion significantly decreases (Lovins, 2003). Hydrogen explosions at high pressures can be very devastating, causing immense fires. However, in practice, such explosions are often the result of a complex interaction between several gaseous hydrocarbons mixed with hydrogen. Such fires are difficult to overcome, but if hydrocarbons are present, fire fighters are able to deal with them relatively better (Wilson, 2003). Furthermore, it has been reported that the hydrogen manufacturing industry have very few and minor incidents (Lovins, 2003; Ogden, 2006; Wilson, 2003), thus claims of a
good safety record have been made. This is because efforts have been made to minimise the exposure of employees (Wilson, 2003). On the other hand, in the hydrogen user industry (oil refineries, ammonia plants, aerospace industry), there seem to be more incidents observed. It has also been reported that compressor fires or explosions usually go unreported (Wilson, 2003). In spite of the above-mentioned challenges related to hydrogen that surely needs to be addressed by further studies, we cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that all types of fuels (gasoline, diesel fuel, natural gas, liquid petroleum gas (LPG), oil) can be harmful to man. For hydrogen, NASA proposes to distinguish between three types of harm: physiological—frostbite, respiratory ailment, and asphyxiation; physical—phase changes, component failures, and embrittlement; and chemical—ignition and burning (1997), some of which can also be extended to the other fuels. In addition, their manufacturing contributes significantly to pollution and increasing greenhouse gas emissions. For these reasons, amongst others, such fuels should be managed (produced, transported, stored) addressing their specific physical properties, their related technical equipment and their related organisational and operational procedures. Like for the other fuels, ‘‘hydrogen’s safety y is a function of engineering and safe practice’’. Furthermore, its ‘‘safe use y requires preventing volatile combinations of the three combustion factors–ignition source (spark or heat), oxidant (air), and fuel’’ (Hydrogen.gov, 2006). With the combination of increased investment in research and consequent support for deployment in markets accompanied by a strong awareness campaign, the future could be bright for hydrogen as it is a fuel that would not pollute the environment and not harm people, if carefully handled using necessary precautions; it would be plentiful widely available for all. We must recognise that we have learned to use gasoline and other fuels safely, and do so daily. As long as we use best knowledge and practice in our methods of production, storage and use of hydrogen, we will experience comparable safety as with fossil fuels, with the additional benefit of fewer health and environmental hazards when hydrogen-related incidents do occur. 3. Learning from accidents Both the EC-JRC and DNV have a long track record with regards to database management of accidents, either
Table 1 Lower explosion limit (LEL) and upper explosion limit (UEL) of four types of fuels: hydrogen, methane, diesel and gasoline (wikipedia, 2006) Substance
LEL (%)
UEL (%)
UEL–LEL (%)
Hydrogen Methane Diesel fuel Gasoline
4.10 5.00 0.60 1.40
74.80 15 7.50 7.60
70.70 10.00 6.90 6.20
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on an EU-funded (and thus publicly accessible) or on a commercial basis. JRC has extensive experience with European public databases, such as MARS,8 ECCAIRS9 and NEDIES,10 whilst DNV deals with WOAD11 on a consultant basis. Initiatives have been taken in many countries around the world since a long time to provide industry, governmental and research institutions with high quality information on past accidents as a means of future accident prevention. Databases containing information on accidents consist of specific sets of data variables describing causes, circumstances, evolution and consequences of past accidents and are designed to meet several objectives, often complementing each other (Kirchsteiger, 1998):
to look at compliance with regulations, codes of practice and standards, to assist national and international regulators, financial and insurance companies to formulate proactive policies, to help to identify whether current emergency procedures are appropriate, to improve total quality management of safety and training of operators and managers, to develop research projects for understanding of hazardous phenomena, hazardous situations and accident initiating events, to improve public information on risk issues, to identify relevant accident scenarios, to identify deficiencies in design/operation of hazardous installations and transportation systems, to assist consultants in their tasks dealing with safety cases and experts in accident investigations, to develop quality aspects for data and software, to collect information on equipment failure, etc.
In summary, industrial accident databases are important tools for
assisting in the formulation of new regulations and principles in safety, emergency and land use planning,
8 Major Accident Reporting System: ‘‘established to handle the information on ’major accidents’ submitted by Member States of the European Union to the European Commission in accordance with the provisions of the ’Seveso Directive’’’. See http://mahbsrv.jrc.it/mars/Default.html. 9 European Co-ordination Centre for Aviation Incident Reporting Systems: aims ‘‘to integrate information from aviation occurrence reporting systems running in the authorities of the various EU member states’’. See http://eccairs-www.jrc.it/Start.asp. 10 Natural and Environmental Disaster and Information Exchange System: was created ‘‘to support the Commission Services of the European Community, Member State Authorities and European Organisations and the citizens in their efforts to prevent and prepare for natural and technological non-Seveso disasters and to manage their consequences’’. See http:// nedies.jrc.it. 11 Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank: database that ‘‘includes details of accident sequences for total losses and accidents causing significant damage to the offshore units, major hydrocarbon releases, and fatal accidents’’. See http://www.dnv.be/consulting/safetyhealthenvironment/ software/woad.asp
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coping with ‘‘what-if’’ requests from the public, industrial management boards and governmental institutions, assisting in risk analysis, as a J qualitative tool in identifying relevant accident scenarios, J quantitative tool in producing estimates of event frequencies.
The latter point, generation of frequency estimates for Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), can usually not be accomplished by industrial accidents databases due to missing information on the underlying equipment/system ‘‘population data’’, but is the objective of reliability databases. What such databases are usually mostly used for is to analyse the incidents and accidents recorded, identify lessons learned from them, and disseminate the resulting knowledge throughout the Community to prevent a recurrence of similar accidents. Such feedback is of high value in terms of identifying where there are needs to make further improvements in safety, health and environmental protection. 4. Importance of participation and communication in risk governance In this first decade of the 21st Century, it can be said that we are all citizens of a ‘‘risk society’’ where ‘‘consequences of scientific and industrial development are a set of risks and hazards’’ that demand a ‘‘reflexive’’ approach when dealing with different forms of knowledge. In this reflexive learning process, stakeholders negotiate different epistemologies and discourses interactively amongst themselves (Beck, 1992; Craye, Funtowicz, & van der Sluijs, 2005). This risk governance approach to reach ‘‘reflexive modernity’’ is Beck’s third stage of social change required to address our dynamic risk landscape. In other words, there is a need to shift from the more traditional science-based risk governance practice where decision-making strictly depends on hard scientific facts (Cross, 1998) to a more participatory approach where diversity of experiences, knowledge and values are captured (Guimara˜es Pereira, 2006). From another perspective, we should move from the uncritical puzzle solving within an unquestioned ‘‘paradigm’’ of ‘‘normal science’’ (Kuhn, 1962) to the management of complex science-related issues of ‘‘post-normal science’’12 (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). The issue of communication is intricately linked with governance. Communication in this paper implies processes to improve the different publics’ understanding and perception of hydrogen-related matters, such as access to 12 Elements of post-normal science are: appropriate management of uncertainty, quality and value-ladenness; plurality of commitments and perspectives; internal extension of peer community, i.e. involvement of other disciplines; external extension of peer community, i.e. involvement of stakeholders in environmental assessment & quality control (van der Sluijs, 2006).
