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La longue durée
La Longue DurE3e James E. Dougherty, a founding father of FPRI and Ortz&, was apparently the first author to defend ballistic missile defense in these pages. Writing in only the fifth volume of orbis (Winter 19621, Dougherty turned to the topic in the course of a two-part survey of the literature on disarmament. His prescience deserves celebration. First, he implicitly rejected the doctrine of moral equivalence and with it the notion-still widely heldthat the physical nature of a weapon gives it a political character. Thus, he denounced the argument, put forward by Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, that speaks of “offensive weapons of surprise attack,” as though that were somehow an attribute of a missile, independent of a government’s motives. In fact, we know now, the Soviets knew that NATO had no intention of launching a surprise attack. Secondly, Dougherty predicted that an arms race in anti-missiles “would constitute a much heavier economic burden for the Soviet Union than for the United States.” We know now that Dougherty was right about that, too. Lastly, Dougherty expressed his fear that, as the new cult of arms control became ensconced in the U.S. government, the incantation of “destabilization” would “compound the reluctance of our policy-makers to
increase the allocation of resources for [the anti-missile missile].” That, alas, is true to this day. But happily Jim Dougherty lived to see the end of the story-at least the Soviet chapter of it. He is today emeritus professor of politics at St. Joseph’s University in Philadelphia. But his words of thirty-four years ago are worth re-reading as we again confront the “curious” opponents of ballistic missile defense. “One of the most curious notions in the arms control literature is a uniform opposition to the anti-missile missile. [Hedleyl Bull is of the opinion that such a weapon ‘would undoubtedly tend towards the undermining of the strategic nuclear balance.’ In their efforts to demonstrate that the development of an AICBM would be essentially ‘de-stabilizing,’ some of the writers perform interesting mental gymnastics. According to Schelling and Halperin, for example, ‘since the advantage in striking first is largely in reducing or precluding a punitive return attack, measures to defend the homeland against incoming punitive weapons are complementary to offensive weapons of surprise attack.’ [Frank E.1 Bothwell declares that counterforce is not only highly de-stabilizing but also ‘technically and practically impossible’ (presumably because of the difficulty of discriminating between an actual incoming warhead and target decoys
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which might accompany it); hence, he says ‘it is most desirable that we enter into a fomlal agreement with the Soviet Union guaranteeing the elimination of all counterforce and the stabilization of the deterrent.’ [David H.1Frisch and [TosephlSalerno cite the excessive cost of an AICBM, which they think would constitute a drain on the resources of any large country. ‘From our standpoint--that of a country which does not want to threaten an all-out nuclear attack-development of an AICBM . . . (if we could get it fmt) would, at best, only put us back into the position of again waiting until other nations caught up with us.’ “These arguments are strained and potentially dangerous. First of all, the argument about ‘technical and practical impossibility’ is an absurdity, as Mr. Bothwell himself tacitly admits when he calls for a formal agreement to refrain from producing anti-missile weapons. The question of cost is equally spurious; where national survival may hang in the balance, neither the United States nor the Soviet [Union1 would cavil at a 10 or 20 billion dollar expenditure (although this would constitute a much heavier economic burden for the Soviet Union than for the United States). Actually, since the Soviets completed their testing series in the fall of 1961, American analysts have gradually shifted to the position that their earlier estimates of both the technical problems and
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economic costs of an AICBM were probably a little high. The comment by Frisch and Salerno quoted above, when placed in its proper political context, makes no sense whatsoever. It implies that there is no advantage for the defending side to maintain a steady lead in the development of weapons which will improve its security against the possibility of a first strike by a side whose ideology would not restrain it from such a course if the opportunity presented itself. Moreover, it overlooks the possibility that the Soviet Union may develop an AICBM first, one which would enable it to attack with relative impunity. In this area, the speculations of the theoreticians are rather remote from the actual situation. ‘At present,’ writes Arthur Hadley, ‘both sides are working hard on anti-missile devices; indeed there is some impressive evidence the Soviets are working harder than the United States.’ But as ‘arms control’ becomes institutionalized within the framework of the U.S. government, much current writing on the potentially de-stabilizing effect of the AICBM serves only to compound the reluctance of our policy-makers to increase the allocation of resources for this weapon before there has been any clear indication that the Soviet Union is seriously interested in ‘arms control’ or ‘stable deterrence.“’
increase the allocation of resources for [the anti-missile missile].” That, alas, is true to this day. But happily Jim Dougherty lived to see the end of the story-at least the Soviet chapter of it. He is today emeritus professor of politics at St. Joseph’s University in Philadelphia. But his words of thirty-four years ago are worth re-reading as we again confront the “curious” opponents of ballistic missile defense. “One of the most curious notions in the arms control literature is a uniform opposition to the anti-missile missile. [Hedleyl Bull is of the opinion that such a weapon ‘would undoubtedly tend towards the undermining of the strategic nuclear balance.’ In their efforts to demonstrate that the development of an AICBM would be essentially ‘de-stabilizing,’ some of the writers perform interesting mental gymnastics. According to Schelling and Halperin, for example, ‘since the advantage in striking first is largely in reducing or precluding a punitive return attack, measures to defend the homeland against incoming punitive weapons are complementary to offensive weapons of surprise attack.’ [Frank E.1 Bothwell declares that counterforce is not only highly de-stabilizing but also ‘technically and practically impossible’ (presumably because of the difficulty of discriminating between an actual incoming warhead and target decoys
Winter 1996 I 173
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which might accompany it); hence, he says ‘it is most desirable that we enter into a fomlal agreement with the Soviet Union guaranteeing the elimination of all counterforce and the stabilization of the deterrent.’ [David H.1Frisch and [TosephlSalerno cite the excessive cost of an AICBM, which they think would constitute a drain on the resources of any large country. ‘From our standpoint--that of a country which does not want to threaten an all-out nuclear attack-development of an AICBM . . . (if we could get it fmt) would, at best, only put us back into the position of again waiting until other nations caught up with us.’ “These arguments are strained and potentially dangerous. First of all, the argument about ‘technical and practical impossibility’ is an absurdity, as Mr. Bothwell himself tacitly admits when he calls for a formal agreement to refrain from producing anti-missile weapons. The question of cost is equally spurious; where national survival may hang in the balance, neither the United States nor the Soviet [Union1 would cavil at a 10 or 20 billion dollar expenditure (although this would constitute a much heavier economic burden for the Soviet Union than for the United States). Actually, since the Soviets completed their testing series in the fall of 1961, American analysts have gradually shifted to the position that their earlier estimates of both the technical problems and
174 I O&s
economic costs of an AICBM were probably a little high. The comment by Frisch and Salerno quoted above, when placed in its proper political context, makes no sense whatsoever. It implies that there is no advantage for the defending side to maintain a steady lead in the development of weapons which will improve its security against the possibility of a first strike by a side whose ideology would not restrain it from such a course if the opportunity presented itself. Moreover, it overlooks the possibility that the Soviet Union may develop an AICBM first, one which would enable it to attack with relative impunity. In this area, the speculations of the theoreticians are rather remote from the actual situation. ‘At present,’ writes Arthur Hadley, ‘both sides are working hard on anti-missile devices; indeed there is some impressive evidence the Soviets are working harder than the United States.’ But as ‘arms control’ becomes institutionalized within the framework of the U.S. government, much current writing on the potentially de-stabilizing effect of the AICBM serves only to compound the reluctance of our policy-makers to increase the allocation of resources for this weapon before there has been any clear indication that the Soviet Union is seriously interested in ‘arms control’ or ‘stable deterrence.“’