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information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, as promoted by the Aarhus Convention.13 Access to information entails collection, analysis and quality assurance of information; public participation connotes multi-stakeholder inter action and discussion of risks, benefits and uncertainties, along with Beck’s reflexive learning process; access to justice includes awareness of citizens’ rights, building of their trust and access to administrative or judicial procedures. It is against this backdrop, that the philosophy behind the HIAD was inspired. HIAD will collect hydrogenrelated information, analyse such information in partnership with other stakeholders (industry, academia, regulators, etc.), thus, promoting the participation of any interested party, and will liaise with decision-makers. Section 6 of this paper provides a more detailed description of HIAD. 5. HySafe—an EU-funded network on hydrogen safety Under the European Union’s 6th Framework Research Programme, a Network of Excellence project named HySafe14—Safety of Hydrogen as an Energy Carrier has been established since 2004. The HySafe network focuses on safety issues relevant to improve and co-ordinate the knowledge and understanding of hydrogen safety and support the safe and efficient introduction and commercialisation of hydrogen as an energy carrier of the future, including the related hydrogen applications. The overall goal of HySafe is to contribute to the safe transition to a more sustainable development in Europe by facilitating the safe introduction of hydrogen technologies and applications. A number of work packages were defined with the participation of 25 partners. One specific work package is devoted to the development of an international HIAD. HIAD is defined to be one of the Integrating Activities of HySafe and of any succeeding entity, and thereby having a central position in the European Network. HIAD will become a major tool for communication of risks associated with hydrogen and preventive/mitigative safety measure taken to all Network partners and interested parties beyond, incl. the general public. For all persons involved in risk management, it is realised that learning from past accidents and incidents helps you to prevent them in the future. Hence, this shows the importance of having access to databases holding accident and incident information. The use of incident databases as a management tool provides an opportunity for organisations to: check its performance, learn from its mistakes, and improve its management systems and risk control. Knowledge of events having the potential for inducing hazardous situa13
Adopted in Aarhus, Denmark on 25 June 1998 (http://www. unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf). 14 http://www.hysafe.org
tions will also contribute to the corporate learning and memory. More specifically, HIAD, within the HySafe project will:
contribute to the integration and harmonization of fragmented experience and knowledge on hydrogen safety in Europe and international across professions and countries; contribute to the progress in common understanding of hydrogen safety and risk; which are the hazards, causes and consequences of accidents/incidents associated with hydrogen; be a harmonised tool for safety and risk assessment associated with hydrogen applications by providing input to analyses and safety management work; enable generation of common generic accident and incident statistics; serve as a common methodology and reference format for future hydrogen incident/accident data collection and storage; be a source for the understanding and experience transfer of hydrogen accident phenomena, scenarios and hazard potential; what are the hazards; what can go wrong, how and why do accidents/incidents develop, etc.
And last but not least, HIAD is intended to keep all stakeholders (authorities, public, research, industry) updated and informed with recent accidents/incidents involving the use of hydrogen, thus contributing to spread of knowledge and best practice as well as to building up a realistic perception of the risks related to use of hydrogen in industrial applications. HIAD will, when fully operative, be a central European and international reporting regime. The HIAD database structure and operating regime has been developed by JRC and DNV during the years 2004–2006 as described in the next chapters of this paper. 6. Main characteristics and operating regime of HIAD The overall purpose of HIAD is to assist all stakeholders in better understanding the relevance of hydrogen-related incidents and accidents as well as the safety actions taken and to provide a methodology to contribute towards improving hydrogen-related risk assessment and management. It is important to highlight that HIAD is not a standard industrial accident database tool but a collaborative and communicative process in the form of an open web-based Information System to promote safety actions taken by industrial and other partners following hydrogen-related events (similar to the US Department of Energy funded ‘‘H2 incidents’’ database15). 15
http://www.h2incidents.org.
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Fig. 2. HIAD timeline overview.
The reasons for this new and innovative approach to the more practiced ‘‘classical’’ alternative are the following: 6.1. From a general risk governance standpoint
Traditional databases are relatively more static and reductionist in style, whilst HIAD aims to be more dynamic through procedures that will promote user interaction and that will be open to existing ‘‘science and technology–environment–society’’ interfaces. These procedures will be identified during the duration of HySafe, but will become fully operational in the post-HySafe phase. Classical databases do not have ‘‘community-building’’ in their agenda. HIAD aims to promote the abovementioned reflexive learning process (see Section 4). The Authors are aware that this implies the continuation of the HIAD process beyond the life of the HySafe Network of Excellence. The majority of existing databases still ‘‘house’’ information strictly related to risks from a ‘‘hazards and consequences’’. HIAD aims to also include multidimensional uncertainties, along with benefits, in order to provide a more holistic and dynamic picture.
6.2. From a hydrogen-specific standpoint
There is currently no European or other international legislation, which would make it mandatory to report hydrogen-related incidents and accidents to a closed, partly open or open user group. Therefore, a classical
database reporting scheme with a group of data providers and a set of obligations put together in Terms of Reference does not work for HIAD at this stage of the project. Further, as we are dealing here with a still largely new and rapidly developing technology (with related risks, benefits and uncertainties), it is a challenge to have access to existing knowledge; therefore, again, a classical ‘‘lessons learnt from accidents’’ type of database does not work for the case of HIAD. HIAD is a process that also aims to promote trust amongst users.
Consequently, JRC and DNV chose a conceptually different approach for developing and operating HIAD as portrayed in Fig. 2 below. To summarise, within the HySafe project life, HIAD aims to: (1) Collect information on hydrogen-related events: A flexible web-based architecture, with a user-friendly interface will be created to collect information on hydrogen-related events. Initially, this information will come from publicly available open sources (Trustbuilding Phase). In the long-term (after HySafe period, when HIAD is expected to run without HySafe funding), a common user-driven methodology of data collection is envisaged, supported by endorsement from a User Working Group (Trust-acquired Phase). (2) Provide stakeholders with unbiased information hydrogen-related events: During the Trust-building Phase, information on events from open source will be collected and put together. Industrial and other
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partners within HySafe are encouraged to report their own versions of the same events in order to highlight (their) safety actions taken and illustrate differences in risk perception from different sources. Thus, ‘‘unbiased’’ information will be made available to stakeholders as an outcome of a communicative process. During this phase, the stakeholders will be limited to those identified by the HySafe Consortium. However, it is envisaged that during the Trust-acquired Phase, HIAD will be made available to a wider range of interest groups (operators, authorities, general public, etc.). (3) Communicate information on hydrogen-related events: Lessons learned, good practice, etc. are valuable information that could be derived from HIAD. Thus, during the Trust-building Phase, information from open source will be analysed anonymously and communicated to all interested users, including the HySafe Consortium. During the Trust-acquired Phase, HIAD will provide a more targeted service that spans various interest groups (operators, authorities, public, etc.). The threshold for including an event in HIAD is only that the event has any relation with hydrogen. 6.3. HIAD database structure The main challenge when specifying HIAD was to develop a tool that should serve various purposes such as being a data source for risk assessments, experience transfer and risk communication. In addition it should be easy to use, the user friendliness encompassing the tasks of recording and extraction of information/data by having a modern user interface, was given high priority. The planned user/system interface is shown graphically in Fig. 3. The HIAD event report format should be such that the information held by HIAD should be relevant for risk assessment exercises and related modelling development work. In addition, the information recorded for each event should be such that it serves the objective of corporate learning about risks and safety related to hydrogen applications. Details about each field being defined to be included in each of the six blocks are outlined in full (Funnemark, Kirchsteiger, & Vetere Arellano, 2005). Recording of information in the various database fields will be through a combination of pre-defined option lists (drop-down or tick-box types) and free text. The resulting six building blocks of the HIAD event report form are shown in Table 2 with some field examples. Regarding HIAD information block 3 (nature of event), relevant details should be given for each event in the defined chain of events, which constitutes the full accident scenario. The required input is depending on the type of event, as shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 3. HIAD user/system interface.
6.4. Data collection and quality assurance: As described above, in the initial Trust-Building Phase, data are collected from JRC, DNV and other HySafe partners from public reports, Internet news and other sources. This information is then transformed by JRC and DNV into ‘‘short versions’’ of HIAD event reports, the draft unverified report can be commented by the HySafe Consortium (ideally the risk source owner, i.e. mostly industry) before it is becoming a final unverified report stored in HIAD and accessible to all HIAD users. In the ensuing Trust-Acquired Phase,16 risk source owners themselves insert the necessary information, directly in the webbased HIAD application, which is then being subject to Quality Assurance by DNV and JRC. A final qualified report is then accessible to all HIAD users via the webbased application. In other words, information on hydrogen incidents and accidents becomes qualified as soon as the risk source owners themselves compile it (see Fig. 5). The detailed description of the post-HySafe procedural framework is not the object of this paper.
6.5. Operation of HIAD: The above Figs. 1 and 4 essentially define the operational process of HIAD. As mentioned, the HIAD Process is divided into three phases:
pre-operation, limited operational, operational.
16
The Trust-Acquired Phase connotes a dynamic process where participation, deliberation and interaction amongst stakeholders are paramount for the HIAD process.
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Table 2 HIAD event report building blocks 1. HIAD administration
Event coding Information sources Dates of entry and last revision HIAD operator and data provider details
2. Pre-event conditions
Event details Weather details Scenario details Technical details
3. Nature of event
Event nature summary Systems and components affected/involved Emergency action and evaluation Chain of events Causal relations Safety systems Releases Leak hole characteristics Ignition details Explosion details
4. Consequences of event
Consequences on people (injured and fatalities) Other consequences (physical, environment and economical costs; cost of emergency response actions)
5. Post-event actions
Clean-up and restoration Event investigation Research investment Legal and other official actions Preventive actions Emergency improvements Risk awareness Lessons learned
6. References
Hyperlinks/references to files and documents, websites, etc. Specification of attachments, e.g. maps, drawings, photos, etc.
Chain of events:
Type of event
Equipment/system failed/affected/damaged
Cause(s)
Release specification
Leak hole specification
Ignition details
Details/specification of fire
Safety systems / mitigation
Explosion/detonation details
Event 1
Give input in each information box if and when applicable. E.g. if only a release occurs and no fire, fire and ignition details are not applicable
Event 2
Fig. 4. Illustration of HIAD input requirements for chain of events.
6.6. Data confidentiality aspects Efforts were made by JRC and DNV to formalise the issues of data confidentiality and at the initial stage of the development of HIAD. The HySafe Consortium partners
(especially the ones from industry) found this approach was too formal, and thus signing such an agreement was found impossible. Hence, the selected solution as described above is intended to assure that all HySafe partners will contribute to the work with populating HIAD, and thereby overcoming the issue of confidentiality.
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Fig. 5. HIAD process.
7. Next steps towards finalisation of HIAD Because of its previous experience with the development and operation of similar EU level event databases, it was agreed within the HySafe consortium that JRC-IE, Petten, would perform the software development. The HIAD software solution is ready for use on the Internet (see: https://odin.jrc.nl 17). Soon thereafter, the database will be populated with past events, along with quality assurance of the input. Quality assurance will be supported by the establishment of a HIAD Working Group, which will be a multi-disciplinary and multi-user group to ensure a continuous peer-reviewing of both the HIAD methodology and results based on the analysis of the information collected. The identification of potential data sources and preliminary data collection has already commenced some time ago in parallel with the software development. Next, provisions will be made to enable interested parties to populate HIAD with new hydrogen events on a continuous basis’’. Although this paper focuses mainly in HIAD as a product that collects hydrogen-related information that is made accessible to all publics, the authors would like to highlight that HIAD is a process that is intended to continue after the HySafe project. It is based on an overall risk governance philosophy that will hopefully be disseminated and utilised in future when dealing with various 17 You must first subscribe to ODIN and then you will be able to access HIAD.
different types of risks, not only the ones related to the use of hydrogen in industrial applications. References Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity (theory, culture and society series). 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road, London, EC1Y 1SP, UK: Sage Publications Ltd. Craye, M., Funtowicz, S. O., & van der Sluijs, J. P. (2005). A reflexive approach to dealing with uncertainties in environmental health risk science and policy. International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management, 5(2/3/4), 216–236. Cross, F. B. (1998). Facts and values in risk assessment. In , Reliability engineering and system safety, Vol. 59 (pp. 27–40). Northern Ireland: Elsevier Science Ltd. European Commission (2004). Sustainable energy: The hydrogen fairy— The legacy of Romano Prodi, RTD Info No. 42, August 2004. Available at: /http://ec.europa.eu/research/rtdinfo/42/01/article_1316_en.htmlS Funnemark, E., Kirchsteiger, C., & Vetere Arellano, A. L. (2005). Deliverable No 22: HIAD Specification and definition of its contents, operation and structure. Report within Safety of Hydrogen as an Energy Carrier (HySafe) Project, co-funded by the European Commission within the sixth framework programme (2002–2006), Contract No SES6-CT-2004-502630. Funtowicz, S. O., & Ravetz, J. R. (1993). Science for the post-normal age. Futures, 25(7), 739–755. Guimara˜es Pereira, A. (2006). Public participation methods. Lecture slides presented at the e-Knowledge Assessment Methodologies course. European Commission Joint Research Centre Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen, 2–6 October 2006. Available at: /http://www.bimtas.com.tr/istbdo.htmlS. Hoffmann, P. (2002). Tomorrow’s energy: Hydrogen, fuel cells, and the prospects for a cleaner planet. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA: MIT Press. Hydrogen.gov (2006). /http://www.hydrogen.gov/safety.htmlS.
ARTICLE IN PRESS C. Kirchsteiger et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 98–107 Kirchsteiger, C. (1998). Lessons learnt from accidents. In Proceedings of a seminar held on 16–17 October, 1997. Organised by the European Commission, European Process Safety Centre and Bundesministerium fu¨r wirtschaftliche Angelegenheiten. European Commission, DG JRC, EUR 17733 EN. Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago 60637, USA: University of Chicago Press. Kunstler, J. H. (2005). The long emergency: Surviving the converging catastrophes of the twenty-first century. 841 Broadway New York, NY 10003, USA: Atlantic Monthly Press. Lovins, A. B. (2003). Twenty Hydrogen Myths. Rocky Mountain Institute, USA Available on: /http://www.rmi.org/images/other/Energy/E0305_20HydrogenMyths.pdf#search=%22%22twenty%20hydrogen%20myths%22%22S. Lide, D. R. (1991). CRC handbook of chemistry and physics (72nd ed). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press; 1991. Material Safety Data Sheet—MSDS (2006). /http://www.msdssearch. comS. Korea Occupational Safety & Health Agency—KOSHA (2006). /http:// www.kosha.netS. National Aeronautics and Space Administration—NASA (1997). Safety standard for hydrogen and hydrogen systems—Guidelines for Hydrogen System Design. Materials Selection, Operations Storage, and Transportation. Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, Washington, DC 20546, USA. Available at: /http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/ doctree/canceled/871916.pdf#search=%22hydrogen%20safety%22S.
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Ogden, J. (2006). High hopes for hydrogen. In Scientific American, special issue: Energy’s future beyond carbon (pp. 94–101). September 2006. Ordin, P. M. (1974). A review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations. In ninth intersociety energy conversion engineering conference. New York: ASME. Rifkin, J. (2002). The hydrogen economy. 375 Hudson Street, New York, NT 10014, USA: Penguin Group (USA) Inc. van der Sluijs, J. P. (2006). Knowledge quality assessment in the sciencepolicy interface. Lecture slides presented at the e-Knowledge assessment methodologies course, European Commission Joint Research Centre Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen, 2–6 October 2006. Wikipedia, (2006). /http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lower_explosive_limitS. Williams, G. P. (1978). Causes of ammonia plant shutdowns. Chemical Engineering Progress, 74(9). Wilson, J. R. (2003). The truth about hydrogen (A Response to Amory Lovins’ ‘‘Twenty Hydrogen Myths’’). TMG/The Management Group, P.O. Box 36250, Grosse Pointe, MI 48236, USA. Available on: /http://www.tmgtech.com/images/Truth_about_Hydrogen_Myths_ Response_-_v4.1.docS. Zalosh, R. G., & Short, T. P. (1978a). Comparative analysis of hydrogen fires and explosion incidents. Norwood, MA, USA: C00-4442-2, Factory Mutual Research Corp. Zalosh, R. G., & Short, T. P. (1978b). Compilation and analysis of hydrogen accident reports. Norwood, MA, USA: C00-4442-4, Factory Mutual Research Corp.
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 98–107 www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp
Towards establishing an International Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents Database (HIAD) C. Kirchsteigera,, A.L. Vetere Arellanoa, E. Funnemarkb a
European Commission, DG JRC, Institute for Energy, Westerduinweg 3, 1755 LE, Petten, Netherlands b DNV Consulting, Veritasveien, 1322 Høvik, Norway Received 19 June 2006; received in revised form 18 October 2006; accepted 18 October 2006
Abstract This paper describes the need for, and objectives of the European Hydrogen Incident and Accident Database (HIAD). This web-based Information System is currently being developed by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (Institute for Energy) and Det Norske Veritas (DNV). The background, design principles and operating regime are described. The result is a conceptually new and innovative event database approach. Instead of standard industrial accident database tool, HIAD is a collaborative and communicative process in the form of an open web-based Information System. This, to promote and communicate safety actions taken by industrial and other partners as a consequence of hydrogen-related incidents and accidents. r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Hydrogen; Risk; Communication; Participation; Governance; Lessons learning
1. Rationale Public awareness about hydrogen has increased again in the last couple of years, as an alternative source of energy. Contributions to this increased awareness have been a cocktail of issues (political, economical, environmental, etc.). First of all, from a political standpoint, on 25 June 2003 the European Union and the United States agreed to cooperate on building momentum towards the creation of the hydrogen economy.1 Fig. 1 shows a scheme of the Hydrogen Economy. This triggered, the launch of the campaign strongly promoted by Romano Prodi, the former President of the European Commission (European Commission, 2004). The search for alternative energy sources is also favoured by the world’s strong dependence on oil and gas, which are found mainly in difficult regions of the world (Middle East, Caucasus, Russia), where security of supply cannot be continuously guaranteed. This is also intricately linked to dynamic markets that are sensitive to recent geopolitical Corresponding author. 1
E-mail address: [email protected] (C. Kirchsteiger). http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030625-6.html.
0950-4230/$ - see front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2006.10.004
developments in these regions that resulted in the rising oil and gas prices, which in turn increased electricity prices. Such events, although far away, directly affect all publics and thus, raise their awareness on our gradually decreasing traditional energy resources. These publics demand solutions from governments to address them, who in turn look to experts for advice on new technologies. Another contribution to the increased awareness on alternative energy sources, such as hydrogen, is the world’s awareness on climate change and sustainable development, which increased momentum in the search and support for cleaner technologies. The European Union has committed itself to the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in order to contribute in reducing green house gas emissions.2 As hydrogen would be a clean energy source, coordinated research efforts have increased to support the development of hydrogen-related technologies. An example for this concerted effort in Europe is the Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Platform, which was established ‘‘to facilitate and accelerate the development and deployment of 2
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/kyoto.htm.
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Fig. 1. The Hydrogen economy [taken from RTD Info No. 42 (European Commission, 2004)].
cost-competitive, world class European hydrogen and fuel cell-based energy systems and component technologies for applications in transport, stationary and portable power’’.3 A further visible expression of increased awareness on hydrogen is the appearance of popular literature in bookshops (Hoffmann, 2002; Kunstler, 2005; Rifkin, 2002), where the first two books are quite favourable towards the realisation of this hydrogen economy. The third book by Kunstler claims ‘‘in the Long Emergency4 there will be no hoped-for hydrogen economy’’. Moreover, the petroleum industry, along with other industries, such as natural gas, nuclear and chemical, have processes that deal with hydrogen. In light of the abovementioned observations regarding reasons for increased awareness on hydrogen, there are also techno-economical discussions on the use of hydrogen derived from these industries. As a result of this, coupled with the publics’ environmental concerns, nowadays, it is also possible to observe the ‘‘greening’’ of petroleum companies, who are investing in renewable energies too, including hydrogen.5 In addition, also the transport industry has increased investments in hydrogen-powered vehicles, as a contribution to efforts in decreasing green house gas emissions.6 3
https://www.hfpeurope.org/hfp/about_hfp. According to Kunstler the Long Emergency implies the ‘‘abyss of economic and political disorder on a scale that no one has ever seen before’’, i.e. his vision of the future, if no action is taken. 5 Shell: http://www.shell.com/home/Framework?siteId=hydrogen-en; BP: http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9007644& contentId=7014506; ExxonMobil: http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/ Campaign/Campaign_energysaving_fuels.asp; Total: http://www.total.com/en/ corporate-social-responsibility/Challenges_actions/Future-Energy/new-energyvectors_9066.htm; Agip/Eni: http://www.eni.it/eniit/eni/internal.do?cate goryId=-1073754689&RID=@252A4|0?xoidcmWopk&fromSearch=true &menu=true&lang=en&sessionId=3753433. 6 BMW: http://www.bmwworld.com/hydrogen; Toyota: http:// www.toyota.com/about/environment/technology/fuelcell_hybrid.html; 4
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Against this background, it is inevitable that improved hydrogen risk governance will be required to address safety and security issues, as hydrogen technologies develop and interface more and more with the publics. An important tool that can contribute towards improved risk governance is the incident and accident repository system. Any effective industrial risk management is aimed at preventing major accidents and limiting their consequences. In order to reduce or eliminate accidents, incidents and hazardous conditions, it is acknowledged in most industries that it is of utmost importance to learn from past incidents and accidents to prevent them from happening in the future and to mitigate their consequences. In other words, an important part of the work towards achieving effective risk control is by learning from past events. This must also be complemented with risk communication and public participation processes. Based on the above-portrayed rationale, this paper will first describe some possible risks of hydrogen and other fuels, followed by a section on learning from accidents. The next section is dedicated to a description of hydrogen risks, along with some comparisons to other fuels. A section follows this on the importance of communication and participation in risk governance. Finally, the objectives and establishment of a European Hydrogen Incident and Accident Database (HIAD), which is currently being developed by the European Commission Joint Research Centre’s Institute for Energy (EC-JRC), in partnership with Det Norske Veritas (DNV) are illustrated.
2. Risks of hydrogen and other fuels Hydrogen.gov, which is the United States government’s central source of information on hydrogen-related research, explains that ‘‘hydrogen has been handled safely in large quantities for many years. It is used in spacecraft, in the foods and electronics industries, and in industrial applications such as petrochemical production’’ (2006). Although statistics on hydrogen events are not easily accessible, there is a significant amount of hydrogen hazard information accessible on the Internet and in literature. Zalosh and Short (1978a, 1978b) carried out a comparative analysis in the industrial sector and discovered that the three main types hydrogen-related incidents are undetected leaks, hydrogen–oxygen off-gassing explosions and piping and pressure vessel ruptures. The results of their work were also used in NASA’s Safety Standard of 1997.7 Hydrogen incidents in ammonia plants were related to oil leaks, equipment flanges and piping flanges (Williams, 1978), whilst in the aerospace industry, a quarter of the incidents occurred in closed spaces (Ordin, 1974). (footnote continued) Volvo: http://www.greencar.com/index.cfm?content=news&ArticleID= 152. 7 Although this report was cancelled on 25 July 2005, the information on hydrogen-related hazards is still valid.
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According to Wilson (2003), in closed or poorly ventilated areas, hydrogen ‘‘is not inherently safe because it rapidly disperses up and away from its source’’. Installing ‘‘hydrogen and fire detection sensors’’, which are strategically placed above hydrogen-related equipment, can circumvent this. Ogden (2006) explains that ‘‘although hydrogen is flammable, it has a higher ignition temperature than gasoline and disperses in the air much more quickly, reducing the risk of fire’’. Notwithstanding, she also admits that hydrogen offers a wider range of concentrations for which it is flammable, compared to other fuels (see Table 1). Moreover, flames from large-scale hydrogen fires can be scorching hot on contact and can rapidly cause significant damage of anything in its vicinity. According to Lovins (2003), a hydrogen ‘‘explosion requires at least twice as rich a mixture y as of natural gas, though yitsy explosive potential continues to a fourfold higher upper limit’’. But Table 1 shows slightly different values, i.e., that hydrogen has an upper explosive limit that is almost five times higher than methane, the main component of natural gas. It also compares the lower and upper limits of explosion of four types of fuels hydrogen, methane, diesel and gasoline (Wikipedia, 2006 [with data from Lide, 1991; KOSHA, 2006; MSDS, 2006]). In addition, the table confirms Lovins’ statement ‘‘ignition also requires a fourfold higher minimum concentration of hydrogen than of gasoline vapour’’. Thus, it has been observed in many cases of hydrogen leaks that led to ignition, there had been no explosions but only burning (Lovins, 2003). Additionally, hydrogen can ignite and explode quite easily in enclosures, as it needs 14 times less energy than natural gas. However, as its explosive power per unit volume of gas is 22 times weaker than that of gasoline vapour, whilst in the open air, where it is unconfined and quickly dilutes itself (being lighter than air), the risk of ignition and explosion significantly decreases (Lovins, 2003). Hydrogen explosions at high pressures can be very devastating, causing immense fires. However, in practice, such explosions are often the result of a complex interaction between several gaseous hydrocarbons mixed with hydrogen. Such fires are difficult to overcome, but if hydrocarbons are present, fire fighters are able to deal with them relatively better (Wilson, 2003). Furthermore, it has been reported that the hydrogen manufacturing industry have very few and minor incidents (Lovins, 2003; Ogden, 2006; Wilson, 2003), thus claims of a
good safety record have been made. This is because efforts have been made to minimise the exposure of employees (Wilson, 2003). On the other hand, in the hydrogen user industry (oil refineries, ammonia plants, aerospace industry), there seem to be more incidents observed. It has also been reported that compressor fires or explosions usually go unreported (Wilson, 2003). In spite of the above-mentioned challenges related to hydrogen that surely needs to be addressed by further studies, we cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that all types of fuels (gasoline, diesel fuel, natural gas, liquid petroleum gas (LPG), oil) can be harmful to man. For hydrogen, NASA proposes to distinguish between three types of harm: physiological—frostbite, respiratory ailment, and asphyxiation; physical—phase changes, component failures, and embrittlement; and chemical—ignition and burning (1997), some of which can also be extended to the other fuels. In addition, their manufacturing contributes significantly to pollution and increasing greenhouse gas emissions. For these reasons, amongst others, such fuels should be managed (produced, transported, stored) addressing their specific physical properties, their related technical equipment and their related organisational and operational procedures. Like for the other fuels, ‘‘hydrogen’s safety y is a function of engineering and safe practice’’. Furthermore, its ‘‘safe use y requires preventing volatile combinations of the three combustion factors–ignition source (spark or heat), oxidant (air), and fuel’’ (Hydrogen.gov, 2006). With the combination of increased investment in research and consequent support for deployment in markets accompanied by a strong awareness campaign, the future could be bright for hydrogen as it is a fuel that would not pollute the environment and not harm people, if carefully handled using necessary precautions; it would be plentiful widely available for all. We must recognise that we have learned to use gasoline and other fuels safely, and do so daily. As long as we use best knowledge and practice in our methods of production, storage and use of hydrogen, we will experience comparable safety as with fossil fuels, with the additional benefit of fewer health and environmental hazards when hydrogen-related incidents do occur. 3. Learning from accidents Both the EC-JRC and DNV have a long track record with regards to database management of accidents, either
Table 1 Lower explosion limit (LEL) and upper explosion limit (UEL) of four types of fuels: hydrogen, methane, diesel and gasoline (wikipedia, 2006) Substance
LEL (%)
UEL (%)
UEL–LEL (%)
Hydrogen Methane Diesel fuel Gasoline
4.10 5.00 0.60 1.40
74.80 15 7.50 7.60
70.70 10.00 6.90 6.20
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on an EU-funded (and thus publicly accessible) or on a commercial basis. JRC has extensive experience with European public databases, such as MARS,8 ECCAIRS9 and NEDIES,10 whilst DNV deals with WOAD11 on a consultant basis. Initiatives have been taken in many countries around the world since a long time to provide industry, governmental and research institutions with high quality information on past accidents as a means of future accident prevention. Databases containing information on accidents consist of specific sets of data variables describing causes, circumstances, evolution and consequences of past accidents and are designed to meet several objectives, often complementing each other (Kirchsteiger, 1998):
to look at compliance with regulations, codes of practice and standards, to assist national and international regulators, financial and insurance companies to formulate proactive policies, to help to identify whether current emergency procedures are appropriate, to improve total quality management of safety and training of operators and managers, to develop research projects for understanding of hazardous phenomena, hazardous situations and accident initiating events, to improve public information on risk issues, to identify relevant accident scenarios, to identify deficiencies in design/operation of hazardous installations and transportation systems, to assist consultants in their tasks dealing with safety cases and experts in accident investigations, to develop quality aspects for data and software, to collect information on equipment failure, etc.
In summary, industrial accident databases are important tools for
assisting in the formulation of new regulations and principles in safety, emergency and land use planning,
8 Major Accident Reporting System: ‘‘established to handle the information on ’major accidents’ submitted by Member States of the European Union to the European Commission in accordance with the provisions of the ’Seveso Directive’’’. See http://mahbsrv.jrc.it/mars/Default.html. 9 European Co-ordination Centre for Aviation Incident Reporting Systems: aims ‘‘to integrate information from aviation occurrence reporting systems running in the authorities of the various EU member states’’. See http://eccairs-www.jrc.it/Start.asp. 10 Natural and Environmental Disaster and Information Exchange System: was created ‘‘to support the Commission Services of the European Community, Member State Authorities and European Organisations and the citizens in their efforts to prevent and prepare for natural and technological non-Seveso disasters and to manage their consequences’’. See http:// nedies.jrc.it. 11 Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank: database that ‘‘includes details of accident sequences for total losses and accidents causing significant damage to the offshore units, major hydrocarbon releases, and fatal accidents’’. See http://www.dnv.be/consulting/safetyhealthenvironment/ software/woad.asp
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coping with ‘‘what-if’’ requests from the public, industrial management boards and governmental institutions, assisting in risk analysis, as a J qualitative tool in identifying relevant accident scenarios, J quantitative tool in producing estimates of event frequencies.
The latter point, generation of frequency estimates for Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), can usually not be accomplished by industrial accidents databases due to missing information on the underlying equipment/system ‘‘population data’’, but is the objective of reliability databases. What such databases are usually mostly used for is to analyse the incidents and accidents recorded, identify lessons learned from them, and disseminate the resulting knowledge throughout the Community to prevent a recurrence of similar accidents. Such feedback is of high value in terms of identifying where there are needs to make further improvements in safety, health and environmental protection. 4. Importance of participation and communication in risk governance In this first decade of the 21st Century, it can be said that we are all citizens of a ‘‘risk society’’ where ‘‘consequences of scientific and industrial development are a set of risks and hazards’’ that demand a ‘‘reflexive’’ approach when dealing with different forms of knowledge. In this reflexive learning process, stakeholders negotiate different epistemologies and discourses interactively amongst themselves (Beck, 1992; Craye, Funtowicz, & van der Sluijs, 2005). This risk governance approach to reach ‘‘reflexive modernity’’ is Beck’s third stage of social change required to address our dynamic risk landscape. In other words, there is a need to shift from the more traditional science-based risk governance practice where decision-making strictly depends on hard scientific facts (Cross, 1998) to a more participatory approach where diversity of experiences, knowledge and values are captured (Guimara˜es Pereira, 2006). From another perspective, we should move from the uncritical puzzle solving within an unquestioned ‘‘paradigm’’ of ‘‘normal science’’ (Kuhn, 1962) to the management of complex science-related issues of ‘‘post-normal science’’12 (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). The issue of communication is intricately linked with governance. Communication in this paper implies processes to improve the different publics’ understanding and perception of hydrogen-related matters, such as access to 12 Elements of post-normal science are: appropriate management of uncertainty, quality and value-ladenness; plurality of commitments and perspectives; internal extension of peer community, i.e. involvement of other disciplines; external extension of peer community, i.e. involvement of stakeholders in environmental assessment & quality control (van der Sluijs, 2006).
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information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, as promoted by the Aarhus Convention.13 Access to information entails collection, analysis and quality assurance of information; public participation connotes multi-stakeholder inter action and discussion of risks, benefits and uncertainties, along with Beck’s reflexive learning process; access to justice includes awareness of citizens’ rights, building of their trust and access to administrative or judicial procedures. It is against this backdrop, that the philosophy behind the HIAD was inspired. HIAD will collect hydrogenrelated information, analyse such information in partnership with other stakeholders (industry, academia, regulators, etc.), thus, promoting the participation of any interested party, and will liaise with decision-makers. Section 6 of this paper provides a more detailed description of HIAD. 5. HySafe—an EU-funded network on hydrogen safety Under the European Union’s 6th Framework Research Programme, a Network of Excellence project named HySafe14—Safety of Hydrogen as an Energy Carrier has been established since 2004. The HySafe network focuses on safety issues relevant to improve and co-ordinate the knowledge and understanding of hydrogen safety and support the safe and efficient introduction and commercialisation of hydrogen as an energy carrier of the future, including the related hydrogen applications. The overall goal of HySafe is to contribute to the safe transition to a more sustainable development in Europe by facilitating the safe introduction of hydrogen technologies and applications. A number of work packages were defined with the participation of 25 partners. One specific work package is devoted to the development of an international HIAD. HIAD is defined to be one of the Integrating Activities of HySafe and of any succeeding entity, and thereby having a central position in the European Network. HIAD will become a major tool for communication of risks associated with hydrogen and preventive/mitigative safety measure taken to all Network partners and interested parties beyond, incl. the general public. For all persons involved in risk management, it is realised that learning from past accidents and incidents helps you to prevent them in the future. Hence, this shows the importance of having access to databases holding accident and incident information. The use of incident databases as a management tool provides an opportunity for organisations to: check its performance, learn from its mistakes, and improve its management systems and risk control. Knowledge of events having the potential for inducing hazardous situa13
Adopted in Aarhus, Denmark on 25 June 1998 (http://www. unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf). 14 http://www.hysafe.org
tions will also contribute to the corporate learning and memory. More specifically, HIAD, within the HySafe project will:
contribute to the integration and harmonization of fragmented experience and knowledge on hydrogen safety in Europe and international across professions and countries; contribute to the progress in common understanding of hydrogen safety and risk; which are the hazards, causes and consequences of accidents/incidents associated with hydrogen; be a harmonised tool for safety and risk assessment associated with hydrogen applications by providing input to analyses and safety management work; enable generation of common generic accident and incident statistics; serve as a common methodology and reference format for future hydrogen incident/accident data collection and storage; be a source for the understanding and experience transfer of hydrogen accident phenomena, scenarios and hazard potential; what are the hazards; what can go wrong, how and why do accidents/incidents develop, etc.
And last but not least, HIAD is intended to keep all stakeholders (authorities, public, research, industry) updated and informed with recent accidents/incidents involving the use of hydrogen, thus contributing to spread of knowledge and best practice as well as to building up a realistic perception of the risks related to use of hydrogen in industrial applications. HIAD will, when fully operative, be a central European and international reporting regime. The HIAD database structure and operating regime has been developed by JRC and DNV during the years 2004–2006 as described in the next chapters of this paper. 6. Main characteristics and operating regime of HIAD The overall purpose of HIAD is to assist all stakeholders in better understanding the relevance of hydrogen-related incidents and accidents as well as the safety actions taken and to provide a methodology to contribute towards improving hydrogen-related risk assessment and management. It is important to highlight that HIAD is not a standard industrial accident database tool but a collaborative and communicative process in the form of an open web-based Information System to promote safety actions taken by industrial and other partners following hydrogen-related events (similar to the US Department of Energy funded ‘‘H2 incidents’’ database15). 15
http://www.h2incidents.org.
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Fig. 2. HIAD timeline overview.
The reasons for this new and innovative approach to the more practiced ‘‘classical’’ alternative are the following: 6.1. From a general risk governance standpoint
Traditional databases are relatively more static and reductionist in style, whilst HIAD aims to be more dynamic through procedures that will promote user interaction and that will be open to existing ‘‘science and technology–environment–society’’ interfaces. These procedures will be identified during the duration of HySafe, but will become fully operational in the post-HySafe phase. Classical databases do not have ‘‘community-building’’ in their agenda. HIAD aims to promote the abovementioned reflexive learning process (see Section 4). The Authors are aware that this implies the continuation of the HIAD process beyond the life of the HySafe Network of Excellence. The majority of existing databases still ‘‘house’’ information strictly related to risks from a ‘‘hazards and consequences’’. HIAD aims to also include multidimensional uncertainties, along with benefits, in order to provide a more holistic and dynamic picture.
6.2. From a hydrogen-specific standpoint
There is currently no European or other international legislation, which would make it mandatory to report hydrogen-related incidents and accidents to a closed, partly open or open user group. Therefore, a classical
database reporting scheme with a group of data providers and a set of obligations put together in Terms of Reference does not work for HIAD at this stage of the project. Further, as we are dealing here with a still largely new and rapidly developing technology (with related risks, benefits and uncertainties), it is a challenge to have access to existing knowledge; therefore, again, a classical ‘‘lessons learnt from accidents’’ type of database does not work for the case of HIAD. HIAD is a process that also aims to promote trust amongst users.
Consequently, JRC and DNV chose a conceptually different approach for developing and operating HIAD as portrayed in Fig. 2 below. To summarise, within the HySafe project life, HIAD aims to: (1) Collect information on hydrogen-related events: A flexible web-based architecture, with a user-friendly interface will be created to collect information on hydrogen-related events. Initially, this information will come from publicly available open sources (Trustbuilding Phase). In the long-term (after HySafe period, when HIAD is expected to run without HySafe funding), a common user-driven methodology of data collection is envisaged, supported by endorsement from a User Working Group (Trust-acquired Phase). (2) Provide stakeholders with unbiased information hydrogen-related events: During the Trust-building Phase, information on events from open source will be collected and put together. Industrial and other
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partners within HySafe are encouraged to report their own versions of the same events in order to highlight (their) safety actions taken and illustrate differences in risk perception from different sources. Thus, ‘‘unbiased’’ information will be made available to stakeholders as an outcome of a communicative process. During this phase, the stakeholders will be limited to those identified by the HySafe Consortium. However, it is envisaged that during the Trust-acquired Phase, HIAD will be made available to a wider range of interest groups (operators, authorities, general public, etc.). (3) Communicate information on hydrogen-related events: Lessons learned, good practice, etc. are valuable information that could be derived from HIAD. Thus, during the Trust-building Phase, information from open source will be analysed anonymously and communicated to all interested users, including the HySafe Consortium. During the Trust-acquired Phase, HIAD will provide a more targeted service that spans various interest groups (operators, authorities, public, etc.). The threshold for including an event in HIAD is only that the event has any relation with hydrogen. 6.3. HIAD database structure The main challenge when specifying HIAD was to develop a tool that should serve various purposes such as being a data source for risk assessments, experience transfer and risk communication. In addition it should be easy to use, the user friendliness encompassing the tasks of recording and extraction of information/data by having a modern user interface, was given high priority. The planned user/system interface is shown graphically in Fig. 3. The HIAD event report format should be such that the information held by HIAD should be relevant for risk assessment exercises and related modelling development work. In addition, the information recorded for each event should be such that it serves the objective of corporate learning about risks and safety related to hydrogen applications. Details about each field being defined to be included in each of the six blocks are outlined in full (Funnemark, Kirchsteiger, & Vetere Arellano, 2005). Recording of information in the various database fields will be through a combination of pre-defined option lists (drop-down or tick-box types) and free text. The resulting six building blocks of the HIAD event report form are shown in Table 2 with some field examples. Regarding HIAD information block 3 (nature of event), relevant details should be given for each event in the defined chain of events, which constitutes the full accident scenario. The required input is depending on the type of event, as shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 3. HIAD user/system interface.
6.4. Data collection and quality assurance: As described above, in the initial Trust-Building Phase, data are collected from JRC, DNV and other HySafe partners from public reports, Internet news and other sources. This information is then transformed by JRC and DNV into ‘‘short versions’’ of HIAD event reports, the draft unverified report can be commented by the HySafe Consortium (ideally the risk source owner, i.e. mostly industry) before it is becoming a final unverified report stored in HIAD and accessible to all HIAD users. In the ensuing Trust-Acquired Phase,16 risk source owners themselves insert the necessary information, directly in the webbased HIAD application, which is then being subject to Quality Assurance by DNV and JRC. A final qualified report is then accessible to all HIAD users via the webbased application. In other words, information on hydrogen incidents and accidents becomes qualified as soon as the risk source owners themselves compile it (see Fig. 5). The detailed description of the post-HySafe procedural framework is not the object of this paper.
6.5. Operation of HIAD: The above Figs. 1 and 4 essentially define the operational process of HIAD. As mentioned, the HIAD Process is divided into three phases:
pre-operation, limited operational, operational.
16
The Trust-Acquired Phase connotes a dynamic process where participation, deliberation and interaction amongst stakeholders are paramount for the HIAD process.
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Table 2 HIAD event report building blocks 1. HIAD administration
Event coding Information sources Dates of entry and last revision HIAD operator and data provider details
2. Pre-event conditions
Event details Weather details Scenario details Technical details
3. Nature of event
Event nature summary Systems and components affected/involved Emergency action and evaluation Chain of events Causal relations Safety systems Releases Leak hole characteristics Ignition details Explosion details
4. Consequences of event
Consequences on people (injured and fatalities) Other consequences (physical, environment and economical costs; cost of emergency response actions)
5. Post-event actions
Clean-up and restoration Event investigation Research investment Legal and other official actions Preventive actions Emergency improvements Risk awareness Lessons learned
6. References
Hyperlinks/references to files and documents, websites, etc. Specification of attachments, e.g. maps, drawings, photos, etc.
Chain of events:
Type of event
Equipment/system failed/affected/damaged
Cause(s)
Release specification
Leak hole specification
Ignition details
Details/specification of fire
Safety systems / mitigation
Explosion/detonation details
Event 1
Give input in each information box if and when applicable. E.g. if only a release occurs and no fire, fire and ignition details are not applicable
Event 2
Fig. 4. Illustration of HIAD input requirements for chain of events.
6.6. Data confidentiality aspects Efforts were made by JRC and DNV to formalise the issues of data confidentiality and at the initial stage of the development of HIAD. The HySafe Consortium partners
(especially the ones from industry) found this approach was too formal, and thus signing such an agreement was found impossible. Hence, the selected solution as described above is intended to assure that all HySafe partners will contribute to the work with populating HIAD, and thereby overcoming the issue of confidentiality.
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Fig. 5. HIAD process.
7. Next steps towards finalisation of HIAD Because of its previous experience with the development and operation of similar EU level event databases, it was agreed within the HySafe consortium that JRC-IE, Petten, would perform the software development. The HIAD software solution is ready for use on the Internet (see: https://odin.jrc.nl 17). Soon thereafter, the database will be populated with past events, along with quality assurance of the input. Quality assurance will be supported by the establishment of a HIAD Working Group, which will be a multi-disciplinary and multi-user group to ensure a continuous peer-reviewing of both the HIAD methodology and results based on the analysis of the information collected. The identification of potential data sources and preliminary data collection has already commenced some time ago in parallel with the software development. Next, provisions will be made to enable interested parties to populate HIAD with new hydrogen events on a continuous basis’’. Although this paper focuses mainly in HIAD as a product that collects hydrogen-related information that is made accessible to all publics, the authors would like to highlight that HIAD is a process that is intended to continue after the HySafe project. It is based on an overall risk governance philosophy that will hopefully be disseminated and utilised in future when dealing with various 17 You must first subscribe to ODIN and then you will be able to access HIAD.
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